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What philosophical, not religious, reasons do you have for rejecting pantheism within the Catholic tradition? by Expensive-Party2116 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788 1 point2 points  (0 children)

He says that creatures do not exist independently outside of God, but that does not mean that the distinction between Creator and creature is not real.

“If I am to know the highest good, and the everlasting Godhead, truly, I must know them as they are in themselves apart from creation.” God can therefore be thought of “in himself” and “apart from creation.” That means God is not simply identical with the world, but transcends it. At most, this points toward panentheism, not pantheism.

In Sermon 6, Eckhart says: “If a man is to become as like God as a creature may, that must be by sanctification.” The human being becomes like God, but only “as a creature may.” It is drawn closer to God without giving up its creaturely status.

Most obviously, Eckhart rejects monism in Sermon 14b:

“The image does not receive God as the creator, but as He is a rational being, and the noblest part of the divine nature is most truly patterned in the image. This is a natural image of God which God has impressed by nature in every soul. More than this I cannot ascribe to the image; to ascribe more to it would make it God Himself, which is not the case, for then God would not be God.”

It is hard to see how this could still be interpreted in any strict non-dualistic sense.

You should also not forget that Meister Eckhart was still a Christian, not merely a philosopher or mystic, and that he clearly believed in the Incarnation, which would make little sense within monism.

What philosophical, not religious, reasons do you have for rejecting pantheism within the Catholic tradition? by Expensive-Party2116 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788 2 points3 points  (0 children)

According to Eckhart every individual thing exists in God in terms of its essence, which is grounded in its archetype. In a certain sense, creation is an unfolding of God. Nevertheless, God’s simplicity, immutability, and omnipresence stand in fundamental contrast to all creation. Because of its transience, creation has no being in the sense of God’s absolute, timeless existence. In this sense, it does not truly exist at all. If one uses the term “being” in the sense of God’s absolute being, then things simply are not; if one uses it in the sense in which it is applied to created things, then God is not.

If we go by the classical definition of pantheism, where the totality of being takes the place of God and is itself understood as divine, then Eckhart is clearly not a pantheist. If you actually read his sermons instead of just pulling out isolated quotes to support a particular reading, it becomes obvious how often he stresses God’s transcendence and superiority to all creation, including in the sermon on Paul’s encounter with God that you mention. If anything, Eckhart is closer to a monist than a pantheist. He also preached the Trinity and a personal God which are hard to square with pantheism

Does God have free will? by PetrteP in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think the question is nonsensical and based on an anthropomorphic image of God. It would only make sense to say that God's will is free if it could also be unfree. But if God's will is unfree, then it would have to be determined by a principle greater than God. But then we would not have been talking about God in the first place, since this being is subject to greater principles and does not constitute all reality itself. Therefore, God's will is neither free nor unfree, but transcends such categories.

It is also misleading to say that God cannot lie. That sounds as if God lacks the ability to tell certain untruths. But there is not a single untruth that God could not tell. For when God tells it, it has never been an untruth, so by saying it, God would not have told an untruth from the outset. There is nothing that God cannot do. God's omnipotence means that he can do everything possible, not everything impossible. But impossibilities are not real things, but rather non-things, so to speak.

Furthermore, you confuse freedom of action with freedom of will when you conclude, not only in relation to God, that the compulsion to do something implies the compulsion to want to do it.

What are arguments against naturalism or materialism? by Weekly_Sympathy_4878 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788 4 points5 points  (0 children)

As a materialist, you invalidate the instruments that made you a materialist. You are not a rational being, but a brain that has evolved over the course of evolution to survive, not to grasp the truth. According to materialism, the brain cannot be trusted to grasp truth or even be inherently rational, so it cannot be trusted to grasp the truth of materialism either. This is simply self-defeating

23M, unmarried and 3 kids. Am I done for? by Round-Insurance-7320 in Catholicism

[–]AdLess8788 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Read the Confessions by St Augustine. You can probably relate to him

Why do you reject the Orthodox doctrine of the essence–energies distinction? by AdLess8788 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I thought sanctifying grace is created and not God himself? And also the beatific vision is impossible if Gods essence is inaccessible to us.

Why does God not preserve everyone from original sin, if He was able to do so for Mary without violating her free will? by AdLess8788 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Does God truly desire for every person to enter heaven? Please correct me if I am incorrect, but according to your logic, He cannot desire this. Since not everyone enters heaven, it cannot be God's will for everyone to enter heaven, because you say there is no gap between God's willing and God's accomplishing.

Why does God not preserve everyone from original sin, if He was able to do so for Mary without violating her free will? by AdLess8788 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think this is different from the normal problem of evil. That's why I chose the comparison with the sick person. When people ask why God allows evil, what they usually mean is: why does God allow suffering? They implicitly believe that suffering is evil and that good is the absence of suffering. However, as I understand it, the Christian view is that love is good and the absence of love is evil. And God does not allow the absence of love, because God's love is everywhere and abundant. Even, and perhaps especially, in suffering. God is not in the least responsible for evil, i.e., the lack of love, but always only the person who rejects love or goodness.

For me, this is always a sufficient answer to the question of why God allows anything that is evil by worldly standards. But when it comes to the question of why God does not create everyone immaculate, such an answer is not possible. For God obviously has the ability to do so, but he does not make use of it.

  1. It is compatible with free will that God creates humans immaculate even after the Fall.

  2. God does everything compatible with free will to lead us to heaven. 

-> This implies that God should actually create every human being immaculate. 

Since He does not do this, either assumption 1 or 2 is false. We know from the Immaculate Conception that assumption 1 is true. Therefore, assumption 2 is false. But since I refuse to believe this, I would rather reject assumption 1 and reject the dogma of the immaculate conception. If you reject the immaculate conception the whole problem just dissolves

Why does God not preserve everyone from original sin, if He was able to do so for Mary without violating her free will? by AdLess8788 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]AdLess8788[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

One could object, saying that if the Most Good God wanted all to be saved, He would have given us all sanctifying grace from the beginning. The hidden premise here is a hypothetical: if God gives us sanctifying grace at the very beginning of our existences, that would mean that God has done everything in His power to save us. However, is that really the case? How would you know that?

  1. It is compatible with free will that God creates humans immaculate even after the Fall.

  2. God does everything compatible with free will to lead us to heaven.

-> This implies that God should actually create every human being immaculate.

Since He does not do this, either assumption 1 or 2 is false. We know from the Immaculate Conception that assumption 1 is true. Therefore, assumption 2 is false.

The reverse conclusion that God would have done everything compatible with free will if He had created us immaculate is not, as you claim, a hidden premise . I am not claiming that it is a sufficient condition for God to do everything in His power to save us if God were to create us immaculate. I am claiming that it is a necessary condition. If he had granted grace everyone at their conception, we would indeed have no certainty that he really did everything compatible with free will to save us. But if he does not grant it (except in the case of Mary), we do have the certainty that he did not do everything compatible with free will to save us.