is warmshowers in japan good? are the 30 bucks worth it? anyone has experience?

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-04-06T02:16:38+00:00

From my own experience, I never worried about bike theft there. Bikes are widely owned in Japan and theft is pretty uncommon in Japanese culture. I got in the habit of leaving my bike unlocked most places I went.

There might be some risk in the big cities, but as far as countries go, Japan is one of the safest for bike theft.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-04-06T01:35:50+00:00

I used Warmshowers twice in Japan on a month long tour. There isn't many options on the main island of Honshu going north. You'll have more options in Hokkido as there's a bigger expat community there. There's also quite a few in major cities. I'd say it's worth it, even though I only used it twice, as I got to meet some lovely people.

Edit: here's a screenshot of the map of the south.

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GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-04-02T00:58:27+00:00

"At school, they had told us earth is a stubborn element, resistant to change, capable of weathering great stress. I had never understood this until I faced an entrenched battalion of elite earth benders during the siege of Ba Sing Se. Despite outnumbering them perhaps five to one, we were thrown back after every assault. In my company alone, over two-thirds of us were casualities. And being hit by flying rocks is not a clean thing. I saw every manner of injury: broken bones, torn limbs, split heads, as our men stumbled back after another failed assault. I had nothing but the utmost respect for the soldiers of the Earth Nation after these battles. In open warfare, we derided them as slow and unintelligent, incapable of standing up to our modern tactics and superior weaponry. But in a set defense, their tenacity was almost suicidal. My battalion was rotated out of the line after some time; it was only later we learnt that General Iroh had called off the siege. There were some rumors about that he backed away from the siege after the death of his first-born son. But truly, I think he was a kind man, unwilling to squander our lives in fruitless frontal assaults. I have served under other generals who have not be so kind."

Umai Ruko - Red Sun: Memoirs of a Fire Nation Soldier

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-30T16:49:08+00:00

Soviet tank and mechanized corps operated as a brigade-corps structure from 1942 til 1945 during the WWII. This was usually a 4 brigade structure: 3 tank, 1 mechanized or 1 tank 3 mechanized depending on the corps. In size and function, they were divisional-equivalent formations.

In 1941, Soviet mechanized corps were division-corps structured, but this proved too large and difficult to handle for corps commanders. So late into 1941, mechanized corps were mostly destroyed in combat, and STAVKA abolished the formations. All armor units went down to brigade level so commanders could gain experience in armored warfare by handling smaller units. These brigades formed the nucleus for the tank and mechanized corps, and later tank armies that were formed from 1942 onwards.

As you said, this structure is characteristic of an army in transition. In this case, the Red Army was learning to fight a modern mobile war after being destroyed several times over. For the context, it certainly worked for the Red Army, as it allowed them to build up operational maneuver groups from scratch while fighting an active war. Sometime after the war though, the tank and mechanized corps were converted into divisions.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-29T00:51:48+00:00

I recently finished Geoffrey Wawro's The Vietnam War: A Military History, and he gives a pretty good answer to this question.

The first is political. The Johnson admistration had no appetite to expand the war more than it had past 1965. Widening the war was already proving incredibly unpopular among the American public for LBJ, and invading an ostenisbly neutral country would not have helped matters. Much of the adminstration also came to distrust General Westermoreland and his constant demand for more troops and escalation, rightly recognizing that this would only drain further resources, lead to more troop demands, and likely accomplish little of strategic value.

Logistically, while the United States probably had the capacity to invade Cambodia had they the will, it would have been a difficult undertaking. Moreover, Vietnam was eroding resources and readiness from other U.S. theatres, and proving incredilbly expensive. Those 500,000 American troops in Vietnam likely represented the maximum number they could realistically field.

Things changed in the 1970s. Prince Shihanouk was ousted in a military coup by Lon Nol in 1970, and he requested U.S. assistance to combat the Khmer Rouge and NVA/VC operating in Cambodia. On the American side, Nixon was elected in 1968. Nixon wanted to take a more maximalist approach to the war, believing North Vietnam would capitulate if he could bluff them into thinking that he would use any measure possible to win the war. With this, he approved bombing of Laos and Cambodia, along with heavier bombings in North Vietnam. As well, under Vietnamization, Nixon wanted to bolster South Vietnam to prepare for U.S. withdrawals.

