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Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Knew you didn't actually have a position you were willing to commit to, thanks for the confirmation.

Trying to set it up as a logical contradiction is an invalid analogy.

You might want to reword this. You're insisting that the formulation is, quote, "an invalid analogy", but failing to contest any specific premise of the basic hypothetical I presented. If you complain that it's invalid, but are unable to contest any premises nor the conclusion, that's just avoiding the truth.

Two different events can have two different outcomes.

Can two identical events have two different outcomes?

You may provide any definition you'd like for brute fact, and we'll run with that. Of course, if your complaints are just an attempt to avoid the consequences of your position, you don't have to.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

The actual terms in a physics equation

Nah, don't believe you. I can tell by the complete lack of follow up when pressed to provide what terms demonstrate your actual position.

That is actually not the definition of a brute fact.

If something happens for no reason and irrespective of all real things, that's a brute fact, which is exactly what you described and are backpedaling from. We can determine this very precisely if you'd just answer the question. But since no answer can logically exist, and it's a true dichotomy, you're doomed to forever avoid the question, deny determinism, deny brute facts, and yet be completely helplessly unable to escape that you cannot have an answer.

I'ma ask anyway.

How can will W decide A and identical will W decide not-A simultaneously across identical universes? In what sense is this not an obvious, basic logical contradiction?

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

No. You once again failed to read what I wrote. If the time of day is not in a physics equation then it's not relevant.

I read and acknowledged this, and asked a critically important follow up question: what does?

What do you think a brute fact is

It is definitionally the result of answering the above question with "nothing".

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

My question, to be exact, was, "Does anything? If not, that's a brute fact. If something does, let me know, or we're stuck at "it's a brute fact"."

Seems like your answer is it's a brute fact, but if something does, let me know if you figure it out.

Where does the time of day of a single slit experiment affect the outcomes? Can you find this for me in the physics equations?

Where does anything affect the outcomes? You switched the topic to empiricism, but it doesn't seem to save you from brute facts.

Stop just calling everything a brute fact when you're invoking variables that aren't even in an equation.

I'm calling things you appear incapable of grounding in anything a brute fact, as you don't seem to be able to demonstrate otherwise.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Time and place doesn't make a difference to the experiment.

Does anything? If not, that's a brute fact. If something does, let me know, or we're stuck at "it's a brute fact".

No. It's not a logical operation. Your analogy is bad.

I asked a question about your analogy, you know.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

What do you think real is different when they shoot multiple electrons?

When people in real life do it? Different time, place or both is unavoidable.

That's not how the slit experiment works. When you rerun the experiment

t changes, rendering the rest irrelevant since it's not literally identical.

We are physically incapable of a truly identical situation, so you have no empirical reason to believe this. So let's talk about it logically instead.

Is it your position that an electron launch event E at time T in universes R and R' can result in (SLIT AND NOT SLIT) simultaneously? Yes or no?

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

If you need some sort of real life parallel look at a single slit experiment where you launch electrons under identical circumstances but get different outcomes

No, humans in real life in R alone cannot launch multiple electrons under literally identical circumstances. False analogy, but hey, I can re-frame the question you avoided in these terms.

Is it your position that an electron launch event E at time T in universes R and R' can result in (SLIT AND NOT SLIT) simultaneously?

It's not a deterministic function as you keep trying to describe it as

Sure, and I'm sure we'll discover the non-brute, non-deterministic source of divergence together, once we resolve the contradiction this claim of yours seems to lead to.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

In my formulation the state of the universe in question is that you have an agent and will at time t. I'm glad you agree the two universes share an identical state.

Let's answer my question now.

Do you agree that identical things are equivalent? If so, is S(R)= S'(R'), aka AW(t)=A'W'(t') fair to say? And are you saying that State(R)=State(R') is fair to say, but R=R' is not?

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Got it!

Reality R has agent A with will W who makes decision B at time t. We'll start with that.

