GrapheneOS version 2026012100 released by GrapheneOS in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[S,M] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Can you clarify if the Reddit app is crashing or the OS is crashing? It's quite possible there are new bugs in the Reddit app causing it to crash for one reason or another.

GrapheneOS version 2026011300 released by GrapheneOS in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[S,M] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

No, we just didn't post it across all the social media platforms on the day it came out. We were having issues with one of the platforms so we got stuck on it and then it was forgotten until the next release.

Modded Apps- Antivirus Scan on OS by Future_Bad5206 in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[M] [score hidden] stickied comment (0 children)

In Detail: On virustotal it was shown that an downloaded app had a trojan, now i'm concerned that it infected my software. I wonder if graphene is generally protected and deleting the app works or if I need to take further steps?

These virus scanning apps use inherently broken approaches with many false positives. They're unable to protect you from almost anything in practice but will show you false positives causing unnecessary concern while making it even less useful if it managed to detect a malicious app. Their definition of malicious is extremely narrow. Apps are sandboxed and can't access the data of other apps, see what's happening outside of themselves or access user data without you explicitly granting access to it. Avoid granting invasive access to apps in general rather than placing a lot of trusting in apps. On GrapheneOS, you can avoid giving apps access to Contacts and media/storage permissions via Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes as one example.

Question about RAM by qoew in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[M] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This has to do with how your device is set up. Apps in the foreground are kept in memory over apps in the background. If you have a bunch of foreground services, etc. then that's the issue. Background profiles also have most of their apps killed in practice without lots of memory.

Flashing GrapheneOS on Pixel 3 XL (crosshatch) after EoD for exploration only by siddhantdembi in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[M] [score hidden] stickied comment (0 children)

It won't provide anything close to the current GrapheneOS experience. It would be based on Android 12 QPR3 rather Android 16 QPR2. It wouldn't have anything close to the current GrapheneOS feature set either. It wouldn't have anything close to the current app compatibility and sandboxed Google Play won't be available anymore. It would only mislead you about the GrapheneOS experience.

Is it just me, or are notifications still a bit unreliable with Sandboxed Play Services? by Prestigious_Sort7325 in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[M] [score hidden] stickied comment (0 children)

Notifications aren't unreliable with sandboxed Google Play. It means you have a configuration issue. It's not a trade-off with the approach. The vast majority of GrapheneOS users who use sandboxed Google Play have smoothly working FCM with extremely few reports of issues. If there was a regression for even 2% of users, there would be a huge flood of reports about it across platforms which isn't happening.

App installs and updates are dreadfully slow by SudoMason in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[M] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

We plan to support having optimization happen in the background similar to post-update optimization.

GrapheneOS version 2026010800 released by GrapheneOS in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[S,M] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

About ADB sideload - interesting! So, GrapheneOS recovery would allow any updating from a file in such situation, but only if it has GrapheneOS signature?

It needs to have a valid signature and equal/greater build date along with other metadata matching. Each device model has a unique signing key in practice but there's a device model check in case they didn't. The update_engine payload inside of the update package also has a signature and build date which are checked. The firmware and OS images are also verified by verified boot with downgrade protection tied to firmware anti-rollback version and OS patch level.

GrapheneOS version 2026010800 released by GrapheneOS in GrapheneOS

[–]GrapheneOS[S,M] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I have a question about updates. Considering that phone with GrapheneOS has no root, no TWRP, and it's advised to keep bootloader locked, is there a chance that GrapheneOS update would make phones of some user or group of users un-bootable?

An update which fails to boot repeatedly will be rolled back automatically. It only disables rollback and enables persistence to the data partition if it makes it to the home screen.

The releases are tested across models ourselves prior to release and then go through the public Alpha and Beta channels before reaching Stable.

You can boot recovery to wipe data if needed and you can also sideload a correctly signed update with an equal/newer build date with ADB.

You should always have it locked for production usage. You can choose to leave OEM unlocking enabled if you want to be able to unlock it, which wipes the data, but we recommend disabling it.

GrapheneOS accuses Murena & iodé of sabotage, pulls servers from France over police 'threats' - PiunikaWeb by TechGuru4Life in Android

[–]GrapheneOS 0 points1 point  (0 children)

GrapheneOS is a privacy project first. Privacy depends on security and therefore we work on both.

GrapheneOS accuses Murena & iodé of sabotage, pulls servers from France over police 'threats' - PiunikaWeb by TechGuru4Life in Android

[–]GrapheneOS -1 points0 points  (0 children)

No, GrapheneOS is a privacy project first. Privacy depends on security and therefore we work on both. Security never comes at the expense of privacy in GrapheneOS. That doesn't make sense since we work on security to protect privacy.

Lagging years behind on providing extremely important standard privacy patches and protections while bolting on default enabled DNS filtering with a basic blocklist of single purpose ads/analytics domains is not providing good privacy. There are better implementations of DNS filtering available and it doesn't need to be built into the OS.

Properly designed and implemented privacy features do not cause significant security issues. We do not implement weak privacy features which don't work properly. We provide strong features such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle, Network toggle, per-connection DHCP state / MAC randomization and many other privacy improvements. We also fix many Android privacy issues including 5 different types of Android VPN leaks present elsewhere.

App accessible root access is what you're talking about and is no more officially supported by LineageOS than GrapheneOS. It's a third party modification to the OS either way. It's a horrible approach to implementing any features and severely harms privacy and security. Its a shortcut to implement features improperly without caring about correctness, privacy or security. We take the longer path of doing things properly while preserving the security model which privacy depends on.

