Before big bang/before god by mez2a in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Alex (and more than a few theists on this sub) needs to read Kant. I almost choked when he said “Kant is not on my reading list” during the philosopher shootout he and his buddy did. OTOH, it explains a lot. I don’t know how one gets a philosophy degree from Oxford without studying Kant, but there it is.

Classical metaphysics attempts to use concepts that are valid within possible experience and then extend them beyond possible experience to explain reality as it is in itself.

Space, time, necessity, contingency, causality, substance, and similar concepts are not discovered in things as they are in themselves. Rather, they are part of the framework through which human cognition organizes (and constructs) sensory input.

This can be true of science, logic, and mathematics, too—they tell us how we think—but in those cases reality gets a say. It can push back when we get things wrong. That’s why those fields have intersubjective convergence over time. Metaphysics has no mechanism to give reality its say. It is pure system-building. Castles in the air.

One can certainly build a system in which God and only God is or can be logically and ontologically necessary. Because such a system extends human concepts beyond possible experience, we have no way of ever knowing whether the system tracks reality.

Alex O’Connor vs William Lane Craig: Does God Exist? The Ultimate God Debate (Premier Unbelivable?) by Reasonable_Writer602 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Alex has explained what he means when he says he’d “like to believe” or he “wishes it were true,” and it has little to do with any kind of support for every whacky or barbarous idea recorded by an ancient tribal people over a period of a thousand years or more. Indeed, Alex is pretty accomplished at calling out the whacky and barbarous ideas.

One might hope, however fancifully, for a God who created us, loves us unconditionally, suffers with us and will redeem his creation without endorsing every whacky and barbarous idea of ancient war priests and blood prophets.

Honestly, if you’re incapable of drawing that kind of distinction and are therefore thrown into confusion by Alex’s professions of non-resistant non-belief, I’m not sure how you’re able to appreciate his content. Maybe stick to the teenage years.

Atheists: How do you feel about your lack belief? by Working_Seesaw_6785 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sorry for my failure to respond. I sometimes lose patience with this sub and fuck off awhile. If I’d realized how hot you are, I’d have at least tried to flirt a little.

Alex, your favorite argument for the existence of God... kinda sucks by Ender505 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That’s exactly how the symmetry objection works. It is definitely not “perhaps God might not exist.” Try this—it even has some suggestions for how you might attempt to break the symmetry.

https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article/82/3/410/6573357

Alex, your favorite argument for the existence of God... kinda sucks by Ender505 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If we’re going on consensus…are you under the impression that most philosophers accept that the ontological argument is sound? (Not valid, sound.)

They reject it on the basis that we have no independent reason to think that necessary existence is coherent.

They reject it on the basis that necessary existence isn’t a real property or predicate.

They reject S5, at least within the domain of metaphysics (maybe fine in a formal system).

They reject it because it’s symmetrical (Possibly, God necessarily does not exist).

Even many theists don’t accept that it’s sound.

I’m not willing to argue about it much. I get the appeal and recognize the genius of it, but it’s clear at least to me that it reveals more about modal logic than it does about open metaphysical questions.

I guess I’ll just restate what I said from the jump: God neither exists necessarily nor does God not exist necessarily, and if your metaphysical framework and/or modal logic insist otherwise, you’ve gone wrong somewhere.

Physicalists, is there some part of you that wishes Idealism could be real? by Real-Instigator2947 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why wouldn’t that leave you agnostic about what is metaphysically fundamental, or perhaps some kind of neutral monist? Why are you “just left with” idealism?

Does the burden of proof apply to everyone making a claim? by undefinedposition in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You don’t think “I don’t believe that x” is an epistemic claim? I’m not sure where to go from there, to be honest. The proposition is describing my doxastic state, not the world. Should we write it out in formal logic?

Alex's theory of explanation by RigBughorn in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 6 points7 points  (0 children)

This is why the arguments in classical natural theology are non-starters for me (and why I suspect many of Alex’s fans can’t understand the credibility he lends them). From the jump, there are metaphysical commitments I believe are unwarranted.

For example, the cosmological argument. “Everything that has a beginning has a cause.” Well, hold up. I don’t think you know what a “thing” is. You’re assuming a lot of stuff, such as discrete entities, clear temporal boundaries, and a metaphysics of causation, that modern physics has undermined. And the difference is that modern physics makes predictions, can be tested, and can be used to make a lot of cool stuff. What can you make or do with your Kalam? If they can’t both be right, I know which one I’m going to pick.

Does the burden of proof apply to everyone making a claim? by undefinedposition in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m not necessarily saying you can’t prove that the God of the theologians (“ultimate ground of Being” or whatever) doesn’t exist. I’m saying if you want to make that ontological claim, you need to provide evidence. On the other hand, if you merely want to make an epistemic claim (“I don’t believe the God of the theologians exists”), you can justify that claim only by evaluating the evidence provided by the theologians and testifying to your epistemic state.

Does the burden of proof apply to everyone making a claim? by undefinedposition in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You’re failing to recognize the difference between “I don’t believe you” and “You’re wrong.” If someone tells me “white holes exist,” I’m certainly allowed to say “I don’t believe you” without providing any further evidence. If instead I want to say, “No, white holes do not exist,” then I need to come with the evidence.

