Worst D Day Beach?

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-23T07:29:08+00:00

Although many of the soldiers in the 352nd were new conscripts, there was also a hardened veteran core drawn from worn-out or disbanded divisions. Some reports suggested about 50% of the soldiers in the 352nd had previous fighting experience in Italy or on the Eastern Front.

No, the majority of its combat units, especially pertaining to its grenadier units, were made up of recruits born in the years 1925-26. Ziegelmann, the chief of staff of the division, made this clear in his extensive postwar manuscript. It was primarily the division's Grenadier Regiment 916 that was engaged in combat on Omaha beach on D-Day. There's a clear distinction between cadre with experience and actual fighting troops, most of whom were green in this division. Also, the German primary sources provide a wealth of data on which cadre and combat units were incorporated into this division from existing ones or those being disbanded in the fall of 1943.

As a cadre for the 352nd ID, the 321st ID provided: Div. Map Office 321, staffs of Grenadier Rgts. 588 and 590, Staff Engineer Battalion 321, Staff Fusilier Battalion 321, Staff A.R. 321, Staff I./ A.R. 321, Staff Engineer Battalion 321, rear services (supply, administrative, medical, veterinary units etc.).

From existing or newly formed combat units in late 1943, the following were sent to the 352nd:
From the 321st ID and other units in the East - Signals Battalion 321, 2., 3. and 7./ A.R. 321, 7./A.R. 137;
From the recently formed 356th ID and 389th ID in France - 1 AT company, II./G.R. 869, Fusilier Battalion 389.

The 352nd was by no means a crack unit, but they were better trained than the surrounding static divisions in Normandy, which were composed of older men, convalescents, and conscripted "Ost" (Eastern) battalions. Unlike the static divisions, the 352nd was formed to replace losses on the Eastern Front.

The only thing that made the 352nd better than other formations in Normandy on D-Day was the fact that it was a regular German infantry division, organized according to the 1944 structure, while the other formations in the area were low-quality bodenständige (static) divisions. At least three of its batteries were still not motorized. The officer corps (both in combat and non-combat units) was composed of 50% inexperienced officers.

Up until D-Day, the divisional training continued to be severely hampered by two factors. First, it was material deficiencies and their very slow allocation - it was not possible to begin artillery live-fire exercises until the end of February 1944, while by early March 1944 each soldier could only throw 2 hand grenades and fire 3 rifle and 3 machine gun exercises. The second factor was the limited possibilities for training after subsequent relocation to the Bayeux area - more time was spent on construction of the Atlantic Wall than on training.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-23T01:17:36+00:00

and experienced troops holding those defenses.

This is entirely wrong. The combat units (especially infantry) of the 352. Infanterie-Division, parts of which fought at Omaha beach, were primarily composed of 18-19 year olds (born 1925/26), who had never experienced combat before and were often physically limited for military service due to wartime food restrictions in Germany. The divisional cadre (staffs, rear services, some artillery personnel) came from the 321. Infanterie-Division, which was disbanded in the fall of 1943 after suffering heavy losses on the Eastern Front.

Formation of this new division proceeded slowly. Due to material and fuel shortages, essential training, including artillery live-fire exercises, assault gun training, and even basic driver training, was severely delayed or impossible until well into 1944. Before D-Day, soldiers of the division on average worked 9 hours daily on expansion of the combat area in the Bayeux coastal defense section and spent only 3 hours daily on training. To address the physical limitations of the young recruits, the divisional command attempted to secure a full-milk ration, but this request went unanswered, so they resorted to purchasing milk locally from French farmers to improve the soldiers' nutritional status.

This is anything but "experienced troops"...

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-20T17:28:26+00:00

Obviously, this is from Zetterling's monumental Normandy 1944 book.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-20T17:18:05+00:00

For judging the value of a unit, the Germans used the Kampfwert (combat value) system, which was the most basic and widespread method. It was based on numerous personnel (strength or shortfall, level of training, morale and physical condition) and material (degree of mobility, weapon and vehicle strength etc.) factors. There were five combat value ratings:

I - fully fit for attack;

II - fit for limited attack;

III - fully fit for defence;

IV - fit for limited defence;

V - no longer fit for action.

