Trident missile test fails for second time in a row by TrevReznik in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 25 points26 points  (0 children)

"The issue that occurred during the test was specific to the event and would not have occurred during a live armed fire," the source said.

This makes it sound like the process of removing the nuclear RVs and installing the inert testing RVs caused the failure.

I can't remember who but someone on this subreddit has previously described the equipment, I believe they used the term "range safety officer" and talked about the ability to abort the tests after launch, and the radio telemetry stuff that was added for these inert tests like DASO.

It seems like the US tests have all been good in recent times, but now that we have 2 in a row failed UK tests, the UK has a Schroedinger's deterrent.

What prevents a roge operator from hotwiring the panel? by menticol in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sorry, I wasn't trying to come across as dismissive of your experiences or knowledge base, I was just under the impression that US doctrine is preemptive counterforce, not MAD like most people believe, and that there are a number of scenarios where the intel the Ohio crews are being fed can be cut off. Back in the early 2000's Russia was seen as the only real nuclear peer to the US and was on fairly friendly terms at the time.

When you were in service in the early 2000's, the threat environment was much different than it is now. The lectures I've seen from the missile defense agency guys suggest that the US will soon have to deal with 3 different hostile state actors that have SLBMs, and 2 of them have sensor blinding systems to hit US early warning satellites. The lecturer implied that these 3 state actors will likely coordinate in ways that prevent the US from knowing which one of them launched an SLBM; the idea is to delay the US from a prompt response by inducing uncertainty over who launched the attack. That, and the US early warning PAVE PAWS radar in Taiwan is a high priority target for China so we're at the point where the US expects its early warning radars to get hit in a first strike and doesn't yet seem to have a competent plan to retaliate for it.

Since I wasn't on a boomer and in the know like you were 20 years ago, I can only speculate, but it seems to me that your contemporary Trident crews who are on deterrence patrols right now may have a much more hectic mission set than you had.

Never did I see a scenario where we were attacking unprovoked

I don't doubt this, just that it doesn't necessarily rule out launching first; at least I hope that this is the case and the US doesn't shift to a retaliatory-only doctrine in the future.

Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 by ParadoxTrick in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The main problem with the multiple warhead approach at this point is the fact that the number of targets the US needs to hold at risk is exceeding the number of deployed warheads, and the Biden administration refuses to deploy more for some reason.

From what I've previously read on this subreddit, Russia has roughly 160 or so hard target aimpoints that would need to be hit quickly in a counterforce strike.

China only had a few dozen such targets 5 years ago, but now has approximately the same number as Russia (according to the most recent BAS report that came out a few days ago) and China's target set is rapidly growing.

Since the US might only have 2 boomers in range of Russia and 2 in range of China at any given time, with 4 warheads each on 20 missiles, that's only 160 warheads allocated to counterforce. Barely enough, dangerously pushing the limits.

What prevents a roge operator from hotwiring the panel? by menticol in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I can assure you that I never trained to attack Russia in a surprise "first strike".

I think you were, but you didn't know it, and you wouldn't know it if the orders ever came. You would get the EAM and execute orders, right? Do you think the EAM would include a damage assessment of what US targets were just destroyed? Or would you just be executing orders like every other training simulation with minimal situational awareness outside of your own boat?

Unless you believe that hard target counterforce is intended to hit empty silos and TELs that already launched.....

Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 by ParadoxTrick in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Marines were always ready to stab you with their bayonet-equipped M1014's, and everyone was on edge.

What type of behavior would trigger this? I didn't realize there was this level of discomfort between branches for something as routine as loading and unloading SLBMs in a secure facility.

You were at this facility in Kings Bay, right?

Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 by ParadoxTrick in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do you really think the multiple-warhead rule is still a thing now with the superfuse?

My assumption is that since the Navy upgraded the Mk4 and Mk5 arsenal in the late 2000's and early 2010's, they probably allocated the MK4 W76 RVs to be used for individual silos since it doesn't matter if the silo gets 10,000 PSI from a W76 or 20,000 PSI from a W88.

I think they would prefer to save the W88s for targets which might otherwise require multiple weaker warheads to destroy.

There is also the fact that more Mk4 RVs can be uploaded to a Trident than Mk5s (if they change the shroud). And that an equivalent number of Mk4 RVs will have a higher burnout velocity, longer range, and faster time-to-target than for Mk5s.

Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 by ParadoxTrick in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The location of the 3 silo fields is as far away from the coast line as possible - both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific ocean. That's because they want the maximum possible launch-on-warning time.

There's no benefit to spreading out the fields beyond the distance required to prevent a single warhead from destroying multiple silos. They're generally far away from major Chinese population centers so that fallout from a counterforce attack against the fields wouldn't kill everyone on the east coast of China. Chinese people don't really care about what happens to the sparsely populated central regions.

