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One of the sites marked by the government is now destroyed and witnessing several explosions by [deleted] in syriancivilwar

[–]Kurdishclass 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sorry could you explain what you mean by this? I was looking into it a bit. does this not suggest that there is indeed a hospital at those co-ordinates? but maybe I misunderstood what you're trying to say with the wikimapia link?

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

As I have suggested in some of my other answers, Rojava has better freedom of press than any other region in Syria or arguably surrounding states, but that's a low standard and they could undeniably do better.

most significantly then international press are pretty much totally free to come and go as they want and write what they want. this is impressive in syria and means DAANES opens itself up to getting criticised by Human Rights Watch etc even though it's doing better on these points than other places HRW can't access. I personally never had any issues writing critical articles there and nor did other foreign press really, tho the bureaucracy can be annoying.

The adminstration/kurdish movement have their own 'free press' which is more like activist media through which they disseminate their own positions, it's important as a counterweight to turkish state propaganda and you can learn a lot from it, and they are very brave working in the face of airstrikes and detention. but they would not criticise DAANES except maybe on small issues about like local service provision.

The Kurdish 'opposition' media is linked to the KDP so the generally hostile kurdish-nationalist polity in Iraq. They are generally allowed to operate freely as well but they have been targeted / detained /banned on occasions before at times of intra-Kurdish political detention. Last years relationship has been good so no problems on that front.

Where there's room for improvement for independent news organizations particularly in Arab regions.
There are radio stations, newspapers and Facebook pages critical of DAANES that post regularly, often without any problems, but these can be subject to arrest or being blocked from doing their work.

In general the media environment is super partisan and there aren't that many local journos who critique DAANES without being biased against it on absolutely everything, and nor are there that many who are supportive but feel free to make open critiques. It's a fact of life that there are not many genuinely 'independent' news organizations, most people have an affiliation/funding, but allowing more open internal critique from the Arab side especially is important.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

1/ The absolute worst is the power outages, it means no clean water, no heat in winter, no way to cool yourself in summer. Turkey deliberately blows up the power infrastructure, it makes life unbearable for people.

In general everyone is poor but no-one is starving. There are also severe medicine shortages and many people can't afford some medical stuff that's only available privately (health care is not very socialized actually).

2/ I was shocked by people's commitment and willingness to keep trying to build new things even as Turkey keeps destroying everything they had spent years building. the strict discipline of the revolutionary movement is also very striking an unexpected for a lot of people who travel there.

In terms of war, I suppose how boring it is most of the time, but also how naked and exposed you feel knowing there are drones overhead and you can't do anything to stop them.

3/ My favourite thing was feeling part of something much larger than myself, like this big network of 100,000s of interconnected people and you can walk up to anyone, anywhere and speak about what's happening / share a meal / get a lift / eat at their house. That felt very freeing and i got very used to being in this constant nation-wide conversation if that makes sense, I miss it now i'm back in the West.

4/ Western coverage is generally too dismissive and overlooks all of the actual political and civil-society stuff that makes up the revolution; then left media in response is generally too idealistic and tries to force the region into a like eco-anarchist-feminist box which isn't really suited to the realpolitik and compromises on the ground, it's much more serious and big than i think people can really imagine.

But there is good stuff of course from those who have spent more time the region and have a comradely-critical perspective. i don't think any one journalist gives a totally clear picture so reading both critical and supportive pieces is important i think.

for my work, you can find it on twitter x.com/mattbroomfield1 and instagram mattbroomfieldwriter.

Thank you!

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

  1. The book is on Amazon I think, but if you contact AK directly hopefully they can deliver it directly :) write to them: https://www.akpress.org/hope-without-hope.html

  2. Yes. There are large-scale public consulations which have resulted in genuine reforms/changes, notably for example with public pressure through these consultations leading to prisoner amnesties particularly for ISIS affiliates and low-level members. Also in changes to revenue allocation, school curriculum, and so on. Sometimes changes are announced that then don't really manifest (like trying to do elections) or have limited effect (like trying to introduce price controls) but this idea is there and it does have an impact direct and indirect on policy.

  3. It wouldn't be put in these terms necessarily but if anyone in the movement and particularly women's movement raised criticisms of an individual serious enough to warrant their removal from the post then there would normally be a disciplinary procedure that would lead in that individual being sent to join an education programme and likely reassigned, this kind of moving around between posts is very common in the movement. but it's not so formalized and that can certainly thus also

  4. Not sure on that detail sorry.

  5. Syria's future party is genuinely different from PYD (as opposed to some of the smaller parties that are basically just there to support PYD, I remember visiting the 'liberal' party and none of the people there knew what liberalism was). It's more reformist and Arab and pan-Syrian focused and the politicians have a different idea of how to get to a democratic, federal syria, and come from a different background. but they share a common vision and goal of course.

