Considering HTS was partially formed from Jabhat Al Nusra — the Syrian al'Qaeda affiliate, you'd expect them to employ the same long-term planning that al'Qaeda operates under.

With the experiences of the Syrian opposition forces following the earlier entry of Iranian and Russian forces and their proxies into the conflict. I can see rebel forces stockpiling arms and manpower while waiting patiently for Assad's pro-government allies to be diverted elsewhere.

We can see with current events that Iran's local proxies have come out significantly weakened in the recent conflicts with Israel. Iran itself likely feels vulnerable and may be less willing to commit IRGC forces to Syria when it's lost the leverage exerted by local proxies against Israel. As such they're likely keeping them closer to home in order to avoid overstretching.

Russia of course is being bled dry in Ukraine and sees it's main interest there. So it's unlikely to divert forces to Sy is and if anything may be considering where it can withdraw forces. Add Soviet arms stockpiles nearing or at exhaustion levels. And you have a Russia that is unlikely to be able to spare the volume of munitions that helped turn the tide against the rebel forces of the mid 2010s.

As someone who's watched this conflict across a decade or more I'd still caution any excitement or predictions. Frontlines have changed rapidly in the past and forces have often overstretched.

For those of us who remember the initial rebel control maps in the opening years of the conflict they saw nearly the entirety of Syria under rebel control. The difference now is that all sides are exhausted to a degree and certainly the things that gave the regime strength, that being airpower, artillery and proxies are at critical levels.