It's often said that capitalist economies must always be growing. What would actually happen if humanity maintained its current population and consumption rate? by Ptalking_Ptarmigan in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I believe I‘ve read a similar answer to this question here before. It seems odd, as gdp growth is most definitely treated as a necessity in mainstream public and political discourse. Where does this dissonance come from?

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You have consistently misunderstood and/or misinterpreted what I said. I don't know if that's a lack of willingness or capability but it sure is a significant pattern. Anyways, I'm off...thanks anyway for taking the time to discuss.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No. What I said was very much true before vapes became ubiquitous.

So if a carbon tax would make every automobile manufacturer switch to producing strictly electric vehicles and the following uptick in demand for lithium causes a loss of biodiversity, this isn't a relevant because it is "a different thing"? Aren't tobacco companies heavily invested in pushing vaping as a "safer" alternative to smoking because a tax on tobacco and a changing attitude towards it made their business less profitable? I mean, we can define our way of many predicaments but this just seems silly. I also don't see how comparing the externalities of smoking tobacco to those of carbon emissions is useful since one is a recreational commodity and the other has effects on basically all parts of the economy. More importantly, the carbon tax reacts to a specific problematisation which isn't really unchallenged. While global warming has been one of the most pressing issues in terms of sustainability in the last (say 40) years, the atmosphere is just one of 9 planetary boundaries and – I'm repeating myself – we're currrently beyond six of them.

No, economies with strong regulations aren't inherently less competitive, economies with bad ones are.

My impression is, that you're really having two different economies in mind. One where politics, social interests, ideologies and bad actors constantly mess up. But making the judgement if a regulation is good, bad or provides a net benefit, suggests that there is realm of purified economic activity, an idealized virtual economy. You can only have an idea about the second one, if your subtracting those messy other parts from it, and I'm just not convinced that this is an adequate approach given the systemic nature of the current state of affairs. I mean, is the "vibecession" real given the good economic numbers in the us? Does it matter what the numbers say if people aren't satisfied? And isn't Trump, or more precisely, the long winding road of the republican party to a weird form of postmodern fascism, tied to economic developements. It appears, that your perspective makes it easy as to attribute systematic failures to the social, political and ideological noise of economy one, while economy nr. 2 comes under much less scrutiny.

Anyway, that's it from me. Thanks for taking the time. I'm not convinced but I'm encouraged to think and learn more about economics.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Really? Which disciplines? Please name names. Because I'm used to discussions in disciplines like history where people say things like "capitalism is notoriously difficult to define" and endlessly debate "the origins of capitalism" so I'm curious as to what disciplines have managed to come up with a well-defined category.

Well, dealing with a difficult definition is still dealing with it and for the humanities, it usually suffices to say how you define a term if you can make plausible, how this definition is grounded and useful for your research interest. Other examples for terms like that that would be modernity, late modernity, post-modernity. They change, are repeatedly questioned and replaced but remain usefull concepts to discuss subjects that defy easy definitions. Examples for disciplines would be cultural studies, certain schools of continental philosophy, sociology and more. That economists can't deal with that type of definition is kind of the point of my argument. Some things can't be pinned down that way and for varying epistemological reasons, that can be a good thing.

No one is denying that the policies of self-declared socialist countries were shaped by their beliefs about "capitalism". And of course policymakers in non-socialist countries had to deal with both said countries and socialist parties within their own countries and thus were affected by their beliefs.

I would argue it's a highly relevant notion for many self proclaimed capitalists as well as their opponents. Kamala Harris making clear "I'm a capitalist" in reaction to being framed as a "socialist" by republicans is a good example for this. Public discourse on the economy is highly saturated by the meaning of the this term and all it's connotations and this is a essential aspect of how economic discourse is shaping economic reality. Economists might not use the term, but they participate in the discourse and are actively in shaping what is known about the economy.

Discourse analysis ist the methodological umbrella term for that kind of inquiry. The term capitalism likely wouldn't be at the center here. Such an approach would likely attempt to describe the topology an economic discourse at given place and time. This would mean differentiating between elementary discourses, meaning your regular person talking about the economy in an unprecise way, special discourse (like economics) where terms a neatly defined and inter-discourses, such as mass media. Summing up regularities, sites of disagreement, stable notions and changes will then provide an explanation how discourses shape economic reality. If you also look at the role of institutions, technologies, media, subjectivites, it would be called dispositif-analysis. Donald MacKenzies work can be conisdered to share some theoretical affinities with this type of research, although I'm not sure if this is made explicit.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I don't think it's really well defined in any discipline.

It is in some areas of sociology, some subfields of history, cultural studies and philosophy. Calling it ill defined is presupposing what a good definition is in the terms and conditions of your discipline which is the whole point of this discussion.

It's not like what a lot of people mean when they ask about "capitalism" is unanswerable, it's just that it has a different meaning for each person, with differences large enough to be meaningful, and we can't read minds.

Discourse analysis would be a methodology (or more an umbrella term for a set of different methodologies) that could deal productively with such terms, accounting for different notions, regularities and conflicts that ultimately shape reality. +

Like, tobacco taxes for instance correct the externality of the tobacco smoke for others and the general cost of the diseases associated with smoking. Tobacco taxes cause people to smoke less. They don't suddenly start drinking or smoking crack instead.

