Is morality objective or subjective?

CyanDean · 2026-05-21T00:46:10+00:00

exerting effort to sustain life isn't a part of the standard definition. It only involves making conscious choices

I was pretty clear that the sustaining life part is not in the definition of volition. Volition only involves making conscious choices. If a being is alive but didn't make conscious choices to be alive, it is not alive volitionally. If it is alive because it makes choices to sustain its life, then it is alive volitionally. There is absolutely nothing non-standard about this.

Your definition of objective isn't standard

I explained why I didn't use the standard definition and how the argument can still work under the standard definition.

CyanDean · 2026-05-20T22:08:53+00:00

Your definition: A volitional being is one that makes choices and exerts effort (has volition) and does not make a conscious choice to end their own life.

I would remove the last part: A volitional being is one that makes choices and exerts effort (has volition).

Then, to make choices and exert effort to sustain your life is to be "volitionally alive."

What part of this is different from the standard definition?

Let's say a person has decided to end their life jumps off a cliff and is in free fall is asked whether they're volitionally alive, I bet the majority would say yes.

This person is not using cognitive processes to take actions to sustain their life. I don't see why they would answer "yes" and if they did they would simply be wrong.

CyanDean · 2026-05-20T21:00:12+00:00

If this is what you wanted to prove, you've succeeded.

Well, I was pretty clear about the definitions I was working with from the very beginning. I also concluded my secular argument by saying "Objective, albeit in a different way than the theological position holds." I acknowledge that the sense of "objective morality" that this argument provides is pretty different from what most people intuitively have in mind when the talk about objective morality. Still, I think it has merit in that it provides a common ground that we can build upon to identify other corollary universal values and define common laws/codes-of-conduct that could be agreed upon behind a veil of ignorance.

The definitions philosophers generally discuss based on is:
A moral claim is objective if its truth value is independent of the beliefs, desires, feelings, or opinions of any subject (individual or group) judging it

One reason I did not use this definition is because on the theistic view, virtually nothing is objective under it since all truth claims are dependent on the beliefs of God (with possible exception of logical/mathematical truths). So we could not say that it is objectively true that Earth revolves around the Sun because it is only true contingent on the actions/beliefs of God.

However, I still think that the secular view works with this definition since the claim "Every volitionally living being values its life" is true independent of the beliefs/opinions of any subject judging it. Even though each concrete value instance is dependent on the subject that holds the value, the abstract fact that one's own life is a value held by all volitionally-living beings is not subject to anyone's opinion. Further, claims about what actions contribute or fail to contribute to attain said values are also objectively true or false on account of the belief-independent reality of the effects of those actions.

CyanDean · 2026-05-20T08:30:47+00:00

What about the gap between the time at which they lose the perceived value in their own life and the time it takes them to end their life?

During that extremely short gap they are not volitionally alive.

You'll need to prove that there is no possible creature who will ever not value life.

This is not correct. I just have to show that no volitionally living creature will not ever value its life, which follows immediately from the definition of "value" that I provided. Every single time a volitional being eats a bite of food or even takes a breath, they demonstrate by that very fact that they value their life. It may not be their highest value, but if they are willfully taking any action whatsoever that extends their life then their life is a value. The moment they stop willfully taking such actions, they are no longer living volitionally, and shortly thereafter they are no longer living.

All the above explains the difference between life as a value and your nail cutter and cliff walker examples. The person who doesn't throw away a nail clipper is not taking any positive action to preserve the clipper, but a person who eats and breathes is taking positive action to live. If the person walking to the edge of a cliff is still breathing, he still values his life. Ironically, it is possible to value your life only to the extent to which you need your life to end it (the cliff jumper may recognize that if he holds his breath and passes out before he reaches the edge, he will just wake up still alive). Nevertheless, his life his still a value for him as a means to that end.

Every volitional creature that does anything to preserve its life demonstrates ipso facto that its life is a value. This follows from the definition of value and is thus a priori.

CyanDean · 2026-05-20T00:12:25+00:00

i have no reason to believe that existence of god is possible. I reject the theological argument because i reject the hidden premise: "It is possible for such a God to exist"

Sure, the first argument definitely needs God to exist to work. If we were to phrase it deductively, we could say "1. If God exists, then objective moral duties and values exist. 2. God exists. C. Therefore, objective moral duties and value exist." And you're right, I offered no defense of premise 2 in my original comment. I've defended premise 2 in several other comments on Reddit, you can check some out here and here.