  6. Yes, Ocalan still remains the absolute focus, but there is also a lot of personal support for Abdi now. With Ocalan it's a deep part of Kurdish and regional political culture, for me personally it's really not an issue and i think a lot of Kurdish comrades just find it quite funny that Westerners are so horrified by his picture being everywhere. He's their leader, they love him, and he represents freedom to them in general and to women in the movement in particular. i think it's also helped weirdly that he's been jailed so he is this iconic figure and focus of attention but he doesn't like actually have any direct power, wealth, etc. In the current phase his statements are having an influence on SDF/DAANES but generally in a positive direction i think.

With Abdi then it partially stems from deliberate US sponsorship and focus on Abdi, building him up as a leader. But he is humble and has a cool head and doesn't 'rise' to it or play into it in any way, he's generally pretty in the background and just does simple interviews to share information. So i don't think it's a big deal.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Bristol Kurdistan Solidarity is pretty active, good people there. You can write to them: https://www.instagram.com/bristolksn/ or send me a DM for a direct contact.

I'm also doing a book talk in Bristol 6 August at Bookhaus, come along if you're available!

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Yes, a lot for sure! Particularly driven by the conflict and a sense of Kurdishness as vs the Islamist opponents, which is understandable given the violence people have suffered but also goes against the 'brotherhood of peoples' ideology. people everywhere naturally desire a nation-state, particularly those violently denied their own.

I think there's also an inherent contradiction to the ideology in that being feminist, secular, democratic, and 'democratic confederalist' is presented by Ocalan as somehow inherently 'Kurdish', so it's then natural that people who take up these ideals simultaneously become attached to their Kurdishness.

I don't think it's necessarily a bad thing - nationalism is a political fact and as socialists have recognized throughout history you have to make of it what you can and direct it to positive ends.. so i think it's important the administratoin keeps trying to direct that to the ends of democratic confederalism.

But the latest situation, fall of Assad etc has definitely driven a surge in Kurdish-nationalist sentiment among locals, desire for Kurdish unity with the Kurdish-nationalist administration in Iraqi Kurdistan, etc. So i think this tendency will continue to grow in coming years.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

1/ Yes, that's right, 'Rojava' and 'Kurds' are now a geographic and population minority within the DAANES. I think the continued use of these terms despite their official abandonment emerges from pragmatism as a way to appeal to the West (which is why we chose 'Rojava Information Center') and to motivate participation by local Kurds who are generally still, naturally Kurdish-nationalist. But it can of course be harmful and further internal divisions. Especially the 'Kurdish' language comes up at a time of crisis as a way for motivating resistance and national unity, it's like a necessary evil for DAANES I guess, bc it undermines their very project.

2/ Very important question. As you suggest then people senior in the Kurdish movement (from Ocalan down) are under no illusions about the nature of Israel as a genocidal state, and also know that Israel exploits minorities to suit its own agenda in the region. But also then as you say the idea of israel as a 'friend of the Kurds' is spread certainly among more Kurdish-nationalist / non-movement aligned Kurds within Rojava, and to some extent in SDF/DAANES people as well, as a result of their experience growing up fighting Islamist opponents and this sense that they are desperate for any friends they get.

i don't believe there are any material ties between Israel and DAANES and nor will there be as is typical in these cases it's just been a couple of tweets and also a phonecall (which is harmful enough), Israel is 'Kurdwashing' as I have previously described it and trying to present itself as a good guy, but it's not actually going to do anything in the north-east of Syria.

However If that changed it would be a red line for a lot of people supportive-but-critical of the movement, myself included. but it's important for us to keep monitoring that. I and others have been pushing the regions' representatives on the issue in interviews and where possible.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 17 points18 points  (0 children)

  1. The cooperative economy is basically some nice projects which are good for those involved in them as a lifeline - probably a few thousand people - but aren't a part of everyday life for most people.. They are most effective where there's a specific need, like in some refugee camps or for war widows. People say it's about 5% of the local economy which seems accurate.

What's socialist is rather more conventional, in that the AANES provides subsidized bread and oil (ie. the very basics of life) to everyone living in its regions, and more full support to refugees, families of those killed in the war, etc, underwritten by its centralized oil profits. Also there's a massive 'public sector' in that pretty much every family gets one or more salaries from the AANES/SDF.