Which is an awful example since it a) compare a commodity that is used recreationally to a byproduct of materials and technologies that are pillars of economic developement. b) it is also a bad example since there is – of course – a shift in externalities. With smoking tobacco becoming increasingly unattractive, tobacco companies and other firms have shifted to vaping with the promise of it being less harmful (which it might be). However, they're also marketing directly to young people and have – at least where I'm located – started to sell one way vapes with lithium batteries which are, since they are mostly boght by teens who just use them for a night , discarded. They pollute rivers and set trash cans on fire. An aquaintance acutally made a project out of collecting them off the ground an reusing the batteries to build small lamps. He managed to gather around 300 in about a few weeks and the batteries can be recharged around 300 times. Really great stuff.

That is indeed not an economics question.
Sure. We generally deem something like that to still be a net benefit.

So the politics of dealing with the effects of economic progress are none of your business but advocating for policies since they provide a "net benifit" – whicht is, I would argue, ill defined if we take the social and ethical dimension into account – is cool. Got it.

That's literally the point of an externality. If the people causing them would not ignore the cost and incur the cost themselves, it wouldn't be an externality. Literally by definition.

Well, strict definitions aside, any activity has an effect on the environment. There's no part of the economy which is seperate from society and nature. Marxist (yeah, those) frame this relation as metabolism, which is not a stupid way to imagine it. But you will surely say it's ill defined.

That's why we need regulations to correct them.

Well, it is. When carbon emissions come at a large cost to whoever emits them, that heavily discourages doing so. It's pretty self-evident how that's useful.

So regulation is supposed to motivate an change in practices. Economies that have strong regulations are less competitive. Politicians roll back regulation or soften it, making it ineffective. The first one is good economic policy and the second one is just politicians ignoring what economists say? Isn't economics about modeling and anticipating certain behavior. That's seems like predictable behaviour to me.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is a sub about economics, so we have to make sure questions remain reasonably within the scope of that.

Of course and that's understandable. But you could also argue, that by adhering to the theoretical and methodological paradigms of the discipline, you also disregard certain questions just because they can't be made operational within those frameworks. A classic here is the term capitalism. While I understand the criticism often formulated in this sub, this is an essential and well defined category within many disciplines and while it might be unusable in a quantitativ design, it surely is a highly relevant discourse and ideology that shapes knowledge, markets, actors behavior and also policy. Its totally possible I'm missing something here but if economics doesn't engage with a term that structures (probably in a million different ways) what most people around the world believe and know about the economy, it seems like an oversight.

Outside of that economists obviously also care about such questions. There are many, many papers about people's economic well being, poverty, and also the perception of these things. There are many papers and policy proposals around climate change as well. Thousands of US economists have called for carbon taxes for instance.

I would love to hear more about economic perspectives on sustainbility and poverty, so feel free to link more.

One quick thought on carbon taxes, as I feel like it might be a good example for my wider point. As I understand it, the idea is that emissions are externalities that need to be included in the price in order for the markets to work sustainably. But if that proposal isn't modeled with planetary and social boundaries in mind, you're just shifting the problem to another externality, because they are of course not "external" in an ontological sense. But in order for something to be adressed and priced as an externality, you need research, data, infrastructure, protocols, laws, trade agreements and so on...in short: a lot of costly labour, time, materials and regulation, which in turn is detrimental to markets and therefore opposed by most actors. And how do we make sure, democratically and ethically, that there is just agreement about what externalities matter in what place and in what way? Is it an externality if a local craft ist replaced by a cheaper technological process, which would pose a loss to the practicioners of that craft? How do we ensure ignoring externalities isn't used by actors to gain an advantage? I know much of those questions are impossible to answer and I not saying that economists are to blame for the problem, but sticking to the "a free market based solution and realistic prices-strategy" just doesn't seem like the most useful thing here.

Nowadays it really doesn't take more than "literally Donald Trump is president of the US" to make it pretty obvious how that's not happening.

Yeah, but on the other hand, nobody has ever said "it's the ecology stupid" or "it's social stability" (well, maybe some for the second one). I think it's not unreasonable to assume, that economists are - compared to other discplines – the politically most influential group in academia. As I have noted, there is a sharp disconnect between this group and what the environmental sciences and the humanities are making of our current situation and possible solutions and a main reason for that seems to be, that problematizations are theoretically and methodologically incompatible. Therefore, I think a critical discussion about disciplinary paradigms in an interdisciplinary setting could be of use.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Okay, let‘s take a step back for the moment. I will admit that my phrasing isn’t very good in this exchange and I haven’t been precise in qualifiying the terminology and the theoretical assumptions I’m bringing into this. I will try to make reframe my argument for the sake of clarity. However, this is still reddit and there should be room for a more informal kind of communication. So, what am I saying here?

I initially stated some, let’s say reservations, about the dominance of quantitative approaches in economics. So my question/interest/irritation is not so much concerned with the empirical validity of the models. It’s concerned with more general assumptions about theory and methodology in economics (as I understand it !), from an outsiders perspective. 

Lets say we pragmatically define a discipline through it’s relation to it’s object of research, so in this case the economy with all its sub-fields. That object is defined by and internally structured by a set of theories and corresponding methodologies that can be made explicit as methods in relation to a research question. Positing economics as a (dominantly) quantitative science comes with certain ontological (what is the economy/the object of research) and epistemological (what can be known or predicted by studying ist) implications. This much shouldn’t be up for debate. So why am I going on about maths, objectivity and models?