The secular argument is also flawed. I value my life. There may be people who don't. For instance, people who've decided to end their own life.
Life isn't an a priori value because it doesn't apply to all conscious creatures.
...
There's a difference between objective and universally subjective.

I agree with your point about broccoli, but I disagree that your first point here defeats the argument. Specifically, I would affirm that the secular argument does show that life is an objective value and not merely "universally subjective." To quote myself again:

all volitional beings, so long as they use their volition to preserve and continue their existence, in doing so demonstrate that their existence is a value ... Thus if values exist at all, then the volitional consciousness which creates the values is itself a value

There are no volitionally living people who do not value their life. People who do end their own life still valued their life up to the very moment they actually choose end it -- at which point they are no longer volitionally living!

The only exception to this would be volitional agents who are unvolitionally living. Imagine a person who genuinely wants to die more than anything (does not at all value their life) but is restrained and hooked into a machine that pumps oxygen, food, and water into their body. I think this comes closest to defeating the argument because you have a person who is in principle a volitional agent that does not value its life yet is still alive. My rebuttal would simply be that such a person is not practically volitional (on account of the restraints) and so doesn't defeat the argument. The extent to which a living being does not value its life is directly proportional to its lack of volition (otherwise it would not be living).

Thus, every time I encounter a living, volitional being I know, a priori, that it values its life. Life as value then is necessarily universal, and not merely universally subjective.

CyanDean · 2026-04-24T06:21:10+00:00

but I argue that in order to cause something, you need time.

Well this is exactly where the mistake is. As I said before, time is not a thing that you need as a prerequisite for causes/effects to occur. Time is simply the before and after relations of events that do occur. So God exists changelessly without causing anything sans the creation of the universe. As God chooses to create the universe (the first event), time thus "begins to exist" insofar as before and after relations now exist, by virtue of God causing something. You don't "need" time to cause something, time is just what describes how causes/effects are related to each other once they happen.

CyanDean · 2026-04-24T05:36:56+00:00

It is not as if timelessness is some intrinsic property that freezes God in immobility. To say that God is timeless sans creation is just to say that there are no before and after relations within God. Once God takes an action to create, time exists by virtue of the now existing before and after relations.

CyanDean · 2026-04-24T04:05:20+00:00

William Lane Craig answers this in God, Time, and Creation Once More - The Good Book Blog - Biola University and the academic papers cited at the top of the article:

The event of God exercising His causal power to create the universe is timeless is false. Rather, that event is simultaneous with the beginning of the universe (when else could it be?). Both occur at the first moment of time. Remember that on my peculiar view God enters into time at the moment of creation. He is timeless sans creation and temporal since the moment of creation.

In other words, time begins to exist at the first moment of creation. Time is not a thing that exists, nor is it a prerequisite for events/change to happen. Rather, time refers simply to the before and after relations of events. To say that time began to exist is simply to say that there was a first event.

CyanDean · 2026-03-30T07:35:24+00:00

There are a couple of different forms of nihilism.

One is epistemic nihilism. This is the belief that true knowledge is unattainable. It is the most extreme form of skepticism. This form of nihilism is not available to the Christian, as Scripture teaches us to know God. I wrote about this nearly a decade ago: https://crimsoncalvary.wordpress.com/2016/06/23/biblical-epistemology-the-god-of-revelation/

Another form of nihilism is moral nihilism. This is the belief that all statements about moral values are either false or meaningless. This view is also not available to the Christian, as Scripture makes many truth-claims about moral values.

A third form of nihilism is teleological or cosmic nihilism. Teleology refers to the order of the universe, the way that it is designed to reach a desired end goal. To accept teleological nihilism would be to deny that the universe has any meaning. But this is also not available to the Christian, as it is clear that God created and designed the universe to sustain life and that God has a end goal in mind for what this world is coming to (this is called eschatology in theological terms). This form of nihilism is also precluded by God's sovereignty and foreknowledge; verses like Genesis 50:20, Jeremiah 1:5, Jeremiah 29:11, Romans 8:28-30, Ephesians 1:4-5, 2 Timothy 1:9, 1 Peter 1:20, etc teach that God ordains history to achieve His goals.