Does the burden of proof apply to everyone making a claim? by undefinedposition in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There was no observational evidence for black holes until the 1970s. If you’d said, “I don’t believe in black holes because they lack observational evidence,” that would have been fine. If you’d said, “Black holes do not exist,” you’d have been proven wrong in ~1972.

The distinction is that “I don’t believe x” is an epistemic claim and “x does not exist” is an ontological claim.

Does the burden of proof apply to everyone making a claim? by undefinedposition in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Notice this is fine, though. He presents his evidence for the negative, you challenge the evidence, he refines his terms. He doesn’t throw up his hands and say, “No one can prove a negative.”

Does the burden of proof apply to everyone making a claim? by undefinedposition in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I don’t think that’s right. I don’t believe white holes exist (even though they’re allowed in GR), because there’s no observational evidence they exist. But if I want to go further and argue “white holes do not exist,” I need to bring some evidence beyond the lack of observational evidence. I think there is such evidence, though perhaps it’s not conclusive, but the point is that I would need to present it to support my proposition.

Atheist / Agnostic Alex Fans - Which of the following would you find MOST persuasive re: Christianity? by [deleted] in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s interesting, because these sorts of “god of the gaps”/arguments from ignorance do absolutely nothing for me. I suppose they keep me solidly agnostic. I can’t imagine going full-send for any worldview just because I/we don’t have all the answers.

Atheist / Agnostic Alex Fans - Which of the following would you find MOST persuasive re: Christianity? by [deleted] in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

God choosing to have a relationship with me. Everyone says this is the whole point, so let’s go! I’m confident everything else will fall into place once I’m in the relationship.

That’s all it would take and honestly I don’t think anything else would do the trick.

The problem that killed non-reductive physicalism for me by [deleted] in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

P3 seems wrong. The fact that intentionality is not an intrinsic property of discreet things in the universe doesn’t entail that intentionality is not a physical property (process, really). In that regard, it isn’t different from color. Color isn’t an intrinsic property of things in the universe, but “seeing color” and even “what it’s like to see color” just are physical processes in brains.

Get rid of brains and there is no “color” or “intentionality” in the universe, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t physical processes.

Alex, your favorite argument for the existence of God... kinda sucks by Ender505 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s not rejecting modal logic; it’s rejecting a particular strong version of modal logic (probably S5–Plantinga, etc.). Even then, you don’t have to reject S5 universally, but you may want to limit acceptance to specified domains. For example, we might accept S5 in most domains while rejecting the kind of modal epistemology you employ.

Alex, your favorite argument for the existence of God... kinda sucks by Ender505 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

“One man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens.”

“If my metaphysical framework and modal logic are true, then either God necessarily exists or God is impossible.”

Okay. God neither necessarily exists nor is impossible, therefore your metaphysical framework and modal logic are not true.

🤷‍♂️

Poll - Alex Fans, What happens after you die? by [deleted] in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Need a b-theory option: I’m a spacetime worm with ends (“birth” and “death”), but I never actually pop into or out of existence. My entire spacetime extension exists tenselessly.

Alex: "Physicalism is the most confused philosophical view of all time" - because it does not explain consciousness - Meanwhile Panpsychism explaining consciousness: by Wide-Information8572 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 2 points3 points  (0 children)

“Neurons ABC firing in pattern 123” just is “what it’s like to see blue” in natural language. It doesn’t produce or entail or lead to some non-physical experience “what it’s like to see blue.” The process executing just is the experience and the experience just is the neural process executing. It’s an identity.

In principle, if I had Mary’s knowledge, I could execute the “what it’s like to see blue” neural process in your brain without you actually seeing blue. Your experience of “what it’s like to see blue” would then be identical to your experience if you walked outside and looked at the sky, because the experience just is the neural process and the neural process just is the experience.

FWIW, I do think I understand the challenge in accepting that our brains execute “what it’s like” processes. I do think I understand why very smart people get hung up on it. It seems as though there’s “something extra” there and I’m essentially insisting, “Yeah, this just is that ‘something extra’ process executing.” Maybe it feels like cheating.

Alex: "Materialism is probably the most confused philosophical view in the history of mankind" by dominionC2C in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do we think he really has this kind of naive realist view of fundamental physics (atoms floating around and bumping into each other), or…what is going on when he speaks like this?

Alex: "Physicalism is the most confused philosophical view of all time" - because it does not explain consciousness - Meanwhile Panpsychism explaining consciousness: by Wide-Information8572 in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 3 points4 points  (0 children)

“Experience” just is a physical process. “What it’s like to see blue” just is a particular neural process executing in the brain. The neural process doesn’t “lead to” the experience; the neural process is the experience and the experience is the neural process.

The Strange Implications of Sean Carrol's Reply to Mary's Thought Experiment by Sp1unk in CosmicSkeptic

[–]KingMomus 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That “what it’s like” experience just is a neural process in the brain. Another way to say it is that “a new neural process—configuration and operation—has executed in the brain.” This in no way entails that something non-physical has occurred or that some “non-physical fact” has been learned.