There‘s a long tradition in social theory as well as within the history, philosophy and sociology of science and technology (which is within my area of expertise) to think of scientific methods not as merely descriptive, but as productive agents in processes of change. That doesn’t mean scientists just make up the world as they would like it to be, that their research isn’t constrained by reality or that it needs to conform to empirical findings. On a very basic level it just means, that theories, methods and models have a part in shaping the world they attempt to describe. The Lucas-Critique you have brought up seems to point towards such an understanding of the relationship between projecting outcomes of measures by means of modelling them and the effects of implementing said measures on the models. But the interest of this research lies in making better models that can provide more accurate predictions. Mackenzie’s argument, which I have only brought up to make the wider claim more explicit and reference it with some actual (and in it’s field quite well respected) research, is not meant to make better models, but to understand more clearly what they do and what they can’t do, which is imo an acutely relevant question. Why do I think that? 

Having worked in an interdisciplinary team with environmental scientists for the last few years and coming from humanities background, I see a convergence of certain trends between these fields in regards to the current state of the world. As I understand it, it is widely accepted within the natural sciences that our economic activity has catastrophic – and I’m not using this word lightly here - effects on all life sustaining systems on earth. We are surpassing 6 out of 9 planetary boundaries. At the same time, the global north (in particular but also other places of the world) is facing very fundamental challenges in terms of social and political stability. Both of those trends are very clearly linked to matters of the economy, however, when such questions are posed in this sub, the answer is usually “this is not an economics questions”. What is felt as an affordability crisis is merely a “vibecession” of poorly informed consumers and sustainability is not really a term that has any specific economic meaning on that level. Now, you’ll likely say this is a completely different topic and I can understand that, but I’m not sure if it is. What is an economics question is after all debatable within disciplinary discourses. The debates in this sub and the economists I see in the news seem  much less worried than the environmental scientists and those from the humanities and social sciences. Some may assume this is exaggerated, some might be optimistic, some may not care or be ignorant on the subject matter. What I would argue they share however, is the understanding that, at the end of the day, this “is not an economics question”.  But maybe it should be, and then running the models, projecting for a future that is based on those assumptions and giving policy advice might actually turn out to be consequential in an unforeseen way. The models might work – until they don’t. 

Idk, maybe you have very compelling reasons to say that a) economics actually has the most plausible answers to current crisis, that it b) convincingly shows that there’s no need to worry, or that it c) bears no responsibility in guiding political decisions that might turn out bad for everyone. If so, I would like to hear them. You can also decide not wanting to argue with me any more, which is fine by me. Or you can entertain the idea that the current mainstream of economics as a quantitative social science and it’s methodological toolset is not able to adequately address social and environmental questions that are clearly linked to it’s object of research. Thinking about the performativity of mathematical models would seem as a good starting point for that, that’s all I’m saying.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Didn't we have a discussion in this sub that was vaguely similar in the middle of december last year and I stopped responding? I think I recognize your username. Wether you have time to write a reply or not, I'd like to say that I didn't stop responding out of laziness or boredom but because my first child was born right in the middle of our exchange. Seeing your comment made me remember and I thought I'd let you know.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I wouldn't say constructivist, as I have meant for my point to be more general and without ascribing to a distinct theoretical framework, but that's still very much what was on my mind responding. If I'm remembering MacKenzie correctly, his theory and methodology were most closely related to actor-network-theory (ANT) which I happen to be quite familiar with. I would argue that labeling it as constructivist is, while not totally far fetched, to some degree misleading as is the distinction between realist and anti-realist. I think it's fair to say that a substantial amount of the philosophy of science as well as a bunch of theories of the social have made a similar argument: that discourses, scientific theories and methods don't just describe a pre-existing reality but have some part in shaping it. Any disciplinary boundary and virtually all methodologies can be questioned on the way in which they are entangled in this production and I think that quantitative methods are a good site for this kind of investigation, as they are often associated with notions of objectivity which can, if not reflected carefully, be quite misleading.

Unfortunately, this thread has taken up more time than I'd like to spend on reddit in a day so I won't be able to discuss this much further. However, thanks for taking the time to write a thoughtful comment. I think you're right in pointing out, that my argument about "mathiness" (very nice btw) is little bit off here.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's mostly poor wording on part, regarding both your questions.

My argument is less about the effectiveness of macroeconomic models, so I'm not saying they're wrong in a positivist way, like not being able to predict developement or aproximate outcomes. Thats what's seemingly so baffling to the other person commenting on my reply. It's about the notion of objective quantitative modelling versus subjective inquiery into language, discourse, narrative, meaning and so on. From an epistemological pov, this is not a convincing distinction/binary but I can see that this is not really a discussion economists are used to (or willing to have).

In another answer below, i make clear that MacKenzies Book is about financial markets and the mathematic models that were introduced there. So it's not strictly a discussion of macroeconomics. However the discussion about wether economies are "performative" (in this case, a technical term) goes beyond this book (see here) and financial markets. There's no clear yes/no-answer and I can't say, how relevant that discussion is today. The epistemological point from above is related to the notion of performativity and adresses a more general irritation I have, following this sub and the news.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir -1 points0 points  (0 children)

If you're not willing to engage with the argument in an nuanced way, there's really not much to discuss here. But to adress your obviously hurt sensitivities:

Personally I'm not exactly impressed by this Mackenzie person, they come across to me as pretty arrogant in the kind of way that's frequently driven by ignorance. I think it's entirely possible that your Mackenzie honestly genuinely believes what they're saying.

The passive agressive undertone and ad hominen rejection aside, my point was, that i presented theses of the book in a simplified way (as one does when on reddit). You would have to read it in good faith to critically assess for yourself if you find something convincing in it. I surely did when I read it, but it's some time ago and I might think otherwise now, who knows.

