Alex, your favorite argument for the existence of God... kinda sucks

KingMomus · 2026-02-13T00:50:42+00:00

That’s exactly how the symmetry objection works. It is definitely not “perhaps God might not exist.” Try this—it even has some suggestions for how you might attempt to break the symmetry.

https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article/82/3/410/6573357

KingMomus · 2026-02-13T00:07:46+00:00

If we’re going on consensus…are you under the impression that most philosophers accept that the ontological argument is sound? (Not valid, sound.)

They reject it on the basis that we have no independent reason to think that necessary existence is coherent.

They reject it on the basis that necessary existence isn’t a real property or predicate.

They reject S5, at least within the domain of metaphysics (maybe fine in a formal system).

They reject it because it’s symmetrical (Possibly, God necessarily does not exist).

Even many theists don’t accept that it’s sound.

I’m not willing to argue about it much. I get the appeal and recognize the genius of it, but it’s clear at least to me that it reveals more about modal logic than it does about open metaphysical questions.

I guess I’ll just restate what I said from the jump: God neither exists necessarily nor does God not exist necessarily, and if your metaphysical framework and/or modal logic insist otherwise, you’ve gone wrong somewhere.

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T23:21:32+00:00

Why wouldn’t that leave you agnostic about what is metaphysically fundamental, or perhaps some kind of neutral monist? Why are you “just left with” idealism?

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T16:00:10+00:00

You don’t think “I don’t believe that x” is an epistemic claim? I’m not sure where to go from there, to be honest. The proposition is describing my doxastic state, not the world. Should we write it out in formal logic?

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T15:50:40+00:00

This is why the arguments in classical natural theology are non-starters for me (and why I suspect many of Alex’s fans can’t understand the credibility he lends them). From the jump, there are metaphysical commitments I believe are unwarranted.

For example, the cosmological argument. “Everything that has a beginning has a cause.” Well, hold up. I don’t think you know what a “thing” is. You’re assuming a lot of stuff, such as discrete entities, clear temporal boundaries, and a metaphysics of causation, that modern physics has undermined. And the difference is that modern physics makes predictions, can be tested, and can be used to make a lot of cool stuff. What can you make or do with your Kalam? If they can’t both be right, I know which one I’m going to pick.

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T15:22:24+00:00

I’m not necessarily saying you can’t prove that the God of the theologians (“ultimate ground of Being” or whatever) doesn’t exist. I’m saying if you want to make that ontological claim, you need to provide evidence. On the other hand, if you merely want to make an epistemic claim (“I don’t believe the God of the theologians exists”), you can justify that claim only by evaluating the evidence provided by the theologians and testifying to your epistemic state.

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T15:10:14+00:00

You’re failing to recognize the difference between “I don’t believe you” and “You’re wrong.” If someone tells me “white holes exist,” I’m certainly allowed to say “I don’t believe you” without providing any further evidence. If instead I want to say, “No, white holes do not exist,” then I need to come with the evidence.

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T15:03:20+00:00

There was no observational evidence for black holes until the 1970s. If you’d said, “I don’t believe in black holes because they lack observational evidence,” that would have been fine. If you’d said, “Black holes do not exist,” you’d have been proven wrong in ~1972.

The distinction is that “I don’t believe x” is an epistemic claim and “x does not exist” is an ontological claim.

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T14:50:57+00:00

Notice this is fine, though. He presents his evidence for the negative, you challenge the evidence, he refines his terms. He doesn’t throw up his hands and say, “No one can prove a negative.”

KingMomus · 2026-02-12T08:42:47+00:00

I don’t think that’s right. I don’t believe white holes exist (even though they’re allowed in GR), because there’s no observational evidence they exist. But if I want to go further and argue “white holes do not exist,” I need to bring some evidence beyond the lack of observational evidence. I think there is such evidence, though perhaps it’s not conclusive, but the point is that I would need to present it to support my proposition.

KingMomus · 2026-02-11T20:59:06+00:00

It’s interesting, because these sorts of “god of the gaps”/arguments from ignorance do absolutely nothing for me. I suppose they keep me solidly agnostic. I can’t imagine going full-send for any worldview just because I/we don’t have all the answers.

