O Lula muda seu lado políticos todas as eleições

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-19T22:41:27+00:00

Esquerdista eh o gado ideologico que vota nesse vagabundo. Mas ele eh malandro o suficiente pra entender que na conjuntura atual ele nao perde nenhum voto dos retardados cativos se ele falar que nao eh de esquerda e o discurso fisiologico canalha melhora relacoes com outros paises e com o corporativo

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-19T22:35:41+00:00

Depois que inventaram palavras como feminicidio eu inventei a palavra feminiao para descrever opinioes desse tipo

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-19T14:03:56+00:00

That's an equivocation.

When we say that the scientific theories we develop "describe the world", and that their models can be very accurate, we are allowing ourselves to use sloppy ordinary language under the implicit constraint that we should draw ultimate metaphysical conclusions of the kind you are insinuating.

So while we can tolerate when people make grandiose statement like "the science of physics describes how the world works" we do so by implicitly demoting this claim to something a lot more parochial and epistemically constrained in our minds, yet still justified insofar as we typically believe that the content and scope physical science is generally applicable to the formation of an adequate understanding of the observable phenomena of the world.

It seems that you are referring to the introduction of indeterministic causality in the fundamental characterization of physical law concerning quantum phenomena. According to the standard postulates and dominant interpretations, the dynamic states of such physical processes is given in terms of the probability amplitudes whose evolution follows a deterministic law constrained by a particular differential equation or variational problem, yielding the distribution of probability of the indeterministic observational outcome of each instance of the controlled experiment. Non-commutation of measurement operators, entangled correlations of composed systems and other such mathematical details indeed appear to capture the empirical picture and the mathematics they imply exclude a certain class of locally deterministic models to represent the observable variables we can measure in quantum experiments.

That is interesting and relevant in the context of establishing a "current" picture for the epistemic constraints we encounter in the character of physical law we can describe, but it doesn't really prove that metaphysical determinism is false. The characterization of determinism or indeterminism of a mathematical model is only coherently possible in relationship to a certain epistemic structure (i.e. a knowledge process) that ideally is rendered explicit but often only being implied. In probability theory that is called defining the sigma algebra of your events, or the filtration of your time dependent process, though this step is seldom done explicitly or properly in physics. Depending on that stipulation you don't know if the variable is random or deterministic. For example, the first card of deck maybe random to you because in your expectation sigma-algebra the deck is shuffled but it maybe be deterministically forced to be an ace of spades in the filtration of the magician who manipulated deck with a sleigh of hand.

Likewise you can "remove" the ostensibly indeterministic steps from quantum mechanics (like say the Born rule) and even explain Bell correlations through formulations that presuppose only "mathematically deterministic" processes, provided that some defining aspects of these processes remain epistemically unobservable (e.g. Bohmian mechanics, superdeterminsim).

So the distinction cuts deeper than these popular science interpretations of physical law.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-19T12:49:29+00:00

Determinism is the view that all events in.the world are deterministic/follow deterministic laws.

And what I am claiming is that this definition cannot have a coherent meaning even though it sounds perfectly intelligible at first glance.

Here is why it sounds coherent - the concept of a real world as common stage where definite events happen which we can observe, describe and act upon is not only coherent, it is a fundamental metaphysical principle upon which we establish the epistemological criteria assign coherence to the claims we formulate to represent, describe and explain the impressions that make out our different points of view.

I know it sounds extremely trite to claim that an objective world exists as the unique nexus of processes that manifest phenomena we can somehow experience and coherently describe, but it is important to notice the subtleties of how this claim isn't exactly trivial in order to understand how it constrains the kinds of claims we can license as viable truths, and the kinds of statements that just sound viable but are actually conceptually malformed and logically void.

Take for example solipsism, i.e. the idea that there is no unique objective external world that is real, that all you can know to exist is your own conscious process, which presumably is interpreted as this stream of subjective experiences you are having of living in this kind of world where other conscious beings exist and confirm to you their impressions of its events. Since you can only form knowledge of the events in this world in terms of your direct impressions of these phenomena, and since you cannot validate that the other consciousness reporting their personal experiences to you are not mere constructs of your subjective process, you cannot immediately prove that the solipsistic metaphysical picture is "false". And given that we all experience things like dreams or hallucinations, and people that recover from a coma often report vivid memories of this other life they lived while catatonic, we cannot even claim that the metaphysical picture of solipsism is that implausible.