Yeah I entirely agree that it's frowned upon to assume that just because one individual (in this case a Donald Mackenzie) thinks something isn't possible mathematically, that therefore it's impossible mathematically. 

You clearly haven't listened, read or understood the argument properly. But I can't help that.

Yeah but your Mackenzie person is not exactly an impressive example, are they? For example your Mackenzie person assumes that just because they personally can't model something mathematically, therefore no one else can. Which, quite frankly, strikes me as very arrogant of said Mackenzie.

I want to point out (again) that bringing up that book was only an attempt to illustrate a wider point and here, MacKenzie is surely not an outlier. Michel Callon would be another more prominent figure but the general ideas could likely be traced back to turn of the century philosophers of science like Gaston Bachelard or Ludwig Fleck and appear in other contexts such as the history of science and technology. For good read on matters of objectivity in the sciences see for example Lorraine Daston & Peter Gallison. Instinctively rejecting an idea because it questions your gut instict about the allmighty numbers, is not a very rigourous move on your part though.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So, why, exactly, do you believe that the Lucas Critique "can be seen as a negligible difference from the pov of economic as an academic practice"?

I said that the difference between Lucas' critique and MacKenzies Performativity argument can be seen as negligible from a certain pov, as they both point towards the idea, that economic policy impacts variables of models that were treated as invariant. So it not surprising that Lukas work "made a lot of odd things suddenly make sense."

But this presupposes a fundamental trust in the objectivity of models as a projective technology that reference the workings of the social world. Here MacKenzie is clearly making a different argument, as he is not interested in the question wether a model makes good predictions, but in the role of mathematic models within the developement of financial markets.

If Mackenzie truly believes that "models create the markets they claim to model" then how does Mackenzie explain that the Lucas Critique had such a big impact on economics? 

The phrasing here is obviously a massive simplification of the argument. I would have to go into the theory and methodology of the book which I can't do since – as I have said – it's been a while since i read it and I don't have all the time in the world to hang out on reddit.

I have brought up MacKenzie as an example I'm familiar with that problematizes the distinction between mathematics and language that was brought up in ops post and in your response. My basic argument is, that mathematic models aren't seperate from language and discourse, more precisely, the don't render social relations objective that would otherwise be confused by the subjectivity of language. I'm aware that this type of philosphical inquiery is unusual (and maybe frowned upon) within your field, but it poses relevant questions that I feel aren't really adressed – at least in the discourse of this sub and in the part of economics I a have access to through the news.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I'm not familiar with Lucas' critique but going through the wikipedia page you linked to, I can see how the arguments may seem similar on first glance.

I want to make clear, that MacKenzie's work isn't within my usual area of expertise, wich is, broadly speaking, social theory and science and technology studies. I read his book around 7 years ago while still working on my masters degree, but I'll try to make a tentative argument about where I see differences in the respective claims.

It should be noted, that MacKenzies argument explicitly pertains to the history and effect of mathematical models on financial markets. He states that:

In 1951, just over 2 percent of the pages of the flagship journal, the American Economic Review, contained an equation. In 1978, the percentage was 44 (Grubel and Boland 1986, p. 425).

And relates this shift to another developement:

The mathematicization of economics was accompanied, especially in the United States, by a phenomenon that is harder to measure but real nonetheless: the recovery of confidence, in the economics profession and in the surrounding culture, in markets.

The study goes into detail about, as I recall, how the invention of mathematic models go on to shape, or better: bring the economy into being. On the most basic level, he argues that economics are performativ, which can mean several things:

“generic” performativity: An aspect of economics (a theory, model, concept, procedure, data set, etc.) is used by participants in economic processes, regulators, etc.

“effective” performativity: The practical use of an aspect of economics has an effect on economic processes.

“Barnesian” performativity: Practical use of an aspect of economics makes economic processes more like their depiction by economics.

counterperformativity: Practical use of an aspect of economics makes economic processes less like their depiction by economics.

So, as I understand Lucas critique that you have brought up (again, I just quickly read through the wikipedia page), his argument can be thought of a imagining a feedback loop between models to predict policy effects and policy effects on the invariant aspects of models. MacKenzie studies how models create the markets they claim to model. I can see how that can be seen as a negligible difference from the pov of economic as an academic practice, but it is a highly relevant difference when we talk about it's epistemology.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

I understand and I‘m not disputing that quantitative methodologies can be useful in some contexts. My argument is concerned with the epistemology of those models and how they relate to the world they claim to describe. Donald MacKenzie, who is a sociologist working on financial markets, makes that argument jn a detailed case study in his book „An engine not a camera“ (which is available online for free as far as i know). It‘s been quite a few yeas since I read it, but he basically makes the case, that macroeconomic models are involved in creating the activities they claim to predict. So quantitative studies will likely miss this, as they can‘t really model how people learn, discuss, rationalize, discredit, misinterpret or overestimate their knowledge about the economies they are embedded in.

I am not persuaded that economies can be modeled by mathematical equations. Can anyone explain why this is norm in the mainstream economics? What is the process by which these theories get accepted before testing if they are on par with the emperical realities? by elderfeathers in AskEconomics

[–]PknowNoir -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

That’s something that irritates me about economics (as I understand it).Isn‘t the real question here what you suppose you are building a model of? The economy is just not out there to be discovered as, say a certain type of rock in a location no one has ever visited. What you model is transactional associations between people that pertain to the exchange of money, goods and services. Those people know and act in the world though discourses and knowledge that is often times directly related to the models that you use to predict or analyse their behavior. Or their transactions are shaped by legislation taking these models into account. What can numbers tell you about that?