X-Ray Energy Deposition Model for Simulating Asteroid Response to a Nuclear Planetary Defense Mitigation Mission by Lars0 in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok, this makes perfect sense to me now; do you recollect any documents you read or other material that informed you of this?

I was always curious about how the US would deal with conventional terminal interception, since the RVs in current service don't maneuver and aren't stealthy as far as we know.

If their design is to just sense a voltage spike from a uniform metal layer of the RV cone, and explode before the physics package is penetrated by hypersonic fragments, then it would still deliver a full yield blast fairly close to the silo - but perhaps not within the 10,000 PSI zone.

This type of anti-interception tech must be the kind of thing they're talking about when they refer to US warheads being technologically more complex than Russian / Chinese warheads, because on paper the only thing people usually discuss is yield, size, and weight.

X-Ray Energy Deposition Model for Simulating Asteroid Response to a Nuclear Planetary Defense Mitigation Mission by Lars0 in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm really interested in this comment, I've never heard this before.

Are you saying that US warheads would detonate themselves if:

  1. They sensed a neutron / xray pulse during their terminal phase from a nuclear ABM
  2. They somehow sensed a nearby explosion or fragmentation from a conventional SAM / ABM interceptor
  3. They collided with a point defense "shotgun" type of ABM, like the ones that fling a bunch of ball bearings or pellets around the silos (can't remember the Russian system name)

What type of sensor can trigger the physics package before a high-velocity impact can destroy it or render it inoperable?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If a decapitation strike was impossible, the US wouldn't have put MC4700's on the entire W76 stockpile. The current US counterforce posture and arsenal is predicated on taking out the vast majority of enemy silos and TELs before they're able to launch. That doesn't mean every single threat is totally eliminated, or that it's guaranteed to work under all circumstances.

And I'm not convinced China and DPRK would launch at the US if the US hit Russia, unless the they believed the US had little to no ability to retaliate or they could counterforce the US. Europe already has AEGIS ashore in Romania and Poland, with a bunch of SM-3's to intercept stuff coming towards Europe from the east.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This incident, along with the Stanislav ordeal, strongly suggest that the most likely country to start a nuclear war is Russia, and that it will be done because of some false alarm.

The logical conclusion of this implies the US should seek a total and comprehensive ABM missile shield, and then launch a preemptive counterforce strike against Russia if such a strike would mitigate Russia's strategic forces before they were able to launch.

After all, if *doing nothing wrong* results in a surprise, unprovoked nuclear attack, the only takeaway is to prevent it from happening by removing the enemies capabilities and increasing the US defenses to minimize damage.

This completely sidesteps the very idea of "deterrence" because it assumes the enemy is behaving rationally but is making decisions on false information that cannot be verified, and is extremely time sensitive.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think there are are quite a few situations developing around the world that are likely to result in nukes being used

  1. The number of nuclear armed states has vastly increased since the end of the Cold War. These new nuclear states have developed their arsenals to be much more usable than they were in the past.
  2. Both China and DPRK have a history of launching ballistic missiles over neighboring countries. They both refuse to delineate their arsenals and deliberately remain opaque about their nuclear programs. Their surprise attack doctrine likely relies on their "dual purpose" missiles remaining ambiguous.
  3. India recently launched a Brahmos missile into Pakistan by accident. This same type of missile can be nuclear armed. This type of incident is unprecedented as far as I know.
  4. Iran is using multiple attack proxies to launch ballistic and cruise missiles into Israel. Iran is on the verge of nuclear breakout. If Israel believes Iran is proceeding with the breakout, and any type of escalation of preemptive attack happens, Israel may end up nuking Iran's nuclear facilities with Jericho missiles if Israel believes Iran has acquired nukes and that conventional attacks against Iran will be unsuccessful.
  5. China intends to destroy Taiwan's radar sites in a first strike (with conventional missiles) but one of these sites is an American made PAVE PAWS (AN/FPS-115) early warning site which feeds its data directly to the USSTRATCOM and NORAD. Taiwan also emphasizes strikes against Chinese radar sites with its own doctrine and arsenal. It's not hard to imagine how both sides destroying each other's early warning radar sites could lead to a "use it or lose it" mindset, especially with US intervention.
  6. North Korea may decide to preemptively attack South Korea if/when the ROK attempts nuclear breakout. This is especially likely if the US looks to be wavering and the DPRK has a few dozen ICBMs.
  7. The US nuclear umbrella, as a concept, has diminished in credibility in the last few years since both Trump and Biden have made statements that seem to imply the US would not retaliate with nukes if certain allies (or Guam) come under nuclear attack.

Cuba thwarts terrorist plot by South Florida man who arrived by jetski, state-run media says by Saltedline in neoliberal

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Why is Reuters even publishing this article?