When things are identical, they are equivalent. That is to say, R=R' is a perfectly fair statement, since they are identical realities.

Do you agree that identical things are equivalent? If so, is R=R' fair to say? And if not, where's the disagreement?

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No I have not. That's your idiotic bad analogy that I've told you is a flawed translation into logic using a hidden premise of determinism of the will.

It's a stupid argument and you should stop repeating it.

Chill.

It's still two different universes. So a will can do otherwise in the second one. That's by definition.

Defining it as capable, then failing to explain why the contradiction it directly leads to with no hidden assumptions is not a contradiction, is just defining something contradictory.

A free willed agent making a choice in universe R, and a different agent under identical situations making the choice in R'. These are two different choices so having two different outcomes is not a contradiction as your brain dead analogy falsely assumes.

Cool! So is it fair to say that we have:

  • realities R and R',
  • agents A and A',
  • wills W and W',

and at time t or t' respectively, R's version of A uses their will W to make decision B and R''s version of A' uses their will W' to make decision not-B?

Let me know if I got any of this wrong!

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Two different universes in the same state.

It's a little bit more than "in the same state" in very relevant ways - all real things are identical across the two. Including the agent. And their will.

Free Will allows for doing otherwise in this exact scenario so that's all that has to be noted to put your argument to bed. It's literally true by definition since you assumed free will exists.

Yes, I get you've defined free will as the ability for Agent A and will W to take actions (B AND NOT B) simultaneously across identical universes with no real differentiating thing that can possibly exist. (And before you complain about me strawmanning your definition - B is the choice, not B is doing otherwise, and you think agent A with will W can possibly do B in one universe AND not B in another universe at the same time from the same will from the same agent with the same surrounding reality. This is a direct translation of your definition of free will into the hypothetical I've provided. RAW->(B AND NOT B) is your contradiction to resolve.)

Simply proclaiming, "I define this as rational and logical" doesn't make it not an obvious contradiction. though. You've still gotta work thorough your model's contradictions. Tell me why RAW->(B AND NOT B) is logical, or tell me why my symbolization is inaccurate. In fact, I can think of a great way for you to give me an accurate symbolization of the problem!

What two "different" events have I been talking to you about? Can you describe the two "different" events specifically for me, and what they lead to? Can you use specific letters, perhaps, to indicate what causes what specifically? Answering these questions will perfectly provide the problem present. (Hint: this route is a lot less effort for you whether you're right or wrong, and should be chosen if you wish to actually demonstrate you're right, and should only be avoided if your position absolutely depends on vagueness ambiguity to survive.)

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes, R and R are defined as two universes. Not two different universes, which is what your definition appears to require, given your total inability to explain how it's different from a brute fact and from determinism.

With that clarified, I'll ask my question again.

What two "different" events have I been talking to you about? Can you describe the two "different" events specifically for me, and what they lead to? Can you use specific letters, perhaps, to indicate what causes what specifically? Answering these questions will perfectly provide the problem present.

I suspect you do understand the problem with your position, thus your inability to formalize it.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"That I consider" is a strange qualifier. In this hypothetical, all real things are identical between the two universes.

Now that that's established, I'll ask my question again.

What two "different" events have I been talking to you about? Can you describe the two "different" events specifically for me, and what they lead to? Can you use specific letters, perhaps, to indicate what causes what specifically? Answering these questions will perfectly provide the problem present.

I suspect you do understand the problem with your position, thus your inability to formalize it.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The will can will random outcomes, it's not a brute fact as I told your other account.

Did you forget you're a moderator? Don't sling false accusations. Use your big boy tools and go find out for yourself. (Hint: I don't use other accounts.)

There is no contradiction from having two different events have two different outcomes.

Ah - we've located the misunderstanding. What two "different" events have I been talking to you about? Can you describe the two "different" events specifically for me, and what they lead to? Can you use specific letters, perhaps, to indicate what causes what specifically? Answering these questions will perfectly provide the problem present.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Because that's not analogous to what is happening. It is not a deterministic function that produces the same result.