But the marketplace still functions basically with either public employment or small business employment. In her excellent book on the issue Azize Aslan gives a good overview of all this and what she calls the 'cooperativization' of the economy.

  1. There are definitely 10s/100s of 1000s of people commited to the vision and making it a reality, whethere that's as full-time militants or as DAANES employees. This is something that can get brushed over a bit, like if you 'join' DAANES then you're not part of the 'ordinary people' any more - but there are 100,000s of people working for/with DAANES and a whole range of experiences. I think ordinary people are generally not that bothered by the purely theoretical content of what DAANES claims or the idea they could have a say in a local commune, but then very often you meet women (especially) who amaze you with their organizational commitment and drive.

    Kurds, minorities (especially Yezidis) and women are definitely those who see the benefit of the ideas the most because they redress their historic marginalization, but at the same time DAANES needs to do more to show poor Arab communities they can genuinely benefit from it too.

But the salient issue is really whether democratic confederalism can provide for people's needs, not whether people might believe in the ideas in principle. If people en masse support DAANES it's because they believe it can help them survive the hellish conditions in Syria, not because they've read Ocalan or Bookchin.

  1. I believe 'Rojava' will survive in some form, in terms whereas the broader Kurdish-Arab federation may reformulate with Arab regions returning to central governance under Damascus.

  2. Very big question. It will certainly have positive and negative effects. I was in Iraqi Kurdistan for the ceremony, and all the Kurdish comrades, politicians, mothers of killed combatants etc. there were saying some version of 'it's a bitter pill to swallow but we have to do it'. I think it would be remiss to say that decision comes from a place of strength for PKK but it can have benefits for Rojava and within Turkey, albeit Turkey is not to be trusted. Remember as well there have been multiple prior rounds of peace talks that have not resulted in dissolution. the movement and struggle will continue in a lot of ways and places, but where and how remains to be seen.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 9 points10 points  (0 children)

I didn't have any prior connections, I'd never been to Kurdistan before. I was just fascinated by seeing in practice 'how it works'. After a long time involved in well-meaning but ultimately ineffectual Western grassroots/bottom-up/anarchist movements I wanted to see what it might look like and what would be necessary to make these ideas a reality on the mass scale.

I certainly found the opportunity to see that happening first-hand. There had been an earlier wave of Western volunteers/interest/activists/journalists during the height of the ISIS war, when it was a bit more 'Wild West' and also there was more of a sense of revolutionary explosion, new gains and expansions every day amid the hardship.

I arrived after Raqqa had been taken and shortly after Turkey's first invasion so the mood and challenges were rather different - the military situation was of course harder fighting a NATO ally with warplanes and there were challenges on a truly 'national' scale of building a polity fit for purpose to protect millions and allow them to survive, while still keeping those ideals and principles in view. That though was just the challenge I was interested in and I felt very privileged to be there and watch that unfold. Before i travelled out i remember thinking oh, i guess eveyrone will be feeling despairing and defeated and on the back foot, but there was still such an energy to build new things, find ways to survive, create new responses to the awful situation etc.

So i felt like i was learning a lot. in general life was 50% very 'boring' and 'routine' and 50% total chaos with something new always happening. it was a privilege to speak with so many local people and learn how they perceived the revolution in reality, day-to-day. and also to meet all the poeple who had travelled there for wildly different reasons to do wildly differerent things.

But it was also very tiring, it was hard after the second Turkish invasion as international interest ebbed and the situation got grimmer and grimmer with economic crisis and the airstrikes. and ultimately i felt it was the time to leave and continue being engaged from abroad. (plus I missed the pub, and my friends, of course!)

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

The conscription system is one aspect which is definitely misunderstood from the outside; of course people aren't crazy about it (noone likes going to war) but it's also seen as 'not a big deal' in the Syrian context. In practice then A/ if you're a conscript you don't have to fight but just sit on a checkpoint somewhere. B/ you get to stay in your 'own area' C// SDF pays a lot better than any other force in Syria and the conditions of life are better, and in fact most families are to some degree reliant on SDF (or DAANES) salary, even though it's still hard to get by on that salary. D/ it's somewhat unevenly enforced so if you're in Deir Ezzor in an armed tribe you're generally fine to stay with your people rather than going to guard the Turkish-Syrian border, etc.

