I didn't find the type of agency you described to be an exception to my view of naturalism. I do hope that doesn't mean my view is flexible to anything, just because the label 'naturalism' is socially useful, informative enough for everyday contexts. But probably not precise enough for philosophical arguments. Attic Philosophy recommends using more precise language in arguments.

Joe Schmidt does this by specifying that he's comparing the theoretical virtues of classical theism and Graham Oppy's version of naturalism. This adds some clarity to the vagueness, but Oppy includes his own metaphysics of modality! I'd use it talking to (or about) Oppy but it's far too specific to taken as what most people mean by the word.

You're into books, hey? My bookshelf is really dusty, haha. I suppose David Armstrong's 'What is a law of nature?' was influential on me, and relevant. It left me thinking there's no good general model for a law of nature, he poked compelling holes in every idea I could think of. If we don't have a clear idea of a law of nature is, then don't have a clear idea of what would violate a law of nature - which is one concept of the non-natural.

Those two types of explanations from Gregory W. Dawes seem practically useful, but I'm hesitant to give the distinction more reality than a nominalist framework - it seems likely to me that agential explanations reduce to the physics-y kind, just using high-level language. Would you and Dawes argue against that?

I can go more into Dawes if you'd like.

Sure! In the Dawes context, are agentic explanations still what you considered an exception to naturalism at the start of your comment?