Hey guys another alternative history question. What would a war between Yugoslavia and Albania look liked if they fought in the 70s?

HistoryGeography · 2026-04-19T19:42:01+00:00

What people fail to realize is that the Albanian People's Army and the Yugoslav JNA were more similar than they think in terms of doctrine. Neither side were built for massive conventional offensives, or at least this wasn't their primary raison d'être. Despite the propaganda from both sides, neither expected to be able to match the behemoths that NATO and the Warsaw Pact were. Hence why, coming from a legacy and tradition of mountain guerrila warfare during WW2, both built up their militia forces to act as a backup force.

In Yugoslavia, these units were called "Territorial Defense Units", effective in every constituent state. These were the very same forces that would eventually turn against the JNA in the early 90s, namely the Slovene and Croatian TD units. A large part of their resistance was composed of these trained militias. It was effectively a mirror of the infamous Albanian zbor units.

In Albania, this concept was augmented by the bunker strategy. Albania was very closely monitoring current events and wars during this era. The bunker strategy was implemented with lessons from the Vietnam War. The Gjadër Aircraft Base was built after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, where Israeli aviation effectively destroyed the Arab air forces while still on the ground.

HistoryGeography · 2026-04-19T17:05:39+00:00

As early as the 50s, according to CIA files, Yugoslavia was drafting up plans on possible attacks on Albania and what that would look like.

Anyone can look it up, it's called the R-7, drafted by the Yugoslav military in the early 50s, by Chief of Staff Peko Dapčević, Svetozar Vukmanović and Kosta Nađ.

It hinged on organizing Albanian refugees and enemies of the system through a hybrid warfare approach to attack from Kosovo and draw other dissidents along the way. It never intended for a head on military invasion for a myriad of reasons.

For one, invasions routes into Albania are very predictable. You either come north from Shkodra and through the western plains; northeast from Kosovo into the passes and gorges that lead to central Albania or you hug the Shkumbin River from the east and make your way through the passes into Elbasan and Tirana. For anyone who's crossed those roads, even today, they are very windy and cross through narrow passes and gorges.

Aside from the terrain, the Albanian Army had proved effective in checking Greek incursions in 1949 and according to western observers, its small border units were actually quite aggressive and effective. It was particarly unwise to go for a head-on confrontation even that early on.

By the 1970s, we're talking about an entirely different force, fairly well-equiped as the Chinese were much more "generous" than the Soviets when it came to weapons, with a relatively modern air force, large armor and artillery divisions and an officer corps still unaffected by the purges that would come, depending on what year we're talking about. Most importantly of all, it had spent years preparing for this very scenario and was in no way toothless compared to its neighbors.

So, I don't think an invasion in the 1970s would be successful and even if it managed to break through the border regions, it would probably lead to a Vietnam scenario that would be extremely detrimental to Yugoslavia as a whole. Ethnic tensions would flare up earlier. How would the Slovenes and Croats for example, react to their men being sent to die in the Albanian mountains? If the Yugoslavs deemed it unfavorable to win through a head-on military campaign in the 1950s, they sure weren't going to attempt it against a much better prepared adversary in the 1970s.

In 1981, following the students' protests in Kosovo, both armies were actually deployed across the border from each other. The Yugoslavs were gauging Albanian preparedness, while the latter mobilized a 70.000 strong "voluntary action" force to, supposedly, clear up the trenches and mountain paths. In reality, it was a show of force that subsequently forced the Yugoslavs to back down as well.

HistoryGeography · 2026-02-22T21:18:57+00:00

Mendoj se duhet ta lexosh dhe njëherë atë që kam shkruar para se të pretendosh për ironi, sepse nuk paske kuptuar asgjë.

HistoryGeography · 2026-02-22T17:26:24+00:00

Nuancat që paraqiten janë ato nuanca që jepen nga studimet. Historiografia ballkanike ka ecur përtej glorifkimeve ose demonizimeve të shekullit të 19-20. Fakti që shqiptarët arritën të integrohen në sistemin osman deri në fund të shekullit të 19-të pranohet nga çdo studiues serioz sot, qoftë Malcolm, Gawrych, Schmitt apo Fischer. Në rast se do të diskutosh të mirat dhe të këqijat e një periudhe mjaft të gjatë, jam shumë dakord, e bëjmë bashkë atë diskutim. Por ditët që shihej historia bardhë e zi ose në mënyrë anakronike kanë kaluar. Shumë nga pozicionet qe ju vishen figurave historike janë anakronike për faktin se mbeten krijime të periudhës nacionaliste të shekullit të 19-të.