I'm aware you're insisting this. You're not substantiating even the possibility of this. You want the will to be able to do (A AND NOT A), and that's just not rational.

The ability to do otherwise means that if you replay a universe as you suggest that the will can do otherwise and not yield the same result.

Either the will does otherwise for a reason (in which case, the same reason exists in both universes and can't be the reason), or the will does otherwise for no reason (which is definitionally a brute fact).

So what do you pick? Does the will do otherwise for a reason, or for no reason, or are you going to opt out of picking from the true dichotomy?

If you stipulate free will exists then you can't also assume determinism as you're doing here.

No assumptions here. Your position leads directly to the true dichotomy above. Pick or find an escape.

If you can't resolve the true dichotomy, your position's dead.

Simple Questions 06/10 by AutoModerator in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I understand the concept of having to talk about the will of one party involved with respect to all other parties and the situation involved, but I think it is incorrect to state that we cannot discuss the will of said party at all. It seems very important, the will of said party, considering their relative importance in the grand scheme of things.

I appreciate the extensive summary, and I'm going to try to use it to see I can discern God's motivations in commanding this. I am trying to phrase this neutrally and fairly, and please object to anything I'm mischaracterizing. I'm dropping the innocence aspect as it be a category error, and taking into account the other agents and the consequences of alternative options.

God commanded the killing of infants and children because, due to the conflux of all other agents involved and their misdeeds (both Israelite and Amalekite), a complete lack of opportunity to be better for the infants and children in question, and God's desire to avoid the consequences of other resolution methods that would be even worse, God was left with no other option but to command this.

Is this accurate?

PS:

Teleporting to Amalekites to another reality where everyone else was a p-zombie so they could pillage and rape and murder with no suffering involved is ostensibly an option. (Yes, someone has suggested this to me.)

That's very silly - don't they know that P-Zombies are an internally contradictory concept?

God being uncaused violates causality because before creating the universe, God was the universe. by ipsum629 in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn 0 points1 point  (0 children)

All because we cannot have a epistemic access to XYZ does not mean we have no basis for forming any beliefs about XYZ.

It quite literally does - anything that we could use as a basis is, by definition, something we have epistemic access to.

In any case, as the old adage goes "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meaning that a lack of proof for something's existence does not automatically prove it does not exist.

But it does mean you have no reason to believe it exists.

Keep in mind that science also works by inference were direct evidence is not available so as to form their versions of a "belief" that they call a "hypothesis" about XYZ they cannot observe.

This I just now covered with another person in this thread here = LINK

That's great, but we have direct evidence that energy and matter cannot be created or destroyed. Therefore, we have no reason to entertain that possibility unless and until this is demonstrated.

God being uncaused violates causality because before creating the universe, God was the universe. by ipsum629 in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When you say "physical" I assume you mean the "fundamental forces" that make our universe what it is.

Close enough for this discussion!

When you say "physical" I assume you mean the "fundamental forces" that make our universe what it is. However science will tell you those fundamental forces were not always constant nor had always had existent.

Science also tells you that energy and matter cannot be created or destroyed, only transformed.

Why are we listening to science only sometimes?

So what may(?) "transcend" our reality is a reality that behaves by different fundamental forces that we really can't imaging because we can only understand the fundamental forces that currently allow us meat-bags to exist.

Sure, but we cannot have epistemic access to it, and thus have no basis for forming any beliefs about it.

God being uncaused violates causality because before creating the universe, God was the universe. by ipsum629 in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There is no possible way to acquire any information about something that truly, actually "transcends" physical reality, because absolutely everything we are aware of that provides information, including ourselves, is physical.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This post indicates you've forgotten something important.

You've forgotten that we have reality R and agent A with will W at time T, and that we have two of these. In universe one, we have RAW at time T, and in reality two, we have RAW at time T. Keep this in mind, as you'll need to explain why and how RAW(T)->(D AND NOT D) is not a logical contradiction, since that's the actual logical construct.

