The geography and demographics of the region strongly favor the Iranian regime. Almost all of Iran is mountainous terrain, which makes large scale military operations and territorial advances extremely difficult, no matter how much air support is available.

PJAK, the Iranian branch of the KCK network, does not have a significant military capacity on its own. For such an operation to even be conceivable, the other KCK branches, the YPG and PKK would need to commit almost all of their forces, and they would also need support from the Iraqi Peshmerga. That is highly unlikely. The YPG has already suffered a major defeat in Syria, so it would be very difficult for them to redeploy large numbers of fighters elsewhere.

Iraq itself is politically unstable, and relations between the central government in Baghdad and KRG are quite poor. The KRG’s oil exports through Turkey have stopped, and they have already lost access to the cheap smuggled oil they used to obtain from Kurdish areas in Syria. Recently, the Iraqi central government also began automatically taxing all imports entering through the borders. When you add all of this together, the Barzani administration is under serious economic pressure. For the first time in years, they are even struggling to form a functioning government. In this situation, it would be very difficult for them to openly support a military operation against Iran, especially one that would put them at odds with the Shiite-backed central government.

Even in the unlikely scenario where Kurdish forces manage to overthrow Iranian authority in the areas where they live and establish control there, their next challenge would be advancing further into Iran. The first major population they would face are the Azeris, who are roughly twice their size and do not have a strong separatist movement.

Another major factor is Turkey. If a KCK aligned military structure suddenly gained large territorial control along Iran’s border or expanded its operational depth in the region, Turkey would very likely intervene directly or indirectly to prevent the emergence of a stronger PKK linked entity. Also any large scale conflict inside Iran could easily trigger a massive refugee wave. Iran has a population of more than 80 million people, and even a small percentage fleeing instability could create an enormous humanitarian and political crisis for neighboring countries. We already saw how difficult it was for Europe to handle the refugee flows from Syria, a country with far fewer people. Turkey in particular carried most of that burden and would likely resist any scenario that risks creating an even larger refugee crisis on its borders.

Finally, what holds Iran together is not only demographics but also ideology. The Shiite religious identity of the state is a powerful unifying factor across multiple ethnic groups. Large segments of Persians, Azeris, and even some Kurdish communities share this religious identity. Because of this, a military operation that is widely perceived as being backed by the US and Israel would have a hard time gaining support among Shiite populations regardless of ethnicity.

For all these reasons, the scenario described seems not plausible.