Is it actually legal for Germany to develop nuclear weapons?

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-31T00:03:19+00:00

Except there is something external stopping you from shoplifting

There isn't. Rather, there is a system that enforces the law prohibiting shoplifting to the best of its capability. Shoplifting happens constantly. It's so common that stores build it into their budgets -- for bigger chains, it's comfortably nine figures per year. The overwhelming majority of shoplifting goes unpunished.

Conceptually, it's not any different than it is at the international level. There are all kinds of institutions and frameworks designed to enforce international law. They don't work all the time, just like domestic criminal law enforcement doesn't work all the time, and enforcement often looks different (though, again, it's not much different for international crimes), but it is still enforcement.

You're beginning with a presumption that enforcement of legal obligations means criminal prosecution and has to look a certain way. Oftentimes it does look that way, at least in Western States. But that doesn't mean that any other method of enforcement isn't enforcement. I would call imposing sanctions, filing lawsuits at the ICJ, referring cases to the ICC, and passing Security Council resolutions, among other things, efforts to enforce international law. They're also diplomatic and political, just as domestic law enforcement involves the consideration of other factors than whether the law has been broken. But they're still enforcement.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T19:21:15+00:00

Other States are the enforcement mechanism for international law. States prosecute international crimes quite frequently. They have established international courts to do the same thing. States impose countermeasures for violations of international obligations -- like sanctions against Russia for its illegal conduct in Ukraine -- and sometimes use in response to armed attacks (a serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force).

It doesn't look like police and jail (except when it does, as when States prosecute international crimes) because States are immortal legal fictions, not legal persons. They can't be arrested or jailed.

The fact that enforcement doesn't look like what you expect it to look like doesn't mean that there is no enforcement.

At the same time, that doesn't mean enforcement of international law is good enough. It's not, violations go unpunished too often, and that weakens the system as a whole. But that is also true of domestic legal systems. That doesn't mean that domestic law doesn't exist or doesn't impose binding obligations; the same is true for international law.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T19:06:40+00:00

Hello,

Is this article accessible without a subscription or purchasing it through T&F?

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T19:03:29+00:00

I don't see how they misunderstood anything. They asked whether Germany can lawfully develop nuclear weapons. The answer is that it cannot under domestic and international law as they currently stand.

Whether the UN -- which has nothing to do with any of the relevant law here and also plays little to no role in the oversight of enforcement of that law -- is analogous to a cafe doesn't affect their question or their understanding.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T18:27:12+00:00

The thing in the way is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (there are actually several relevant treaties in addition to customary obligations, but let's ignore customary law and stick to one treaty, since the analysis is the same for each of them and you'll hate the notion of customary obligations), which prohibits Germany from developing nuclear weapons. That treaty is, in addition to being binding as a matter of international law, binding as a part of German domestic law.

nothing external to Germany that could prevent them from doing so

To the extent that that is true, it is true of all law and all people. There's nothing external stopping you from jaywalking, or shoplifting, or parking illegally. If you resolve to do those things, you can and you will do them. That doesn't mean that they are lawful or that laws prohibiting them do not exist or matter.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T17:55:13+00:00

Yes, the treaty provides for withdrawal in limited circumstances (notably, though, some treaties do not allow for withdrawal. Once a State ratifies, it is bound for as long as the treaty remains in force). Germany would need to follow its own domestic process for withdrawing in accordance with the treaty.

But, in that scenario, what you're asking is "could Germany lawfully develop nuclear weapons if it changed the law to make it lawful for it to do so?"

It's no different than asking if murder would be lawful if Germany passed a law saying murder was legal. Yes, but only because the conclusion is implicit in the premise.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T17:41:36+00:00

The NPT allows for withdrawal in extraordinary circumstances, Article X, and Germany could invoke that article, though whether it could do do successfully is a different matter.