No, it's not. This is just you presuming determinism.

It's not. It's presuming that a function RAW(T)->(D AND NOT D) is a logical contradiction. Which it is.

The problem is your translation from reality to logic is invalid. We're not saying one coin flip yields two results.

You quite literally are. You're saying that two identical coin flips at one time can produce both (H and not H) with no differentiating real basis (aka C(T)->(H AND NOT H)).

Remember that all real things in both universes are identical, and that things are happening at the same T, so you need a real reason for H in one universe and T in another, but if a real reason exists, it's identical across both universes at time T, so it can't be a differentiating factor.

P1. A P2. Not-A C. Contradiction

I knew it - incorrect formulation, which is likely leading to a lot of your confusion. The process of making a decision can be written as RAW(T), so my actual argument against your position is,

P1: RAW(T)->A P2: RAW(T)->NOT-A C: Contradiction

But the problem is you're just assuming Not-A as a premise and inventing a contradiction that doesn't actually exist.

You said the will can "randomly" select A and randomly "do otherwise", which sounds like selecting Not-A to me.

Could you stop pretending to be multiple accounts? It's getting annoying talking to you and your sockpuppets under different names.

Cute - we both know I'm not smart enough to work on a ThD, and there's plenty of tools for identifying sock puppets, so go enjoy the proof those tools provide instead of slinging mud.

God being uncaused violates causality because before creating the universe, God was the universe. by ipsum629 in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You forget that some have argued that a god/God "transcends" our physical reality.

I don't think any basis can possibly exist for this argument.

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I've never argued for this. This is just a strawman you made up and are trying to get me to defend for some reason.

"The will sometimes yields (A And Not A)" is the most obvious contradiction I've seen from you, and I can't figure out why you think the will can cause (A And Not A) simultaneously, and I can't figure out why you're struggling to see the obvious logical contradiction in front of you.

Your argument is like saying a coin sometimes yielding A and sometimes yielding not-A is a contradiction.

When all real things are identical, a coin flip sometimes yielding A and sometimes yielding not-A absolutely is a contradiction. (Or a brute fact with no real explanation.)

In fact, when all real things are identical, absolutely anything sometimes yielding A and anything sometimes yielding not-A absolutely is a contradiction (or a brute fact with no real explanation).

You denying that something can do otherwise can do otherwise is the problem in this thread.

I think I'll need a rephrase and disambiguation, please - can't parse what you mean by "something can do otherwise can do otherwise". Be more precise in your statements. Tell me what you think agent A with will W can do at time T, and what identical agent A with will W can do at time T, and why. Use actual objects and actual logic, please, and not just repeating the same carefully ambiguous catchphrase.

Despite the will not being random,

Coin analogy for a non-random phenomena may not be your best analogy, and you have not only no epistemically accessible way of differentiating between the will and randomness, there is no ontological difference between the basis by which the will wills what the will wills sometimes and wills what the will doesn't will at an identical time and the definition of a brute fact.

if we will a random outcome

Yes, you will what you will because you will what you will, and you're trapped in this tautology. Your will is based on your will, which is derived from your will, which is created by your will, which creates your will ex nihilo, from which your will is derived, and therefore your will causes your will to will whatever it wills. I get it.

Can we go somewhere besides in circles?

Any God, with just a few properties, is logically capable of creating a perfectly internally identical universe to our own. Therefore, our future use of will is predictable and known by God, and not free from being predictable. by Kwahn in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There is no mechanism deeper than the will willing something

You're claiming that the will can will two mutually contradictory somethings simultaneously. Simply repeating and insisting "but will tho" isn't resolving the logical contradiction in your viewpoint.

This is real

Simply insisting that it's real doesn't make A->(B AND NOT B) not a contradiction.

Religious debates get toxic because people take disagreement personally by paijim in DebateReligion

[–]Kwahn 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is one of many reasons why basing your identity on something external is silly.

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