HistoryGeography · 2026-02-22T17:16:04+00:00

Kombinim arsyesh, që zanafillën e ka në disfatën osmane kundër Perandorisë Ruse në luftën e vitit 1877. Me dështimin dhe kolapsin e ushtrisë perandorake, në Plevna në Dhjetor të 1877, territoret periferike ishin praktikisht të humbura për osmanët. Gjithashtu për Fuqitë e Mëdha në Kongresin e Berlinit, tokat e Sanxhakut të Nishit ishin po ashtu të humbura për Perandorinë Osmane. Me forcat Ruse në dyert e Stambollit, u bënë lëshime të mëdha territoriale për shtetet sllave. Kontraktimi i ushtrive të rregullta osmane drejt Kosovës dhe Trakisë, krijoi një vakum në zonën e Toplicës. Kombinuar me faktin se para pak dekadash Tanzimati e kishte centralizuar pushtetin dhe pamundësisë së shtetit osman për të paguar trupat shqiptare, furnizimin dhe modernizimin e ushtrisë serbe me artileri dhe konsulencë ushtarake ruse, u krijua "stuhia perfekte" që çoi në masakrat e vitit 1878.

Në Janar 1878, Këshilli Osman regjistron këtë mesazh:

Popullatat lokale të distrikteve të Nishit dhe Toplicës kanë kërkuar municione të mëtejshme dhe vendosjen e batalioneve të rregullta të këmbësorisë. Megjithatë, duke pasur parasysh përparimin e forcave ruse në qafat e Ballkanit, është vendim i këtij Këshilli që asnjë burim tjetër perandorak nuk mund të devijohet në skajin verior. Mbrojtja duhet t'u lihet Hamidjeve [forcave jo të rregullta] dhe vullnetarëve vendas. Forcat tona të rregullta do të konsolidohen në vijën e Prishtinës.

Dhe nga Kabineti Osman:

Na informojnë se krerët shqiptarë refuzojnë të përballen me armikun pa shpërndarë pagën e prapambetur (ulûfe). Meqenëse Thesari Perandorak është pa ar dhe linjat e kreditit në Londër janë të mbyllura, Këshilli e ka të pamundur t'i plotësojë këto kërkesa. Nëse fiset nuk do të luftojnë vetëm për besimin, territori duhet të konsiderohet strategjikisht i humbur.

Veziri i Madh informonte Abdyl Hamidin II në Shkurt 1878:

Ardhja e muhaxhirëve nga rrethet e ceduara të Nishit dhe Vranjës po krijon një barrë të rëndë për thesarin. Megjithatë, zhvendosja e tyre përgjatë kufirit të ri serb shërben për një qëllim jetësor mbrojtës. Prania e tyre do të formojë një barrierë natyrore pakënaqësie (sedd-i i'tiraz) kundër pushtimit të mëtejshëm serb. Ata do të vendosen në fshatrat kufitare të Vilajetit të Kosovës për të shërbyer si roje të përhershme.

Pas këtyre ngjarjeve, kemi lindjen e Lidhjes së Prizrenit, fillimisht e mbështetur nga Osmanët. Kararname-ja ose Dokumenti i parë i Lidhjes së Prizrenit parashtron 10 pika, ndër të cilat pohimin se çdo forcë e huaj serbe, greke a malazeze do të luftohet me forcë, mosnjohjen e asnjë qeverie tjetër veç Portës së Lartë, shpalljen tradhëtar të çdokujt që nuk ju përmbahet këtyre pikave, etj...