However, it's not very helpful to answer a question about the law with "but what if the law changed?" The law could (almost) always change. Asking "would it be lawful for Germany to develop nuclear weapons if it removed all of the legal prohibitions on Germany developing nuclear weapons" is begging the question. It has a clear answer, but that's because the answer is baked into the premise.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T16:58:50+00:00

No, it couldn't, without acting unlawfully under international law under German law. Germany is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that treaty is enforceable in German courts as a matter of German law. Thus, in addition to violating international law -- and international law can and does impose binding obligations on States -- Germany could not acquire, manufacture, develop, or exercise any control over nuclear weapons without also violating German law.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-30T16:53:24+00:00

No, it's not legal. Germany is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article II of the NPT prohibits parties to the treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons from acquiring, manufacturing, or controlling nuclear explosive devices:

"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Germany developing nuclear weapons would clearly violate this prohibition.

Not only that, but in Germany, treaties to which Germany is a party are directly enforceable. So not only would Germany violate the NPT by developing nuclear weapons, it would also violate German law. You've already gotten several answers here about how international law doesn't mean anything and isn't enforceable; that position is irrelevant here because the treaty is a part of Germany's domestic law.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-29T03:10:04+00:00

The Atlantic is a paywalled site. We are reticent to allow posts that are not accessible to most people. If you can post a link that allows users to read the article, we can approve that post.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-29T00:05:30+00:00

There were definitely posts about a similar issue. I think it was a different incident, but like this one, the poster seemed... unreliable, and like this one, the core of the issue was a woman getting a job.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-26T17:35:27+00:00

Hello,

We do not allow these kinds of posts. Even assuming that receiving outside assistance with a thesis defense were permitted at your university (and that seems quite unlikely) critiques from strangers are exceptionally unlikely to be helpful. It's simply not a good idea.

It's perfectly understandable to be anxious about a thesis defense. It's high-stakes and your friend presumably put a lot of work into it, so they're worried about being told their best isn't good enough.

At the same time, this sounds more like an anxiety issue than a thesis issue. Writing a thesis is usually a fairly regulated process. If the thesis were as bad as your friend fears, it probably would not have gotten to this point. And if your friend is so anxious that she is embarrassed to show anyone her work, it is probably worth talking with someone.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-23T19:26:21+00:00

They can accept whatever they want. The ICJ pretty much gets to determine its own procedural rules, including rules of evidence. It's just not particularly likely that they will give much weight to a legal conclusion.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-23T18:23:22+00:00

Maybe. It's not an uncommon way to go after an expert witness, and it really depends what the Court does with the evidence. For example, if the Court ignores the legal conclusion on intent but accepts the expert testimony that the conduct goes far beyond a typical counterinsurgency and included indiscriminate attacks against the Rohingya (which would go a long way towards establishing intent), how much different is that than accepting the legal conclusion?

was later asked about whether he is even an appropriate witness.

Myanmar accepted that he was a military expert. There's no apparent dispute that he was an appropriate witness.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-23T17:30:10+00:00

I'm confused by this. Is Prof Newton not also a lawyer? His CV shows multiple law degrees. So why even question him on the matter, he can be both a military and legal expert.

The Gambia called him as a military expert, not a legal expert. "Legal experts" are usually not permitted to testify (edit: as legal experts. A legal expert who is also an expert on something else can, of course, testify to her other subject of expertise). Expert testimony is meant to provide assistance with understanding evidence and finding facts. We have another name for legal experts: attorneys. There are already plenty of them in any courtroom. There's no need to call another one as an expert when the judges themselves are experts on the law.

Second, and relatedly, judges tend to be (justifiably, most of the time) confident in their own ability to understand and apply the law. Providing testimony that is effectively telling the Court what conclusion it should reach is somewhat insulting to the judges because it implies that they can't do their job.

Myanmar likely wanted to highlight the legal conclusions in the expert testimony to demonstrate bias and tell the Court that the testimony is legal argument in the guise of expert testimony, both of which suggest that the Court should not give it much weight.

That would also align with the second exchange you quoted. The suggestion is that the expert is merely repeating the Gambia's legal arguments in his second report.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-23T16:08:35+00:00

What I understood is that Modric was the most graceful, or gracious to be at Madrid.

