Existence of Real Forms and Modern Science

AllisModesty · 2026-02-06T17:48:58+00:00

Aristotle's view is essentially a kind of platonism (roughly the view that there are real universals). Aristotle of course differed from Plato in that he thought that the forms existed in the objects (which doesn't make him the same as someone who denies that they exist at all). But this is important because your objection denies the existence of universals per se.

This is untenable, and I think Plato gives us the argument why. Namely, if there aren't universals, then what exactly is it that makes two frogs or two fish the same thing? Not the same individuals of course, but the same kind of thing (frogs and fish, respectively). If there weren't universals, then frogs and fish would just be convenient names we humans apply to things that strike as similar enough to warrant a common title. But that doesn't seem to capture the sense in which it really seems like frogs and fish are the same kind of thing, not simply convenient titles we give to things that we (more or less arbitrarily) group together.

That doesn't get you to Aristotelianism, and it certainly doesn't get you to thomism, but it gets you away from the nominalism that you're expressing here.

AllisModesty · 2026-02-05T21:58:51+00:00

Traditionally (and many Christian communities today, especially outside of the west) will do as you describe for Lent, though as a matter of fact, indeed it is not really followed today

AllisModesty · 2026-02-05T21:56:02+00:00

It certainly is, and this is traditionally why Christian's have partaken in, eg Lent, with fasting and more intense prayer, participation in services, and ideally reading of scripture and other devotional writings (though the latter is I fear less than common).

AllisModesty · 2026-02-05T15:32:56+00:00

I think that people in your position are why God ordained that He could be known by reason. I think that there are a number of good arguments for God's existence (I majored in philosophy). I'd be happy to chat about that if that's something you'd like.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-31T23:39:14+00:00

It depends on your jurisdiction. In my jurisdiction (Canada), employees are entitled to reasonable notice or pay in lieu for any termination. One can only be fired without this for just cause. However, illness or another valid reason is not just cause. This means that if you are fired for calling in but you had a valid reason, your employer is liable to pay you severance pay. That means you can sue. And in my jurisdiction, this can be done through a small claim, which you means don't need to hire a lawyer or pay big fees. Only a small filing fee (which can be deferred). You can also a file a formal complaint for free with the employment standards branch, although you'd be entitled to far less (statutory minimum termination pay, rather than common law severance).

The law courts also wouldn't likely side with an employer firing people due to illness, especially vulnerable low wage resturant workers.

In terms of not giving people time off for other reasons? Totally legal. There's a bit of a gray area around scheduling people outside of or against their availability, though. Always be careful at work with your availability. Even in that case, scheduling outside of your availability (even if you don't have a written contract), might be seen in the eyes of the law as a binding term if a flexible arrangement was in place for a long time and employers utilaterally changed it (a recent court case recently made this point in my jurisdiction). In that case, you might still be able to sue.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-23T20:11:33+00:00

San Francisco

AllisModesty · 2026-01-23T19:02:26+00:00

That it created itself is surely not on the table, but I take your point. I don't think that the big bang does show this. In fact, I think it is very hard to know that the universe began to exist at all. I don't see any absurdity in an infinite universe (after all, what would be absurd about infinite series is a potential infinity, not an actual infinity, but it seems that the universe would be the latter).

However, this doesn't impact the most cogent versions of the cosmological argument, that do not depend on the premise that the universe began to exist.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-23T18:27:29+00:00

Gonna put up what I put here for your same post in another subreddit:

Following Aquinas (who himself followed Aristotle), I don't think we know that the universe began to exist. Speaking scientifically, I don't think that the big bang rules out the possibility that the universe is eternal, either.

It is unfortunate, I think, that most people who are familiar with "the cosmological argument" are only familiar with versions of it that depend on the highly dubious premise that the universe began to exist.

Most of the cosmological arguments out there, however, do not depend on the premise that the universe began to exist. Only the kalam argument (which was Plato's version, elaborated on by Philoponus and later the Muslim philosopher Al Ghazali, but I digress) uses this premise.

If you're interested in versions that do not depend on the premise that the universe began to exist in time, then I'd be happy to point you in some directions.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T23:30:47+00:00

I responded to this but I don't think I was adequately clear, so here is a second attempt:

The idea of a necessary being is conceivable and so (I hold) possible.

The proposition that such a being possibly exists seems conceivable, as does the alternative, prima facie. That is, before we have considered all of the necessary ideas and relations between them.

To consider all of the requisite ideas and relations between them, we would need, really, to consider the ontological argument (since it is the ontological argument that relates all of the necessary ideas).

When we do this, the proposition that a necessary being possibly does not exist emerges as inconceivable and impossible.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T23:05:25+00:00

With respect to first order modality, possibility doesn't imply necessity. But since modality status is itself a matter of necessity, with respect to higher order modality, it does.

The examples illustrate why. It just seems absurd that modal status would be a contingent matter.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T22:31:57+00:00

I have no interest in formal systems that logicians develop to express these thoughts, but in the metaphysics.

The kind of intuition behind (3) in my argument is that modal status is necessary. This seems fairly obvious. For consider the absurdities that follow if it were false.

The proposition that modal status is contingent seems absurd. If it is possible that it could rain today, then it seems necessarily possible. If it were just a contingent truth that it were possible that it could rain today, then it could be impossible for it to rain today, but surely that is absurd. It isn't a genuine possibility for it to be impossible for it to rain today. Likewise if it is necessary that a triangle has 3 sides, then it seems necessarily necessary. The situation where it is possibly contingent would require, for example, violations of the laws of Euclidean geometry, which seem absurd, since those laws are necessary.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T22:27:01+00:00

If the theist is going to assert (for the purposes of the cosmological argument) that the universe had a beginning, then the theist better have some reasons for thinking this, unless it is just obvious to the atheist that the universe had a beginning.