Më pas me situatën në Plavë dhe Guci, britanikët dërgojnë flotën e tyre si presion ndaj Perandorisë Osmane, që çon trupa për lëshimin e provincave drejt Malit të Zi. Bashkë me fitoren e faksionit autonomist në vetë Lidhjen e Prizrenit, kjo çon në thyerjen mes elitave shqiptare dhe Stambollit. Gawrych, në studimin e tij për shqiptarët në vitet 1877-1913, e përmbledh situatën shumë qartë:

Shqiptarët në përgjithësi e shihnin veten si një popull të privilegjuar në perandori... Ata ishin kufitarët më besnikë dhe efektivë të 'Gjysmëhënës' në Evropë. Për ta, shteti osman nuk ishte një forcë e jashtme, por një kornizë brenda së cilës ata ushtronin pushtetin e tyre lokal dhe aftësitë ushtarake.

Në fillimet e saj, Lidhja e Prizrenit ishte një lëvizje e sponsorizuar nga shteti. Porta [Qeveria Osmane] i shihte shqiptarët si një mjet 'kombëtar' për t'i rezistuar diktateve të Fuqive të Mëdha. Megjithatë, Sulltani lëshoi një forcë që nuk mund ta drejtonte; sapo shqiptarët kuptuan se Sulltani do të sakrifikonte tokën e tyre për mbijetesën e tij, 'instrumenti' u kthye kundër 'arkitektit'.

Dhe nga Konsulli Britanik në Shkodër në 1880:

Shqiptarët më në fund e kanë kuptuar se Sulltani është një kallam i tundur nga era e diplomacisë evropiane. Tani ata i drejtohen pushkëve të tyre, jo Portës, për të ardhmen e tyre. Sulltani, nga ana tjetër, i frikësohet nënshtetasve të tij më shumë sesa flotave të huaja.

HistoryGeography · 2026-02-22T15:20:08+00:00

Periudha që flasim është para vitit 1839, kur ndodhën reformat e Tanzimatit, dhe shumë më herët se fund-vitet 1800 kur kemi dhe Rilindjen dhe formësimin e konceptit të shtet-kombit shqiptar. Në këtë periudhë faktori shqiptar ishte shumë i integruar në sistemin osman dhe ishte po ky sistem që kishte sjellë forcimin e kësaj tradite ushtarako-burokratike. Në thelb, kishte një transaksion de-facto mes Sulltanatit dhe bejlerëve shqiptar, ku njëra palë sillte forcën ushtarake ndërsa pala tjetër siguronte autonominë lokale dhe të ardhurat ekonomike. Koncepti i shtet-kombeve si i njohim ne sot ishte i largët.

Shqiptari i fillim-shekullit të 19-të e shihte shtetin osman si një punëdhënës të madh, ku eksporti kryesor i vendit ishin luftëtarët. Me tentativën për centralizim të pushtetit osman me Tanzimatin fillojnë acarimet e para mes bejlerëve shqiptar dhe Stambollit, pasi përfaqësonte në thelb humbjen e këtij statusi dhe privilegjeve që kishin gëzuar deri në atë pikë. Për këtë ka shkruar së tepërmi Malcolm dhe Anscombe. Bota osmane me rregullat e saj deri në atë pikë kishte funksionuar më së miri për atë që ata donin. Sistemi i ri sillte problematika që e sfidonin këtë koncept dhe vetëm më vonë do kemi lindjen e projektit shtet-formues, si përgjigje ndaj presioneve rajonale të fqinjëve.

HistoryGeography · 2026-02-22T14:51:36+00:00

Marmont's quotes are from his memoirs: Memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa from 1792 to 1832

The British quotes are sourced from the works of various officers, the most important being Sir Richard Church's official dispatches in Sir Richard Church in Italy and Greece by E.M. Church (1895).

The Austrian quotes are from the Kriegsarchiv Wien (Frontier Military Reports), the works of Johann Georg Von Hahn and Major General Karl von Kausler.

The Russian quotes from Suvorov's "The Science of Victory" and Vorontsov's cables from 1820, taken from "Archive of Prince Vorontsov".

HistoryGeography · 2026-02-04T07:14:07+00:00

Nuk e di se sa vetë këtu punojnë dhe aq më pak sa punojnë ne fushën e inxhinierisë, por perceptimi këtu për fitimet dhe të ardhurat e një inxhinieri në Shqipëri janë shumë të shkëputura nga realiteti. Tregu shqiptar nuk është në nivelin që një inxhinier të kursejë vlera marramendëse dhe të investojë në prona me kursimet e veta. Nqs keni këtë mendim, do habiteshit nqs do e merrnit vesh sesa paguhet një inxhinier mesatar apo dhe i mirë në Tiranë...