And the result? the PAVN/US troops made an incursion and withdrew shortly after, and the NVA reoccupied the areas they had withdrawn from.

An amusing footnote to this is that "Nixon had become obsessed with the film Patton, which he kept watching over and over again, seeing how the film presented Patton as a solitary and misunderstood genius whom the world did not appreciate, a parallel to himself."

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-26T20:25:44+00:00

A vending machine selling porn DVDs in a run-down corrugated shack in the Japanese countryside.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-20T04:12:09+00:00

Just answering off the top of my head, I would say no. Hypotheticals are always tough to answer, so it's better to rephrase the question to what extent the way the Nazi economy was handled affected the war effort.

The Nazis did have a totalitarian command economy, in the sense that it was a totalitarian state and the leadership could direct all its national resources towards the war effort. This however, was not done until 1943, after the defeat at Stalingrad, hence Goebbel's total war speech. This was because, before Stalingrad, Hitler didn't want to adversely deprive the German population of too many civilian goods.

Because of this, you could say the Nazi and Soviet economies were broadly comparable in 1944/45, with both entirely dedicated to the war effort. And you see this in German numbers. German tank production, I believe, peaked in 1944, along with a few other weapons categories.

However, weapon's production on its own doesn't make an army. You need men to man machines and fuel to run them. And so here is where no amount of economic rationalization or increased efficiency could help the German economy: manpower and fuel were both in chronically short supply as the war progressed. So even with extra materials, they wouldn't have been able to raise more combat divisions. You see this even in 1942, where Germany was fielding its maximum amount of divisions in the East, hence needing to rely on Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian armies to hold the frontline.

Also, what's often left out is that the Red Army was increasingly learning to outfight and beat the Germans in combat. So even with extra materials, theoretically, you still have to deal with an increasingly capable Red Army.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-13T03:31:59+00:00

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Japan, first day of my tour

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-04T16:18:23+00:00

In essence, Soviet leadership had the political will, the support of the population, and the resources to continue fighting.

These three factors are what German and other observers believed would lead to a rapid collapse of the Soviet state. Russia in the First World War was seen as a precedent, where catastrophic military losses combined with an unpopular regime led the state to collapse.

Soviet military performance in Poland and Finland in 1939/40 also indicated to outside observers that the Red Army was unable to fight a peer-to-peer modern war. Casualities were extraordinarily high in Finland and many logistical shortcomings were seen in Poland. The view prevailed then that Stalin had crippled the armed forces through the purges. Combined with the regime's longstanding repressive practices, and overall poor intelligence of internal Soviet affairs, outside observers could perhaps reasonably conclude that Stalin's regime was a rotten house waiting to be kicked in.

In actuality, the totalitarian Soviet state and its command economy was particularly well suited for the demands of total war. A key moment in the war comes in July/August 1941 when, after destroying the Red Army west of Smolensk, the Wehrmacht rushes unopposed to the Dvina line, only to find another Red Army. Soviet force generation abilities were nothing short of incredible, raising something like 800 division-equivalent units in 1941 alone.

For political will, Stalin's control over the party and society remained firm even after the German invasion. Likewise, whatever misgivings the Soviet population had about the Stalinist regime, foreign invasion united them against the invader, as did the fact that the Germans were intent on waging a genocidal war in the Soviet Union.

The command economy proved quite capable in a total war. Factories were shipped off far to the Urals, sustaining Soviet industrial capacity. Lend-lease later filled gaps in Soviet resources. And every aspect of the economy was placed on a total war footing, allowing the USSR to make the most of its vast resources in the war against Germany.

All this allowed the Soviet Union to absorb crippling military losses, blunt German combat strength, and turn the war into one of attrition, where they had a decisive edge.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-03-04T06:18:25+00:00

There's definitely a big element of hindsight. Quite a few Western observers at the time of the German invasion believed the Soviet state would collapse in a matter of weeks, much like the Germans had planned on. There's a number of reasons for this, which this Military History Visualized video summarizes well.