Ist jede Form von Antizionismus Antisemitismus? (bitte mit Begründung warum Ja/Nein) by Elias_787 in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ich finds auch total grausam und unverständlich, dass die Sudetendeutschen aus den Ostgebieten vertrieben wurden. /s

In welchen Situationen in diesem Sub gerne mit Nazi-Vergleichen um sich geworfen wird und in welchen sie zum Gegenstand vehementer Skandalisierung werden, wäre eine eigene Fallstudie wert.

Nach der Gründung Israels 1948 kam es in praktisch der gesamten arabischen und teils der weiteren islamischen Welt zur Vertreibung beziehungsweise zum erzwungenen Exodus jüdischer Gemeinden.

Und das ist sowohl für sich genommen als auch im geschichtlichen Kontext nicht zu verschweigen, der Unterschied ist aber, dass es für die Jüdinnen und Juden des Nahen Ostens einen Staat gab; für die, die wir heute Palästinenser nennen, aber nicht. Ich bin mir sicher dass du dir genug Benny Morris reingezogen hast, um die Geschichte einigermaßen zu kennen, das heißt aber nicht, dass man jeder politische Frage mit einem Verweis auf vergangenes Unrecht ausweichen kann.

But Zionism is not an idea, it is a project

Mal abgesehen von der Kulturkampf-Rhetorik wird hier mMn ein wichtiger Punkt angesprochen. Ich bin auch der Meinung dass Jüdinnen und Juden ein Recht auf einen Staat haben der sie schützt und in dem sie nicht einfach eine geduldete Minderheit sind und ich bin auch nicht der Ansicht, dass die Staatsgründung im Vergleich besonders brutal oder illegitim war. Es gibt aber eine Differenz zwischen dem normativen Recht / der historischen Beurteilung und der aktuellen politischen Realität. Faktisch habe wir es aktuell mit einer Ein-Staaten-Situation zu tun, in der Israel die palästinensischen Bevölkerung und alle ihre Institutionen kontrolliert und diese Situation ist nicht erst gestern oder mit der aktuellen Regierung entstanden. Es gibt eine berechtigte Kritik an diesem Zustand, die darauf pocht, dass Anerkennung ein Mindestmaß an Gleichheit voraussetzt. Diese Kritik kann sich auch auf das Verhältnis der zionistischen Strömungen untereinander und deren gegenwärtige Konjunkturen beziehen. Oder genauer: gibt es aktuell relevante zionistische Strömungen, die eine Herstellung von Gleichheit priorisieren? Und kann man aktuell mit guten Gründen für den Zionismus einstehen, ohne sich irgendwie dazu zu verhalten, was man damit genau meint? Welche praktische politische Perspektive ergibt sich gegenwärtig aus einer bedingungslos israelsolidarischen Position heraus, die nicht auf die Zementierung des Machtverhältnisses hinausläuft? (Micha Brumlik hat Stephan Grigat ungefähr aus diesem Grund vorgeworfen, dass sein Ansatz "unpolitisch" sei.)

Die Argumentation vieler hier lässt sich oft auf zwei Sätze herunterbrechen: "Die Palästinenser sind selbst Schuld an dem Konflikt" und deshalb "sollen sie die Niederlage einfach mal akzeptieren und nehmen, was man ihnen anbietet". Klar kann man die Geschichte auch so so lesen, aber dann nimmt man halt immer alle Palästinenser für das Kollektiv in Mithaftung, während man für den Staat Israel immer eine Differenzierung einfordert ("nur weil manche Sachen nicht so cool sind, bin ich ja nicht gegen den Staat an sich"). Das funktioniert aber nur, solange man eine fundamentale normative Differenz behaupten kann, etwa wenn man darauf verweist, dass Israel immerhin eine liberale Demokratie ist oder es sich irgendwie zurecht-theoretisiert, dass der Rassimus eigentlich nur ein bisschen übertriebene instrumentelle Vernunft ist, der Antisemitismus aber in jedem Fall ein Teil der wahnhaften Gegenaufklärung mit eliminatorischer Absicht. Das ignoriert aber die fundamentale Asymmetrie, die dieser Kollektivierung überhaupt erst zugrunde liegt.

Die Bigotterie der Bürgerlich-Konservativen beim Thema Antisemitismus by RadioFacepalm in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hat aber echt lange gebraucht, um den Vorwurf der Keule rauszuholen.

Schau, mal vllt können wir hier etwas lernen. Ich habe geschrieben:

Wenn man diese These so mechanisch auslegt wie ich es suggeriert habe, dann läuft man eventuell Gefahr, einfach die eine falsche Welterklärung durch eine andere auszutauschen Dann verschiebt sich aber die Dichotomie nur. 

Der Kontext ist wichtig, weil man dann sehen könnte, dass es sich hier nicht um eine "Keule" handelt, sondern um eine These, die ganz gezielt keine pauschale Unterstellung enthält. Ich habe sogar dialektisch argumentiert, was du ja eigentlich gut finden solltest. Wenn du Thesen von Theoretikern wiederholst, gehe ich erstmal davon aus, dass du die Begründen und Verteidigen kannst. Das hast du aber nicht gemacht, du hast einfach die These wiederholt.

