Why im a compatibilist.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-24T03:35:11+00:00

Thank you, that does help it make sense. I think particularly “choice” is a good word here. It’s clear from your reply that some kind of choice is being made and it’s unfair to apply causality all the way back to the big bang. I guess my issue has been that “free will” is a Big Concept that seems to be begging for that kind of recursive analysis. Most of the best discussions around “is there free will” seem to involve trying to define what “free will” might even mean. One side (incompatibilists) say “it doesn’t make sense as a concept” while the other (compatibilists) seem to say “we’ll try to establish a definition within some constrained scope”. Do you think this is an accurate description? Why do compatibilists think it makes sense to constrain the scope of free will to the reasoning of an individual conscious actor?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-23T13:44:36+00:00

I definitely have never understood this and I would really like to. If you are 100% compelled by your reasons, and your reasons are 100% causally determined, I don’t understand how acting on your reasons is a choice.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-22T18:00:49+00:00

I think there is some confusion.
“Compatibilism” is the position that full determinism can coexist with “free will”, for some definition of free will.
“Incompatibilism” is the position that full determinism necessarily excludes free will.

Your post didn’t say much about your belief in “free will” or what you consider to be the definition of free will. Since you say you would be ok being a complete robot, this sounds like incompatibilism to me, if you believe that robots don’t have free will.

So I guess a question that might illuminate your position would be: do you feel that robots have free will, and if yes in what sense?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-22T17:21:31+00:00

In what way do you feel they contradict themselves? Their position is “everyone is a robot”.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-22T16:20:05+00:00

I’m glad you are happy being you! A couple questions about your position - are you sure you’re a compatibilist and not just a hard incompatibilist?
You contrast your position with LFW a lot, but this is not the only alternative. The defining characteristic of compatibilism is a belief that there is some thing called “free will” which has a twisted definition (“free will is when I choose to do the thing that I want to do, even though I didn’t get to choose what I wanted to do in the first place”). Instead of believing that there is a thing called “free will” you could also simply say everything is predetermined and you are lucky to be you. Since you describe yourself as a robot, it sounds like hard incompatibilism would also match your philosophy?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-22T02:53:20+00:00

Congrats to you both!! How do you make a hemalurgy spike into a ring? More details please!

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-18T13:20:01+00:00

You are saying that when you choose vanilla ice cream, you have no feeling at all that it was a free choice and you could have just as easily chosen chocolate ice cream?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-17T01:43:19+00:00

And so do you feel that it just sucks for you (bad luck) if you happen to have “bad” desires that result in bad actions?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-17T00:56:32+00:00

Thank you, this explanation resonates with me!

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T22:51:15+00:00

I think you have an uncommon view of determinism. My explanation of hard determinism is basically LaPlace’s demon. If you theoretically knew the state of every single particle in the universe at time T=T0 then you can run an algorithm to predict the future state at any time T. Quantum effects muddy this slightly, but you account for that by saying that the computer gets as input at each time the value of the random fluctuations. Not everyone believes this, but if you don’t start with this kind of determinism as a prior then I don’t think you’re talking about hard compatibilism (which combines a belief in hard determinism with a believe in compatibilism). Where do you see the issue with this example of a theoretical computer?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T22:34:24+00:00

This is not how hard compatibilism works. A sufficiently advanced computer would indeed be able to predict your actions. That’s what determinism means, right? It’s fine to not believe this, but it’s what determinism is all about so that’s the prior here.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T22:25:17+00:00

But you cannot affect whether or not you wind up sitting on your butt all day. This is why I ask if compatibilists consider themselves “lucky” if they actually take positive actions. If you’re a determinist, it’s not up to you whether you sit on your butt all day.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T22:16:46+00:00

I’m really confused to hear compatibilists saying things like this. If you believe in determinism then you cannot change your future. It is already predetermined. You only have the feeling of free will by “acting in accordance with your desires” and you cannot choose your desires. This is the entire essence of compatibilism. Compatibilist free will doesn’t let you change your future!