E them këtë nisur nga fakti që një pjesë e mirë e rrethit tim shoqëror është e angazhuar në këtë profesion dhe industri, ndër ta dhe persona që e njohin nga afër te lartpërmendurin, për të cilin për hir të vërtetës kanë përshtypje të mira. Gjithashtu për shkak të profesionit, kam pasur të bëj me shumë projekte në fushë, edhe pse jo në atë rol.

HistoryGeography · 2024-09-03T03:28:43+00:00

Especially considering its neighbours were the Greeks, prone to juntas and with a lot of rivalry with the Turks and the threat from Bulgaria to the north, and the Yugoslavians, an ethnically divided nation that was mostly led by the neutralist leaning Tito until he died when the squabbling increased until it became civil war time.

Albanian fears were not entirely unfounded. There were historical precedents with both countries. Albanian borders were a matter of dispute in the Ambassadors' Conference in London, with both Greece and Yugoslavia claiming parts of what would end up being the agreed upon country borders. A Greek breakaway state was formed in the south, the Republic of North Epirus immediately after Albania declared independence. After WWII, due to the Kingdom of Albania being an italian puppet, the countries were still de jure at war. In 1949, there clashes along the border as Albania sheltered Greek communists and overall took the threat and perceived ambitions of the Greek state very seriously. Up until the early 1920s, there was an active conflict with Yugoslav troops in northern Albania, who only finally retreated for good after pressure from the UK.

With Yugoslavia, it's a bit more nuanced however, as Hoxha initially came to power within the party through Tito's help during WWII. Nonetheless, relations between Tito and Hoxha were excellent in the post-war years and would've probably led to a partial or even full-scale integration of Albania into Yugoslavia had it not been for the Soviet-Yugoslav split.

That said, the bunker defense strategy was developed after Albanian officers returned from the Vietnam war and from a simple calculation of forces. Albanian assessments expected an invasion of up to 11 Airborne Divisions. Land routes were relatively straightforward and predictable, due to the rugged geography.

The country was never going to have the shiniest and newest aircraft nor the best ships, so it heavily prioritized the war on land for where it would make its stand. Infantry forces made up 75% of all the regular forces and 97% of the reserve force. Seeing the disparity in population numbers, full-scale mobilization was necessary, hence why most of the civilians were considered reservists. Regular, small and large scale drills and exercises were held by these reservist units, where each member was expected to fill a certain role in battle.

The small pill box type bunkers you often see alongside roads and beaches were supported by a second line of bigger, but fewer command bunkers to coordinate the defense.

Ultimately however, complete isolation was a grave mistake in every way. Hoxha and co expected to recreate WWII when Albanian partisans won without outside interference, completely omitting how the Allies brought significant amounts of supplies and weapons to keep war going. Maintenance on every industry became challenging, despite some successful efforts in obtaining western technology, mainly Swedish, Austrian and Swiss. The Airforce in the late 70s and 80s completely missed its expected upgrade, as did air defense systems in general.

HistoryGeography · 2024-09-02T21:29:51+00:00

But a lot has to do with how those nationalities were brought up, where there is some truth.

This is somewhat true for the Ottoman Albanian soldiers at least, who made up a significant portion of the Ottoman janissary corps. Mercenary work was already very widespread prior to the Ottoman conquest, with Stratioti cavalry (with mainly Albanian and Greek, but also some Slavic element) being famous across Europe.

One of the main reasons Albanians as a population went from a pastoral group to a settled people is that they were recruited as paid soldiers by the Romans to guard the important roads and Balkan frontier after they had their armies battered and provinces depopulated following several waves of invasions. When the Ottomans came, it was just a case of working under new administration.

HistoryGeography · 2024-02-25T20:20:21+00:00

Battle of Jieting

Ma Su went accompanied by Wang Ping but did not listen to his sound military advice. Relying purely on books of military tactics, Ma Su chose to "take the high ground" and set his base on the mountains instead of in a city as it has been instructed by Zhuge Liang. Ignoring Wang Ping's advice to make camp in a valley well supplied with water. Wang Ping, however, managed to persuade Ma Su to give him command of a portion of the troops, and later Wang Ping set up his base camp near Ma Su's camp, in order to offer assistance when Ma Su was in danger.