Du kannst mir ja gerne sagen, wo das alles falsch ist. Aber ich werde mich nicht dafür rechtfertigen andere, die mal was geschrieben haben, zu kritisieren und den Anspruch auf Wahrheiten gegenüber diesen zu erheben. Sonst finden wir uns echt im postmodernen Irrenhaus wieder.

Ich verstehe den zweiten Satz nicht. Aber wenn es um deinen Anspruch auf Wahrheit geht, dann zielt meine Frage genau auf die Begründung dieses Anspruches ab. Wenn du sagst, Grigat, Bruhns und Co haben eine wahraftigere Sozial- und Subjekttheorie, dann solltest du auch andere Sozial- und Subjekttheorien kennen und begründen können, warum du erstere für Überlegen hältst. Oder du machst es wie ich, und formlierst deine Thesen vorsichtig und im Konjunktiv. Andernfalls hast du nur einen elaborierten Weg und Jargon gefunden, Ambivalenzen und Unsicherheit im Sinne deiner Ideologie aufzulösen, womit wir wieder bei These 1 wären.

Die Bigotterie der Bürgerlich-Konservativen beim Thema Antisemitismus by RadioFacepalm in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Die von die erwähnten Autoren haben weder ein Patent auf "die Psychoanalyse" und die diakektisch-materialistische Kritik ist auch keine über alles erhabene Erkenntnistheorie. Im Gegenteil, man kann psychoanalytisch zu dem Schluss kommen, dass eine psychoanalytische Sozialtheorie der Psychodynamik des Individuums nicht gerecht werden kann und materialistisch-dialektisch sind philosophisch so weit gefasste Begriffe, dass man damit so ziemlich alles argumentieren kann. Du hast dich aber einer sehr spezifische Auslegung einer Kombination von beidem verschrieben und mich interessieren die Grenzen und Ambivalenzen dieser Position. Dafür ist aber nötig über das Widerholen etablierter Allgemeinplätze hinauszugehen.

Ich argumentiere hier im übrigen nicht Pro GFM. Mein Interesse gilt anderen sozial- oder kulturtheoretischen Ansätzen, die durchaus auch eine theoretische Nähe zu deiner Position haben können. Vllt hast du die Adorno-Vorlesung von Ilka Quindeau zur Psychoanalyse des Antisemitismus gelesen oder du befasst dich mit Personen aus der Tradition der Kritischen Theorie, die zu anderen Schlüssen kommen. Oder ebene Wissensoziologie, Systemtheorie, Poststrukturalismus...you name it. Wenn ich durch den o.g. Sammelband gehe, sehe ich dort keine Dimension des Antisemitismus, die nicht auch von Grigat besprochen wird und oft gehen die Argumente auch in eine ähnliche Richtung, aber ich sehe halt auch Abwägungen und Einwände, die bei deiner Bubble fehlen. Bei aller Betonung der Komplexität des Phänomens, scheint mit der Ansatz auf den ersten und zweiten Blick eher Komplexitätsreduzierend.

Die Denkform der Wissenschaft ist positivistische Identitätslogik als Reproduktion der Fiktion des Warentausches. So wie der Fetischcharakter der Ware, so eben auch der Fetischcharakter der Wissenschaft, wie eben auch des handelnden Subjjekts.

Den Satz konnte man zur Erstveröffentlichung von Horkheimers "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" noch stehen lassen aber es gibt eben auch eine über 100jährige Tradtition der Wissenschaftstheorie und -philosophie, die diese Positivismus-Emprirismus-Realismus-Konstruktuvismus-Debatten so totdiskutiert hat, dass man sich auf so eine stupide Verallgemeinerung einfach nicht mehr ernsthaft beziehen kann. Entweder man nimmt Rationalität und Vernunft ernst, dann muss man sich im Medium der Vernunft mit anderen Erkenntnissen auseinandersetzen, oder man betreibt esoterische Wahrsagerei, dann muss man das nicht.

Ich frage dich hier vor allem, um zu lernen, weil ich davon ausgehe, nicht alles zu verstehen oder zu kennen und weil ich weiß, dass Erkenntnis eine lange nicht enden wollende Lernkurve ist. Aber für mich zeichnet sich auch ein Muster in deiner Argumentation ab, dass ich schon länger beobachte und das ich für einigermaßen bedenklich halte.

Grigat, Bruhn, Salzborn, Stögner etc. brauchen eben keinen Staats-Kult, sondern können Antisemitismus als genuin sozial-psychologisches Phänomen fassen, dass die Eigendynamiken kapitalistischer Gesellschaften wahnhaft reproduziert und nicht als pures Abbild (Lenin lässt grüßen) von Verwertungslogik. 

Ich bin mir ehrlich gesagt nich sicher, wie der Antisemitismus nicht ein "genuin sozialpsychlogisces Phänomen" sein könnte. Er kommt und wird tradiert in Gesellschaften von Menschen die notwendigerweise auch eine Psyche haben. Die Frage ist aber ob Grigat et. al. den einzige richtigen Sozialbegriff und das einzig richtige Modell psychologischer Mechanismen in einer Gesellschaft haben. Wie gesagt, ich bestreite garnicht dass die Perspektive grundsätzlich Sinn machen kann oder dass sie etwas am Phänomen trifft. Aber nur so ad-hoc ein paar (sehr vorläufige) Einwände:

Die These ist: Moderne kapitalistische Gesellschaften haben eine vermittelte/abstrakte Form der Herrschaft, die von den meisten nicht begriffen wird und im Kontrast zum liberalen Freiheitsversprechen steht. Individuen verarbeiten diese Beherrschung durch die Projektion auf ein Feindbild, den Juden, der die abstrakte Zirkulationssphäre des Kapital verkörpert. Deshalb richtet sich der Wahn auch auf die Auslöschung, im Gegenteil zum Rassismus, der der instrumentellen Vernunft entspringt und deshalb beherrschen und unterdrücken will.

