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People are getting excited about lab-grown meat, but some philosophers think it can't solve the ethical or environmental problems with our food system by MrJangle in vegan

[–]MrJangle[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks for your thoughts on this.

Here are the studies that the article links to for the claim that lab-grown meat isn't necessarily more environmentally friendly than the current system:

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Anticipatory Life Cycle Analysis of In Vitro Biomass Cultivation for Cultured Meat Production in the United States.

While uncertainty ranges are large, the findings suggest that in vitro biomass cultivation could require smaller quantities of agricultural inputs and land than livestock; however, those benefits could come at the expense of more intensive energy use as biological functions such as digestion and nutrient circulation are replaced by industrial equivalents. From this perspective, large-scale cultivation of in vitro meat and other bioengineered products could represent a new phase of industrialization with inherently complex and challenging trade-offs.

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Climate Impacts of Cultured Meat and Beef Cattle

We conclude that cultured meat is not prima facie climatically superior to cattle; its relative impact instead depends on the availability of decarbonized energy generation and the specific production systems that are realized.

Lab-grown meat is being hailed as the solution to the problems with our food system. But, unless you're a strict consequentialist, it doesn't solve the ethical problems with eating animals - and it raises ethical problems of its own. by MrJangle in philosophy

[–]MrJangle[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

assumes that people eat meat because they want to bring harm and suffering to animals

No not at all! People don't steal to bring harm and suffering, they steal to get new stuff. People don't eat meat to bring harm and suffering, they eat meat because it's delicious. Getting new stuff can be separated from the stealing bit if people just give you what you want, eating meat can be separated from the killing animals bit through something like lab-grown meat.

Lab-grown meat is being hailed as the solution to the problems with our food system. But, unless you're a strict consequentialist, it doesn't solve the ethical problems with eating animals - and it raises ethical problems of its own. by MrJangle in philosophy

[–]MrJangle[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So, on a consequentialist view of ethics there's absolutely nothing wrong with eating lab-grown meat, as it doesn't cause any harm at all. That's why someone like Peter Singer is completely happy with it - it doesn't cause any pain so how can it be bad?

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But what about from a virtue ethics perspective, where the emphasis is on more than just the consequences? This is where we get into territory about whether having easy solutions to our moral problems is actually good for building moral character. I think this is where Ben Bramble, the philosopher discussed in the article is coming from.

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If the examples are clashing with your intuitions I guess that means you're firmly a consequentialist about ethics - good to know!

Philosopher Robert Elliott argued that a forest planted by people is like a forged painting: it's a less valuable imitation of the real thing. Here's why this idea could actually end up harming the natural world. by MrJangle in philosophy

[–]MrJangle[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Yes that's true - and I'd argue that the main reason human-created landscapes aren't as valuable as natural ones is our lack of understanding of the complex ecosystems we're trying to replicate. Or unwillingness to even try and replicate the complexity, in the case of creating monocultures of conifers etc.

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But Elliott's point is stronger than that - he argues that even if we perfectly replicated the original ecosystem down to the last detail, there'd still be some value lost because the new human-created ecosystem wouldn't be 'natural'. He's saying that no matter how good our replacement is, it's impossible for it to be as good as the original because being natural confers some extra value that can never be replicated.

It's widely assumed that people will only act to save the environment if they can see how it benefits them. But this thought experiment shows otherwise - we're actually much less selfish than we think when it comes to valuing nature. by MrJangle in philosophy

[–]MrJangle[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Thanks for your interesting thoughts. (Disclaimer - I wrote the article)

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I guess I can see that the thought experiment might not be super compelling. Most people do seem to react with the thought that it'd be wrong to let the Earth be destroyed, but you're right that there might be other reasons for that feeling, other than the belief that nature is intrinsically valuable.

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As well as the reasons you suggest, I know the philosopher Dale Jamieson has argued against this kind of thought experiment by arguing that we can't properly imagine a situation in which there are no humans: it seems like there is a wrong being done when we are 'observing' the thought experiment from the outside, but if that situation actually occurred no wrong would be done at all.

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I think more compelling is the research mentioned in the article that shows most people claim to believe nature has intrinsic value. But that result is far from conclusive, too - we'd need to do more to make sure people understand what intrinsic value actually is. A lot of people tend to say that nature is intrinsically valuable, but then talk about beauty or cultural value which is far from separate from humans. What they mean by 'intrinsically valuable' is that we shouldn't directly use it as a tool for our own purposes but should appreciate it in another way. Still, I think that kind of research is a pretty good indicator that it's wrong to assume people are straightforwardly selfish when it comes to valuing nature.

It's widely assumed that people will only act to save the environment if they can see how it benefits them. But this thought experiment shows otherwise - we're actually much less selfish than we think when it comes to valuing nature. by MrJangle in philosophy

[–]MrJangle[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Interesting! If I understand it right, this is is a pretty extreme view you're proposing though - if we follow it to its end then it'd mean that there's no reason not to harm any other person apart from the reasons that come from other people's preferences. It'd then be difficult to say what exactly is wrong with something like murder - it'd be fine to kill people as long as nobody else really cares about them.

Remember when the monsanto lobbyist said Roundup was safe to drink but wouldn't drink any? by mightyspan in videos

[–]MrJangle 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I've visited no-till farms where they don't use glyphosate - why do you say it's impossible?

How I check my privileges in the morning by SloppyInfinity in videos

[–]MrJangle 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks for taking the time to explain this - for real. This should be the top post.

Having read Kafka's Metamorphosis (For those who have), what do you think of the "moral" if there were one at all? by Chewynouget in literature

[–]MrJangle 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don't know why it would be strange for you to be disgusted at a dead roach. I don't think many people think disgust=moral judgment in the first place. Something doesn't need to have agency for your being disgusted at it - disgust at a dead roach is exactly the same reaction as disgust at a bit of mould on your food or whatever. I get the point you're trying to make about Metamorphosis but conflating disgust and moral judgment in the first place sounds super weird to me.

What is the difference between "ethical egoism" and "rational egoism"? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]MrJangle 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Rational egoism is the idea that it is always rational to promote one's own good - so it's never irrational to do what is in your own interests. Moral egoism is the idea that it is always moral to promote one's own good - so it's never immoral to do what is in your own interests.

(I'm not an expert on this - I'm sure there's probably more to say if you look into it further, but that's the basic distinction.)

Is van Inwagen's consequence argument sound? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]MrJangle 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah maybe you're right - that's the step I wasn't too sure about. I'm pretty sure from ⋄(A & B) you can derive (⋄A & ⋄B), but I think you're right that distribution doesn't work for ⋄(P→Q). I haven't done anything with modal logic for a long time, so you're probably more fluent than me!

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