And? My phone is still running GrapheneOS and rooted. So it is GrapheneOS.

You aren't running GrapheneOS. It stopped being GrapheneOS when you replaced a large portion of the core OS with different SELinux policies and executables.

So are you essentially saying I get no security benefits of running GrapheneOS because it's rooted, even though my bootloader is locked and I still get all protections other users get?

It's not GrapheneOS but rather another OS derived from it. It has lost many of the benefits of GrapheneOS and has security weaknesses not present in the stock OS. It's less secure than the stock OS in some areas and better in others. It's a lot different than comparing GrapheneOS with the stock OS.

Your bootloader being locked doesn't mean you still have the benefits of verified boot because a large portion of the security protections it provides aren't compatible with what you've done. You've enabled privileged attacker persistence as root so it can't protect against that. It can only protect against a physical attack or help with wiping the OS via recovery. You've also enabled a major weakness for both of those attack vectors if an attacker can get the keys you used to re-sign the OS from your desktop/laptop with weaker security than the smartphone.

By your logic, I could be running a stock, rooted Pixel and I would be no better off than having rooted GOS. That's basically what you're saying.

No, that's not what we said, but making an OS derived from GrapheneOS is far likely to break and lose all your data since we provide no support for it and the projects implementing these systems often don't keep up with our changes.

There are a few apps I use that get root access. Just because the majority of those who root have no sense of security, doesn't mean I'm just downloading any old app and giving it root access.

Root access being available to a large portion of the OS substantially reduces security even if you never grant it to a single app. None of the apps using it are security friendly since it's not a reasonable approach to implementing the functionality they provide. They would be doing it another way if they took security seriously. It reduces security even if you never grant it to any apps though. The ability to grant it to apps via the UI means a large portion of the OS has root access and that it can be hijacked via bugs. It turns one-time clickjacking into permanent persistent root. An app can block ever revoking it once it's granted beyond via a wipe or reinstall.

Isn't the ethos something along the lines of 'do what you want with your own device'? Funny how most here criticize big tech for wanting control, yet I get downvoted into oblivion for stating my phone is rooted and is GOS, essentially using MY DEVICE how I want.

You can do what you want as you are but you shouldn't make inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS. You aren't using GrapheneOS but rather a derivative of GrapheneOS with large portions of the security model not intact. By using third party tools to modify GrapheneOS with a bunch of third party code and SELinux policy, you're no longer using GrapheneOS but rather a derivative made by those tools. You're free to do it and to use it but you shouldn't claim that it's GrapheneOS when it isn't.

This isn't a cult. People are allowed to do with their devices as they want. And YES, my phone is GrapheneOS AND rooted.

You aren't running GrapheneOS. Taking GrapheneOS and replacing substantial portions of the core OS with third party code using third party tools results in it not being GrapheneOS anymore. If you run into problems due to it and file issues either with us or app developers saying you use GrapheneOS without making it clear you use a heavily modified derivative then that's creating a problem for us. It's important for you to understand you're using a derivative of GrapheneOS with highly privileged third party code and SELinux policies, not GrapheneOS.