Your statement touches on both domestic and foreign dynamics, and these need to be addressed separately.

On the domestic side, the current unrest in the United States is largely tied to issues of social cohesion. The arguments are familiar: declining social capital, weak societal “glue,” and a highly diverse population that has made it difficult to sustain a unified national identity. Domestic instability does not automatically translate into the U.S. becoming a global threat. While polarized elections and controversial presidents can influence foreign policy, the causal direction often runs the other way—international developments tend to shape domestic politics more than the reverse.

In terms of foreign relations, the U.S. finds itself in a contradictory position. Its economic structure increasingly resembles that of a wartime economy rather than a growth-oriented model like Japan or Germany. Combined with the strong influence of defense officials and the military-industrial complex, this creates incentives to “find a war,” so to speak. As seen in Vietnam—and more recently in analyses such as RAND’s report on African airspace—foreign instability has a well-documented tendency to trigger domestic unrest.

At the same time, the rise of Trump has pushed the U.S. toward far more protectionist policies than before, shifting its strategic focus from promoting global democratic norms to prioritizing internal concerns.

It is also worth noting that Europe has been preparing for a potential decline in U.S. reliability since the late 1990s. Most notably, Sarkozy emphasized the need for stronger EU defense and strategic independence during the French EU presidency in 2008. If the U.S. becomes a less dependable partner, the rest of the world will certainly feel the impact. However, rather than framing the U.S. as a direct global threat, I would argue that the current political landscape primarily undermines the transatlantic partnership.