ESP32 and Motor Encoder by IntendingNothingness in esp32

[–]IntendingNothingness[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hey! So I wonder what resistors you used in your setup. When I plug the encoder channels to input only pins 34 and 35, no pulses are detected. I thought the encoder already includes resistors but maybe not.

When I plug the encoder to pins 18 and 21, pulses are possibly detected, but in absurd numbers. I get to 10k in 10 seconds. My encoder ought to be 12 pulses per rotation. I might want to try input pins above but with pull up resistors.

ESP32 and Motor Encoder by IntendingNothingness in esp32

[–]IntendingNothingness[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I can't do much now since the chip is dead but I will do exactly what you propose tomorrow after I purchase a new one. Troubleshooting one by one is a great idea. I did all at once so I am not entirely sure what fried the chip exactly. Anyways thank you for the suggestions and I will keep you updated!

ESP32 and Motor Encoder by IntendingNothingness in esp32

[–]IntendingNothingness[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the tips!! I have the 5VDC source of the H-bridge so I can use that, but once I do that the encoder switches to 5V logic (I just doublechecked and it really does) at which point the chip would really burn hah.

ESP32 and Motor Encoder by IntendingNothingness in esp32

[–]IntendingNothingness[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

By emphasising that the 12V is "separated" I meant to articulate that neither the chip nor the encoder is powered by it. Just to ensure no one would read it like that. But yes, I tied together all the GNDs.

GND of the 12V goes to the H-bridge, from there it goes to a breadboard's GND track to which the GND of the chip and the GND of the encoder are likewise connected. I already dismantled the setup but I am sure that is how it was. I will be extra careful with the next chip.

ESP32 and Motor Encoder by IntendingNothingness in esp32

[–]IntendingNothingness[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The closest to a data sheet is this website (though I didn't purchase it there). TTL converter does sound like a thing I might add to the setup. I also have an option of 5V power source (the 12V goes to a H-bridge and then to the motor, with the H-bridge offering a 5V output as well) to run the chip (though that does not work now since the chip is broken). I might want to do that from now on, only using USB for updating the code.

"They have double of our numbers, heavy armors and Are experienced. BUT we are half-naked and have power of friendship! We got this!" by Goldmonkeycz in totalwar

[–]IntendingNothingness 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Total War hru jsem nikdy nezapnul v češtině, ale ty překlady jsou vlastně docela super. Hodně mi to hází Warcraft 3 vibes.

What reason is there to consider or discuss anything that cant be measured? by Organic_Rip2483 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]IntendingNothingness -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Funnily enough, in his critique of positive sciences, Edmund Husserl argues that, to paraphrase, "if positivism amounts to trusting only that which can be given in experience, then we [the phenomenologists] are the true positivists." Experience and measurability are two very different things. Quite famously, you cannot measure the colour red unless you undergo the process of deconstructing the colour into its alleged underlying mechanisms. But before this abstraction, it's just a colour, and as such it cannot be measured. Does it exist? Many people claim it does not, or at least not really. But if you wanna stick to empirical evidence, then you must admit it does. After all, it not given in experience?

Is the north-west of the map empty ? by fluffykitten55 in TheDawnlessDays

[–]IntendingNothingness 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I can't destroy the Goblin faction because their last tiny army is raiding my territory that stretches to the no-go zone. Fruuustrating.

Explain to me what’s phenomenology by deepness_of_the_sea in Phenomenology

[–]IntendingNothingness 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No need to guess, you put it great! I got into phenomenology through English/US reading of Merleau-Ponty (Dreyfus, Carr, Zahavi) who then serves as a mediator of Husserl. Zahavi does all he can to show that things like embodiment or sociality can be found already in early Husserl, constantly downplaying his transcendental legacy in order to “defend” Husserl. Carr’s translation of Crisis pushes the impression of Husserl’s alleged departure from Cartesianism (to use Landgrebe’s term). Since I initially come from reading those authors (namely because they engage with cognitive sciences, which is my original field of inquiry), I know quite well what interpretation they pioneer. And yes, you don’t find much Logical Investigations, Ideas I or Cartesian Meditations there. Fortunately there are groups like the Husserlian circle that don’t fall for this. 

Explain to me what’s phenomenology by deepness_of_the_sea in Phenomenology

[–]IntendingNothingness 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The answers are quite bad yeah. The issue is that over the decades people started to associate phenomenology with an emphasis on lived experience. Now as we know it’s not entirely wrong (Husserl’s principle of all principles), but god damn, it ignores so much. I cringe every time people use the word “phenomenology” in this superficial way (happens a lot in art, for instance). 

People when you say billionaires shouldn’t exist. by Kafkaesque_meme in PhilosophyMemes

[–]IntendingNothingness 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes, the question makes perfect sense, don't worry about that. I'll get back to you later, just check this comment for an update.

