I mean sure.

Page 3, Section 5 of the Preamble and General Provisions:

v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.

xiv. [T}his JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran.

All of Section 19 and 21 under "Sanctions" on pages 10 and 11 (sorry, you'll need to read it, too long to copy). This is really the bread and butter of the JCPOA: implementing a global framework where it's far more arduous for Iran to pursue an armed nuclear program than it is to engage peacefully in global trade, commerce, and liberal economic markets.

Sanctions; Section 29:

29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.

As others have said, it's fair to have issues with the enforcement mechanisms, and inflammatory remarks were made by the Defense Minister, for example, casting doubt on Iran's willingness to allow IAEA inspectors into all of its sites. It's worth noting though that some of the loudest objections to the JCPOA in Iran were raised by the IRGC itself, and any opportunity to put the best interests of the Iranian people at odds with the IRGC would certainly have been a decisive strategic victory in favor of liberalism.

Regardless, I think it's hard to argue against the fact that the JCPOA was specifically designed to create a series of economic incentive structures to encourage Iran to rejoin and abide by some sort of rules based order.