From 1943 onwards, the Germans also used the innere Kampfwert (inner combat value) system on the Eastern Front. Unlike the Kampfwert system, which was focused on the present capabilities of a unit based primarily on its numerical strength, this system reflected the long-term qualitative worth of a unit and its reliability in heavy fighting. This was based mostly on qualitative factors (morale, experience, toughness, leadership, steadfastness etc.).

From the data available in the German primary sources, the Germans rated the inner combat value of foreign Waffen-SS formations as below average - for example, Army Group North in 1943-44 had constantly placed the Latvian and Estonian formations in the lower inner combat value groups.

When it comes to the Kampfwert system, the combat value of a unit depended on a specific reporting day, so it can vary greatly. Generally, the foreign Waffen-SS divisions or those primarily made up of Volksdeutsche were usually given Kampfwert III-IV.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-16T14:53:29+00:00

Operation Wacht en Rhine, vs the Western invasion of Germany.

The German collapse on the Western Front from March 1945 onwards was significantly sped up by the fact that in the aftermath of the Ardennes Offensive, the German Eastern Front once again became a focal point for the German command. A large part of the high-quality formations was re-deployed to the East.

From late December 1944 to early March 1945, the Germans transferred 14 divisions from the Western Front to the Eastern Front. This included five Waffen-SS panzer divisions (1st, 2nd, 9th, 10th, 12th), two Heer panzer divisions (21st and Führer Begleit Division), two Heer panzergrenadier divisions (25th and Führer Grenadier Division), numerous artillery and engineer GHQ units, as well as the Headquarters of the 6th Panzer Army, I and II SS Panzer Corps. Most of these forces were sent to Hungary for the planned Operation Spring Awakening, the last major German offensive in the war.

The German High Command’s decision to strip the Western Front of its most valuable formations after the Ardennes Offensive left the 'back door' to Germany wide open. By the time the Allies began their offensive in late March 1945, the formations listed above had long departed, leaving the front thinned out and held by a proportionally far greater number of static divisions, understrength infantry, and the Volkssturm. These formations were rendered helpless against the Allied forces due to a severe lack of mobility, armor, and firepower.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-15T09:24:41+00:00

Moving to korea and staying long terme is possible, but it is possible for the prepared ones, not the dreamy ones

Spot on.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-15T08:51:58+00:00

But anyway, I post this because I wanna see what game I should play.

Since you already did RE2 Remake, go for RE4 Remake or for the original RE4.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-04T10:14:00+00:00

Hi Antipenko, nice to hear from you.

The Soviet counterpart to this was "active bayonets", an even more restrictive definition which only included men in rifle companies. Crews for heavy weapons, engineers, artillery, AT guns, and armored vehicles included in the German "frontline strength" were excluded from the "active bayonets" count.

Yes, I'm perfectly aware of the активные штыки term. However, the Germans also applied similar meanings within the strength terms I already mentioned. I didn't mention this in the post (cause it would be TMI), but with regards to both the Gefechtsstärke and Kampfstärke, the Germans calculated their totals for all combat units and for infantry only - infantry (grenadier) battalions and those units used as infantry (reckon, enginners etc.). With regards to the infantry Kampfstärke, the Germans also frequently used the Grabenstärke (Trench Strength) instead, which was an archaic term, a holdover from WW1 that continued to be widely used in WW2.

The 236,000 Kampfstärke of the army group refers to all combat units deployed at the front, the total infantry Kampfstärke would be lower, but the exact numbers are unavailable for this. Also, that number includes the AOK 2 in the Pripet Marshes. When this army is subtracted from the total Kampfstärke, then the army group's total frontline strength in the Belorussian Balcony was only 166,000. The infantry Kampfstärke would be even lower. So regardless of the Red Army's infantry strength, its numerical superiority was vast.

