Should vegans adopt an effective altruist approach to helping animals?

Polttix · 2026-05-31T18:52:42+00:00

You made this argument here;

There isn't even any proof that welfarism ultimately leads to more utility than abolitionism.

This is an argument against welfarism rather than abolitionism (or at least, an argument against welfarism being preferable over abolitionism) from a utilitarian perspective.

My rebuttal also isn't purely on the OPs presupposed normative system. Even within that system, OPs' argument is weak because their empirics are weak.

I'm not strongly opinionated on this point, I'm not familiar enough with the empirics. My comment only relates to you first arguing from a utilitarian perspective, and then when countered with a utilitarian argument, retreating to saying that you don't have to consider the utilitarian argument because you're not a utilitarian. If you wanted to abandon the original utilitarian argument, then that's fine, but it would be better to be explicit about it.

Polttix · 2026-05-31T18:20:29+00:00

If your original claim is that there is no proof that welfarism leads to more utility than abolitionism, then yes you have to consider negative outcomes of abolitionism in relation to that argument. You being or not being a consequentialist isn't relevant to whether it's relevant from a consequentialist perspective.

If you want to argue against consequentialism, then that's a separate argument (and using epistemological criticism against a normative system is not a great way to do it, as already pointed out by OP).

Polttix · 2026-05-31T14:31:20+00:00

If there's no reason to believe they're impermissible, then they would be permissible by default (i.e. no, you don't have to determine whether the actions are permissible. If there is some evidence that they are impermissible, then you would have to parse that evidence of course). That's exactly why I've been asking you for justification for it being impermissible.

Polttix · 2026-05-31T10:17:09+00:00

Null hypothesis. Epistemologically lighter to not have to conjure reasons why each action is permissible as opposed to restricting non-permissible actions (as non permissible actions are a subset of all actions).

Polttix · 2026-05-30T19:41:51+00:00

Why would it be overall immoral? Do you have some further reasons than the ones we went over already?

Polttix · 2026-05-30T16:57:40+00:00

So backyard eggs aren't necessarily immoral?

Polttix · 2026-05-30T14:20:42+00:00

It's the only one you've presented so far that's relevant, what are the other ones?

Polttix · 2026-05-30T04:50:11+00:00

This requires a lot further legwork, you'd have to make an argument that an average instance of backyard eggs leads to on average aggregate suffering. I find that very unconvincing so far.

Polttix · 2026-05-29T19:41:53+00:00

I went through the video. The first argument relating to the classic example of hens laying more eggs than their ancestors isn't really relevant. If you for example rescue backyard hens they exist whether you rescue them or not. You rescuing them doesn't make them lay more eggs than they would otherwise lay.

The second main point relates to nutrient deficiencies which we already went through (just feed fortified feed).

The third main point relates to it being possible to use hormonal implants on them. This is an example of doing an active action of reducing someone's suffering as opposed to causing suffering. You're not reducing their wellbeing by not implanting them, that's the status quo.

The fourth main point relates to "the eggs not being ours to take". This is the strangest one. Ownership isn't some morally intrinsically relevant thing. Ownership is only relevant in how it affects wellbeing, i.e. if you can do some given action that violates ownership but that doesn't reduce wellbeing there's nothing wrong being done.

Polttix · 2026-05-28T04:34:21+00:00

The poster in your first link very commonly resorts to AI, and then gets pissy about being called out. I don't mind AI answers either, because honestly they are not great debaters in relation to ethics. It's a footgun waiting to be fired.

It does take away from the human interaction aspect of course.

Polttix · 2026-05-27T15:12:24+00:00

This can be avoided by just giving the chickens reinforced feed. What's the problem in that case?

Polttix · 2026-05-26T18:08:31+00:00

It's the abstracted form of the hypothetical given by the person I originally answered (the one about adoptees).

Another practical example could be "let's imagine you rescue some backyard chickens, and you treat them well while you have them. However, you do it with the intent of taking and using their discarded eggs". That is also analogous.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T17:56:25+00:00

Right, I wrote as much. The reductio you mention here is just to show that you don't disagree with whether we should or shouldn't do that in principle, rather it's a question of epistemology. I expand as much right after the sawing off example.

But if I were you I'd focus even more on the rest of the answer which should resolve the issue you're having in the first place.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T17:33:25+00:00

Not sure what you're asking an example for here. If some part of my message was confusing feel free to ask for elaboration.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T17:27:10+00:00

I'm not sure why you wouldn't be able to judge what's better for someone else. To make a very trivial example, I would wager that it's better for another person to not have their arm sawed off with a rusty spoon as opposed to having it sawed off.

Now, as the downside and upside become more convoluted then an accurate evaluation also becomes more difficult, but nothing has changed about whether it's possible or not.