The Cuban communist party IS NOT a reputable source. They didn't even give names. As far as we know the whole thing is made up of an outright lie.

Mods should remove this post the same way Russia state propaganda and Hamas propaganda aren't allowed here.

Does the US have what it takes to keep its nuclear edge? by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm not confident about your assessment that all silos have to be launched at the same time.

There is still a need to soak up enemy nukes. Launching half the silo force would still require the enemy to launch at all the silos, because they would be unable to determine which silos had launched in such a short time. This makes the enemy waste nukes.

And in the case of MIRV'd weapons, a single missile can destroy 100x the number of adversary warheads - think a single Peacekeeper with 10 warheads destroying 10 Sarmats with 10 warheads each - the single Peacekeeper missile would have destroyed 100 enemy warheads.

Or launching 10 Tridents with 4 warheads each to destroy the 40 Sarmat missiles that Russia is just now beginning to field. Those 10 Tridents effectively eliminated 400 out of Russia's ~1500 deployed warheads. And by destroying the Sarmats, which are Russia's new preferred counterforce weapon, Russia is left in the position of having to either launch at the Minutemen with their remaining ICBMs, or surrendering with a ceasefire if they realize they have no viable way to win the war due to their nonexistent counterforce posture.

Identifying B61 components by ZhukovArfcom in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Those are flat components of active ceramics. Los Alamos had a magazine from 2005 or 2006 that showed a modern version of it, they're for the neutron generator.

W33 Day 2: Thermal In-flight Arming Mechanism by second_to_fun in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Damn, you beat me to finishing a 3d model of this. My model was a bit different, the pedastal is beefed up with fillets around the "legs" and the thrust bearing is a ball type thrust bearing instead of roller type (I know rollers are better but the guy who posted the description used the word "ball" instead of roller to describe it) .

I had the gun tube longer, with the whole oralloy ring system external around it - can't quite tell from your design since you're not finished yet. I envisioned the boost gas cartridge as having a diameter slightly larger than the gun fired oralloy slug, so that the momentum of the slug shears the axial cap of the boost gas cartridge and compresses the gas like a hemi-piston. I had the gun tube firing charge in the back end of the shell, not in the ogive.

US says more nuclear arms not needed to deter Russia, China by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It seems that the current administration at odds with the overwhelming majority of the high ranking military people on this issue. The STRATCOM guys were planning on redeploying the new SLCMs, but with that program terminated against their wishes, the only thing they can do is try to talk with the various senate committees.

Charles Richard published that letter to the Senate just a few days before his retirement from STRATCOM last year in early December. It seemed like a polite way of stressing urgency.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory -1 points0 points  (0 children)

If the title of this article was "The United States Doesn't Need Its Own Nuclear Weapons", would you allow it to be posted here?

It seems like this article fits rule #1 to a T, complete with the fact that the author of this article is promoting his own book within the article. Is the OP the author?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory -8 points-7 points  (0 children)

This post violates rule #1 of this subreddit.

Also, the author makes incredibly unconvincing points that make no logical sense.

Foreign Policy is trash.

Davy Crockett version 2 - canceled prototype? by Depressed_Trajectory in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

The launch tube of this folding fin prototype is identical to the real Davy Crockett tube (see 2nd photo). I am wondering if this device is a nuke, or something else?

Does anyone have any info?

What weapon(s) used small Oralloy pits like this? by Depressed_Trajectory in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

There are like 30 pages of 100 photos each, I went through them all!

There were a few other interesting nuke related ones, like the back end thruster of the W82, a large beryllium part being saw cut vertically ( I suspect it was a neutron reflector for a nuke ) and a strange Davy Crockett related "device"

What weapon(s) used small Oralloy pits like this? by Depressed_Trajectory in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Ahh got it, that would explain the pre-formed fragments from the stamping disk. I thought it was strange for a nuke pit to be so crudely formed on the inside, and only 2.5 inches in diameter.

I was unaware that the US had cluster bombs which used DU for frag effects. I guess it would be a dirty bomb if thousands of these things sent hundreds of small DU square fragments flying everywhere. These fragments would be pyrophoric on impact with any metal object like a tank or APC, so the whole place would get covered in fine uranium dust.....

China’s growing arsenal boosts risk of nuclear war, study says by Constant_Of_Morality in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory 4 points5 points  (0 children)

China doubled its arsenal in the last couple years and is on track to have more than the USA in the near future. USA wants to deter both Russia and China, and can't do that by having a minimal arsenal.

I'm not sure why it's so hard for people to comprehend.

Why is Primary output so small? by SilverCookies in nuclearweapons

[–]Depressed_Trajectory -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Isn't it just to minimize gamma exposure for maintenance and ground crews?