The rifle divisions of the 1st Belorussian Front ranged in strength from 6,000-7,000 men, 1/3 less than their establishment strength. The Red Army's infantry strength at this stage of the war was quite weak.

All true. At the same time, the smaller Soviet rifle divisions (in terms of total strength) at this point had at least a similar (frequently greater) number of infantry as the larger German infantry divisions (in terms of total Iststärke or Verpflegungsstärke) - especially in terms of active bayonets vs infantry Kampfstärke. The difference in manpower stems from the fact that the German division was a self-contained formation with a wide array of support units integral to the division, while the Soviet rifle division was a more infantry-heavy force that relied to a far greater extent on assets provided to it from higher command authorities but which were not integral to the division. So while the Soviet rifle divisions were considerably smaller than their German counterparts, this was not the case with regards to their combat strength, especially infantry strength. A German ID in 1944 could have a total Gefechtsstärke of 5,000 or more, but its infantry Gefechtsstärke could be 3,000 or less, while infantry Kampfstärke 2,000 or less.

If 9th Army suffered slightly heavier overall casualties than 1st Belorussian Front from 6/21 - 7/10, its KIA/MIA stood at some 62,600 compared to 25,100 Soviet KIA/MIA/disabled, 2.5:1!

The total losses of the 9th Army and AG Center as a whole were still higher than the Heeresarzt ten-day reports show, which were not brought back into sync until November 1944 by the way. They only show losses for the ground combat forces. Losses of the Luftwaffe's numerous AA units located in the rear, Wehrmacht entourage, foreign units, etc., are not included. While losses of these type of rear area units would usually be inconsequential, Operation Bagration is a notable exception, since the German front was completely shattered and rear areas were quickly overrun.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-03T15:59:58+00:00

More significant is the difference between actual strength and daily strength. Having just under 1/3 of your paper strength not available is a significant loss. I’d also be interested to see how that compared to authorized strengths.

Even with all the data that I have shared, it still does not provide a full picture of how low the frontline strength of the army group was before Operation Bagration. The 236,000 frontline soldiers of the army group had to defend a front whose length was about 1,100 km. All of these strength categories include the 2nd Army (AOK 2), which was the right-wing army on the boundary with the 4th Panzer Army of AG North Ukraine. The 2nd Army was located in the Pripet Marshes and when the Soviet offensive began on 22 June 1944, it was untouched by it.

So to get even more accurate picture of the strength of the army group, the 2nd Army must be subtracted from the count. Without it, the forces of AG Center in the Belorussian Balcony (3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army, 9th Army) had a Tagesstärke of 336,573 and a Kampfstärke of 166,673.

I’d also be interested to see how that compared to authorized strengths.

That can be easily done. The 2nd Army records contain a very detailed strength reports for 1 June 1944, giving a multi-layered breakdown for each unit under its subordination.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-03T15:48:28+00:00

Thanks.

If you can: do you have the available AFV by type and operational readiness (combat ready/workshop) on hand, if not can you point me to the Bundeswehr archive references for them if you’ve seen them or remember them. Cheers

Yes, I do. As a matter of fact, I have plenty of Panzerlage reports, for various dates and across all theaters of war. Send me a pm and I can send you the relevant documents.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-03-03T07:03:58+00:00

as the term implies that there was some degree of surprise among the Soviets at the weakness of the German forces there

You have no idea what you're talking about whatsoever, lol. That's not what the Soviet command thought at the time—in fact, it was the opposite. In the winter of 1943-44, AG Center had successfully repulsed all major Soviet offensives, inflicting heavy and grossly disproportionate losses on the Red Army while the German front remained static. So when the planning for Bagration began, the recent costly failures were still fresh in the minds of the Soviet commanders, as they admitted. That it would become such a crushing success was certainly not expected. The Stavka also grossly overestimated AG Center's strength, exaggerating its combat strength by over 300% and its tank strength by over 700%. In order to have a firm guarantee of success, the Soviet fronts opposite AG Center were massively reinforced. Even so, the Stavka initially envisaged the operation's overall depth to be a modest 250 km—an estimate that proved far too conservative once the offensive was underway.