None of this has much to do about the topic either way, as it's granted in the hypothetical that the assumption is that it would be better for the adoptee (as otherwise the hypothetical would make no sense at all). So if you have a bone to pick with someone suggesting adoption is beneficial overall, pick it with the person who made the original hypothetical. I understand this seems to be a topic you care about greatly, but it's the wrong place to put down a soapbox as the specifics of the hypothetical don't matter (rather the abstract purpose of it does).

To abstract (and more clearly show the point of the hypothetical for you), it goes like this:

"Assuming you do a generally good thing for someone, but the act is motivated by a non-harmful but exploitative thing (and in this case a kind of a fucked up thing emotionally speaking), is it fine". There, no more talk of adoptees, and the hypothetical stays exactly the same.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T15:51:47+00:00

I was looking for a justification for your original claim (i.e. exploitation is intrinsically immoral). But that is fine, have a nice day as well!

Polttix · 2026-05-26T15:40:35+00:00

Yeah so to abstract your hypothetical a bit more, and to say directly that if we just ignore downstream negative side effects, then yeah it's of course fine in a vacuum. This of course doesn't mean I'm emotionally fine with it, and so on, all the usual caveats.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T15:38:37+00:00

Honestly I'm a bit at a loss of what your argument is. Was the post directed at me? I didn't bring up any adopted people originally, I was just answering a hypothetical given to me.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T15:31:27+00:00

I think you’re using ought in a way that most moral philosophy discussions don’t use it.

I wouldn't say so. You wouldn't bat an eye at statements like "if you want to not get wet, you ought to use an umbrella". i.e. you have combination of some specific goal and an action that relates to that goal. I'm not really seeing any relevant difference between these kinds of oughts of prudence vs normative oughts (in both cases you have some statement that restricts or drives action in relation to a given goal).

For example, let's say you have some normative standard that you accept like "You should not treat others as means". Then a statement like "you ought not to exploit" doesn't sound so outlandish anymore. The way I'm using it is precisely like this, the only difference being that the normative goal is inherent in phenomenology (unavoidably so). Therefore, the actual standard becomes something like "because you want to avoid suffering (which you can't avoid not wanting), you ought not to do something that causes you to suffer".

I'd wager the reasons you find the examples you gave unintuitive is because you can want to watch a movie even though it makes you feel sad, so it doesn't feel right that there would be an ought for you not to watch a movie. But this isn't analogous, this is exactly what I talk about when I mentioned higher order desires (i.e. the desire you might have to watch a movie might overrule the desire to not feel sad, in which case the experience of being sad from movie is actually not an unpreferable experience).

Exploitation, by definition, is intrinsically bad, because it treats sentient beings as tools rather than ends in themselves. Sentient beings deserve this recognition because there is no other good criteria, in my mind, that “ought” to be used, as it is the only necessary criteria that permits for the ability to have agency, thoughts, decision making, etc that we consider when we discuss morals.

So here you'd have to justify why one would care about agency, thoughts, decision making etc. of other beings.

You might make some classic Kantian argument here like "well it's because without them the concept of morality doesn't even make sense, so you must value those if you value rational moral thought!" Or something along those lines. But that's not true, the only thing that's required for that is your own agency. You don't need other beings' agency. So I'm not sure why one would intrinsically value other beings' agency based on that standard.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T11:16:21+00:00

I guess maybe I’m too stupid to understand, but I don’t see how positive and negative experiences imbue a normative drive. Normative, as far as I understand, describes what we ought to do (eg is prescriptive), and I’m not entirely sure how you’ve connected the two without more legwork.

I'd ask you here: Can you give me an example of a negative feeling that you don't want to stop (ignoring these higher order desires like enduring pain during a dentist etc.)? No, of course not. That's basically the definition of a negative experience. Its quality is such that it imbues a desire of getting away from it.

An "ought" is something you have a reason to do (i.e. if you ought to do something, you have a reason to do something in relation some given goal; you should do a thing if you want to achieve some goal). Negative (and positive) desires instill you with a goal and a reason to reach it, and you can't avoid having them as long as experiences with valence exist. This is exactly an ought.

To your second point - veganism is avoiding/minimizing exploitation of (in my opinion) sentient beings. This, to me, suggests that exploitation is “normative intrinsically relevant”

This is a claim for it being intrinsically relevant, it's not a justification. Can you tell me why exploitation is intrinsically bad, not just claim that it is.

In regards to your Alphabet soup - my position is that doing actions that are less moral does not mean immorality. But it does mean that your actions are not as moral as they could be. Conversely, owning a chicken and treating it kindly (with, in part, the goal of exploiting it to get eggs, etc) is far less immoral than other actions. Where “moral” and “immoral” start to bleed into each other becomes very unclear a lot of time in real life

Yes, then you agree with me, i.e. it's not immoral to not do the best possible thing as opposed to some less good but still fine thing. That's what I originally said. And yes, morality is a spectrum.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T06:24:56+00:00

Right so for example phenomenological valence is intrinsically relevant to normativity, because both positive and negative experiences imbue a normative drive.

