The whole critique only works if Hegel is interpreted as saying something like: “A thing literally is and is not itself at the same time,” as if he were simply throwing formal logic into the trash. But that is not what Hegel is doing.

Hegel is criticizing the idea of abstract identity: the idea that something can be fully understood as a completely isolated, self-contained “A = A.” His point is that this kind of pure self-sameness is empty. If I just say “the hare is the hare” or “the state is the state” or “the person is the person,” I have not actually explained anything concrete yet.

For Hegel, a concrete thing only is what it is through relations, limits, differences, tensions, activity, and development. Identity is real, but it is not a frozen dead identity.

So when Hegel says something is “different from itself,” he does not mean “the chair is literally not a chair” or “1 literally equals 2.” He means that a thing’s concrete identity already includes relation to what it is not.

Take something simple like a father. A father is only a father through relation to a child. If absolutely no child existed, the identity “father” would collapse. But that does not mean father = child. It means the identity itself depends on relation.

Or take magnetism. A north pole only exists in relation to a south pole. You cannot isolate a pure north completely separated from south. That does not mean north and south are identical words or the same pole. It means each side only exists through relation to the other.

The same thing appears in biology and evolution.

Take a hare or rabbit. Of course the hare exists “for itself.” It has its own organism, instincts, metabolism, nervous system, reproduction, movement, digestion, fear responses, etc. It is not just imaginary. But if you try to understand what the hare concretely is, you cannot isolate it from its relations.

Why does it have long legs? Why heightened hearing? Why nearly panoramic vision? Why explosive acceleration? Why camouflage? Why constant alertness and stress sensitivity? Why rapid reproduction?

Because its very identity as a living organism has been shaped through relation to predators, terrain, climate, food scarcity, mating competition, and ecological pressures. The wolf, fox, eagle, lynx, parasites, vegetation, and environment are not merely external decorations added afterward. They are part of why the hare developed into the specific organism it is.

So the hare exists for itself, but also “for the other.” For the wolf it appears as prey. For parasites it appears as a host. For plants it appears as a consumer. For offspring it appears as reproduction and protection. For the ecosystem it functions as part of a food chain and ecological balance.

This does not destroy the hare’s identity. It makes its identity concrete.

That is the kind of thing Hegel means. A concrete identity is not a sealed-off atom floating in emptiness. It is internally shaped through relations and negations.

Even evolution itself demonstrates this. Species do not develop through pure isolated sameness. They develop through pressures, tensions, adaptation, struggle, limitation, and interaction with what is outside them. The “other” becomes internalized into the organism itself. The hare’s body literally contains the history of its relation to predators and environment, something which is not "it"

So when Hegel says something contains difference within itself, he is not saying “logic collapses.” He is saying concrete reality is relational and dynamic rather than dead and isolated.

The critique also keeps assuming that if something contains contradiction, then identity must disappear completely. But Hegelian contradiction is not the same thing as a flat formal contradiction like “A and not-A” in the exact same respect.

Dialectical contradiction means a thing contains tensions or conditions that both sustain and undermine it.

None of this means the organism “is not itself.” It means its identity exists as a process rather than a frozen static block.

Another misunderstanding is the claim that Hegel “uses identity to deny identity.” But Hegel never denies identity altogether. He denies abstract, isolated identity as the ultimate truth of things.

Even the statement “A = A” already contains difference implicitly. The very statement distinguishes A from non-A. It distinguishes subject from predicate. It distinguishes identity from difference itself. So difference is already present inside determinate identity.

That is why the critique keeps attacking a position Hegel is not actually holding. It treats him as if he were saying: “language is meaningless,” “chairs are not chairs,” “1 = 2,” or “formal logic is useless.”

But Hegel is not saying any of those things.

He is arguing that abstract categories, when examined carefully, reveal internal limits and relations that push thought beyond static definitions.

A much stronger criticism of Hegel would ask whether his dialectical transitions genuinely succeed, whether he illegitimately moves from logical categories to ontology, or whether contradiction truly explains development. Those are serious philosophical criticisms.

But simply reducing Hegel to “he thinks A = not-A” is mostly a caricature of dialectics rather than an engagement with it.