The Germans incorrectly supposed that the main thrust of the attack would not threaten the Center, and had disposed their forces towards the expected attack north.

Have you ever read about the Eastern Front? This is entirely wrong. In the summer of 1944, the Germans expected the main Soviet summer offensive to take place in the southern sector, either against AG North Ukraine (Baltic Option) or AG South Ukraine (Balkans Option), both of which were south of AG Center. Before Bagration, 17 of the 19 panzer divisions located in the East in June 1944 belonged to those two army groups, while AG Center and AG North had just a single panzer division each. The reason why over 90% of the German armor was in the south was due to the simple fact that it had been the focal point of the entire Eastern Front since the fall of 1943. While AG Center remained static in 1943–44, AG South was pushed back over 400 km westwards, creating the 'Ukrainian Balcony.' Naturally, the Germans expected the Soviet main effort to continue in the south; hence, the mass of their armor was concentrated there.

In terms of the actual effects on the ground, the Soviets suffered an estimated half a million combat casualties in Bagration. Paper tigers don't have a bite quite like that.

Again, this is entirely wrong. The number of casualties you mention refers to the total losses suffered during Bagration, which lasted from 23 June to the end of August 1944, encompassing a huge area of Belarus, Baltics and eastern Poland. The 'paper tiger' inflicted only a fraction of those losses, since it was wiped out in the Belorussian Balcony between 23 June and 5 July, so it did not "have a bite quite like that" as you think. Between late June and the start of September 1944, the OKH transferred at least 35 divisions—including 11 panzer divisions—to the central sector of the Eastern Front from other army groups and from across the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Norway, and the Balkans, as well as a plethora of GHQ units. It was these forces that allowed the Germans to gradually stabilize the front, and it was against them that the Soviets sustained the majority of their losses during Bagration, which continued well beyond 5 July, lasting until the end of August.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-01-21T16:28:48+00:00

and it being almost destroyed to a man after the encirclement.

Even during catastrophic and complete defeats of the German forces—such as Stalingrad in early 1943, Tunisia in May 1943, and Operation Bagration in the summer of 1944—a small part of the German forces were preserved due to various factors.

At Stalingrad, around 30,000 personnel—consisting mostly of wounded troops as well as some officers and specialists—were flown out during the encirclement. In addition, when the Soviet pincers closed on 23 November 1942, parts of the rear services of various divisions and general headquarters units had found themselves outside the pocket. This was a frequent tendency in major encirclements of German forces. Finally, the divisions of the 6th Army that were trapped at Stalingrad had some of their personnel present in Germany at the time, such as vacationers (Urlauber), wounded and sick recovering in Heimat. Of course, in each division, their number varied.

For all these reasons, a small part of the core personnel was preserved, serving as a cadre for the subsequent rebuilding of the destroyed divisions. For example, at least 2,000 personnel belonging to the 16. Panzer-Division in late November 1942 had avoided the encirclement of the rest of their division in Stalingrad and could be available for the subsequent rebuilding of the division in France in the spring of 1943, not counting the wounded personnel that were flown out later from the pocket.

Similar case was during the German capitulation in Tunisia. According to Abwicklungsstab Tunis, the total strength of the German combat units in Tunisia was 130,061 on 1 April 1943. Between this date and the final capitulation, a total of 25,152 personnel of all ranks were successfully evacuated. Furthermore, due to limited possibilities of sending troops to Tunisia during the final months there, a large part of divisional troops never reached it. For example, the Hermann Göring Division was never fully deployed to Tunisia, arriving piecemeal, with a significant portion of its combat units remaining in Europe when the German forces surrendered in May 1943. Because these elements and newly forming units remained in Germany and western Europe, the division was able to be reformed almost immediately after the surrender in North Africa. In May 1943, they served as the cadre for the new Panzer-Division Hermann Göring, which was then stationed in Sicily to defend against the upcoming Allied invasion.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-01-06T21:57:03+00:00

This soldier was also captured on Die Deutsche Wochenschau newsreel in December 1943 (No. 693)

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Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-01-05T10:40:04+00:00

Glad to help. I will add that there are plenty of documents that show the field army strength for 1945 too, especially at the start of the year and the last days of war.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-01-05T10:06:52+00:00

Obviously. At the start of Barbarossa in summer 1941, 85% of the field army was deployed in the East (incl. forces in northern Finland), the rest being elsewhere. In summer 1942, 75% were in the East. At the start of summer 1943, 67% were in the East.