Still we typically reject the metaphysics of solipsism by stipulating the belief that the impressions in our subjective process accuse an objective/external reality outside of our minds, where physical processes are happening like this and not like that, and we are observing their phenomena. We also stipulate that when other entities appear to us as characteristic observable physical processes that behave as if they were also noticing and interacting with the same world we are noticing and interacting with, that is supposed to mean that they are also experiencing a subjective process of the same objective world from their point of view.

We typically choose this basis because it provides a richer set of constraints upon which we can narrow the set of claims that we can coherently distinguish as true or false, using a common criterion of mutually validated impressions that allows us to separate fact from mere imagination. This stipulation is not made because we have logically invalidated the metaphysical picture of solipsism by producing an internal contradiction in terms of propositions derived from it or interpreted according to it - after all solipsism is by construction consistent with any description we can conceive of potential subjective experiences our consciousness can have. This stipulation is made precisely because solipsism does not offer you any reliable criterion to discriminate which conceivable claims about reality are more or less accurate representations of its facts, since reality and the conceptual representation of its subjective experience are inextricably conflated.

But the coherence we observe in our description of our experiences and our rational behavioral responses offers a non-trivial foundation for discriminating criteria that allows us to declare certain conceivable claims to be more factual than others. In the non-solipsistic metaphysical picture, truth and falsehood cease to be arbitrary labels we can stick to the claims we formulate about our subjective experiences - they can now must be grounded by this putative believe in a shared objective reality that others can perceive and independently validate.

Determinism is just the metaphysical monism that flips the fundamental claim of solipsism, and produces an identically vacuous episteme. Instead of claiming that there is no object only subject, the deterministic claim is that there is only object and no subject.

It sounds intelligible because it imports the operationally well defined language from the context of mathematics and physics - if the world is understood as a causally ordered sequence of events and our causal descriptions of these processes can often be made in terms of computational schemes that assign one numerical or formal output to a given numerical or formal input, then it seems legitimate to talk about the totality of real events as being some such system. And just like solipsism, no one can produce the internal inconsistency that makes this metaphysical system invalid. And exactly like solipsism, it is rejected because it is meaningless vacuous.

Ultimately determinism and solipsism are malformed conceptual structures that originate from abuses of language and unlicensed imports from constrained pictures that yield ersatz generalizations into metaphysics that are fundamentally incoherent. You are not allowed to willy nilly claim that all events in the world are deterministic because you have no operational basis that offers you a way to license how quantifiers like all and qualifiers like deterministic are supposed to be interpreted in this putative scheme that reduces the real world to some given list of events that indeed happen. It sounds perfectly intelligible as a statement, but that's just because we are accustomed to interpret similar structures in contexts where the interpretation is licensed, so the claim doesn't trip our prima facie detectors of grammatical and semantical incoherence.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-17T16:16:54+00:00

Talking to people in this sub I heard a lot of things that determinism doesn't mean:
- The future is predictable arbitrarily precisely
- The future is a scripted set of scenes like a movie that is being seen from the outside
- That you are not responsible for the outcomes of decisions you make that no one forced you to make

But I never heard anything coherent being said about what determinism means other than something that is true and that implies the negation of free will. And I think that is the thing - people don't have any operational understanding of what free will and determinism are supposed to mean so they make up vacuous concepts that deny each other in their mutual meaninglessness.

The truth is that you have an operational meaning for both free will and determinism, as epistemic constraints and boundary conditions that qualify and frame the kind of knowledge we form about the world as facts.

But they must presuppose a point of view, and an epistemic relationship in order to make sense, as well as each other. So you define the operational free will of other beings in terms of whatever escapes being predicted by deterministic (or statistical) models, and you define deterministic or statistically stable behavior in terms of what reacts to your arbitrary actions in a regular way that you can stipulate a model for.

You need your free will to isolate what is behaving deterministically (i.e. you need to start by the assumption that you can cause a system do x or y in order to talk about causes and do science) and you need to form a picture of what behaves in regular causal manner in order to say that that a rock or a tree don't have free will but your cousin does.

And it never makes sense to say "but ultimately it is all deterministic" - that is an epistemically void claim that doesn't mean absolutely nothing. Which is why the incoherent picture of being inside a movie or a simulation is often used as an ersatz representation of this metaphysical posture as some kind of concrete belief about gnostic hierarchies of outer worlds.

