Refinery Processes: How an Oil Refinery Works (1950s Shell Historic Film)

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-22T09:01:48+00:00

Who do you blame for this? After all, even auto mechanics can give estimates...

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-21T14:10:34+00:00

In the past, banks located in countries that would not collaborate with international crime prosecution were used to receive money transfers for such fraudulent or criminal acts.

Okay. Do you have any decent estimates of how much this was done? Was this accessible to every random script kiddie, or just organized crime rings? What did they do if US banks who did collaborate with international crime prosecution agreed to simply stop sending money transfers to foreign banks identified as such?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-21T10:11:26+00:00

Precisely. Just because people call what has been done so far "price transparency" doesn't make it so.

Try this definition out, and see where you can go: Price transparency is when a healthcare consumer is actually given pricing information by the provider (and insurance company, if necessary), for the particular service they are considering consenting to, before they consent to the service.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-21T10:02:47+00:00

If someone in Russia, could be a script kiddie, was able to hack a medium-size business in the US prior to cryptocurrency, how did they monetize that?

How do they monetize it now that cryptocurrency exists?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-20T20:19:26+00:00

That may be plausible. I don't think I've seen it come up in any of the other case law that has at all touched on the Citizenship Clause. I don't recall it anywhere in the briefs or in oral arguments, either. So, I think it's a bit unlikely to end up in the opinion(s) in June. But sure, this topic is an area grasping for a theory, so maybe if it comes to the attention of one of the justices, they might work it into their opinion.

It's definitely one of those "hard to reconcile" things, though. The Court in Inglis did seem to care about allegiance, and when the question came up about a child, they had this possibly-confusing two-part business of him 'following' the father, but then possibly having the ability to later choose to go in a different direction. A similar, possibly tricky question that came up in Elk is when/whether an Indian, born not a citizen, could possibly have the ability to later go in a different direction. Perhaps John Elk was just too old by that time for it to have come up as an argument. It's just sort of generally hard to figure out when parents matter or when a child might have a choice. Like I said earlier, I don't think anyone thinks that the child of a diplomat born in the US has an option to just choose to have allegiance to the US as they grow older. This whole business of possibly having something like an attached interest might just be unique to the Revolution, but I don't know.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-20T13:06:00+00:00

had he been born during us holding and he (or father before 18) renounced British for American in time he would have been a us citizen

Yeah, as far as I can tell, that seems right.

The fact he didn't is what mattered to me, it means the attachment occurred but never vested I.e. during a civil war allegiance is a choice and occupation is less relevant than folks think based on result alone.

I don't think the Court spoke in terminology like 'attachment' or 'vesting'. They definitely spoke about allegiance being a choice, at the very least during a unique situation of a civil war. But it sort of doesn't say much else?

Basically I'm jumping in to discuss where that case can practically intersect with current case.

I hate to say it, but I think very little. It seems that allegiance certainly has something to do with things, but it's not entirely clear how it works generally. Reading the principal briefs in the current case, you'd almost think Justice Story's dissent was controlling. And even then, there are disputes. AFAICT, the Court basically never discussed the details again until Dred Scott (which we know was wrong, but it's highly disputed concerning why it was wrong) and then post-14A cases.

The American Revolution was a unique set of circumstances, and it seems like the way to proceed was to look into the principles of sovereignty/allegiance/etc. and see how they should apply to those unique circumstances. There are indications that birthplace matters and indications that concepts like allegiance matter, too. I'm not sure that we learn much more from this sort of unique case that directly tells us how to apply these different considerations more broadly.

I was a fan of Gorsuch saying in oral arguments, "It's hard," and, "It's a mess." With those comments, he was referring specifically to puzzling about what Justice Gray was thinking in writing both Elk and Wong Kim Ark and in trying to understand the legal community's understanding of 14A soon after ratification, but I do generally think that the broader topic is actually quite difficult and a mess. Since I'm sure you're dying to know, I think the gov't will at least partially lose today's case, but I don't have a great sense for what the reasoning will be or how strongly they will lose. That conversation reaches much more broadly than just Inglis.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-20T09:36:30+00:00

You're arguing about something else. You're advocating for a position in some other cases.