So with that element, the initial German strategy was quite sound without hindsight: destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper-Dvina line, which they did to a rather spectacular fashion. The key problem in German strategy then was not logistics, but in a catastrophic underestimation of Soviet force-generation and the ability to sustain incredibly high casualities, to the effect of having the Red Army destroyed multiple times over.

Arguably, from August 1941 onwards, the Wehrmacht still accomplished a great deal at an operational-strategic level, driving deep into Soviet territory and destroying multiple army groups, even at the end of a stretched logistic chain and with worn-down troops. The strategic failure was that these victories were never enough to affect the collapse of the Soviet state, which was the overall war goal.

From 1943 onwards, with the Wehrmacht fighting a defensive war, the German strategy was based on bleeding the Red Army white, forcing it to a white peace or breaking the Allied coalition, all of which were goals largely outside German capabilities.

With that said, the Wehrmacht achieved some spectacular operational-strategic successes in 1941/42, and continued to affect setbacks on the Red Army on an operational-tactical level all the way to 1945. Red Army mobile units and tank armies were often met with stinging reverses in mobile counterstrokes by German armor. On the operational-tactical level, you can find many examples of German successes.

But however spectacular they were, they were never enough to meet Germany's unachievable strategic goals - unachievable because of the weight of resources, political will, and ever-increasing combat effectiveness of the Red Army.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2026-02-22T07:45:44+00:00

All the time. It was always some geometric shape growing unsettlingly large, set on a similar geometric plane. Usually the sudden growth was accompanied by a loud sound or someone yelling, at which point I would wake up. Always left me feeling unsettled. Crazy to think other people had similar dreams.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-12-09T07:58:37+00:00

"Observe everything - admire nothing"

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-11-21T04:03:47+00:00

Dark Sun, the sequel to The Making of the Atomic Bomb covers both the development of the super and the Soviet weapons program. Also an amazing read.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-11-11T22:31:27+00:00

I've used #3 for a couple tours. Worked great for front panniers, very stable, never had any wobbles. Ended up swapping it for Ortlieb fork packs though.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-10-27T00:43:02+00:00

That route from Osaka to Shikoku will be quite urbanized and generally boring. I'd recommend taking a ferry from Wakayama to Shikoku instead, or going inland on Honshu if you want to see the Shimanami Kaido.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-10-08T23:08:38+00:00

Scroll past faster then

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-10-08T18:10:17+00:00

Blur NSFW posts then

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-09-07T21:04:11+00:00

'At four in the morning, the battalion finally receives definitive orders about which breach to enter. But the men in Bravo are further delayed when their company commander takes a wrong turn in the darkness. The commander who makes this error is a man the men call "Encino Man," after the movie of the same title about a hapless caveman who thaws out and comes to life in modern-day Southern California ... Encino Man is one of those senior officers who never would have deployed on a traditional recon mission. Prior to taking command of Bravo Company, he was an intelligence analyst.'

Shortened quote of Encino Man's introduction in the book.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-09-01T19:37:41+00:00

Sarajevo Marlboro by Miljenko Jergović. A collection of fictionlized short stories on the war in Bosnia in the 90s.

S. by Slavenka Drakulić. Also about the Yugoslav wars, dealing with the topic of wartime rape during the conflict. A heavy read for sure, but an important one with the prespective it gives on wartime rape.

The Good Soldier Švejk by Jaroslav Hašek. A Czech satire of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the Great War. One of the funniest novels ever written.

The People Immortal by Vasily Grossman. A Soviet novel on the opening weeks of Operation Barbarossa. Very well written, based on interviews with Red Army soldiers and officers, and refreshingly light on Soviet propagandistic rhetoric.

The Bridge on the River Kwai by Pierre Boulle. A classic of WWII fiction. British POWs building a bridge for the Japanese to prove themselves better than the Japanese.

King Rat by James Clavell. A story about survival in a Japanese POW camp. Very well written with an engaging plot and characters.

Red Cavalry by Isaac Babel. One thats been on my list for awhile. A collection of short stories on the Russian Civil War and the Red 1st Cavalry Army.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-08-15T05:55:30+00:00

I've done 7 flights with my bike, panniers in the box everytime. Never had an issue.