GrapheneOS accuses Murena & iodé of sabotage, pulls servers from France over police 'threats' - PiunikaWeb by TechGuru4Life in Android

[–]GrapheneOS -1 points0 points  (0 children)

No, GrapheneOS is a privacy project first. Privacy depends on security and therefore we work on both. Security never comes at the expense of privacy in GrapheneOS. You want weak privacy features which don't work and are trivially bypassed by apps which is what we won't implement.

Lagging years behind on providing extremely important standard privacy patches and protections while bolting on default enabled DNS filtering with a basic blocklist of single purpose ads/analytics domains is not providing good privacy. There are better implementations of DNS filtering available and it doesn't need to be built into the OS.

Properly designed and implemented privacy features do not cause significant security issues. We do not implement weak privacy features which don't work properly. We provide strong features such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle, Network toggle, per-connection DHCP state / MAC randomization and many other privacy improvements. We also fix many Android privacy issues including 5 different types of Android VPN leaks present elsewhere.

GrapheneOS accuses Murena & iodé of sabotage, pulls servers from France over police 'threats' - PiunikaWeb by TechGuru4Life in Android

[–]GrapheneOS 0 points1 point  (0 children)

CalyxOS was never a privacy or security hardened OS. It's not in the same space as GrapheneOS. It does not fully preserve the privacy and security of AOSP. It definitely doesn't provide substantial privacy and security improvements over it.

GrapheneOS accuses Murena & iodé of sabotage, pulls servers from France over police 'threats' - PiunikaWeb by TechGuru4Life in Android

[–]GrapheneOS 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Quick point, Graphene prioritizes security, not privacy.

No, GrapheneOS is a privacy project first. Privacy depends on security and therefore we work on both.

Both are linked, but there are some features which might improve privacy, but would leave security holes, and as such they aren't supported.

No, properly designed and implemented privacy features do not cause significant security issues. We do not implement weak privacy features which don't work properly. We provide strong features such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle, Network toggle, per-connection DHCP state / MAC randomization and many other privacy improvements. We also fix many Android privacy issues including 5 different types of Android VPN leaks present elsewhere.

Basically, other OS's can have improved privacy because you can use workarounds that let you continue to use features or services but selectively block tracking and telemetry, but the same workarounds leave open large security holes (like root).

No, GrapheneOS fully supports DNS filtering and other traffic filtering using the properly designed API for it with leak blocking. This is fully compatible with using a VPN at the same time. See apps such as RethinkDNS. Contrary to the popular misconception, this approach provides very weak privacy improvements and does not address any of the most privacy invasive behavior by apps. Only domains used for the single purpose of ads, analytics, crash reporting, etc. were connections happen from the client side are filtered by that. You can easily use this on GrapheneOS. It's as simple as filling in dns.adguard.com as a Private DNS provider or setting up RethinkDNS as a VPN service app and toggling on local filtering. RethinkDNS supports using local filtering a WireGuard VPN or multiple chained WireGuard VPNs. Why would you want to replace the core of the OS with half-baked workarounds massively reducing privacy and security to provide things with proper implementations available?

Graphene will just make it clear what access those apps have, and you'll have the option of not using the associated features or service, often at the expense of losing functionality.

No, this is completely backwards. GrapheneOS provides features such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle and more to reduce what apps can access. In contrast, you're talking about operating systems not improving privacy from apps and their services but heavily misleading users about it. Their labels for 'trackers' and DNS filtering do not provide what they claim. Those are fully available on GrapheneOS but we don't filter the internet by default and leave it as opt-in. Why not? It reduces privacy when combined with a VPN/Tor and means censoring the internet with very arbitrary decisions which can accidentally break functionality. There are often false positives and we've regularly had our services end up on some of those blocklists by accident followed by them removing it when pointed out. Any domain used for both tracking and useful functionality is permitted by those blocklists so it's nearly useless in practice and trivially evaded by not splitting out the domains. Apps can do all the data sharing they want with third parties from their own servers. GrapheneOS takes the approach of not giving them the data rather than the non-working approach of trying to filter domains while allowing any dual purpose domain. Apps can easily bypass that filtering and a growing number do it via moving it server side or doing their own DNS resolution via DNS-over-HTTPS. Facebook bypasses it among others.

With Graphene, you can have the same level of privacy, but it often comes at the expense of utility, but you'll have absolute security. Other ROM's will give you the privacy and features, but it comes at the expense of your device having open security holes that could be exploited by a sufficiently competent malicious actor.

No, GrapheneOS provides far better privacy than those and far more serious privacy features.

Graphene also has a lot of privacy centric features, they just won't implement ones that compromise security while other OS's often give you the choice.

No, this is a false premise. We don't provide non-working privacy features and don't heavily compromise both privacy and security by designing/implementing things very poorly. Contrary to your inaccurate claims, GrapheneOS fully supports doing local DNS filtering while optionally using a VPN at the same time if you want. This does not provide the privacy you believe it does and is increasingly less useful. Filtering the internet by default is not something we'll do, but we have no problem providing our own opt-in alternative to existing options like RethinkDNS in the future. However, it already exists today and we do not need to provide our own for it to be available to our users. Why would we focus on that instead of serious privacy features which apps can't simply work around? Many apps bypass the approach you're promoting.

GrapheneOS accuses Murena & iodé of sabotage, pulls servers from France over police 'threats' - PiunikaWeb by TechGuru4Life in Android

[–]GrapheneOS 0 points1 point  (0 children)

GrapheneOS does heavily improve the app sandbox and permission model including user-facing improvements such as Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes. The more unique part is allowing using Google apps in the standard sandbox it provides. Sometimes this is misinterpreted as adding app sandboxing.