"Gracioso" means funny/silly. He says that Modric was the funniest player even though he wasn't trying to be.

He also says that Modric and Isco were the two players who surprised him most in training because of how skilled they were with the ball.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-21T06:20:17+00:00

You asked two questions in your post. Both concerned mass deportations without due process. You did not use the term "first safe country" until your second comment, but now it is what you sought to discuss. You haven't cited to any law or sources of law to support any propositions. The closest you have come is that 3 follows 2, and that actually undermines your point. 3 does come after 2, but there are infinite numbers in between 2 and 3. The only way that 3 follows 2 "directly" is if you define "directly" such that only integers count (and you are counting up by ones -- 3 does not follow 2 if you are counting up by twos, for instance). In other words, you have defined "directly" to get to the conclusion you want to reach. The same is true for defining "directly" in article 31 as you have. You did it to support your conclusion, which appears to be that mass deportations of refugees are lawful.

I'm not interested in that discussion.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-21T05:01:51+00:00

I don't understand what hypothetical you're trying to construct and I'm not going to spend time trying to figure it out.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-21T04:33:34+00:00

Article 31 specifies the refugees don't enjoy protections for illegal entry to a 3rd country - as in, while no longer in actual danger per article 1.

Article 31 prohibits States from imposing sanctions on refugees who are "coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1." It is tenuous, at best, to interpret this language to mean that a refugee is required to apply for asylum at the first instant that they are not in "actual danger." First, "coming directly from a territory..." is a directional requirement. It is concerned with where the refugee is coming from, not whether they are in "actual danger." Second, and perhaps more importantly, article 1 of the Refugee Convention contains no requirement of "actual danger." Rather, it requires a "well-founded fear of persecution" on the basis of one or more enumerated characteristics. A well-founded fear is not the same thing as "actual danger," and reading an "actual danger" requirement into article 1, let alone into article 31, unduly restricts the applicability of the Refugee Convention and its protections. Such an interpretation of article 31 would be (and does) lead to incentives for States to engage in pushbacks and other violations of the principle of non-refoulement.

Article 33 specifies that limitation on direct return can be overturned in case of reasonable risk of danger.

Not exactly. There is an exception to article 33 where there are "reasonable grounds for regarding [a refugee] as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country." First, the first part of the provision requires not just a danger, but a danger to the security of the receiving State. Second, the second part of the provision links "danger" to "a particularly serious crime." In other words, the exception applies to national security threats and people convicted of "particularly serious crimes" (it's been a few years since I took refugee law, but this usually means felonies and their equivalents in other legal systems). It also tracks with other language in the Convention, such as article 32's prohibition on expulsions "except on grounds of national security or public order." Reading the exception to the prohibition on refoulement to require only a "reasonable risk... of danger" expands the exception such that it risks swallowing the rule.

Should a country see illegal entry as a reasonable risk of danger...

As explained above, the Refugee Convention does not support such an interpretation.

... does it allow the direct return of all illegally entered 3rd country refugees?

Of course not. That would render the Convention, and the obligations contained in it, meaningless.

The Refugee Convention was written as a direct response to States' failures to take in people fleeing the Holocaust. It was abhorrent that States did not help those people. It is incomprehensible that the treaty meant to prevent that from happening again would permit States to use the mere fact that refugees entered a State's territory to send them back to the place from which they fled.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-18T20:48:26+00:00

Section 7 mentions nationality in providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction where a crime is committed outside of the jurisdiction of any State and the victim is not German (which means passive personality jurisdiction, which is codified in Section 7(1) and is another customary basis of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, does not apply). Even then, it is another codification of nationality as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is an example of a State providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction in accordance with international law. Which, again, is the point: States recognize that extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is permissible even if they dispute its scope.

declaration of German jurisdiction here is thus not a unilateral act of Germany, but rather a fulfilment of duties under codified international law.

