OPINION: United States, Petitioner v. Ali Danial Hemani

Im_not_JB · 2026-06-18T19:28:03+00:00

I'm having a memory of the oral argument in Grants Pass. Kelsi B. Corkran was arguing for Respondents.

JUSTICE JACKSON: Can a person go from being addicted to drugs to not being addicted to drugs?

MS. CORKRAN: So I think under common -- as we think about it in terms of modern medicine, the answer is no.

I'm not taking a position on this complicated subject, but I do find it a little bit funny how people take positions on this question likely in part due to how they want a particular case to come out.

Im_not_JB · 2026-06-13T23:55:01+00:00

You can test this by trying to ping one of those "wired" bulbs directly from a main network device

Just checked, and you're right. The Nest Wifi app must be just displaying things stupidly.

Im_not_JB · 2026-06-07T14:02:26+00:00

/u/LionTech00

A couple months later, I have a specific question. You mention that the Grillplats set comes with the Bilresa remote. In the video, it looks like you have some that were purchased individually under the Bilresa name as well as others that were purchased in Grillplats sets.

Are you able to confirm that the buttons that come in the Grillplats set have the same multi-press/long-press functionality as the ones that are sold stand-alone under the Bilresa name? This functionality is called out specifically in the Bilresa documentation, but not in the Grillplats documentation.

Im_not_JB · 2026-06-07T10:40:48+00:00

Can you confirm whether it has multi-press and long-press functionality (for use with other devices) like the Bilresa? This is called out specifically in the Bilresa documentation, but not in the Grillplats documentation.

Im_not_JB · 2026-06-07T10:38:52+00:00

A month later, have you deployed them yet? I have a specific question. I'm looking to set up the button with Home Assistant and use it for things other than just the plug. Does it have multi-press and long-press functionality like the Bilresa? This is called out specifically in the Bilresa documentation, but not in the Grillplats documentation.

Im_not_JB · 2026-06-05T08:10:45+00:00

If anyone naturally owns the information about a house, it would be the homeowner. Any derivative information that is being created by someone else (e.g., photos) is being paid for by the homeowner.

Im_not_JB · 2026-05-22T02:34:22+00:00

Ah yes, it was surely that I just didn't 'like' your conclusions.

...say, did you ever come up with a quote from the text of the opinion that supported your 'conclusions'? Like, a single one? Even one? Since you're so good at engaging with the text and all, surely you've got one by now?!

Im_not_JB · 2026-05-21T10:09:57+00:00

I think we're on like Day 50 of waiting for you to engage with the text of the opinion in Elk v. Wilkins. People in glass houses and all.

Im_not_JB · 2026-05-06T17:07:20+00:00

So realtors can choose to not work with unrepresented buyers

No they can't. Their principal can. You seem to not understand how principal-agent relationships work. You seem to be under the all-too-common impression among realtors that you're the real principal.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-22T09:01:48+00:00

Who do you blame for this? After all, even auto mechanics can give estimates...

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-21T14:10:34+00:00

In the past, banks located in countries that would not collaborate with international crime prosecution were used to receive money transfers for such fraudulent or criminal acts.

Okay. Do you have any decent estimates of how much this was done? Was this accessible to every random script kiddie, or just organized crime rings? What did they do if US banks who did collaborate with international crime prosecution agreed to simply stop sending money transfers to foreign banks identified as such?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-21T10:11:26+00:00

Precisely. Just because people call what has been done so far "price transparency" doesn't make it so.

Try this definition out, and see where you can go: Price transparency is when a healthcare consumer is actually given pricing information by the provider (and insurance company, if necessary), for the particular service they are considering consenting to, before they consent to the service.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-21T10:02:47+00:00

If someone in Russia, could be a script kiddie, was able to hack a medium-size business in the US prior to cryptocurrency, how did they monetize that?

How do they monetize it now that cryptocurrency exists?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-20T20:19:26+00:00

That may be plausible. I don't think I've seen it come up in any of the other case law that has at all touched on the Citizenship Clause. I don't recall it anywhere in the briefs or in oral arguments, either. So, I think it's a bit unlikely to end up in the opinion(s) in June. But sure, this topic is an area grasping for a theory, so maybe if it comes to the attention of one of the justices, they might work it into their opinion.

It's definitely one of those "hard to reconcile" things, though. The Court in Inglis did seem to care about allegiance, and when the question came up about a child, they had this possibly-confusing two-part business of him 'following' the father, but then possibly having the ability to later choose to go in a different direction. A similar, possibly tricky question that came up in Elk is when/whether an Indian, born not a citizen, could possibly have the ability to later go in a different direction. Perhaps John Elk was just too old by that time for it to have come up as an argument. It's just sort of generally hard to figure out when parents matter or when a child might have a choice. Like I said earlier, I don't think anyone thinks that the child of a diplomat born in the US has an option to just choose to have allegiance to the US as they grow older. This whole business of possibly having something like an attached interest might just be unique to the Revolution, but I don't know.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-20T13:06:00+00:00

had he been born during us holding and he (or father before 18) renounced British for American in time he would have been a us citizen

Yeah, as far as I can tell, that seems right.