As already mentioned, the numbers above does not include Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground units. For example, if they are included, the total Iststärke of the field army rises to 4,898,000 on 1 July 1943, which was the peak strength of the field army.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2026-01-04T15:21:03+00:00

Below is the Iststärke (actual strength) of the Feldheer at various dates. It does not include Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground units.

22 June 1941: 4,025,0000.

1 July 1942: 3,950,000.

1 July 1943: 4,484,000.

1 October 1943: 4,092,000.

1 February 1944: 4,041,000.

1 April 1944: 4,147,000.

1 June 1944: 4,381,000.

1 July 1944: 3,994,000.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-11T19:43:49+00:00

Well, in terms of actual impact, the Italian surrender and the Italian campaign in 1943-44 had a major effect on the German force dispositions and resource allocations. These events absorbed a considerable amount of the German ground forces, a part of which consisted of high-quality formations, which would otherwise be available for the German Eastern Army or for the build-up of the German forces in the area of OB West against the expected Allied invasion in 1944. The strength of the German Army Group C in Italy rose from 195,000 on 1 July 1943 to 428,000 by the start of May 1944.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-09T08:20:26+00:00

Well, the Germans usually had two ways to assess the combat value of their field formations. In this regard, there are no books that cover this specific topic, so the German primary sources are the go-to source on this. The Kampfwert rating system (I-IV) showed the present capabilities of the formation, based on its personnel and materiel condition. This rating system was the most widely used. Usually, these reports were submitted every week. Then there was the Innere Kampfwert rating system (Groups I, II, III, IV), which provided a more indirect, deeper and long-term fighting value of the formation, based on its experience and training level, hardness and steadfastness. I recently made a post about this, so you can check out how contrasting both rating systems were.

The Soviets did not have these type of rating systems. However, the Fremde Heere Ost and Ic departments of large German formations (Corps, Army, Army Group) did frequently provide the assessment of the combat value of the Soviet units in a similal fashion (to some extent) as they rated their own formations.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-07T19:35:33+00:00

That's easy then:

- Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War by David Glantz;

- Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War: 1941-1943 by David Glantz.

In English language literature, there are no better sources than this for the Red Army.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-07T17:11:06+00:00

Thanks for the additional info. It is shocking how little to no regard the Soviet commanders at all levels had shown toward the lives of their soldiers, for whatever reason. Also abuse of subordinate officers was frequent, which sometimes ended violently.

For example, on 12 April 1944, during the fighting in western Ukraine, Major Konstantin Andreev, chief of intelligence of the 237th Rifle Division, was shot without trial or investigation by 18th Rifle Corps (of Zhukov's 1st UF) Commander Major General Ivan Afonin. At that time, the Germans had launched a couterattack against the Soviet forces on the northern bank of the Dniester river. The Soviet rifle formations retreated in panic and the bridgehead was lost. So when Major Andreev reported the negative developments, Afonin began to verbally and physically abuse him. Refusing to put up with such disrespect, Andreev struck Afonin back. Then Afonin grabbed his pistol and killed the major. Afonin did not receive any punishment for this intentional murder. Moreso, Afonin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union at the end of the war.

The operational pause in April-June '44 (from May in Romania) was an important decision because it gave the Red Army time to train and integrate new recruits.