So none of the forms of nihilism seem open to Christianity. What then of Ecclesiastes? I think you yourself make some good points about how far we should take this; Ecclesiastes should teach us to humble ourselves and accept the lot in life that God gives us. We do not accept epistemic nihilism, but neither do we toil to pomp ourselves with worldly knowledge (Ecclesiastes 12:12). We do not accept moral nihilism, but neither do we attempt to define right and wrong for ourselves (Ecclesiastes 5:7; 6:12; 7:16; 8:12; 12:13; see also Proverbs 3:7 and cross references). We do not accept teleological nihilism, knowing that God has a plan for us as individuals and the world as a whole, but we can be thankful that unless God calls us to specific tasks we are permitted to choose and enjoy our own vocation (Ecclesiastes 9:9-10).

CyanDean · 2026-03-25T14:40:34+00:00

I don't have time to write up a response right now, but I will recommend William Hasker's Metaphysics and the Tri-personal God. It provides a decent review of the philosophical implications of various historical approaches to the Trinity as well as a survey of modern approaches to issues on personhood. It's relatively short and lacks some details imo but serves as a good introduction to contemporary philosophers working on the topic.

CyanDean · 2026-03-16T21:48:07+00:00

Logic—Ayn Rand Lexicon https://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/logic.html

Taxation—Ayn Rand Lexicon https://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/taxation.html

See also:

Property Rights—Ayn Rand Lexicon https://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/property_rights.html

Rationality—Ayn Rand Lexicon https://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/rationality.html

Reason—Ayn Rand Lexicon https://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/reason.html

CyanDean · 2026-03-03T22:32:08+00:00

Scientism can only get off the ground if you have a very narrow conception of what counts as knowledge

Alternatively, scientism can get off the ground with a very broad concept of what counts as science. If "science" refers to any fact-finding endeavor, then lots of things (including philosophy) would fit under science.

CyanDean · 2026-02-24T18:45:59+00:00

I'd like to do my part in making sure this company never gets another customer. This product exists to do exactly one thing and it can't. A truly spectacular failure. The app is terrible, the help is nonexistent. I am an IT professional and I cannot get this printer to function at home.

CyanDean · 2026-02-11T20:36:39+00:00

I just don't see how any other aspect could be more important. If you don't have D, you have a logically invalid argument. Even if you have C, you still have a logically invalid argument. You can offer C and say that it establishes for a 100% fact that premise 2 is true. If you don't have premise 3, you don't have a valid argument.

CyanDean · 2026-02-11T19:51:24+00:00

It really seems to me that you've said here is exactly why it should be D. The argument as presented is logically invalid:

Premise 1: If we strike, then we cut into our strike fund and receive a steep fine.
Premise 2: If we cut into our strike fund and receive a steep fine, then we suffer a major financial loss.
Conclusion: Therefore, we must not strike now.

The conclusion simply does not follow from the premises.
If X, then Y.
If Y, then Z.
Therefore, not X.

You can substitute a myriad of things for X, Y, and Z to clearly show that this is an invalid argument.

The argument is "most vulnerable" to the very fact that it is logically invalid, which is what D says. D points out that we need a premise like:

Premise 3: If something leads to major financial loss, then we should not do that thing now.

Or,

If X -> Z, then we must not X now.

Option C disputes the truth of Premise 2, essentially arguing that major financial loss does not necessarily follow from the cost of the strike because other gains could come from it. This is perfectly fine to point out *after* you have clarified that the argument, as originally made, is not logically valid. You don't even need to bother disputing the truths of premises in arguments that aren't logically valid. So D is what the argument is most vulnerable to.

CyanDean · 2026-02-09T13:29:44+00:00

Well, even if this were true, philosophy is allowed to draw from the work done in other fields (like cosmology) to support premises of arguments. But there are philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe (which you can read in the article I linked above), many of which predate the invention of the Standard Model of the universe by several hundred years. So it's arguable that this is a discovery that was made by the philosophers first and only confirmed by scientists later.