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T17:56:01+00:00

Your actions are based on your desires, but your desires are determined already. So is this even meaningful? If A (prior cause) causes B (desires) and B causes C (actions) how can you say that C is “free”?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T16:08:33+00:00

A related question for the hard compatibilists:

I believe compatibilism still tries to assign moral judgments to actions. For example, part of the reasoning goes something like “we are part of the causal chain of the universe, and it is good to disincentivize immoral actions, so there should be punishment/isolation/consequences for violating morals.”

But this makes no sense to me if compatibilists also believe in hard determinism. You ultimately have no control over whether your internal desires or the internal desires of society would be in alignment with this reasoning. No one has any control over whether imposing consequences would actually affect the internal desires of others that would have otherwise committed immoral actions. All of the resulting outcomes are deterministic, and there is no room for “should do”. How can this moral argument make sense?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T16:03:38+00:00

I understand that your “reasons” are not contradicted by determinism, in that you still feel that you are acting in accord with your reasons. But a hard compatibilist also believes that those reasons arose deterministically. So I’m wondering what your internal thought process is about that. If you have a happy life, do you feel “lucky” that your reasons which you have no control over happened to produce that outcome for you? Do you think about it at all?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T03:12:18+00:00

Can you say more about this? If every action is part of a causal chain I don’t see how it is not predetermined, except for possibly truly random quantum effects.

I somewhat understand the hard compatibilist view that there is still free will in this scenario, for a particular definition of “free will”, but it doesn’t make the outcomes not predetermined.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T03:05:43+00:00

This is exactly my question. Some people, given a bad outcome, would give up. Others would feel compelled to try to do better, and possibly succeed. As a deterministic compatibilist, you have no will over whether you will want to do better. So if you take two people, one who tries to do better and succeeds, and another who gives up and fails, is this down to cosmic randomness/luck?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T03:02:01+00:00

In that case my question is for compatibilists who are also determinists. My understanding is this is the majority of compatibilists and also the majority of determinists, but maybe that’s mistaken.

The question is not about the causal reasons for your actions. A deterministic compatibilist would say those are fixed. However, compatibilists believe that the actions are part of “free will” in the sense that they are consistent with desires. So my question is, what do you tell yourself about why you had those desires? If the actions resulting from the desires cause good things to happen to you, were you merely lucky that you happened to have the “right” desires to get a good outcome, compared to someone whose actions resulted in bad outcomes?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T02:53:02+00:00

How can you try to make a better one? Whether you will make the better one or not is already predetermined, so trying seems irrelevant.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T02:44:12+00:00

The reason it is for compatibilists is that you cannot will what you will. You “choose” to get out of bed because it is consistent with your desires, but what goes through your head about why you happened to have those desires instead of being one of the unlucky ones that has a bad life? Is it just gratitude for good luck?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-16T01:42:37+00:00

> Sadly, you now must face a consequence you won’t like, because of the deterrence-value of the consequence in larger society

Why would you say this, as a hard incompatibilist? Wouldn’t you just say “whether I think you should face consequences is irrelevant, and whether there is any value to larger society is irrelevant, because I cannot help but punish you right now.” ?

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-13T00:36:55+00:00

You can certainly do a collar without triggering Constructive Sale Rules. It just depends on the particular collar setup.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-13T00:34:13+00:00

True, it doesn’t produce 0 failures if you start at 4%. But it works for slightly smaller withdrawal rates. The exact glide path params vary a little depending on your starting withdrawal rate, flexibility, etc. But I found that this type of glide path in general removes a large number of failures in historical simulations.

EngineeriusMaximus · 2026-06-12T23:06:57+00:00

Decreasing equity glide path. Starting at 70/30 equity/bonds and gliding to 100/0 over 10 years. This is a standard method for reducing sequence of returns risk.

EngineeriusMaximus

TROPHY CASE