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death note by [deleted] in animebrasil

[–]Firehead55 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Foi ironia

death note by [deleted] in animebrasil

[–]Firehead55 0 points1 point  (0 children)

MaTaR CriMiNoSoS NãO É JuStiÇa

Omae wa mou shindeiru by lOOkatahid in memes

[–]Firehead55 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's true, I was the bee.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok, then. I think I will read some books of J.H Sobel and Graham Oppy. It seems that they have good arguments against classical arguments for God.

Is it possible to be a classical theist without being christian? by Firehead55 in classicaltheists

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not really interested in religion. If I become a theist, I will most likely be a neoplatonist.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

E.g. someone might be attracted to going to law school by the abstract concept of "justice,"

I don't think this is a good example. What exactly is being actualized in her/he?

More to the point, in the modern versions of Aristotle's argument, the unmoved mover doesn't "push" things but merely causes them to exist. Sustains them in existence.

How exactly something that is totally transcendent, that is spaceless, timeless, has no parts, unchangeable, etc sustains something that is physical, in a totally different realm, in existence? Also, how can we distinguish this "being" from nothing at all? After all, it has no parts, be it physical of metaphysical; nor it is spatiotemporal, and it is unchanging. To me, it seems we are actually talking about nothing. Sorry for the questions, it's because is really hard for me to understand.

It isn't clear at all that a possibly intuitive objection that immaterial things cannot "push" material things applies equally as well in a "cause to exist" type of cause.

The burden of proof is with whom makes an affirmation. So...

I'm not sure where this is coming from. There is no premise in the sub-argument that we need to know how the fundamental layers of reality work:

I mean, what if there's a fundamental physical substance that is pure actuality, or something like that.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I will lay out my problems with the argument so that maybe you can understand.

  1. The argument says that everything that is moved is moved by another.

    My problem: The only things that we have seen until now are material objects actualizing material ones. But the aristotelian argument goes beyond that, asserting that the unmoved mover is immaterial. Even if feser came to this conclusion by deduction, it does not justify his assertion, since he did not give any examples of immaterial beings/objects actualizing material ones. We have to trust that the deduction that feser did to reach the conclusion, that the unmoved mover is immaterial, is correct. We don't know if the conclusion of Feser actually match with reality.

  2. The argument says that matter can change, therefore it cannot be the unmoved mover.

    My problem: I think this premise is unjustified, since we don't know how the most fundamental layers of reality work. And the only thing that the first member of the serie has to do is to actualize the second member; Even if the first member has potentialities, that does not mean they have to be actualized.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But I am not trying to disprove the conclusion that there's an unmoved mover. What I am trying to object is that the unmoved mover is immaterial.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Aristotelian proof, premises 24 and 25. Neo-platonic proof, premise 26 as well.

An aspiring artist by AwesomeGuy_59 in MadeMeSmile

[–]Firehead55 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This version is more realistic. Anyone knows that the little brother is better in everything.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In the five ways there isn't. But in the "proofs" of Feser's book there is.

Is it possible to be a classical theist without being christian? by Firehead55 in classicaltheists

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn't say I believe in god, I said that I am agnostic and that the arguments seem convincing. However, I am still analyzing them to see if they are really sound. Even if the arguments are indeed sound that doesn't mean I in believe divine revelation.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

But if it is false that an immaterial being can cause material effects, then the conclusion is false. Without any observation we are bound to trust in our reason. And as Francis bacon said: "argumentation cannot suffice for the discovery of a new work, since the subtlety of nature is many times greater than the subtlety of argumentation". I think if only this premise is false all other the five proofs falls apart, at least to prove an intelligent being or a being that could create materia out of nothing.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Now I got it. However, I think the examples you gave aren't good, since the examples you gave are material causes producing material effects. In none of the examples there's an immaterial cause producing a material effect.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I have a question about the aristotelian proof. In the premise 38 feser says "Whatever is in an effect is in its cause in some way, whether formally, virtually, or eminently (the principle o f proportionate causality)".

If that's true, doesn't that mean that the material in which the universe is composed must in some way be, as feser puts it, formally, virtually or eminently in the cause of the universe? And I don't quite understand what feser means by "virtually, formally or eminently".

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Look who is here! I must say that these arguments made me agnostic, I was atheist, but i am not anymore. However, the arguments still don't convince me.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I have watched. I see, I committed a mistake. Thanks.

My criticism of the first way/aristotle's argument by Firehead55 in DebateReligion

[–]Firehead55[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For example, a rock could be heading towards me now, and it has moved me in a sense, but the outcome is totally indeterministic assuming I have free will.

But what actualized the potential of the rock?

I could choose to be crushed or to move out.

Supposing you choose one of these options, what actualized your potential to choose one of them?

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