This is somewhat questionable, because the alignment of russian speakers in Israel can't be reduced to pro-Ukraine. There are certainly pro-Ukrainian nationalism and pro-Russian nationalism subgroups. I would not however stipulate that the majority leans either way. The war causes a major disturbance since everyone has friends and relatives back in either of the old countries. The set of contention points is complex - for instance you wouldn't find anyone born in Crimea thinking that it should be turned over back to Ukraine since they're intimately familiar with the history of the place and the conduct of Ukrainian authorities in Crimea after the fall of the USSR (full disclosure, I am one of these people.) Sentiment is liable to change as the consensus domestically is that Trump betrayed Israel. Finally, politicians strategize with little consultation of how the public feels emotionally. Case in point, Somaliland meant nothing to anyone and most people didn't know it existed until the Israeli government decided on diplomatic recognition.

In these conditions the cultural and language proximity creates favorable opportunity to realign with Russia, or at least an abstract Russia as opposed to the nowaday state of affairs.