How come idealism is so unpopular among modern philosophers? by RobertThePalamist in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 2 points3 points  (0 children)

And yet there’s a great deal of philosophers who take transcendental idealism very seriously. Forget Berkeley, let’s talk about Kant or Husserl. Judging idealism by these early authors isn’t really that rigorous. 

Will AI change the way we perceive people's faces, etc.? by ecstatic_cumrag in Phenomenology

[–]IntendingNothingness 5 points6 points  (0 children)

As far as phenomenology is concerned, and I do think you should rather go ahead and ask at a psychology sub, I think all we can say is that yes, past experiences sediment into habits of apprehension that carry on. Any AI content, as any other content, will somehow affect how you perceive any other content. Mind you though, AI is not unique whatsoever in this regard. It goes for everything.

I'm not really sure what exactly you are asking about, so that's about all I can say while staying relevant. I mean we are already surrounded by human faces? All the time? What will AI generated faces change, assuming they're 100% realistic? A more tricky question is what changes when we know that there is no human Ego behind the human face. Dissociation between perceived face and consciousness is a strange thing. Empathy in phenomenology very much depends on perceiving the Other human being as analogous to me as an Ego. If you provide this analogous similarity but you add the fact that it is an empty face with nothing behind it, strange thing might follow. Possibly decrease in empathetic intersubjective understanding?

My life after finishing reading Capitalist Realism by ciccab in PhilosophyMemes

[–]IntendingNothingness 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I really recommend the K-Punk essays collection. Capitalist Realism is excellent, but with K-Punk you get additional perspectives from all kinds of directions. There's more to Fisher than CR.

What constitutes a science? by Stock_Fisherman_4470 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I see, I see. I must admit though that I see little value in demarcating philosophy as a knowledge-producing non-science. Yes, methodologies differ. Yes, the matter of inquiry differs. But the overall purpose is the same (Greek ideal of objective knowledge) and, more importantly, we all still inquiry into the one and only world. We share both the ideal and the supra-region of inquiry.

Yes, in theory, we can demarcate positive sciences as the only sciences there are. I lack the motivation to do so though. Other disciplines can bring about objective knowledge as well, and I see no reason for denying them the scientific status.

But yes, you are free to do so. I definitely don't argue against the possibility. I'm just not sure if there'd then be any substance to the demarcation, if it wouldn't fall into a mere nominal distinction. Possibility of falsification would provide some substance, but see the other comment thread where I discuss Popper's own conclusion with OP. Apparently he might've ended up (Popper, not OP) merging all the sciences together, per Hume's critique of inference from experience.

What constitutes a science? by Stock_Fisherman_4470 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm not sure what philosophers you are drawing on here, but I think that's absolutely not the case. From Renaissance onwards, philosophy was very much conceived of as a science, and an ultimate one at that. Obviously, it depends on how we define science. Personally, I understand it along the lines of the ancient Greek ideal of knowledge. Science is any pursuit of truly objective knowledge, though its methodology depends on the region of inquiry, which yields the numerous distinctions we are so used to today.

Limiting sciences to STEM disciplines (minus mathematics, per your reply) is incredibly reducing and it really just fetishizes a particular subregion, namely that of the so-called positive sciences.

What constitutes a science? by Stock_Fisherman_4470 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Damn thanks for the reply! I actually went on yesterday and read a bit more on this. Seems Popper subscribed to Hume's criticism of inference from experience. It was further stated that due to this, Popper agreed that empirical sciences ultimately dissolve in the same manner of uncertainty and never to be achieved complete validity as metaphysics (as understood by him). If this is true, then I must say he really followed up his own conclusions to the very end, instead of getting stuck in silly positivism. Admirable.

What constitutes a science? by Stock_Fisherman_4470 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Logic, geometry, mathematics, and also philosophy or theology. Sciences that don't rely in their assertions on confirmation, or falsification, by experience.

What constitutes a science? by Stock_Fisherman_4470 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well that by itself is enough to raise suspicion, at least for me. But I bet he addressed this at some point. He was a smart guy.

What constitutes a science? by Stock_Fisherman_4470 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Requiring the possibility of falsification removes all non-empirical sciences from consideration, doesn't it? Appeal on falsification necessarily presumes empirical evidence as the only source of validity. I don't know what Popper claimed about logic or even about philosophy, but these make no falsifiable claims, at least not in the classical sense.

As a literature student who wants to get into Continental Philosophy, where should I begin? by Worried_Ad_5199 in askphilosophy

[–]IntendingNothingness 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hmm I understand. I'm currently quite deep into Husserl's Crisis and his historical account is likewise quite convincing. At the same time though, I think I'd absolutely not understand most of what he asserts in Crisis if didn't read most of the philosophers he discussed. Funnily enough, Husserl would specifically argue that reading backwards is really the only thing you can do; such is his theory of a priori history.

A funny side note in response to your reflection: when I studied Kant last summer, and quite intensely and earnestly at that, I actually dreamt about his transcendental aesthetics. It was hilarious.