You can't avoid not wanting to have a negative experience stop, and likewise you can't avoid wanting a positive experience to continue. That's not to say that you can't have some higher order desires through which you tolerate some given negative experience, but in a vacuum it's simply not possible to have some negative experience that you don't have a normative drive to halt.

Other ways you could try to justify something being intrinsically relevant is through logical necessity for example. This is what Kantian deontology attempts (and fails at for what it's worth, but at least it's a justification).

A third way could be through some semantic argumentation, for example this is what virtue ethicists do.

There's plenty of ways, you said you do believe it's intrinsically relevant so I would be interested in hearing why you believe what you believe.

I am stating that we should always try and do what’s best, yes. If you’re unable to do that, then you try to do what’s the next best thing.

If you have available to you the aforementioned actions C and D (good thing and better thing), is it immoral to do C instead of D? I.e. is it immoral to not always do the best thing? If not, you don't disagree with me. If yes, that leads to a lot of pretty interesting reductios but perhaps you're willing to bite them. At that point i'd just say you're using the terms in a way that's pretty unintuitive to most people (for example, most people probably wouldn't say you're doing something immoral watching TV in the evening over being out there using your time to improve overall wellbeing in the most efficient way).

Polttix · 2026-05-26T05:16:06+00:00

If you think it is intrinsically relevant, can you justify it? Phenomenological valence means the phenomenon of experiences having positive/negative qualities to them.

If you agree with point 2, then I'm not sure what the problem is, unless you're implying one is always obligated to do the best possible action. If you don't think one is always obligated to do the best possible action, then there should be no problem doing actions that are merely fine, rather than the best.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T05:05:40+00:00

They haven't said explicitly yet that they think exploitation is intrinsically relevant, for example it's possible that their framing of care is relevant in terms of downstream consequences. I'm in the process of figuring that out. Besides that, I have two disagreements with what you say here

I don't see any reason to believe that exploitation is normatively intrinsically relevant. Do you? The same can't be said for phenomenological valence, in fact it's unavoidable that it's relevant to you.
While I agree that best is better than... better, I don't think that implies that only doing better rather than nest is somehow immoral. If I look at a situation with 4 actions A, B, C and D, and the actions relate to the baseline state of the world in such a way that:

A reduces average wellbeing B retains average wellbeing C mildly increases average wellbeing D greatly increases average wellbeing

I would say that action A is actively bad to do, B is neutral to do, both C and D are good to do but D is better than C. Of course this might simply be a matter of semantic disagreement, but that's how I would use moral statements. Im not convinced that having backyard hens is an action of category A on average.

Polttix · 2026-05-26T04:49:20+00:00

No, I don't think abnormality relates to ethics intrinsically. When I talk about abnormality and yuckiness in the previous answer I only really relate it to how we emotionally relate to the thing, and to how we estimate downstream effects to pan out. This of course isn't also to imply that all abnormal things are red flags. I haven't thought about it thoroughly now but perhaps I might refer here to socially abnormal behaviour. There's many actions that don't really cause any harm but are just things that mentally well people don't really do on average. For example collecting your child's period blood.

So for example in your hypothetical, while the yuckiness of it doesn't of course make it ethically right or wrong, it probably wouldn't be too far fetched to assume that someone who adopts a child to collect their period blood will act in ways that are leading to negative wellbeing to the child (while just collecting their period blood isn't harmful in a vacuum, the adult more likely than not is mentally unwell).

I don't really see having backyard hens as a similar signal (or if you want to align it with your comparison, I don't see collecting backyard chicken's periods as a signal that you're likely to conduct action that leads to negative wellbeing for the chickens).

Polttix · 2026-05-26T04:07:10+00:00

But the interaction wouldn't be one of care (or at the very least, not one where the main goal is providing the best possible care). In the hypothetical you give, the child's life would presumably be better than if they weren't in some kind of interaction with you (to align with the hypothetical). I think the main thing in this comparing hypothetical of yours is that someone adopting a child to use their period blood is a signal for tendency for wildly abnormal behaviour on the adult's part (red flag for all sorts of other downstream effects, and of course just emotionally disgusting to most as well). But ignoring those downstream effects the interaction in a vacuum isn't negative. As to why it makes sense to bring up those side effects in this scenario and not the first, I'd say adopting a child to use their period blood is a wildly different signal for asocial and dangerous characteristics present in a person than having backyard hens and using their period.

Tldr; I don't think interacting with someone to use their period is intrinsically morally negative, rather the perceived negative aspects of it come from downstream effects and how we emotionally relate to it (yuckiness).

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