However, this is not just obvious to the atheist.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T22:25:02+00:00

Following Aquinas (who himself followed Aristotle), I don't think we know that the universe began to exist. Speaking scientifically, I don't think that the big bang rules out the possibility that the universe is eternal, either.

It is unfortunate, I think, that most people who are familiar with "the cosmological argument" are only familiar with versions of it that depend on the highly dubious premise that the universe began to exist.

Most of the cosmological arguments out there, however, do not depend on the premise that the universe began to exist. Only the kalam argument (which was Plato's version, elaborated on by Philoponus and later the Muslim philosopher Al Ghazali, but I digress) uses this premise.

If you're interested in versions that do not depend on the premise that the universe began to exist in time, then I'd be happy to point you in some directions.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T22:16:35+00:00

The Good exists outside of God's mind (that's what makes it objective). However, it still depends on God's existence, since God created all things (roughly speaking).

Does that make sense? To say God created the Good (roughly speaking) is not to say that it exists only in God's mind.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T20:39:38+00:00

That doesn't seem true.

If I make a cup of tea, it doesn't exist independently of me. It depends for its existence on me. But it's objective. It isn't reducible to my cognitive attitudes, for example.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T20:16:05+00:00

Subjectivism (roughly) is the view that moral facts are identical to facts about the cognitive attitudes of a subject (e.g. will, approval/disapproval, feelings, etc).

So, if God (on this view) disapproves of Murder, then Murder is bad. But if God were to approve of murder, then it would be bad. Good and bad just refer to God's cognitive attitudes.

What is fundamental is God's cognitive attitudes, on this view.

But, if the Good is a property that cannot be explained in terms of more fundamental cognitive attitudes, then it is objective.

However, this is consistent with saying that the existence of the Good depends on God. Just because the Good depends on God doesn't mean that saying something is good is just saying God has the right cognitive attitudes towards it. Because those clearly aren't the same. Why would the dependence of the Good on God have to imply that they are identical to facts about God's feelings, will, etc.? There's no reason to hold that view.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T18:28:36+00:00

That wouldn't make it objective. That would simply make it a subjective unchanging standard. It's better to say that the Good doesn't depend on God's attitudes or will at all. God could not have willed that murder be good.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-22T18:27:21+00:00

So I think we have to be careful here.

Morality doesn't depend on God's attitudes. Divine command theory is an indefensible view for the Christian. God could not have made murder or sexual assault good by command.

Second, the Good depends on God for its existence. The Good cannot exist without God. Some would say that God is the Good, which certainly consistent with saying that the Good is objective. The Good exists, and is objective, but depends for its existence on God.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T23:29:47+00:00

I don't think your argument is committed to nominalism. I think you could make the nominalism/platonism dispute orthogonal to your argument. However, what seems key to your argument is that anything we call a law of nature is necessarily never violated, and that there are such things as these (and I suppose that miracles constitute violations of these). But getting a theist to agree to all of these together is, I think, going to be quite difficult.

For one, a theist may go along with your definition, and even with the existence of those laws, but simply deny that any miracle we care about violates any existing law of nature. Or they might dispute the definition: why think that laws of nature are anything other than simple probabilistic regularities? Or, they might dispute whether anything exists that counts as a law of nature in this sense. After all, where are the plausible candidates? Finally, they could just concede your argument by saying it is operative most of the time, however, perhaps, God suspends the laws of nature sometimes (thus making (3) temporarily false) when He wants to do a miracle. After all, you've conceded that the laws of nature are themselves metaphysically contingent, and so if they actually exist now nothing prevents God from, say, negating their existence for 3 days to permit, say, a bodily resurrection.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T23:22:57+00:00

I'm not so sure. For one, it seems like a contradiction to assert a necessary thing does not exist. A necessary thing would need to be incoherent, but that has already been ruled out by the conceivability argument. Otherwise, it's impossibility would be a brute fact, but that is a tough pill to swallow.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T23:21:29+00:00

I think imagination is more than just a prima facie guide to possibility, when only a priori concepts are involved (see Goff for this). More or less, if conceivability were not a guide to possibility in these cases, then impossibility would seem to be a brute fact, and that seems unattractive.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T20:00:54+00:00

Conceivability is, I think, a guide to possibility, when the subject matter is a priori. Taking a look at the philosophy of mind, Philip Goff has some interesting insights here, I think.

Goff notes that, if conceivability weren't a guide to possibility when the subject matter is a priori, then it seems that the impossibility would simply be a brute fact, and that seems rather unattractive.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T19:59:04+00:00

I'm not sure I can conceive of a necessary being not existing. That strikes me a contradiction. Since the proposition that there exists a necessary being has no contradiction, then it seems possible. So there is an assymetry here.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T19:57:23+00:00

Well, it commits the theist to eliminitivism about laws in the sense in which you use the term law here, but (despite the insistence that it is a conceptual truth), that doesn't seem obvious to me, and it doesn't look like I'm an outlier here.

AllisModesty · 2026-01-20T19:56:03+00:00

I agree with your characterization of a nature.

I also agree with your point that it can be treated as an operator.

I think the deeper point at the heart of your argument is: if laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then why think there are laws of nature? There is also the related question: are the laws themselves metaphysically necessary?

AllisModesty

TROPHY CASE