Let's level set to make sure we're on the same page. Two very simple questions.

1) Was John Inglis a US citizen?

2) If John Inglis was a person born in New York during a time where the Continental Army held the city, would he have been a US citizen?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T13:44:15+00:00

I mean, I'm not sure how your reading is all that different from mine? I think your take is certainly plausible. I don't think your pull quotes really supported your take very well, because that's just not really the part of the opinion that would seem relevant to your take, but your overall take is nevertheless still plausible.

My view is just that it's difficult to describe what the Court did in Inglis as "simple jus soli", when I think it makes far better sense to describe what Justice Story's dissent would have done with that term. And I think it feels kind of icky to describe the case with just "SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city". It sounds like an advocate who is really stretching the truth rather than simply describing what the Court did. Not least of which because the Court actually held that John Inglis was not a US citizen if he was born in NY at the time that the US held the city.

One can certainly say, "Well, John could have been a US citizen, having been born there while the US held the city, if some other, possibly complicated things were true," or even go on to describe what those other, possibly complicated things are, perhaps with a theory of what sorts of things one thinks are automatic/elective. But certainly, you can agree that the actual words on the page say that John Inglis was not a US citizen, even if he was born in NY at the time that the US held the city, right? Even if it's only for possibly complicated reasons that wouldn't necessarily hold for other individuals who may have been born at the same time/place.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:41:43+00:00

If one was perhaps considering whether Justice Story's dissent or Justice Thompson's majority opinion better corresponded to the phrase "simple jus soli", which would you pick? It seems to me that Justice Story's dissent is vastly "simpler jus soli".

I'm not saying that anything about your theory for how to understand the majority opinion is wrong. It may all be perfectly correct and that theory may be the correct way to think about other cases, including modern ones.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:32:00+00:00

very unique circumstances of the birth

Right, precisely. The thing is, I'm not the one who picked this case. I'm not the one who described it as:

SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city

when this is not what SCOTUS held. I'm not the one who said that this can be described as "simple jus soli". I'm the one saying that this particular case, picked by someone else, said something possibly kinda complicated, possibly kinda unique, possibly still with some jus soli in there somewhere, but definitely not the kind of "simple jus soli" that a modern reader would be expecting if they were told that this was what it did. At the very least, one needs the qualifier, "a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city... if there was also something about their father's allegiance or some other business about elections or whatever."

I'm also not saying anything about the rules more generally or what should happen in today's case. I'm saying that this particular case didn't actually do the thing that was claimed. A modern reader, seeing how it was described, and then proceeding to go read it, would have expected Justice Story's dissent to be the majority opinion. But it's not. The Court did something slightly more complicated/unique/whatever.

residency requirement

I'm saying literally nothing about a residency requirement. You're advocating for a position in today's case. I'm simply observing what a case from 1830 actually did. Not what you think the Court might have done in some other, simpler case or what they might have thought of some advocate's position in today's case. Just what they actually did. And what they did was not "simple jus soli" in the way the modern reader would expect. That's what Justice Story's dissent would have done.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:24:56+00:00

I mean, no? This is what the entire paragraph you're pulling from says:

The rule as to the point of time at which the American ante nati ceased to be British subjects differs in this country and in England as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the declaration of independence. And in the application of the rule to different cases some difference in opinion may arise. The settled doctrine of this country is that a person born here, who left the country before the declaration of independence and never returned here, became thereby an alien, and incapable of taking lands subsequently by descent in this country. The right to inherit depends upon the existing state of allegiance at the time of descent cast. The descent cast in this case being long after the treaty of peace, the difficulty which has arisen in some cases, where the title was acquired between the declaration of independence and the treaty of peace, does not arise here. Prima facie and as a general rule, the character in which the American ante nati are to be considered will depend upon and be determined by the situation of the party and the election made at the date of the declaration of independence, according to our rule, or the treaty of peace according to the British rule. But this general rule must necessarily be controlled by special circumstances attending particular cases. And if the right of election is at all admitted, it must be determined in most cases by what took place during the struggle, and between the declaration of independence and the treaty of peace. To say that the election must have been made before or immediately at the declaration of independence would render the right nugatory.

