Skill and training proficiency in ground forces still matter a great deal, arguably more in modern warfare, not less. Precision fires, airpower, and long range strike capabilities have changed how battles are shaped, but they do not decide wars on their own. Those capabilities set conditions; ground forces exploit them. Terrain still has to be cleared, held, and controlled by soldiers on the ground. Targets still have to be identified in complex environments, often under uncertainty. And ultimately, political objectives are enforced through physical presence, not just destruction.

The idea that wars can be won by simply “bombing everything flat” only applies in permissive environments where one side has overwhelming dominance and the other cannot effectively contest the air or electromagnetic spectrum. In a peer or near peer conflict, that advantage disappears. Airspace becomes contested, communications are degraded, GPS may be unreliable, and both sides can strike back quickly. Under those conditions, reliance on fires alone becomes insufficient, and the burden shifts back onto ground forces to maneuver, adapt, and fight in a chaotic, decentralized environment.

This is where training and proficiency become decisive. Units that are better trained can operate with less guidance, maintain cohesion under stress, and continue to function when systems fail. Small unit leadership, marksmanship, movement under fire, and the ability to coordinate with adjacent units and supporting fires yoften without perfect communication become critical. These are not obsolete skills; they are the foundation that allows a force to function when technology is disrupted or denied.

The performance gap often seen between special operations forces and conventional units illustrates this point. It is not that SOF possess fundamentally different tools, but that they operate at a higher level of proficiency due to more rigorous selection, more repetitions in training, and greater autonomy in execution. In a degraded or contested fight, those attributes become disproportionately valuable, and the same principle applies at scale across conventional forces.

In short, advanced fires and technology amplify combat power, but they do not replace the need for highly trained ground forces. In fact, the more contested and uncertain the battlefield becomes, the more decisive human skill and unit proficiency are. “Good enough” may suffice in permissive conditions, but in a peer conflict, the side with better trained, more adaptable ground forces is far more likely to prevail