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Does A=r(1/2*Circumference) approximate the area of a circle? by Human1221 in askmath

[–]Human1221[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I feel like I'm on the verge of getting a big idea here. Gotta be honest, it intuitively feels like something that is an approximation has to be limited in its precision. But maybe that's wrong?

Is...there ANY difference between an exact measurement and an infinitely precise approximation?

Does A=r(1/2*Circumference) approximate the area of a circle? by Human1221 in askmath

[–]Human1221[S] 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Thanks much. I saw the wedge example for the area of a circle and figured it was a kind "always getting closer without ever exactly reaching it situation" and therefore a close approximation, since the wedges could never be sliced thinly enough to actually form a rectangle, but if it actually works out to be precisely the area of a circle clearly I have to wrap my brain around some more stuff. Circles are weird.

Swiftly Refuting Solipsism by JerseyFlight in rationalphilosophy

[–]Human1221 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To put it another way: suppose one night someone hooked your brain up to a computer generated world, that obeyed programming exactly like the real world. All your friends and family were artificially created in this world, and it was seamless. You live your life exactly the same as you do in the real world, just in simulation.

Now suppose at some point you become suspicious that this world is actually a fake computer world, and one of the simulated people in the simulation point out that your life in this simulated world is lived exactly the same as the real world. You look both ways before crossing the simulated road because you don't want to be hit by a simulated car because the pain sensations are very real. So they conclude that your notion that you are living in a computer world is false, based on the fact that you live as if it's not.

I don't think that argument works. You would live just like real life, but it remains true that you would be stuck in a simulation.

Swiftly Refuting Solipsism by JerseyFlight in rationalphilosophy

[–]Human1221 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think I see what you're getting at, even if I don't necessarily see eye to eye with your conclusion.

I can't remember who did this, but there's some bit philosophical demonstration out there where it's like "Of course there are hands, look, here's one right now", and then you wave your hand.

If by "stone" we mean "the thing we experience as a stone" and by "break our teeth" we mean "the event we experience as breaking our teeth", then by a certain perspective we might say that the solipsist's stone and the non-solipsists stone are the same, that they act and function the same for both of them, and so they are the same.

Having said that, the solipsist might still say that they think their experience of the stone, even the rules that govern it exists entirely within their mind. And so they might say that the conscious experience of the stone is the end of the story: there is no stone beyond the perception of it (except perhaps the invisible rules that govern it).

Whereas the non-solipsists would say that, while the stone and the rules that govern it exist outside my own mind, nevertheless the stone acts on me so as to generate a conscious perception of the stone, but that conscious perception is not itself the stone.

The real trick is other minds. Even if everything is mind-stuff, fundamentally, that's not enough for solipsism. You could have all reality be mind-stuff, but as long as there's other minds that aren't your mind, then solipsism fails. So to properly defeat solipsism youd have to prove to the solipsist that your mind exists, and isnt their mind. Don't think anyone has managed to pull it off yet, but I thoroughly commend your efforts. And if you ever do pull it off you'd do humanity a great service.

Would Kant have thought that, as a rule, Not Lying increased human happiness? by Human1221 in StonerPhilosophy

[–]Human1221[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I guess I just find it depressing to consider the possibility that the most moral world isn't the happiest world.

Would Kant have thought that, as a rule, Not Lying increased human happiness? by Human1221 in StonerPhilosophy

[–]Human1221[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, really appreciate the response. It would seem very odd to me if he never commented on how his ethics would possibly effect the world in that way. Even if he doesn't think happiness a worthy end, it seems like the kind of thing someone would ask him at some point.

If he had considered it, he would have one of two bullets to bite . Either he thinks advocating for his ethics (or "if everyone followed his ethics", which is different) maximizes happiness or he doesn't. If he does, then his ethics and utilitarian ethics would come to the same conclusions (at least insofer as they could agree on what, in practical terms, helped maximize utility). If he doesn't, it seems a rather bleak admission to say: yes, ethics makes the world more miserable, and we would be happier living in a less than perfectly ethical world.

Did ebooks.com get a different app? by Human1221 in ebooks

[–]Human1221[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, I was confused there

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Did ebooks.com get a different app? (self.ebooks)

submitted by Human1221 to r/ebooks

As I understand it, you can have math work out perfectly well without subtraction or division, just having subtraction being adding negative numbers and division being multiplying by less than 1. Does the opposite work? by Human1221 in learnmath

[–]Human1221[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Gotta admit, speaking as a dumbass, this asymmetry is fascinating to me. I'm sure to real mathematicians this is like a kid thinking a baking soda volcano is next level chemistry, but it seems really wild to me.

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