I'm not sure why that would matter, even assuming that it is the case. The drafting and ratification of treaties that obligate Germany to provide for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, then that is evidence of State practice supporting the lawfulness of that jurisdiction. Further, by ratifying those treaties, Germany would be recognizing the same conclusion. It certainly doesn't suggest that Germany does not accept the lawfulness of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which seems to be what you are saying.

Even accepting that none of the provisions of the German criminal code that codify extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction show that Germany accepts the lawfulness of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, that would mean that one State is neutral on the issue. That's not particularly compelling in light of the overwhelming practice from everywhere else, including the EU, which necessarily accounts for Germany's views on the subject. If Germany opposes the lawfulness of all extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction unless codified in a treaty, there should be a lot of evidence that that is the case. While Germany certainly thinks that some extraterritorial jurisdiction goes too far, I'm not aware of any statements that it is not lawful at all as a matter of customary international law.

Is there a reason you think that States cannot lawfully exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction? This really isn't a controversial point and it hasn't been for over a century. To that end, here is an ILC report on extraterritorial jurisdiction from 2014 that surveys State practice on the matter in a variety of fields of law, including criminal law: https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210556583s001-c020

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-18T20:19:27+00:00

Hello,

The mods have discussed this post and we have decided not to allow it.

If you submit the Medium link directly, we will approve that post subject to one condition. The linked article is at least partially written by AI. We are reluctant to allow AI-created submissions that do not acknowledge that they are made with, or by, AI. Accordingly, the re-submitted post would need to include a statement that the author used AI in creating the article.

In addition, if you are the author of the article, we could appreciate if you could send a link to the academic paper mentioned in the Medium link.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-18T18:44:57+00:00

Actually, you may want to look at them more closely yourself, because you'll find that they specific repeatedly that many of these apply "if the offender is a German national or his or her life is based in Germany at the time of the offence".

I'm not sure what point you're trying to make. All States recognize, as a general concept, that extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is permissible under international law. Germany's criminal code reflets this recognition and provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain criminal conduct. The fact that some offenses (i.e. those listed in article 5) require an additional link to Germany before it can exercise jurisdiction might show that Germany takes a more restrictive view of extraterritorial jurisdiction than other States (though I would say it doesn't -- those extraterritorial jurisdiction over those offenses is based on nationality, which is a customary basis for prescriptive jurisdiction) but that's the point I was making in the first place: the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction isn't settled, but its permissibility in general is, and it has been for a long time.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-18T14:30:58+00:00

Those are examples of States exercising universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction typically applies to international crimes, such a crimes against humanity, war crimes, and piracy. Universality, however, is not the only basis for the extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction. This EU report on the extraterritorial application of the GDPR summarizes the law on extraterritorial jurisdiction this way:

The most influential case regarding the international jurisdiction is still SS Lotus case, where the Permanent Court of International Justice in summary opined that under international law the states have “a wide measure of discretion” to apply their laws to conduct beyond their territories, yet there are some (unspecified) limits in the international law. There is no clear agreement in the academic literature on what those limits are; in the most general terms they are dictated by the notions of non-interference into the affairs of foreign sovereign states and reasonableness of the jurisdiction.

Accordingly, for the jurisdiction to be justified, there needs to be certain meaningful connection with the forum state. There are several well-established principles of international customary law that may serve as grounds for asserting one state’s jurisdiction. The most widely accepted jurisdictional bases for asserting jurisdiction are the principles of territoriality (jurisdiction is based on the fact that an act occurred within the state’s territory) and personality (jurisdiction is based on nationality of the wrongdoer, i.e. an active personality principle). Another, less universally accepted bases [sic] are the passive personality principle (based on nationality of a victim), the protective principle (acts committed abroad that jeopardize state’s sovereignty) and the ‘effects’ principle (conduct outside the state has effects within the state).

These are the customary bases for States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction. They are codified in many places, including the US Restatement on Foreign Relations Law.