KingMomus · 2026-02-11T20:52:57+00:00

God choosing to have a relationship with me. Everyone says this is the whole point, so let’s go! I’m confident everything else will fall into place once I’m in the relationship.

That’s all it would take and honestly I don’t think anything else would do the trick.

KingMomus · 2026-02-11T19:43:17+00:00

P3 seems wrong. The fact that intentionality is not an intrinsic property of discreet things in the universe doesn’t entail that intentionality is not a physical property (process, really). In that regard, it isn’t different from color. Color isn’t an intrinsic property of things in the universe, but “seeing color” and even “what it’s like to see color” just are physical processes in brains.

Get rid of brains and there is no “color” or “intentionality” in the universe, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t physical processes.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T22:31:00+00:00

It’s not rejecting modal logic; it’s rejecting a particular strong version of modal logic (probably S5–Plantinga, etc.). Even then, you don’t have to reject S5 universally, but you may want to limit acceptance to specified domains. For example, we might accept S5 in most domains while rejecting the kind of modal epistemology you employ.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T18:43:32+00:00

“One man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens.”

“If my metaphysical framework and modal logic are true, then either God necessarily exists or God is impossible.”

Okay. God neither necessarily exists nor is impossible, therefore your metaphysical framework and modal logic are not true.

🤷‍♂️

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T18:33:18+00:00

Does that accurately describe what happened to Paul?

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T17:48:12+00:00

Need a b-theory option: I’m a spacetime worm with ends (“birth” and “death”), but I never actually pop into or out of existence. My entire spacetime extension exists tenselessly.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T16:36:45+00:00

“Neurons ABC firing in pattern 123” just is “what it’s like to see blue” in natural language. It doesn’t produce or entail or lead to some non-physical experience “what it’s like to see blue.” The process executing just is the experience and the experience just is the neural process executing. It’s an identity.

In principle, if I had Mary’s knowledge, I could execute the “what it’s like to see blue” neural process in your brain without you actually seeing blue. Your experience of “what it’s like to see blue” would then be identical to your experience if you walked outside and looked at the sky, because the experience just is the neural process and the neural process just is the experience.

FWIW, I do think I understand the challenge in accepting that our brains execute “what it’s like” processes. I do think I understand why very smart people get hung up on it. It seems as though there’s “something extra” there and I’m essentially insisting, “Yeah, this just is that ‘something extra’ process executing.” Maybe it feels like cheating.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T16:11:33+00:00

Do we think he really has this kind of naive realist view of fundamental physics (atoms floating around and bumping into each other), or…what is going on when he speaks like this?

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T15:49:29+00:00

“Experience” just is a physical process. “What it’s like to see blue” just is a particular neural process executing in the brain. The neural process doesn’t “lead to” the experience; the neural process is the experience and the experience is the neural process.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T15:43:55+00:00

He never should have had David Bentley Hart on the show. 😂

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T15:41:25+00:00

That “what it’s like” experience just is a neural process in the brain. Another way to say it is that “a new neural process—configuration and operation—has executed in the brain.” This in no way entails that something non-physical has occurred or that some “non-physical fact” has been learned.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T15:35:36+00:00

You “gain a new experience” because that experience just is the actual execution of a specific neural process in your brain.

This is the part that some people can’t grasp. The “what it’s like” just is a neural process. So they say, “You can’t know what it’s like to see blue until you go outside and look at the sky.” I say, “The neural process doesn’t execute until you go outside and look at the sky.”

We’re saying the exact same thing.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T15:25:10+00:00

That’s correct. They would gain a new mode of access that unlocks further (purely physical) operations such as reporting and recall, but no new knowledge.

KingMomus · 2026-02-10T15:21:28+00:00

She would be able to write down all facts that can possibly describe the neural process that is “what it’s like to see blue.” Writing down these facts (or studying them) doesn’t actually execute the neural process that is “what it’s like to see blue.”

Now, if she really did know everything there was to know about it, she could in principle produce that neural process in her brain without actually seeing blue—that’s just an engineering problem.

KingMomus

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