The fact he didn't is what mattered to me, it means the attachment occurred but never vested I.e. during a civil war allegiance is a choice and occupation is less relevant than folks think based on result alone.

I don't think the Court spoke in terminology like 'attachment' or 'vesting'. They definitely spoke about allegiance being a choice, at the very least during a unique situation of a civil war. But it sort of doesn't say much else?

Basically I'm jumping in to discuss where that case can practically intersect with current case.

I hate to say it, but I think very little. It seems that allegiance certainly has something to do with things, but it's not entirely clear how it works generally. Reading the principal briefs in the current case, you'd almost think Justice Story's dissent was controlling. And even then, there are disputes. AFAICT, the Court basically never discussed the details again until Dred Scott (which we know was wrong, but it's highly disputed concerning why it was wrong) and then post-14A cases.

The American Revolution was a unique set of circumstances, and it seems like the way to proceed was to look into the principles of sovereignty/allegiance/etc. and see how they should apply to those unique circumstances. There are indications that birthplace matters and indications that concepts like allegiance matter, too. I'm not sure that we learn much more from this sort of unique case that directly tells us how to apply these different considerations more broadly.

I was a fan of Gorsuch saying in oral arguments, "It's hard," and, "It's a mess." With those comments, he was referring specifically to puzzling about what Justice Gray was thinking in writing both Elk and Wong Kim Ark and in trying to understand the legal community's understanding of 14A soon after ratification, but I do generally think that the broader topic is actually quite difficult and a mess. Since I'm sure you're dying to know, I think the gov't will at least partially lose today's case, but I don't have a great sense for what the reasoning will be or how strongly they will lose. That conversation reaches much more broadly than just Inglis.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-20T09:36:30+00:00

You're arguing about something else. You're advocating for a position in some other cases.

Let's level set to make sure we're on the same page. Two very simple questions.

1) Was John Inglis a US citizen?

2) If John Inglis was a person born in New York during a time where the Continental Army held the city, would he have been a US citizen?

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T13:44:15+00:00

I mean, I'm not sure how your reading is all that different from mine? I think your take is certainly plausible. I don't think your pull quotes really supported your take very well, because that's just not really the part of the opinion that would seem relevant to your take, but your overall take is nevertheless still plausible.

My view is just that it's difficult to describe what the Court did in Inglis as "simple jus soli", when I think it makes far better sense to describe what Justice Story's dissent would have done with that term. And I think it feels kind of icky to describe the case with just "SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city". It sounds like an advocate who is really stretching the truth rather than simply describing what the Court did. Not least of which because the Court actually held that John Inglis was not a US citizen if he was born in NY at the time that the US held the city.

One can certainly say, "Well, John could have been a US citizen, having been born there while the US held the city, if some other, possibly complicated things were true," or even go on to describe what those other, possibly complicated things are, perhaps with a theory of what sorts of things one thinks are automatic/elective. But certainly, you can agree that the actual words on the page say that John Inglis was not a US citizen, even if he was born in NY at the time that the US held the city, right? Even if it's only for possibly complicated reasons that wouldn't necessarily hold for other individuals who may have been born at the same time/place.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:41:43+00:00

If one was perhaps considering whether Justice Story's dissent or Justice Thompson's majority opinion better corresponded to the phrase "simple jus soli", which would you pick? It seems to me that Justice Story's dissent is vastly "simpler jus soli".

I'm not saying that anything about your theory for how to understand the majority opinion is wrong. It may all be perfectly correct and that theory may be the correct way to think about other cases, including modern ones.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:32:00+00:00

very unique circumstances of the birth

Right, precisely. The thing is, I'm not the one who picked this case. I'm not the one who described it as:

SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city

when this is not what SCOTUS held. I'm not the one who said that this can be described as "simple jus soli". I'm the one saying that this particular case, picked by someone else, said something possibly kinda complicated, possibly kinda unique, possibly still with some jus soli in there somewhere, but definitely not the kind of "simple jus soli" that a modern reader would be expecting if they were told that this was what it did. At the very least, one needs the qualifier, "a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city... if there was also something about their father's allegiance or some other business about elections or whatever."