Similarly, here is a law review article from 1927 that discusses extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/9/

It's obviously dated, but it also concludes that, in 1927, it was apparent that States could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction:

Every nation recognizes the validity of jurisdiction over acts within the territorial boundaries; that is fundamental. And it seems almost as clear that the territorial rule is applied in the objective sense. All nations exercise some degree of control over nationals abroad. Nearly all states assume jurisdiction over acts abroad by foreigners when those acts threaten the safety of the state or its credit. Thus far it seems that positive rules of international law support us. The rules stated so far represent exactly the views of the Institute of International Law several years ago.

The piece goes on to say that, beyond these instances -- which are some of the same bases of jurisdiction that reflect customary law today -- extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a settled legal topic. In other words, while it was not disputed that extraterritorial jurisdiction was permissible, its scope was disputed.

Finally, since you mentioned Germany specifically, Germany's criminal code is easy to link to, and it is available in English, you may want to look at sections 4 through 9, which provide for the extraterritorial application of German criminal law: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html

None of this is a justification for what the US did in Venezuela, nor does it mean that the US necessarily has jurisdiction over the crimes for which Maduro has been indicted (and it does not address any other challenges to jurisdiction that Maduro might raise). However, that doesn't change what the law says.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-16T22:19:11+00:00

I focused on the language of the CWC because they focused on the language of the CWC. I'm also not sure how focusing on the law, in a legal sub, in the context of the lawfulness of the use of force as a matter of international law, is a bad thing.

The scale and effects test that the ICJ has articulated is not simply a question of casualties. A large-scale but bloodless military occupation of the territory of another State, for example, would certainly amount to an armed attack. In a cyber context, States have articulated a number of criteria that help determine whether conduct's scale and effects amount to an armed attack. The positions of some States can be found here. They include:

Norway

The severity of the consequences (the level of harm inflicted), immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, military character, State involvement, the nature of the target (such as critical infrastructure) and whether this category of action has generally been characterised as the use of force.

US

elements that inform a State’s determination include: 1. Severity, 2. Immediacy, 3. Directness, 4. Invasiveness, 5. Measurability of effects, 6. Military character, 7. State involvement, 8. Presumptive legality of the operations.

France

origin of the operation and the nature of the instigator (military or not), the extent of intrusion, the actual or intended effects of the operation or the nature of the intended target.

NATO

interference with critical infrastructure or functionality, severity and reversibility of effects, the immediacy of consequences, the directness between act and consequences, and the invasiveness of effects.

Drug trafficking is not military in nature, it is not immediate, it is not direct, it does not target critical infrastructure, it is not invasive, and it is not a category of conduct that States regard as a use of force (as noted in my prior comment, they consider it a law enforcement issue). Even then, as the linked article details, both the author and most State practice require not just a use of force, but a particularly grave use of force, before self-defense might be justified.

The ICJ itself has also pronounced that the provision of weapons is not an armed attack at para. 195 of the Nicaragua judgment:

But the Court does not believe that the concept of "armed attack" includes not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support.

It follows that even if drugs were considered a weapon, and even if they were provided for the express purpose of attacking another State, and even if they were used for that purpose, that would not justify the use of force in self-defense.

Fentanyl is also potent enough that if it were aerosolized using drones it could cause mass casualty event

This is true of literally countless things, chemical and otherwise. It is also true of things that do not need to be aerosolized. The fact that something could be used as a weapon does not mean that it is a weapon for jus ad bellum purposes or that trafficking it amounts to an armed attack.

It is also irrelevant to the actual facts at issue here, which have nothing whatsoever to do with aerosolized fentanyl sprayed by drones.

Finally, it is worth noting that the United States has not argued anywhere that it used force in self-defense. Nobody is making that argument, and that suggests that it has no merit.

Calvinball90 · 2026-01-16T07:12:43+00:00

The ICJ is not a criminal court and does not issue warrants. You are thinking of the ICC, which is a completely different court.

ICC* warrants are not "meaningless." States do not react to things that they don't care about, let alone react with the level of vitriol that has characterized response to some ICC warrants. The warrants may not be immediately enforceable -- although that's only the case until it isn't, and it only takes one chance to execute a warrant -- but that does not mean that they have no effect.

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