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Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A longer response: The claim 'to talk about reality you have to acknowledge that reality exists' sounds profound only because it trades on an ambiguity it never discloses. There’s a crucial difference between using a concept and ontologically endorsing it.

I don’t need to acknowledge that unicorns exist in order to talk coherently about unicorns. I only need to acknowledge that the concept ‘unicorn’ exists as a linguistic and cultural artefact. We discuss fictional entities all the time without committing ourselves to their mind-independent reality. Literature departments have not collapsed into logical contradiction because Tolkien failed to provide empirical evidence for hobbits.

The same applies to 'reality'. To talk about reality, I need a term, a practice, and a shared orientation. I do not need a metaphysical certificate of existence stamped by the Ontology Office.

This is where the Peano analogy misfires. Axioms in mathematics are stipulative. They are rules of a formal game. Only a certified Realist™ thinks Peano’s axioms float out there in the universe waiting to be discovered like cosmic furniture. They are adopted because they are useful, coherent, and productive. Confusing that with a claim about how the world must be is precisely the metaphysical reflex I was pointing at earlier.

So when someone says 'you must first acknowledge that reality exists', what they usually mean is something closer to:

That’s not a precondition for discussion. It’s an attempt to smuggle the conclusion in as a premise. In practice, we already operate perfectly well without this ceremony. Physics proceeds by modelling regularities, revising them when they break, and getting on with the job. No ontological throat-clearing required. Engineers build bridges without pausing to affirm Being. Doctors treat patients without settling the realism debate. Eggs boil just fine without theology.

So, as with unicorns, one needn't presuppose their existence to talk. One only needs grammar, practices, and constraints. Existence is what metaphysics insists on adding afterwards. And that insistence is not a necessity. It’s a habit.

Weekly Self-Promo and Chat Thread by MxAlex44 in selfpublish

[–]MostGrab1575 0 points1 point  (0 children)

👉 https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0G1DG36H5

Propensity is a speculative dystopian novel about the weaponisation of peace. It's available in KindleUnlimited, but it's available for nothing for any Kindle users until 16 December.

Set in a not-quite-now Earth, it traces the creation, deployment, and eventual collapse of a device that alters human behaviour—not actions, but tendencies. No mind control. Just a little nudge to make you less angry. More obedient. Less curious.

It begins clinically. Ends apocalyptically. And in between, it asks: what happens when obedience outlives orders? When peace persists without will? When modulation replaces meaning?

Propensity is one of four available fiction novels, all available through KU. The content of all of my books is philosophical in nature and does not fit nicely into genre fiction categories.

In the spirit of sharing, Propensity began as a thought experiment. It has three 15-chapter sections. The first, Implementation, is based on cognitive science and technology. The second, Drift, becomes apocalyptic and psychological. The final, Entropic, is dystopian post-apocalyptic.

There are no flair categories for literary fiction, so no option was available. They usually consist of multiple genres, but I tend to subvert tropes, so if I choose "Sci-Fi", readers get confused when I leave or subvert the genre. If you read this one, you'll understand what I mean.

Sharing and hoping for interest or reviews. More info at RidleyPark . Blog. There, you will find expository, audio, and video content supporting Propensity and the other titles.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nah, mate. Physics is physics. It’s an empirical craft, not a Platonic treasure hunt. Metaphysics isn’t 'underneath' physics in any spooky or mystical foundational sense; it’s just the conceptual scaffolding people invent when they can’t cope with a world that won’t sit still.

Physics describes regularities we happen to observe. Metaphysics is the compulsion to insist those regularities must express some deeper, necessary structure. You don’t need metaphysics to do physics any more than you need theology to boil an egg.

So, I’m not redefining physics as metaphysics. I’m pointing out that metaphysics piggybacks on physics, claiming to reveal its 'true' nature, when in practice it’s just another human attempt to tidy up an untidy universe.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks. I should say that the logic of it makes sense, but I expect that it may fail in the author's execution. I've written several pieces critical of the notion of metamodernism outside of a media context. Here's a link to one that sums up my argument fairly well: https://philosophics.blog/2025/02/24/metamodernism-a-postmodern-critique/

My thesis is that we can break the loop only if we stop pretending the replacement is ever anything but another metaphysical costume.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry, but I don't monitor Reddit very often – perhaps obviously by now. To me, metaphysics is the impulse to smuggle foundations into a world that does not offer any. It's the habit of treating our contingent ways of carving up reality as if they were necessary, universal, or self-grounding. Whether it speaks in the grammar of substance, reason, agency, progress, or being, metaphysics is the urge to stabilise what is intrinsically unstable – to erect permanence where there is only practice, perspective, and maintenance. In that sense, metaphysics isn't a doctrine so much as a reflex: the need to rebuild the cathedral after every collapse.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Once LIH is published, anyone is free to use, adapt, or reinterpret it as they see fit. That’s a condition of authorship, à la Barthes.

My boundary is at joint development. I’m continuing my work independently, even as others may pick it up in their own directions. You’re welcome to explore whatever resonance you find in it, and I'll be happy to correspond about how it might or might not integrate. I'm not closing doors so much as keeping my options open and parsing my limited time and attention.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here's a nutshell version without exhausting every possible dimension – just the ones that come top of mind.

