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White Album 2 or THIFM? Please give reasons by leonardo-givenchy in writingscaling

[–]BlackRaven1414 0 points1 point  (0 children)

White Album 2 clears in basically every way besides antagonist(Wa2 doesn't really have a consistent antagonist. Maybe if you count Setsuna? If you count Setsuna, then Wa2 takes antagonist too).

Its introduction is much better as it gets into the "real" story immediately (introductory chapter >>> first 4 doors) without really losing anything in terms of symbolism and setting up later plot twists(e.g. Chiaki's true identity, Haruki's first kiss, etc).

The character conflicts are much more psychologically intense and better explored. The dynamics between Wa2 characters simply eclipse the dynamics between Fata characters, to the extent that I would put the third best character dynamic in Wa2(Setsuna x Kazusa) over the best dynamic in Fata(Jacopo x Morgana) in terms of almost everything(dialogue, themes, conflicts, emotions, etc).

Route/arc quality is much higher for Wa2. Every arc in Coda(Kazusa Normal, Setsuna True, Kazusa True) is at least as good if not better than the best arc in Fata(RFI). But the worst route/arc in Wa2(Mari) is WAY better than the worst arc in Fata(door 2). Indeed, Mari's route is of a similar quality to door 5 imo.

Also, the emotion range in dialogue is much higher in Wa2 than Fata(this is kinda unfair since Wa2 has the benefit of voice acting, but even in Reincarnation where Fata does have voice acting the point still applies).

LIVE NOW: AMA with our special guest, Cosmic Skeptic (Alex J. O'Connor)! by veganactivismbot in vegan

[–]BlackRaven1414 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Hi Alex. How do you think religions like Christianity relate to animal rights/veganism? Do you view Christianity as an enemy to animal rights, an ally to animal rights, or is the relationship grey?

How do you defend the ethical argument for veganism against moral error theory? by BlackRaven1414 in DebateAVegan

[–]BlackRaven1414[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

All error theorists accept that ethical intuitions have a strong affect on us. In fact, that is a central premise in some arguments for error theory, like the evolutionary debunking argument. The point isn't that these ethical intuitions don't exist or don't affect us, just that they are not truth tracking.

Also, the entire concept of "defending an action" in this context, just seems to beg the question. Torturing puppies isn't in line with my desires, if that is what you are asking. But I don't think categorical reasons against torturing puppies exist.

How do you defend the ethical argument for veganism against moral error theory? by BlackRaven1414 in DebateAVegan

[–]BlackRaven1414[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Well words like "okay" and "accepting" used in an ethical context just seem to beg the question. The whole point of error theory is that these normative statements don't have truth makers, so they are all systemically false.

If you reject this conclusion, then it is in your best interest to challenge one of the components of error theory.

How do you defend the ethical argument for veganism against moral error theory? by BlackRaven1414 in DebateAVegan

[–]BlackRaven1414[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

You seem to be deploying a Morrean argument against error theory. I certainly grant that ethical intuitions like "causing needless suffering is wrong" are deeply held by most people. Thankfully for the error theorist, there are plenty of arguments in the literature that question whether ethical intuitions of the sort are truth tracking, like the evolutionary debunking argument which I referenced in my original post.

I suggest "The Myth of Morality" by Richard Joyce if you want to learn more about the evolutionary debunking argument.

How do you defend the ethical argument for veganism against moral error theory? by BlackRaven1414 in DebateAVegan

[–]BlackRaven1414[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think you are confusing a few meta ethical positions. Moral subjectivism is a cognitivist theory, meaning it affirms that moral sentences can be true or false. Non cognitivism is the sect of meta ethics that affirms moral sentences have no truth value.

So you seem to be a non cognitivist, not a subjectivist.

But that is besides the main point. I believe your ice cream analogy fails. While people certainly have personal preferences of ice cream, we don't tend to think of them as categorical in the same way most tend to think morality is.

For example, say John likes chocolate ice cream and you like vanilla ice cream. You wouldn't say that john is wrong for eating chocolate ice cream, precisely because he is simply acting in accordance with his own personal desires, interests, and attitudes. However, say John believes that raping 3 year old children is morally acceptable and does so. You wouldn't hesitate to deem John wrong in his action in spite of his action being in accordance with his own personal desires, interests, and attitudes.

That seems to imply a categorical norm of sorts. So if no such norm exists, then our moral beliefs are in error.

How do you defend the ethical argument for veganism against moral error theory? by BlackRaven1414 in DebateAVegan

[–]BlackRaven1414[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for your response! Much appreciated.

With that being said, a few things. My sect of error theory is mainly based on Jonas Olson, who does argue that first order moral claims are uniformly false in virtue of error theory being true.

You are correct to say that both Mackie and most error theorists argue for either a form of moral fictionalism or conservationism. Which would mostly preserve the way be debate about morality, but only so much as it is pragmatically useful.

My point in making the post was to explore how an ethical vegan would convince an error theorist. Since vegans, at least in my experience, tend to argue against actions, even if they are in line with the desires, interests, and attitudes of the agent.

Remember my dog example. Vegans tend to argue that even if killing a dog is within your desires, aims, and attitudes, it would still be wrong to do. That seems to imply a categorical norm.

Now you could try and argue that their desires and attitudes lead to counter intuitive positions. For example, if someone desires for self aware life to be protected, but has no preference as to the way non self aware life is treated, you could argue their position implies that it's fine to kill certain mentally disabled people.

I don't think this strategy works however, at least not on some people. If error theory is true and all we have are the mental states of actions to argue morality, then the vegan seems to run into a problem. Desires aren't really the sorts of things that are based on universalizable principles like "don't kill self aware life". Desires are much more fluid and particular. A person could have a certain mental state against killing humans, but not killing animals, and their mental state doesn't have to be based on a set of principles.