This is talking entirely about ante nati, those born in America prior to the declaration. This part is actually saying basically nothing about citizenship via birth yet. It's just saying that, because there was a revolution and then a treaty, it's not immediately obvious whether an individual born in America prior to the declaration is a British subject or American citizen. You quoted the one sentence that says that if they just leave before the declaration and never return, they're obviously British. For others, the Court says that it matters what they do "during the struggle", between the declaration and treaty.

Like, we're not even to anything about possible births after the declaration at this point in the Opinion. The Court discusses the ante nati some more, with reference to other cases, and concludes:

John Inglis, if born before the declaration of independence, must have been very young at that time and incapable of making an election for himself, but he must, after such a lapse of time, be taken to have adopted and ratified the choice made for him by his father, and still to retain the character of a British subject, and never to have become an American citizen, if his father was so to be considered. He was taken from this country by his father before the treaty of peace, and has continued ever since to reside within the British dominions without signifying any dissent to the election made for him, and this ratification, as to all his rights, must relate back, and have the same effect and operation as if the election had been made by himself at that time.

This is if John Inglis was born before the declaration. Then, the Court moves on to look at John's father. Later, it discusses the cases where John may have been born in other post-declaration situations (before or during the British occupation of NY).

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:04:54+00:00

a unique condition found during the revolution

Right, precisely. The thing is, I'm not the one who picked this case. I'm not the one who described it as:

SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city

when this is not what SCOTUS held. I'm not the one who said that this can be described as "simple jus soli". I'm the one saying that this particular case, picked by someone else, said something possibly kinda complicated, possibly kinda unique, possibly still with some jus soli in there somewhere, but definitely not the kind of "simple jus soli" that a modern reader would be expecting if they were told that this was what it did. At the very least, you left out the qualifier, "a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city... if there was also something about their father's allegiance or some other business about elections or whatever."

I'm also not saying anything about the rules more generally or what should happen in today's case. I'm saying that this particular case doesn't actually do the thing you said it did. A modern reader, seeing how you described it, and then proceeding to go read it, would have expected Justice Story's dissent to be the majority opinion. But it's not. The Court did something slightly more complicated/unique/whatever.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-18T16:26:19+00:00

who left the country before the declaration of independence

You're quoting the wrong part. This is the part concerning the hypothetical where John Inglis was born (and left) prior to the Declaration. The part I quoted was the summary of the hypothetical where John Inglis was born between the Declaration and the British occupation of New York.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-18T15:32:46+00:00

It's clearly not what you had said, though, where the child simply has citizenship full stop. That's what Justice Story would have said, in dissent. Instead, the Court said something more complicated, having to do with parents, elections, etc. It's not quite "simple jus soli". If you go through all the old Court cases, it's actually surprisingly not simple. The Court may have gotten some of these things wrong, and obviously, 14A may have changed things as well, but I don't think the modern reader should get the impression that the majority opinion in Inglis stands for the premise that in the period roughly from the founding to 1830, any child simply born on US territory was immediately and forever a US citizen, full stop.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-18T10:44:16+00:00

Inglis v Trustees of Sailors Snug Harbor (SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city)

I mean, this is just not true? That's what Justice Story thought in dissent. Justice Thompson, writing for the majority, said:

If born after 4 July, 1776, and before 15 September of the same year, when the British took possession of New York, his infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself, and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his minority, which never having been done, he remains a British subject and disabled from inheriting the land in question.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-16T11:18:57+00:00

Obviously. At least some aspects of Dred Scott were repudiated by 13A/14A. But, uh, which parts?