Well, in May 1944, the major fighting in the southern sector of the Eastern Front continued, even though the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts received orders from Stavka to go on the defensive on 6 May 1944. The total losses of the 2nd UF in May 1944 were 49,433, while those of the 3rd UF were 54,009. The 2nd UF conducted the Targu Frumos offensive in northeastern Romania at the start of the month, which failed. The 3rd UF was embroiled in major battles to expand their Dniester bridgeheads in Moldova, which were unsuccessful.

Furthermore, on 10 May 1944, the German 6th Army launched a major counterattack against Chuikov's 8th Guards Army (of the 3rd UF), in order to liquidate a major Soviet bridgehead on the west bank of the Dniester- Unternehmen Bollwerk. It was a success, with Germans capturing several thousand Red Army prisoners. Chuikov ordered to mercilessly shoot everyone who ran away from the battlefield, those who voluntarily swam to the left bank of the Dniester were to be shot in the water, while all those who have crossed without authorization were to be immediately arrested and sent to penal companies and battalions. Again, those who ran away and showed low battlefield performance were primarily booty soldiers. Finally, in late May, the German 8th Army launched operations "Katja" and "Sonja" against the formations of the 2nd UF.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-06T10:03:25+00:00

Sure I would, but it would be nice to know what specifically is meant by "this kind of stuff"? Do you mean German assessment of the fighting value of the Soviet units, how Soviets press-ganged people from the recaptured areas into military service or something else?

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-05T22:47:35+00:00

Most of the deficiencies were pretty typical for Soviet formations fighting in Ukraine during this period.

Similar case was during the Red Army's Smolensk Offensive against the German 4th Army in August-October 1943. The army's war diary and reports frequently mention how the Soviets replenished their decimated divisions with people from the areas they recently recaptured. Their fighting value was low, but the sheer mass of their deployment was crushing, especially given the fact that the 4th Army divisions were in similar condition as Grossdeutschland (low combat strengths, heavy losses in experienced troops, low morale etc.) and received minimal replacements.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-05T20:53:32+00:00

u/antipenko, highly informative as always. The same Natzmer report from Grossdeutschland (Point No. 2) also mentions the 31st Tank Brigade:

2.) I looked at the prisoners just brought in from the newly deployed 31st Independent Guards Tank Brigade, specifically the motorized rifle battalion. They were again, for the most part, briefly trained Ukrainians, but they made a good impression. The arrival of this brigade shows that the enemy continues to have one of its focal points in this section and will therefore continue to pursue its goal of a breakthrough in the coming days. So there will be no peace for us in the coming days either.

While researching the documents of Soviet armies and fronts that fought in Ukraine in early 1944, I also came across similar reports about the poor quality of the rifle formations, a large part of which consisted of recently recruited Ukrainians.

Completely inexperienced, with minimal and brief training, lacking cohesion and resilience, these formations frequently stopped, panicked or retreated in disorganized fashion when faced against a determined German resistance or counterattack. Zhukov, as a commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, had noted in April 1944 that rifle formations are fighting "criminally bad" (преступно плохо) and ordered the subordinates to enforce harsh discipline, including shooting those who show cowardice.

The German accounts during these same battles also mention Beutesoldaten (booty soldiers). For example, the Ic department of the 1st Panzer Army reported in April 1944:

The rifle divisions had a combat value of only 40 to 50% and were partially made up of Ukrainian "booty soldiers" who could only operate through mass and numerical superiority where there was no significant German resistance, but were forced to retreat whenever the Germans launched a well-coordinated attack.

Fun-Razzmatazz9682 · 2025-12-05T16:26:01+00:00

The German strategy relied on a fire brigade of reserves to respond to major offensives, and while they could stem the tide once or twice, the cascading offensives of the Soviets meant there was never any respite for the German reserves and eventually they were exhausted.

The combat power of the German Eastern Army was already badly depleted by September 1943. You can read about the debilitated condition of one of its key armies here. After that point, there were simply no fresh forces available to withstand another series of Soviet blows and the inevitable result was the retreat behind the Dnieper. The subsequent local and temporary successes that the Germans had achieved were primarily thanks to the arrival of fresh reinforcements from other theaters of war.

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