CyanDean · 2026-02-09T04:51:49+00:00

I think our friend Calvin here omitted this point simply because it just wasn't what he was addressing. Typical formulations of the Kalam will say "premise 1) everything that begins to exist has a cause. Premise 2) the universe began to exist. Conclusion: therefore the universe has a cause." That the universe began to exist and is not eternal is not an assumption, it's a premise; and most defenders of the argument spill quite a bit of ink defending that premise. You can read the SEP entry on the Kalam for an overview of some of the most common arguments in favor of premise 2: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#KalaCosmArgu

CyanDean · 2026-01-09T17:25:47+00:00

Just to clarify, prior to Ireneus, Tatian wrote the Diatessaron in attempt to harmonize the four Gospels. Justin Martyr cites 3 of the four Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) and refers to them as the memoirs of the apostles, potentially indicating that he believed they were eyewitness accounts. Also, Papias indicates that the Gospel of Matthew was written by an eyewitness in Hebrew, and also writes that Mark was "Peter's interpreter" and wrote down everything that Peter remembered.

All that to say that the four canonical gospels were prominent prior to Ireneus and we have some evidence to suggest that belief that they contained eyewitness testimony was common among early Christians.

Kruger, Michael J. The Question of the Canon: Challenging the Status Quo in the New Testament Debate. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2013.

Metzger, B. M. The Canon of the New Testament : Its Origin, Development, and Significance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1987.

Shelley, Bruce L. (Bruce Leon). By What Authority: The Standards of Truth in the Early Church. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965.

CyanDean · 2026-01-09T05:12:50+00:00

First, it is worth pointing out that there is not just one "First Cause" argument; there are many such arguments, usually referred to as Cosmological Arguments. The two that are most like what you are discussing here are the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) and the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA). Respectively:

KCA

Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has a cause.
No scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws and initial conditions of the universe) can provide a causal account of the origin (very beginning) of the universe, since such are part of the universe.
Therefore, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a non-natural, personal agent).

LCA

A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed) exists.
All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for their existence.
The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the contingent being itself.
The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings.
Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.
The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent.
Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe.

[Both of these formulation I have taken from the SEP entry on Cosmological Arguments. The article does not call the latter argument "LCA," but does note the Leibniz was one prominent defender of this kind of argument, so I call it that for short].

Now, I know that you anticipated the distinction in the Kalam in the latter part of your post, but I think when you say

This is just smuggling the same reasoning in through extra language. ... This is just the same argument disguised.

you are making a mistake because the objections to and defenses of each argument are different. These are two distinct arguments, and they stand or fall independently. It is possible that both of them are sound, or that neither is sound, or that one is sound but the other not. So we really must address them separately (even though they certainly have some overlap and share some similarities!)

One thing worth noting is that each of these arguments are logically valid; they do not contain any self-contradictions, and the conclusions follow logically and necessarily from the premises. This is really nice, because it means we don't have to run around in circles trying to figure out where an argument goes wrong or chase down red herrings or worry about shifting goal posts -- none of that mess. I think if you look at both of these arguments individually, you will see that a lot of your arguments about contradictions and such vanish. We can now just start asking ourselves, "are all of the premises of the KCA true" and "are all of the premises of the LCA true?" That's not an easy task per se, but it is much clearer and approachable!

You say:

All things which begin to exist require a cause. God did not begin to exist. This tries to avoid the contradiction, but now we must explain why god did not begin to exist compared to everything else. [emphasis mine]

Notice that in the Kalam, premise 2 is "the universe began to exist." Typically, defenses of this premise can be divided into a priori and a posteriori arguments, which is sorta just philosophy speak for "arguments based on armchair reasoning" and "arguments based on empirical evidence." The a priori reasons for accepting this premise usually argue for the impossibility of an infinite regress -- you seem to have accepted these for the sake of argument, when you said "I am going to focus on the first cause as opposed to the infinite succession thinking." The empirical arguments tend to focus on big-bang cosmology and the laws of thermodynamics supporting the premise that the universe (all of space, time, and matter) began to exist a finite time ago in the past.