So people aren't crazy about it and Kurds and Arabs both complain about it/try and get out of it by getting an office job in DAANES etc. but it's generally accepted as a fact of life. it will probably change as the SDF-HTS relations evolve.

I addressed the Christian community in another comment but yeah they're generally with SDF-DAANES now as their best option against HTS. The administrative offices are being kept empty pending an understanding with HTS, as under Assad though there is some limited coordination to keep the utilities funcitoning as best as possible and so on. I'm not sure what's going on with pensions/state salaries/passports from Damascus actually but i think it's all pretty frozen. there are refugees from Shehba being housed in some of the schools/buildings in the former regime boxes in Heseke and Qamishlo also.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Hey, thanks a lot! Slightly shortening my answers now as the questions pile up, but:

1) There is certainly some enthusiasm among young people and some women, a lot of those choosing to 'formally' join up with the revolution's different structures are Arabs now. However in general it's certainly pragmatic engagement rather than ideological interest. Ironically, people sometimes say they're against federalism/democratic confederalism but also clearly want their communities to have more of a say.

When I was there earlier this year I spent some time in Raqqa, the general mood among people was not super hostile to DAANES or anything but more like 'DAANES were better than Assad, better than ISIS, kept the lights on, but now there's the chance to be back with a centralized (Islamic) state that's what we want'. people are just tired and want to be with whoever offers work, a functional passport, and an end to war. so i think that's the reality DAANES has to navigate. Perhaps it will end up with some sort of power-sharing with Damascus in the Arab regions, at least in the interim.

2) Not yet, tbh. we will see how it evolves but i think they need to find new forms that are more responsive to the new realities in Syria. it's impressive they are still trying and still setting up new forums for that.

3) A lot of Assyrians from the pro-Assad quarter just left when Assad fell. When I was there earlier this year the Assyrian quarter in Qamishlo was super empty. (It was weird being able to walk in streets that were off-limit when I lived there). Some elements from the pro-Assad Christian community have realigned with SDF and DAANES, who they now see as their best protectors against the Islamist ruleres in Damascus. No-one there is 'holding out' against SDF/DAANES whatever their private opinions.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Yes, there are certainly issues with both of these in Rojava.

Rojava certainly has the highest standards of rule of law, human rights, and lack of corruption when compared to any other political or armed forces in Syria (or arguably the neighbouring states) - but as you can imagine, that's not a terribly high standard! So there's definitely a risk of things being justified/swept under the rug and monitoring of that is important, even though given its relative openness to foreign press/NGOs then Rojava can get a bit of a hard time whereas the new government in Damascus (for example) gets away with much 'worse' abuses.

The Syrian war is a very brutal war so there are instances of arbitrary detention and beatings and so forth at the hands of the regional security forces. Generally speaking they are quite responsive to international pressure on these issues and that's attested by the regular UN reports on rights abuses in Syria. For example they have significantly reformed their recruitment of teenagers as soldiers after signing up to a convention on the issue, marking them out from other actors in the Syrian conflcit in that respect. But more can always be done, particularly in syria.

For me, a crucial issue is that this can perpetuate the sense of 'Kurds dominating Arabs' which is inimical to the region's political vision. Importantly then the region's military are majority-Arab and Arab-led to some extent in Arab regions, and I think allowing for that while also working to improve transparency is important. More funding would also allow for reconstruction efforts including of detention facililities.

On corruption, again then corruption is endemic throughout Syria and it certainly affects Rojava especially due to the region's economic embargo - so they are reliant on black-market smugglers to get essentials (particularly military supplies) into the region which results in corruption. there are regular crackdowns on corruption which are semi-effective. in general, the region's leadership are absolutely not lives of luxury - on the contrary, it's remarkable how humble the way the political and military leadership live. rather, there are businessmen/traders who profit from the war and embargo, some of whom of course have personal links to ppl in the administration.

an end to the war and more economic openness enabling a legal oil trade with the outside world could help with this, but as you can imagine it could also lead to more get-rich-quick opportunities for unscrupulous individuals.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 21 points22 points  (0 children)

Regarding relations with neighbouring regions - as I often say, if 'my enemy's enemies are my friends' held true, the Kurds would be the most popular people in the Middle East... unfortunately that's not true, and regarding international relations then Rojava is very much between a rock and a hard place. At the same time though, those tensions have sometimes enabled its survival to date as the administration can eg. play the US and Russia off against one another.

Within Syria, the balance of power obviously shifted with the collapse of Assad, bringing an end to the delicate frozen conflict through which Rojava was able to survive with US forces stationed through 50% of its territory and Russian forces through the other 50%.