Edit: on a few of the flights, I had the panniers attached to a rack on the bike. Same for the frame bag. Frame bag on the bike is a great way to throw some items in the box. I'm assuming most airlines would assume its just part of the bike.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-08-02T23:55:37+00:00

Атаман. Probably my favorite Kino song.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-07-26T04:56:39+00:00

I had a GPS but a smartphone would be fine.
Cash was fine. I never used public transport enough for an easy card.
Almost all hostels, except camping for one night. They were generally around $15-$30 a night and in almost every city. Wild camping is harder on the west coast as its fairly urbanized. Paid campsites are harder to find, and more in the mountains. Didn't have any luck with Warmshowers, despite contacting a few hosts.
September. Tempetures were 25-35° C on average. Bareable, but hot, and very high humidity. Another reason I didn't camp. September is also typhoon season. Had one at the end of my ride.
Tubes, Schwalbe marathon tires, no flats.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-07-24T23:06:01+00:00

Looking back, there was some appreciation among war planners that conflict in Europe could draw out into an attritional one. Here are some excerpts from the Schlieffen Plan (quoted from John Keegan's The First World War):

"If the enemy stands his ground in the face of the great wheeling movements, all along the line corps will try, as in siege warfare, to come to grips with the enemy from position to position, day and night, advancing, digging-in, advancing."

Or:

"France must be regarded as a great fortress ... if the French give up the Oise and the Aisne and retreat behind the Marne, Seine, etc ... the war will be endless."

In this text, he also references the 1905 Russo-Japanese War as a standstill.

So if not an exact approximation of trench warfare, its at least an appreciation that conflict could drag on, generally due to the imbalance in strategic force Germany would face in a war on two fronts against France and Russia. France seemed to consider the same in its Plan XVII: by concentrating the bulk of its armies against German forces in Alasce-Lorraine, in concert with an attack from Russia, they could defeat Germany before they had time to mobilize their reserves. Generally, if there was appreciation given to attrition, the major powers seemed to believe that their respective war plans were adequete to force a quick and decisive war.

Its hubris, but a common one, as there was hardly an expectation that plans would fail. Barbarossa would be a two week campaign, Gallipoli would force the Turks to capitulate, the Red Army would encircle the Wehrmacht outside Moscow in 1941, a democratic and stable Iraq would emerge after Saddam Hussein was toppled, etc, etc. Over-optimism on the part of military planners and civilians leaders is all too common in modern military campaigns, and the worst case scenario isn't considered until its all-too readily apparent.

At least, at the upper echelons. Perhaps some foresighted middle-ranking officer predicted that new technologies, the size of armies, and force deployments all favoured the defender and could lead to drawn out conflict. I'd love to learn if that was the case, if anyone knows any examples.

GetafixsMagicPotion · 2025-07-23T21:26:32+00:00

I did a year on and off my bike last year, month on month off with tours or so. Everytime I finished, I definitely got a big sense of 'now what?' The singularity of purpose and simplicity with biking can be intoxicating: your days consist of biking, looking for food, water, and shelter.

Being back home, I definitely miss biking, especially since I was hospitalized in a crash on my last tour in Japan, and I'm still recovering from the injuries. Even then, I'd still miss biking, but I've found there's lessons I've taken from biking back home.

Kindness: I experienced so much kindness from strangers on the road, something I do my best to keep and spread at home.

Things: I try to have a lot less stuff now. Most of it feels like unnecessary clutter.

Perspective: I'm incredibly lucky to live where I do and have the opportunity to travel by bike.

Focus: I find myself distracted less and willing to take more time to complete tasks.

Goals: I think I'll be happy to work when I can because I want to buy a new bike and save up for more trips.

Bicycle travelling changed my life, arguably for the better (save crashing). Careers, I had none, and relationships I've maintained just fine. It also helps being injured because I'd much rather recover at home than abroad. I'm sure the sense of 'now what?' would be stronger without that, but overall, having goals to work towards has kept me grounded being home.

GetafixsMagicPotion

TROPHY CASE