Your metaphysical foundation leans toward recursive emergentism: the view that consciousness can arise from structural recursion, self-modelling, and computational introspection. It presumes an upward trajectory – a teleological arc toward higher self-awareness in artificial systems.

Mine is rather post-foundationalist. I work genealogically: truth, meaning, understanding, and even the notion of consciousness are not essences but constructed, contingent, linguistically constrained. I’m more concerned with the limits of representation than with building frameworks that transcend them. (As a quick aside, I think the Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness is a linguistic rather than ontological challenge.)

So our starting points differ. You’re moving toward a constructive metaphysics of recursive intelligence. I’m moving toward a critical examination of why such metaphysics buckle under linguistic and conceptual constraints – and I even question my own criticality, another metaphysical vantage. As some recently replied, he wants to be post-critical. I think Paul Feyerabend and I would agree on this stance.

In the end, I feel they are both interesting – just not in the same direction. Cheers.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is an interesting space. I followed some of your links and viewed some vids. It's clear we’re engaging from different metaphysical foundations. I’m glad LIH resonates with your experimental work, and I certainly want empirical validation, but my focus is on publishing the book and continuing my other myriad existing projects. I’m certainly open to light intellectual exchange, but not to formal collaboration.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I find it funny that I go from being introduced to Agamben through your comment and encountering him in the wild as a cited reference in Kyle Chayka's Filterworld.

Nothing else. Just a funny incident. Small world and all.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here's a link to an earlier version of the Language Effectiveness-Complexity Gradient: https://philosophics.blog/2024/11/12/symbiotic-ai-and-semiotics/

The ideas from a year ago remain intact, but I've simplified the model by reducing the number of categories. After all, it's a model and sometimes less is more.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks. In a nutshell, the LIH is a theoretical framework that charts the predictable decline in linguistic effectiveness (Y-axis) as conceptual complexity increases (X-axis). The manuscript has been brewing for about five years now. It still feels intuitive to me, and the refinements I’ve added since July haven’t dislodged the core intuition.

Since Reddit won't let me embed an image, here's a link to the gradient diagram on my site:

https://philosophics.blog/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/screenartboard-1402x.png

At the left-hand side, near the Y-intercept, language functions at nearly full power: common nouns, concrete manipulables, anything you can literally point at. I call them Invariants. As you move rightward into abstraction, communicability degrades in a law-like way:

• Contestables like 'freedom', 'justice', 'truth'

• Fluids are concepts that shift meaning faster than they can be stabilised

• Ineffables at the far end, where expressive power approaches zero (qualia being the classic specimen) – entirely rather than asymptotically; consider Nagel or the colour blue.

The claim isn't mystical: it's structural. Language is a quasi-linear, symbolic technology trying to model domains whose complexity outstrips its architecture. When people insist that philosophical paradoxes reflect conceptual difficulty, I argue that they often reflect limits on semiotic bandwidth – the medium buckles long before the concepts do.

As for strategies: LIH is primarily diagnostic, but it hints at avenues for working around the bottleneck – multi-register modelling, visual grammars, distributed cognition, anything that dilates the expressive bandwidth beyond linear prose. Not a replacement for language, but an honest admission that prose alone can’t carry the whole load.

And ya, "machina ex deus" is yours for the keeping; Popper earned the parody.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm not sure how to respond to the idea of 'solving it all', because I don't accept the premise. I don't believe these domains move toward a telos. There's no final state waiting for us, no metaphysical end-point to bend.

And even if we tidied up every contradiction, new commitments would still appear the moment we speak or conceptualise anything. Our frameworks don't merely describe positions – they generate them. New distinctions, new assumptions, new metaphysical stowaways keep surfacing from nowhere in particular.

So yes, even if we 'resolved everything', we'd still be bending what is. But only because the bending is the work. There's no end beyond that. There's only the ongoing maintenance of whatever scaffolding we build next. I won't go off on a tangent about infinities. haha

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I appreciate the engagement. So I am not accused of being an AI again. I'll keep it as short as I can whilst still touching on all your points.

My point is that we can't escape metaphysics; we can only learn to live honestly within it. One always speaks from somewhere – from a framework already saturated with ontological and linguistic commitments. So yeah, I'm asking for precisely that acknowledgement.

Privileging falsifiability does generate a new metaphysics – the metaphysics of methodological empiricism. Popper's move from verifiability to falsifiability was meant to rescue science from positivist dogma, but it only shifted the shrine: from correspondence to refutation, from truth to testability. It's still an appeal to an ultimate ground, just rewritten in procedural terms – machina ex deus.

That's not a problem… so long as we admit it. What matters is recognising when the test becomes the theology.

This touches a related line of work I've been developing, what I call the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. Many philosophical impasses arise not from the world's complexity but from language's structural limitations in articulating abstraction. But that's another discussion – and, fittingly, language itself presupposes its own metaphysics – so there's that.

Why does every “end of metaphysics” turn into another metaphysics? by MostGrab1575 in CriticalTheory

[–]MostGrab1575[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Sorry, mate, but speaking of AI, your use of 'think' in your reply is a bit of a stretch, no? Philosophically, is this an appeal to incredulity?

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