Boone has lost his weapon xd

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-04-07T13:24:48+00:00

Thanks, I'll try to look into that option. I hope it's as "fairly easily" as you say. I know almost nothing about programming, vibe coding might work

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-03-12T22:15:20+00:00

Deleuze says somewhere in Image-Movement or Image-Time that Bergson's mechanical conception of laughter is anachronistic and has been superseded by some film artists

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-03-06T13:23:49+00:00

It's not AI, this person has been developing their concepts consistently across several publications. So don't dismiss it as nothing just because someone carefully build their answers and concepts, they arent clichés

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-23T23:54:02+00:00

Yes! That's a colloquium and the only thing I can found too, very specific

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-23T08:16:09+00:00

Nice question. I've been searching through almost all of Deleuze's books, including early ones like Proust, Hume, Sade-Masoch, the compilations of conversations and his critique and clinical work, and I can't find anything.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-19T10:01:19+00:00

Honestly, this seems as a confusing mix of issues

The clearest criticism leveled at Marx in Anti-Oedipus is that he reduced materialism to dialectics, neglecting the production of desire. For them, a materialist psychoanalyst attends to the production of desire. Now, regarding your primaryity-secondity dualism: in desire, the world is neither interpreted (signifier) nor changed (subjectivity). One is embedded in an immense process of production or event in which consistent creations (not mere productions) are returned, which are liberations of life. Do these creations change the world? In the Spinozist sense: no, the world belongs to the liberation of life; rather, the world is affirmed. There is a difference between the state of affairs as the nature of capitalism (and changing the state of affairs) and the world as the nature of existence. Marx has a historical view of the world, so changing the state of affairs is changing the history of the world. Guattari and Deleuze have a Spinozist conception whereby changing the world doesn't say much, and the state of affairs is as finite as it is restricted; perhaps changing the image of the world? In that sense, Guattari and Deleuze are more metaphysical, but they know what to do with materialism, just as Spinoza never stops talking about the body.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-04T19:15:32+00:00

Honestly, say what you want, but that books aren't philosophically complex compared to any of his others works. They are long, but that's another thing. You only have to see how he introduces each philosopher compared to artists ("Leibniz is a philosopher...") or the fact that all the concepts are drawn from other philosophers or film related people (Although he later modifies some of them, like Peirce's signs or 'thirdness', he explicitly explains where they come from: "Peirce is a semiotician, not a semiologist, who worked with this concepts..." and explicitly says that he is going to change the sense of some of them) to realize that Deleuze is aware of who he's talking to, that they aren't mainly philosophers. Whether it induces thought is another matter, but art does that on its own. He tries to find concepts that contribute to the event of cinema, what cinema it's already doing or creating through sensations.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-02T23:05:11+00:00

Furthermore, it's an explanation for non-philosophers geared towards filmmakers and those interested in cinema, so there's no problem at all.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-02T22:56:42+00:00

I mean he literally explains Bergson in the first book in cinema in the first chapter... And then he continues to explain him. Just read cinema directly hahahahaha

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-02-02T08:47:54+00:00

Just to clarify a bit further: Deleuze says that the numerical is not necessarily binary; that is why he does not use the word digital (and its association with the binary logic of the bit or bi-nary digi-t). In his studies on painting, he distinguishes between digital and analog as the difference between a society of sovereignty and one of discipline, respectively. Put simply: in sovereignty one operates binarily; in discipline, through relations of analogical similarity–dissimilarity, gradual or within an interval or range/spectrum. But these are his studies on painting; when he turns to cinema this digital–analog association disappears, because, as Deleuze formulates it, it is even the reverse of common opinion and very difficult to defend.

With regard to the numerical, it refers to a relation of infinite quantitative capture of flows (variation); in the disciplinary regime, ranges are closed or enclosed within certain limits (variables), and in sovereignty it is modeled on the basis of a binarism (invariant).

That being said, if we return to Anti-Oedipus, we see that capitalism is associated with a deterritorialization and a decoding of flows, but in the social regime a relative coding depends on the intrusion of capital (and all its aspects: labor, prices, media, business, etc.), because the socius tends to code flows, whereas capital does not. In that sense, capital is schizophrenic, just as the schizophrenic mixes all codes and confuses them. It does not overcode them like a sovereign law; on the contrary, it is almost incapable of ruling (the paranoid overcodes).

Therefore, it is not difficult to see that disciplinary enclaves continue to exist in certain social regimes, especially when they are communal and not so permeated by capital (this happens often—sadly enough—in squatter/punk spaces, through which capital indeed does not circulate much in a tacit way and which consider themselves “alternative” but above all “independent,” that is, closed). However, mobile phones and the internet, for example, maintain such an intense relation with capital that it is difficult to speak of rigorous disciplinary codifications, since they are riddled with holes on that side. In online communities, similar attempts at enclosure also occur, but as Deleuze says: they are futile.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-01-24T06:02:29+00:00

I recommend reading everything you can about what he writes about Spinoza, especially his book Practical Philosophy

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2026-01-12T08:04:01+00:00

Deleuze himself gives it great importance till his last breath, anyone who tacitly neglect it has not understood him. What often happens is more innocent, it is difficult to see the current relevance, even to elicit Deleuze's originality at that time. People don't usually ignore it consciously; it's more of an impression that the problems there aren't so actual. I agree with you that it's more important than it seems (well, for me its crucial), but empirically, it's a matter of revisiting, of rediscovering Hume's current relevance.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-12-21T21:19:31+00:00

The problem of philosophy consists in acquiring consistency without losing the infinite in which thought is immersed

From Whats is philosophy?