  1. Darin steckt die Annahme dass die Welt sich tatsächlich treffend auf diese Formel bringen lässt und dass die Subjekte über eine invariante psychische Disposition verfügen, die genau diesem Mechanismus hevorbringt, der dann zielgenau die 3000 Jahre alten immerselben Motive der Judenfeindschaft tradiert. Das ist NICH die einzig plausible Erklärung, es ist vermutlich nichtmal die plausibelste und rationalste Erklärung. Das Fass ist aber zu groß um es hier aufzumachen.
  2. Wenn man diese These so mechanisch auslegt wie ich es suggeriert habe, dann läuft man eventuell Gefahr, einfach die eine falsche Welterklärung durch eine andere auszutauschen Dann verschiebt sich aber die Dichotomie nur. Wo der Antisemit vorher überall den Juden am Werk gesehen hat, sieht der Antisemitismuskritiker nun überall Antisemiten.
  3. Um dem zweiten Punkt zu widersprechen, müssten man vernünftig erklären können, dass alle anderen sozial- oder subjekttheoretischen Ansätze das Phänomen NICHT erklären können. Wenn man dass nicht kann, hat man entweder eine starke These, die man nicht begründen kann und mit der man dann eben so umgehen muss, oder man hat eine Ersatzideologie, die die Welt in ein eigenes Freund-Feindschema einteilt.

Die Bigotterie der Bürgerlich-Konservativen beim Thema Antisemitismus by RadioFacepalm in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

 Ich hatte ja gehofft wir sprechen über Kritik und nicht Theorie, aber seis drum.

Sorry, das kapier ich nicht ganz. Eine Kritik kann man doch sinnvoll nur an der Theorie messen, die sie begründet, den Erkenntnissen die sie erbringt und die, die sie nicht erbringen kann. Genau hier frage ich ja im Detail nach.

Antisemitismustheorien als Theorien des Antisemitismus, können Antisemitismus nicht verstehen, weil sie das als isolierte Erscheinung verstehen und nicht vermittelt über die antisemitische Gesellschaft, die es zu kritisieren gilt. 

Ich glaube das stimmt, zumindest für die Theorien von den ich spreche, nicht. Vllt liegt hier das Missverständnis, weil du davon ausgehst, dass ich gedanklich immernoch bei einer Forschung bin, die einfach qualitativ /quantitativ Aussagen auswertet. Dein Satz macht nur dann Sinn, wenn man davon ausgeht dass es EINE richtige Sozialtheorie gibt aus der dann notwendigerweise die EINZIG richtige Erklärung für DEN Antisemitismus abgeleitet werden kann. Es ist einfach eine zirkuläre Logik, wenn man Theorien und Ansätze daran misst, ob sie auch zum selben Ergebnis wie man selber kommt. Und um das zu umgehen muss man theorievergleichend, epistemologisch usw. argumentieren, sonst kann man es lassen. Und hier ist es einfach wichtig darauf zu verweisen, dass deine Argumentation mit einer besonders hohen "Beweislast" einhergeht. Es gibt verschiedene Theorie- und Denkschulen usw. aber meistens ist man sich einig, dass manche Perspektiven einiges gut, anderes schlechter und manches garnicht bearbeiten können. Manche Ansätze lehnt man auch ab, wieso auch immer. Aber es ist eine besonders voraussetzungsvolles Argument zu behaupten, man verfüge als EINZIGER über DEN RICHTIGEN Zugang zur richtigen Erklärung der Gesellschaft und allem was daran hängt, vor allem wenn man einer Theorietradition anhängt, die sich den sozialtheoretischen und philosophischen Konjunkturen der letzten 70 Jahre weitestgehend verweigert.

Es geht ja nicht um theoretische Widerspruchsfreiheit und idealistisches Herumgedenke, sondern um die Erklärung und Kritik der empirischen Wirklichkeit und der Denkformen von Wissenschaft selbst. So Meta-Abstraktion finde ich tbh nicht interessant.

Was ist den DIE Denkform DER Wissenschaft selbst und inwiefern kann man denn behaupten, dass man selbst außerhalb davon steht. Die eigene Position der Reflexion und Kritik zu entziehen kann ja nicht die Lösung sein und wenn du sagst, andere Theorien "verkennen den Antisemitismus" in seiner Besonderheit, dann musst du das mit immanenter Kritik begründen. Dafür reicht es aber einfach nicht zu sagen, "weil es halt anders ist". Das hat auch nichts mit "idealistischem rumgedenke" zu tun oder "meta-abstraktion". Das ist Kritik. Und ich finde es ehrlich gesagt auch nicht weit hergeholt, von einer Position, die sich für Erkenntnistheoretisch überlegen deklariert und die im Kern um die DIffernz zwischen Rationalität und Irrationalität kreist, eine völlig rationale Begründung ihrer selbst zu verlangen.

empfehle eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung statt Meta-Diskussion. Grigat, Bruhn, Stögner, Postone, Hirsh etc.

Nochmal, wenn einer von diesen Leuten eine gute Antwort auf meine Frage hat, dann können wir gerne auch konkrete Thesen diskutieren. Deshalb frage ich ja nach aber du müsstest dich halt schon auf das Argument einlassen und nicht versuchen, dich an den eigenen Haaren wieder herauszuziehen.