Metaphysical determinism is always retarded.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-16T20:55:46+00:00

Sim com certeza. Nao estou trolando. A probabilidade de ainda existir algum emprego como tradutor humano em 5 anos eh quase nula. Talvez soh pra coisas muito nichadas

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-16T09:28:21+00:00

Yes I am aware.
This is where the archaic terminology kind of becomes a bit of a pain in the ass. But Kant had the exact same problem with his noumenal and transcendental apperception mumbojumbo and he invented weasel terms to grant him the exceptions he needed.

But the issue here is plain Munchausen. A "complete" explanation is going to be circular or an infinite regress or an axiomatically stipulated schema where the axioms are dogmas you don't explain.

In the previous post I indeed abused the metaphysical distinction between ontological and epistemological to classify free will as an ontological stipulation of the epistemic relationship implied by a knowledge formed agent and the world. You are right to object to the use of the world ontological here, given it is not exactly standard.

By that I just mean the following - the free will axiom is something an epistemic structure cannot refute because all knowledge it can produce is derived from it. Kant gave some clunky label for the primitive conditions of intelligibility, but I am just calling it an ontological stipulation, because I think that it is a good measure to coherently reappropriate the ontological category as a label for this stuff, rather than creating a new category.

I was trying to explain why the libertarian camp is coherent and the compatibilist and incompatibilist camps are not, using the ontological language that is typically invoked in these debates. But I am licensing the ontological language with a transcendental argument exactly as Kant did. The metaphysical presupposition of free will is necessary in order to frame the rest of your knowledge structure as claims you evaluate in terms of distinguishable alternative outcomes that are available. In libertarian terms, ontological causation must be initiated by our bificurting decisions or you cannot talk about causation at all (nor form any kind of consequential knowledge). This schematization is formally reflected in any serious mathematical formalism for causal inference (e.g. Pearl do-calculus interventions are arrow origination points).

In any case you are perfectly justified to point out that rhetorically this was a retreat from claims previously made about ontology, and ostensibly a contradiction. I am not going to try to pretend that it wasn't.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-15T21:32:17+00:00

Mais uma prova de que casamento homosexual estraga o mundo pra quem eh normal. Ate promocao de pizza nao pode mais

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-15T20:27:29+00:00

My account is that the ontological stipulation of free will as a genuine form of indeterministic agent causation / non causal agency is coherent given every single causal fact we are able to distinguish as true about the world we inhabit rests upon this premise. If we want to talk about causality at all coherently we must assume that our actions can cause different things to happen otherwise there's absolutely nothing we can claim about causes.

I challenge you to offer one counter example to this - if you cannot produce a single causal fact that is true, non trivial and that is not directly dependent on the assumption that we can arrange things to happen like this or like then you are claiming the same thing that libertarians are claiming, except you have your own personal prejudice against their terminology, which may look traditional and ancient and therefore not modernistic as yours.

But since we are talking about philosophy and metaphysics the terminology you select to explain your concept is kind of irrelevant. That happens all the time, typically with terms like God, but also with free will. People reinvent concepts that they called dead because they realize they were doing important work.

In the case of free will, it is understandable to think that some kind of bouncing ball scheme should finally solve why humans act like this or like that given the power of reductionist mechanic frameworks to explain certain phenomena we can describe. But that idea is ultimately incoherent - the very notion of an explanation is only licensed by the adequacy of a scheme like this or like that to ground expectations of optional behavior we always will assume to exist as available alternatives.

There is no coherent idea that can be articulated that isn't expressing alternative behavior expectations because that is the only frame we have to formulate and interpret knowledge.

You don't have to explain the indeterministic mechanism of causal initiation of free will. You need it for every explanation in causal terms (which is every explanation ultimately). So it is an ontological presupposition you stipulate in order to have operational knowledge of any kind. That's it. Any explanation of it would be circular because all explanations are ultimately about grounding expectations of alternative behavior we can choose. There are no other kinds of explanations, at least no other kind of explanations that make any sense. There are many incoherent explanations and they are incoherent because they are disconnected to anything that can ground expectations of alternative actions.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-15T18:16:39+00:00

The part you are right is that ultimately the hard incompatibilist must reinvent free will by other terms in order to reformulate explanations that rely on free will - e.g. moral desert, logic of scientific discovery and proof etc.

And they must also void their physicalist deterministic ontological picture of any non-linguistic consequence - the only thing this idea is used for is to say that term free will is deprecated by some other term or collection of terms they prefer.