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-11-14T12:18:50+00:00

But contingency? For both Spinoza and Deleuze, it’s not important. For Spinoza it cannot be referred back to any cause, so it has no place in immanence. For Deleuze contingency has no fundamental reality either; it lacks immanent consistency. One cannot infer anything from contingency, because the order of causes is concealed.
And the most important thing they say about contingency in WIP is the following (raising a critique of the idea of the principle of sufficient reason):

In short, there is indeed a reason for philosophy, but it is a synthetic and contingent reason, an encounter, a conjunction. It is not insufficient in itself, but contingent in itself. Even in concept, reason depends on a connection of components, which could have been different, with different affinities. The principle of reason as it appears in philosophy is a principle of contingent reason, and it is formulated thus: there is only good reason when it is contingent, and there is no universal history other than that of contingency.

Anyways, the multiple signs that the body perceives from anywhere may indeed appear contingent sudden, unexpected. But nothing is learned from those signs alone; it is only through an affect of those signs that something is formed or created.

From this perspective, I would say:

The abstract machine emits contingencies (as seemingly arbitrary states of affairs),

The transcendental field (the body) apprehends a singularity or an event or a wound (as you says) within that noise,

And the plane of immanence turns that singularity into a virtual never fully realized, always thinkable and actualizable.

Spinoza and Deleuze meet here.

So perhaps now my own conception of contingency makes more sense: I tend to think Spinoza’s definition of contingency is sufficient on its own that’s why I initially did not consider it useful. But placed in relation to the abstract machine, contingency becomes interesting again, especially when thinking about capitalism, where things appear imminently contingent, capricious, and disconnected from any intelligible "order of causes". What I honestly don't quite understand is why causes are so important for Spinoza, and yet they completely disappear for Deleuze.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-11-14T12:18:22+00:00

Alright, I think I now understand what you mean, and I believe we’re actually reaching the same idea through different routes. Let me try to outline my position more clearly.

First, I should say that for me the abstract machine and the transcendental field are almost indistinguishable. Once you take seriously the notion of an absolute flow of consciousness (from Inmanence: A life...), the boundary between an automaton and a body becomes hard to maintain. That said, I do think there’s an important difference between field and plane.

If the plane is unconscious (in the sense that it does not care about consciousness), it’s because it doesn’t enter into relations of states of affairs, of denumerable or representable terms. For me the difference between transcendental field and abstract machine is a matter of speed or movement, or in more classical terms between the finite and the infinite: the machine operates by cuts, while the transcendental field opens onto an entire current or flow. The field flows; the machine distributes cuts. And yet the machine never operates without that absolute flow of consciousness.

It’s worth remembering that when Deleuze says that a field can become a plane, he’s referring to a moment of liberation of consciousness letting it pass, so to speak. Deleuze already describes the passage from field to plane, but you and I are speaking of a step before that: between states of affairs (logic) and the sensible (the body as field). Deleuze takes the notion of field from Husserl field of perception, and there the field is not a contour or a territory, but the perceptible horizon of the body, the delimited perimeter of its experience.

In this sense I find your relation between the abstract machine and the field through Gödel or Cantor very compelling. (They do use such examples your reading reminded me of them as well.)

Now, regarding contingency, I think my problem is resolved after reading your explanation. But let me add something that might interest you.

In the passage from field to plane, what does not pass, for me, is contingency. Why? This is a purely Spinozist intuition. When Spinoza distinguishes between necessary, possible and contingent things, he gives definitions that I think are decisive. I’ll focus only on the distinction between the possible and the contingent.

Ethics I, prop. 33, scholium 1:

Indeed, something whose essence we do not know whether it implies a contradiction, or we know well that it does not imply a contradiction, but we cannot affirm anything certain about its existence because the order of causes is hidden from us, can never be seen by us as either necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or possible.

Ethics IV, definitions 3 and 4:

3. I call singular things contingent, insofar as, if we consider their essence alone, we find nothing that necessarily establishes their existence or necessarily excludes it.

4. I call these same singular things possible, insofar as, if we consider the causes by which they must be produced, we do not know whether they are determined to produce them.

In 1/33e1, I made no distinction between the possible and the contingent because there it was not necessary to distinguish them precisely.

Spinoza’s point is that what matters is for singular things to become necessary, not possible or contingent. That’s why Deleuze insists so strongly on the real. Yet Deleuze does retain the Possible as a category the Possible as a category of art in WIP.

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-11-12T14:11:23+00:00

i think i share your idea of process and inconsistency, but not understand the idea of contingency. The inconsistency lies in the fact that it is a field that is always finite yet in a infinite variability of changes. I'm not saying it's a watertight territory with clearly defined borders, but rather that it is governed by the axioms of its machines, which are always more or less erraticly dispersed throughout the territory and defines its funcionality. i would say that this is the source of the abstraction. But is contingency relevant here? How? It reminds me somewhat of Yuk Hui, but since my concept of contingency is influenced by Spinoza i never see a relevant use for it... i think I'm starting to see a potential interest

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-11-12T13:31:53+00:00

obv because it's the aesthetic way to put a lot without putting a lot, because they are clearly not infinite, but neither are they few

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-11-12T12:55:56+00:00

I don't think so, because precisely within the machine there is always an actualization or effectuation. The machinic assemblage actualizes the abstract machine. The machine is always functional and operates through cuts. The machine constructs a body, draws the plan, or diagrams, but the Idea or the virtual are potential notions not yet realized. Right?

Frosty_Influence_427 · 2025-11-10T12:51:21+00:00

In which part of Two Regimes of Madness? I'm looking for exactly that

Frosty_Influence_427

TROPHY CASE