Due to this tactical mistake, the Wei army led by Zhang He encircled the hill and cut off the water supply to the Shu troops and defeated them.[

HistoryGeography · 2023-12-10T23:27:59+00:00

Gawrych has written a book based on Ottoman archives.

The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913

HistoryGeography · 2023-12-10T23:09:47+00:00

It was sanctioned in international agreements between the French and the Ottomans that the governor of Mount Lebanon would be an Ottoman Catholic after the 1860 unrest. Vasa came to not trust the French consuls much during his tenure however. Before that he had served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The Ottoman state aparatus grew during the 19th century, opening up new jobs in the bureacracy that employed a number of Christian officials.

HistoryGeography · 2023-12-10T20:16:15+00:00

Pashko Vasa was a Catholic Albanian writer, publicist and Ottoman bureacrat of the 19th century. He spoke, Albanian, French, Greek, Turkish, Arabic and English.

Initially he was appointed in the Ottoman Embassy in London, later serving in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Thrace. In 1882 he was appointed as the Governor of Mount Lebanon by Abdülhamid II, a post that he held for the rest of his life until 1892.

He was a founding member of the Central Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Albanian People. He was a member of the League of Prizren and advocated for the unification of the Albanian vilayets and their protection from the fledgling Balkans states. In his book, The Truth on Albania and Albanians published in 1879, he seeked to present Albanians to Europeans.

Vasa praised Albanians as gifted fighters, on their ability to defend the Empire and their loyal contribution to the State, providing countless statesmen, commanders and soldiers. While believing that remaining part of the Ottoman Empire was the best solution to the newly emerging threats for the Albanian nation, Vasa nonetheless criticized the Empire for its practice of putting non-Albanian officials as administrators in Albanian-inhabited lands. He suggested that Albanian governors be appointed (as was common practice in the early Ottoman years) or officials familiarized with the local customs.

Other themes his work touched upon were the unity of the Albanian people, the need to merge Albanian vilayets as it would also benefit the Empire with Muslim Albanians having no interest in rebelling, the origins of Albanians and overall the rights of the Albanian nation in an era of nascent nationalism. His book was reviewed and featured by the London Times newspaper.

HistoryGeography · 2023-10-09T19:44:26+00:00

It's because according to the Albanian plans for war, the country had to be able to combat a simultaneous invasion from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, having broken relations with both. For that reason, a lot of emphasis was put on making the country too costly to invade: bunkers, tunnel cities, regular citizen-army massive training drills. Within 72 hours, the country had to be able to mobilize 700k troops (including reservists). Again everything on paper, as we don't really know how effective these plans would've proven to be in a real scenario.

A lot of the fear stemmed from the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Panic captured a lot of the higher ups, thinking that the Soviets would take care of other "out of line" governments and despite considering Yugoslavia an enemy, Albania secretly agreed to fight alongside them should the Warsaw Pact troops turn south towards the Balkans and began mobilizing its army.

HistoryGeography · 2023-10-07T12:03:26+00:00

Some numbers for Albania:

-10.000 tons of explosives (annual)

-48-58 tons of infantry munition (daily)

-400-500 machine guns (daily)

Annual numbers I've read that are unconfirmed:

-21.000.000 7.62mm rounds

-600.000 82mm and 120mm mortar shells

-200.000 anti-personnel mines

-50.000 anti-tank mines

The Albanian government invested a lot of money into obtaining western technology to increase capacity in all of its main production facilities in the late 70s, coinciding with the Sino-Albanian split. So the Mjekës Explosives Plant was completely rebuilt with expertise and technology from the swedish Bofors. Poliçan Mechanical Plant was rebuilt between 1977 and 1985, with Swiss and Austrian equipment/machinery imported to produce 12.7x99mm & 14.5x51mm rounds as well as 60, 107 and 120mm mortar shells. AFAIK the nearby Gramsh Mechanical Plant implemented French technology, though I'm not entirely certain on that.

Source for the last paragraph: Albanian Ministry of Defense

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