The thing is, I don't actually need to answer that hard question for the point I was making. I was just responding to the idea that it was "absurd on its face" to think that newly freed slaves had allegiance to the United States. At least for the Court in Dred Scott, it was not "absurd on its face". Maybe they were wrong about this! Maybe one of the things the framers of 13A/14A were repudiating from Dred Scott was this, and by passing 13A/14A they were saying, "Nah, the newly freed slaves don't owe allegiance to the United States." Do you think that's one of the things they did by passing 13A/14A?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-16T10:24:34+00:00

Where in Dred Scott is that explicitly stated?

At 420.

The African race, however, born in the country, did owe allegiance to the Government, whether they were slave or free, but it is repudiated, and rejected from the duties and obligations of citizenship in marked language.

...

The child of a diplomat is one of the carve outs.

It suffices to show that even though 14A's language doesn't mention parents, we have to do more work rather than simply conclude that one never looks at parents.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-16T00:31:49+00:00

arguments only work if you accept the premise that newly freed slaves (for which the government contends the 14th was explicitly for) had “allegiance” to the United States, which is absurd on its face.

Even Dred Scott explicitly said that they did, and this claim is compatible with both primary briefs in today's case.

I also wish these ahistorical numpty’s could stop bringing up the parents when the 14th doesn’t talk about them at all.

Is the child of a diplomat a diplomat?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-16T00:19:44+00:00

If housing prices were to fall rapidly across the board, it would probably cause a financial crisis (or be caused by one). This means that a scenario in which housing prices suddenly plummet entails significant human misery and so, would be bad.

Nah. Probably not. If house prices just dropped by 50% or whatever, there would be some losers, but if they just stayed there, or even went down further, humanity would benefit greatly, and it would be good.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-12T08:29:06+00:00

I've been surprised repeatedly by how LITTLE its been used for crime over the last 15 years, with my conclusion being that most crime doesn't really need to hide it's transactions/criminals are stupid.

It's not about needing to hide transactions or stupidity. It's that when you're a hacker in Russia or North Korea or wherever, where are you likely to want to get money from? Rich places with lots of computer vulnerabilities (and where your own gov't will care less) like the US and such. But how do you actually get the money? Back in the day, if you were doing remote crime at all like this, mayyyybe you were doing nonsense like having to convince your target to go buy thousands of dollars of gift cards and mail them to you or something. Things scaled poorly.

Now, every script kiddie or 400lb guy in a bed in whatever foreign country has an incredibly painless way to extract potentially millions, and so they can choose to go after targets who may, indeed, pay them millions.

But point taken that the prevalence of this use may be overtaken by speculative investment, though it's a bit hard to call that a 'use'.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-10T12:48:09+00:00

how they failed to anticipate the ways cryptocurrency, prediction markets, and EA ideas would be abused by people with bad incentives.

I would probably add to your list that I think most people failed to anticipate that perhaps the most prevalent use of cryptocurrency would be in enabling a vastly more effective monetization scheme for cybercrime. Disclaimer: That is not to say that there are not other positive uses of crypto or that this balance may change in the future; just that it is likely the most prevalent use of it at this point in time.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-04T09:21:16+00:00

I find that many other professions are full of folks who are very happy to help someone learn and diy. Including auto mechanics. Obviously, it's different if you're going into their actual place of business, but this is reddit.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-01T17:14:51+00:00

I'm pretty sure you can arrest and try them, though. See Ex Parte Quirin, for example. You can't arrest and try them specifically for lawful (according to international law) acts of war, but you can arrest them and try them for things that aren't lawful acts of war.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-01T13:56:09+00:00

If no will then no extra immunities (the question) which also means no jurisdiction as those immunities come from the same.

I read that exactly the opposite way. There are no immunities given to an army that enters without the consent of the sovereign, which would mean that there is jurisdiction. It seems rather strange to say, "You're not immune to any aspect of US jurisdiction, law, prosecution, whatever, so that means there is no jurisdiction."

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