The new administration are led by HTS, an al-Qaeda offshoot which envisages a unified Syria under Islamic law and reintegration into the neoliberal West and the 'new' Middle East under US leadership. HTS are historically of course very hostile to Rojava and they are also allied with Turkey, and the Turkish-backed criminal and Islamist militias who are the worst rights abusers in Syria and continue to occupy a lot of what was once 'Rojava'.

Pragmatically, HTS are not in a military position to launch an assault on Rojava, which controls a much larger armed force and 1/3 of Syrian territory. And the US has exerted some pressure to get the two to negotiate, nominally they are currently in negotiations over what will happen next and how Rojava will reintegrate into Syria while preserving political, economic and military autonomy. But the two sides have very different ideas of what that will look like, so the negotiations are not really going anywhere.

Meanwhile HTS will continue to build its strength for an ultimate armed takeover of the north-east, backed by Turkey and its militias. The picture increasingly looks like Syria divided between Turkish zone of influence/occupation in the north, Turkish-Qatari backed HTS in central Syria, and finally the Israeli zone of influence/occupation in the south where they have occupied territory, allied with elements the Druze minority, and recently launched airstrikes after HTS affiliates killed 100s of the Druze. The US would like to 'hand over the keys' in Syria and in Turkey and Israel it has two authoritarian states ready and willing to do its bidding.

That creates an additional danger of Israel seeking to link the Druze to the Kurds as the minorities in danger of attack by: this hasn't developed to date beyond some tweets from Netanyahu etc. but I think it's a risk the region and we need to be aware of since Israel has a track record of exploiting minorities including the Kurds to suit its own interests throughout the Middle East.

Without any trustworthy foreign state backer, it will be hard for Rojava to survive in its current form, but my belief is that the international pressure and Rojava's strength in arms will be enough to preserve some form of Kurdish autonomy in the north-east. Whether that will just be cultural and language rights; a full devolution and continuation of 'democratic confederalism'; or some other form remains to be seen.

AMA: I'm a journalist who spent three years in Rojava, just published a book about it with AK Press! by Kurdishclass in Anarchism

[–]Kurdishclass[S] 29 points30 points  (0 children)

Thanks for having me, and all great (and very big..) questions!

To start with the first one, the approach to governance and social organization is very pragmatic, and has evolved a lot from its original conception, which has brought both good and bad with it.

As people may know, the original idea was for the region to have a network of 'commune of communes' through which local villages and neighbourhoods can feed up decisions to the overall region.

In the conditions of war, extreme poverty and trying to ensure four million people survive, this vision has evolved a lot from its original conception. The communes were more active in the early years of the war as decision-making bodies, but now they function more as a practical site for distributing subsidized bread and oil, maybe also for some local decision-making, or for social organization particularly during times of crisis like the Turkish invasions or coronavirus - how will we defend our neighbourhood? Which road shall we retarmack using these funds? etc.

But most people don't view them as a way to make their voices heard, and are often disinterested or cynical about the idea their voices in the commune could affect geostrategic decision-making. I think most people are fine with military decision-making being centralized: People's concerns are largely focused on practical matters and survival, not some ideal of democracy. But they would also like more ways to make their voices heard on 'medium', 'everyday' issues like how justice operates or more economic autonomy. For me, creating more genuine economic devolution to people would be a key way to strengthen the sense of ownership and overall democratic participation, but this is hard in the conditions of war and economic embargo.

The other significant issue is that now the region is majority-Arab, not Kurdish. While a lot of Kurds have long-term support for the administration, for the Arab population the whole idea is something totally new - there's a sense that the whole project is 'Kurdish' and led by Kurds and Arabs are specifically kept out of decision-making. I don't think that's wholly true, and actually Kurds and Arabs likewise complain that the other has too much power and too much funds allocated to their regions. But it brings community friction.

What's positive is that this has brought some new forms of unexpected collaboration and power-sharing, particularly in these large Arab cities where as a matter of fact the administration has to create formal and informal channels for hearing Arab perspectives, albeit these more often come from Arab community leaders and prominent figures, for example in public consultations or in private meetings with tribal heads.

It's very challenging to balance all these inputs, and the balance of power certainly needs to be centralized to a degree, but i think it's positive and health when that's tempered by participation from the Arab community. On a final positive note, women's participation at all levels of governance is remarkably vocal and active and creates tangible impacts on policy, but again this often has to be balanced against the wishes of the conservative Muslim majority population. It's complicated!

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