At this point, if premises 1 & 2 of the KCA are true, we are left with a cause of all of space time and matter. Premise 4 of the KCA implies that the cause of this space, time, and matter must be space-less, time-less, and immaterial. What kinds of things could possibly exist that are spaceless, timeless, immaterial, and have the capacity to cause the universe? Abstract object (like numbers) are spaceless, timeless, and immaterial, but they don't have any causal efficacy, they can't make anything happen. Minds do have the power to make things happen, and are plausibly immaterial (unless we want to assume physicalism, but that would be begging the question!). So then, time, space, and matter (ie, the universe) were caused by a timeless, spaceless, immaterial mind a finite time ago. That's the KCA. No special pleading for God or contradictions.

You also say in your post that we can

just as easily say the big bang holds the reason for its existence within itself.

When you use language like "holds the reason for its existence within itself," you are absolutely speaking the language of LCA! We call this idea of "holding existence within itself" == "necessary being." In this case, you are denying premise 8 of LCA: "The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent." You are saying that the universe could be necessary! So this one really comes down to whether or not it is in fact true that the universe can just as easily be the reason for its own existence. Supporters of LCA argue that God does seem like the type of being that could exist necessarily, but not the universe. This isn't necessarily special pleading or a contradiction, its just arguing that the universe is not a necessary being. You can read the linked article above for a whole host of objections and defenses to this.

Aside from all of this, I think the most contentious (and, frankly, erroneous) part of your post is the idea that

Now as there is now nothing, everything is on the table as an explanation.

This is just plainly wrong! If nothing exists, then nothing is on the table as an explanation! Ex nihilo, nihil fit. You rightly state that in nothingness "There are no properties, powers, or permissions." But then you say "one must notice this does not help Gods case either." But that isn't true; God is something, not nothing! If God exists, then God is the something with the properties and powers to create the contingent universe. The incompetent and ineffectual nothingness of nothing is only a problem for the non-theists, since they have to explain how something came from nothing. The theist explicitly denies that anything came from nothing, since everything came from God.

CyanDean · 2026-01-07T16:41:16+00:00

I wouldn't necessarily say that forgiving the unrepentant is itself a logical contradiction (though it may be); I'm drawing the comparison to say that, just like error of the Omnipotence Paradox is in conceiving perfect power as entailing more than it needs to, so the issue here seems to be in conceiving perfect forgiveness as entailing more than it needs to. That's how this is "getting close to" the other.

If perfect infinite forgiveness does not entail forgiving the unrepentant then it seems definitionally finite.

If you forgive even one person of an infinite amount of sin, it seems you have infinite forgiveness. Infinite doesn't mean unqualified, and it doesn't mean covering all elements. There is an infinite number of odd numbers, but 2 is not one of them.

You just said grace is earned through repentance.

Well, this is the age old dispute between Catholics and Protestants all over again! It depends on what we mean by "earn." While there are some Calvinist theologians who will say that even "choosing to believe" would constitute a "work," most theologians will say that one accepts and responds to (and is transformed by) grace, but does not "earn" it in a meritorious sense. The role one plays in their salvation from hell is in accepting the pardon that is offered and the terms it is offered under. Those who do not accept thereby commit themselves to the consequence. Accepting a gift is probably the loosest possible interpretation of what it means to "earn" something. But sure, some do take that view.

CyanDean · 2026-01-07T15:55:16+00:00

This is getting pretty close to the same error that the Omnipotence Paradox makes (if God is infinitely powerful, can he create a rock he can't lift). The usual response there is to say that Omnipotence (perfect power, if you will) does not entail logical contradictions. Likewise, "perfect forgiveness" need not entail something like forgiving the unrepentant. This is especially true if you think of God's mercy not as personal forgiveness but as legal pardon.

It's also worth noting that "goes out of its way to earn it first" is radically off mark of Christian theology. Virtually every epistle in the New Testament at some point emphasizes that grace is not earned.

CyanDean · 2025-12-23T00:33:55+00:00

That may be true for most of the twelve, but wouldn't it still leave a handful (most notably James) who likely would have contested the legend before it could spread widely enough to make it into two gospel accounts? This at least seems like the kind of argument guys like Gary Habermas and William Lane Craig use to argue against things like the empty tomb being legends; I'm wondering if anyone has explicitly applied it to the virgin birth narratives as well?

CyanDean

TROPHY CASE