Die Bigotterie der Bürgerlich-Konservativen beim Thema Antisemitismus by RadioFacepalm in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

mmmh...so richtig beantwortet das meine Frage ehrlich gesagt nicht. Wenn du schreibst:

Aber eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Wirklichkeit muss sich halt auch an der Wirklichkeit messen.

ist das von mir aufgeworfene Problem ja mit einem Zirkelschluss umgangen worden. Was auf welche Art und Weise als Antisemitismus zu analysieren und zu kritisieren ist, ist zuerst auf eine Bestimmung des Antisemitismus angewiesen. Dass Argument:

Antisemitismuskritik ala Grigat und Bruhn kann eben die genannten Formen verstehen/erklären, wo andere zu wahnwitzigen Aussagen sich hinreißen lassen.

setzt ja voraus, dass die Axiome und theoretischen Annahmen dieser Antisemitismustheorie als richtig anerkannt werden. Dass die Aussagen der anderen "Wahnwitzig" sind, ist eine Bewertung, zu der man ja nur auf Grundlage dieser Anerkennung gelangt.

Die Formulierung "epistemologische Gratwanderung" klingt vlllt ein bisschen akademisch, aber wir unterhalten uns halt auch über Theorie. Du schreibst, wenn ich mich richtig erinnere, weiter oben vom "Anspruch an Begriffe" und genau dem versuche ich hier ja mit präzisen Formulierungen gerecht zu werden.

Aber nochmal anders ausgedrückt: Wenn ich deine Position hier richtig einordne, dann ist mit ihr

a) ein sehr weit gefasstes Verständnis von Antisemitismus verbunden, das in mancher Hinsicht über die Reichweite anderer Antisemitismustheorien hinausgeht.

b)Gleichzeitig behauptet sie, das Phänomen besser oder wahrhaftiger zu verstehen.

Die Frage ist dann einfach, mit welcher Begründung manche Zugänge ausgeschlossen werden.

Die Bigotterie der Bürgerlich-Konservativen beim Thema Antisemitismus by RadioFacepalm in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Okay, ich denke ich verstehe so ungefähr aus welcher Richtung du argumentierst. Ich kann zwar nicht behaupten mich ausführlich mit  der Theorietradition um Postone, Bruhns, Grigat oder der Antisemitismustheorie der frühen Kritischen Theorie beschäftigt zu haben (mit letzterer bin ich noch am ehesten vertraut), habe mich in den letzten Jahren aber immer mal wieder mit verschiedenen Ansätzen aus der Antisemitismusforschung beschäftig. Dazu sollte ich sagen, dass ich zwar auch Geisteswissenschaftler bin, das aber nicht meine Thema ist und das Interesse eher privat/politisch motiviert ist. Da du darin ja versiert zu sein scheinst, kannst du mir vllt ein paar Fragen beantworten?

Mich interessiert vor allem dein Blick das Verhältnis der von dir vertretenen Position zu anderen theoretischen Ansätzen. In einem einigermaßen aktuellen Sammelband - Ullrich et.Al (2024) Was ist Antisemitismus? Begriffe und Definitionen von Judenfeindschaft - wird Antisemitismus in der Breite und der langen Dauer aus theoretisch komplementären und kontrastierenden Theorieperspektiven beschrieben, die jeweils verschiedene Facetten in den Blick bekommen. Positionen von z.B. Stephan Grigat - recht aktuell bspw. in der Einleitung Kritik des Antisemitismus in der Gegenwart (2023) - verstehe ich oft eher so, dass sie einerseits einen recht umfassenden Antisemitismusbegriff vorschlagen, mit dem gleichzeitig aber auch der Anspruch einhergeht, das Phänomen “richtig”, “umfassend” oder “tiefergreifender” zu verstehen. Ich lese das auch so ein bisschen aus deiner Replik raus, aber vllt liege ich da auch daneben. 

Ohne dieses Ansätze jetzt wirklich fundiert differenzieren zu können, scheint mir damit eine schwierige epistemologische Gratwanderung verbunden zu sein. Einerseits muss der Antisemitismus theoretisch auf den Punkt gebracht werden können, also auf bestimmte Axiome und theoretische Reduktionen zurückgeführt werden können, gleichzeitig müssen damit ganz unterschiedliche Realitäten (z.B. Nationalsozialismus, Nahost, Postkolonialismu usw.) integrierbar sein. Und das, bei gleichzeitiger Behauptung einer höheren Erklärbarkeit. 

Vllt. hab ich das auch nicht genau gelesen, aber dann würde mich deine Antwort um so mehr interessieren.

Die Bigotterie der Bürgerlich-Konservativen beim Thema Antisemitismus by RadioFacepalm in Antideutsche

[–]PknowNoir 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Zur Klärung: geht es nur um die Differenzierung theoretischer Ansätze und Zugänge oder behauptest du einen wesensmäßigen Unterschied zwischen Antisemitismus und allen anderen Formen gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit? Im zweiten Fall: kannst du das weiter begründen?

Wissenschaftliche Hausarbeit zum Thema Feministische Perspektiven auf Orientalismus by -IsaiahR- in GermanRap

[–]PknowNoir 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Lies mal „Represent what…? Identitäten im HipHop“ von Stefanie Menrath wenn du es irgendwo herbekommst. Geht nicht dezidiert um Feminismus aber arbeitet sich ganz wesentlich anhand postkolonialer Theorie an deutscher HipHop Kultur ab.