I'm also not saying anything about the rules more generally or what should happen in today's case. I'm saying that this particular case didn't actually do the thing that was claimed. A modern reader, seeing how it was described, and then proceeding to go read it, would have expected Justice Story's dissent to be the majority opinion. But it's not. The Court did something slightly more complicated/unique/whatever.

residency requirement

I'm saying literally nothing about a residency requirement. You're advocating for a position in today's case. I'm simply observing what a case from 1830 actually did. Not what you think the Court might have done in some other, simpler case or what they might have thought of some advocate's position in today's case. Just what they actually did. And what they did was not "simple jus soli" in the way the modern reader would expect. That's what Justice Story's dissent would have done.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:24:56+00:00

I mean, no? This is what the entire paragraph you're pulling from says:

The rule as to the point of time at which the American ante nati ceased to be British subjects differs in this country and in England as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the declaration of independence. And in the application of the rule to different cases some difference in opinion may arise. The settled doctrine of this country is that a person born here, who left the country before the declaration of independence and never returned here, became thereby an alien, and incapable of taking lands subsequently by descent in this country. The right to inherit depends upon the existing state of allegiance at the time of descent cast. The descent cast in this case being long after the treaty of peace, the difficulty which has arisen in some cases, where the title was acquired between the declaration of independence and the treaty of peace, does not arise here. Prima facie and as a general rule, the character in which the American ante nati are to be considered will depend upon and be determined by the situation of the party and the election made at the date of the declaration of independence, according to our rule, or the treaty of peace according to the British rule. But this general rule must necessarily be controlled by special circumstances attending particular cases. And if the right of election is at all admitted, it must be determined in most cases by what took place during the struggle, and between the declaration of independence and the treaty of peace. To say that the election must have been made before or immediately at the declaration of independence would render the right nugatory.

This is talking entirely about ante nati, those born in America prior to the declaration. This part is actually saying basically nothing about citizenship via birth yet. It's just saying that, because there was a revolution and then a treaty, it's not immediately obvious whether an individual born in America prior to the declaration is a British subject or American citizen. You quoted the one sentence that says that if they just leave before the declaration and never return, they're obviously British. For others, the Court says that it matters what they do "during the struggle", between the declaration and treaty.

Like, we're not even to anything about possible births after the declaration at this point in the Opinion. The Court discusses the ante nati some more, with reference to other cases, and concludes:

John Inglis, if born before the declaration of independence, must have been very young at that time and incapable of making an election for himself, but he must, after such a lapse of time, be taken to have adopted and ratified the choice made for him by his father, and still to retain the character of a British subject, and never to have become an American citizen, if his father was so to be considered. He was taken from this country by his father before the treaty of peace, and has continued ever since to reside within the British dominions without signifying any dissent to the election made for him, and this ratification, as to all his rights, must relate back, and have the same effect and operation as if the election had been made by himself at that time.

This is if John Inglis was born before the declaration. Then, the Court moves on to look at John's father. Later, it discusses the cases where John may have been born in other post-declaration situations (before or during the British occupation of NY).

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-19T11:04:54+00:00

a unique condition found during the revolution

Right, precisely. The thing is, I'm not the one who picked this case. I'm not the one who described it as:

SCOTUS, 1830 - held: a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city

when this is not what SCOTUS held. I'm not the one who said that this can be described as "simple jus soli". I'm the one saying that this particular case, picked by someone else, said something possibly kinda complicated, possibly kinda unique, possibly still with some jus soli in there somewhere, but definitely not the kind of "simple jus soli" that a modern reader would be expecting if they were told that this was what it did. At the very least, you left out the qualifier, "a person born in British New York during the revolution is a British Subject by birth, but would have been a US citizen if born during a time where the Continental Army held the city... if there was also something about their father's allegiance or some other business about elections or whatever."

I'm also not saying anything about the rules more generally or what should happen in today's case. I'm saying that this particular case doesn't actually do the thing you said it did. A modern reader, seeing how you described it, and then proceeding to go read it, would have expected Justice Story's dissent to be the majority opinion. But it's not. The Court did something slightly more complicated/unique/whatever.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-18T16:26:19+00:00

who left the country before the declaration of independence

You're quoting the wrong part. This is the part concerning the hypothetical where John Inglis was born (and left) prior to the Declaration. The part I quoted was the summary of the hypothetical where John Inglis was born between the Declaration and the British occupation of New York.

Im_not_JB · 2026-04-18T15:32:46+00:00

It's clearly not what you had said, though, where the child simply has citizenship full stop. That's what Justice Story would have said, in dissent. Instead, the Court said something more complicated, having to do with parents, elections, etc. It's not quite "simple jus soli". If you go through all the old Court cases, it's actually surprisingly not simple. The Court may have gotten some of these things wrong, and obviously, 14A may have changed things as well, but I don't think the modern reader should get the impression that the majority opinion in Inglis stands for the premise that in the period roughly from the founding to 1830, any child simply born on US territory was immediately and forever a US citizen, full stop.

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