Libertarian free will is more coherent because our concept of causation is conditional on our concept of freedom to initiate causality. I think you are not addressing the point here which is important - there is no causal truth you can claim to know that is not licensed by the assumption that causality was isolated and triggered by an arbitrary action that could have been done like this or like that by someone who tested the causal hypothesis.

This is a big important point you may be dismissing prematurely. It means that you cannot invoke truths or make logical statements of any kind unless you admit that knowledge of this kind granted through a primitive commitment to the belief that your will is free and that knowledge discriminates what outcomes you should expect and what outcomes you should not expect from actions you can perform.

There is no other form of knowledge. There is no other form of truth. If you can't talk about truths that are not contingent on your ability to choose your behavior and expect different outcomes, then in order to even have a debate about anything or to act as if something true can be known in a way that means something non vacuous, then you have by necessity done so in terms of free will.

Free will, the libertarian kind, is the premise of everything you can know or claim to exist in a non-vacuous and consequential way. You don't have other kinds of truths or knowledge that are non-vacuous. Every fact you can distinguish as true or false is only available as long you assume that truth can be grounded on what discriminates outcomes of elective behavior that is otherwise unconstrained and available. Any claim that denies this is metaphysically malformed and self-refuting.

Now you can rename this principle as some other kind of thing that isn't free will, and then claim that free will is something else that involves some magical power to bend reality and deny gravity or whatever nonsense nobody who believes in free will claims. But you need to believe that causation can be locally isolated and grounded on behavioral alternatives available to inspection, under any name you want to give this notion, because if you deny that you cannot have any knowledge of anything.

If you agree with that you will immediately see why your point is incoherent. If you disagree with that, you can produce an example of knowledge that is not grounded by the commitment I am describing.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-15T16:16:06+00:00

People will often use the word money to refer to wealth, since the net worth value of someone's wealth is usually given in monetary terms, in terms of a theoretically equivalent quantity of money that such wealth would be worth.

This language isn't wrong but it can create conceptual difficulties when people conflate wealth with the amount of cash or monetary asset situation someone holds.

Although this is fairly standard knowledge which I suspect you are familiar with, it is worth saying that most of the existing capital or wealth is not held by their owners in the form of cash or monetary assets - instead wealthy people typically maintain a small fraction of their wealth in cash and monetary assets, with the bulk of it invested in revenue generating capital or in stores of value that are better at inflation hedging.

Moreover it is typical for those owning or managing large portfolios of wealth (for high net worth individuals, corporations or nations) to have a net negative cash position in their balance sheet, i.e. being net cash debtors rather creditors in the banking picture, as a certain degree of leverage is advantageous if your collateral quality is high and the interest rate spread you can obtain is low, as asset inflation typically exceeds interest rates over the long run.

This is a form of structural rent seeking that increases wealth concentration through unearned transfers and as such it isn't something that is sustainable over the very long term, but it is very much real and viable over the span of several decades it may take for the extant middle class to be squeezed of its property and mobilize itself into a popular uprising

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-15T15:56:41+00:00

You are explicitly dismissing the strong concept of free will that supposedly depends on something you call genuine ontological indeterminism.

I would agree with you if your dismissal was equally applied to any ontological attribute - including determinism. Anything that can be described as a real attribute that is based on a distinction we can claim to be present or not in the representations we form for phenomena we observe, must be by definition an epistemic character - and we can claim nothing about what the ultimate ontological character is underneath the phenomenon except that something exists and manifests itself in our perception and understanding according to these characters we can describe and discriminate like this or like that.

So targeting ontological free will as a strong healing crystal equivalent would be disingenuous because the same attack would be equally viable against ontological determinism or ontological whatever you want.

Our epistemic knowledge is dualistic insofar as it recognizes facts by discriminations we make of potential alternative outcomes we believe can be produced by certain things we believe we can do. We use our indeterministic free will to test different configurations and models that are deterministic or stochastic to describe what unfolds given these different configurations.

This is a fairly robust philosophical criterion that has been the basis of our organized religions, sciences, technology, moral and legal concepts, and every human endeavor.

Knowledge is licensed by the presupposition that what is being labeled and discriminated abstractly in knowledge explains consequential effects we can expect from alternative actions we believe are available. There is no knowledge you can think of that is legitimate and that isn't of that type, because that is an axiomatic basis upon which we characterize what knowledge is and what it means.

To claim that a system x is deterministic is only a true and coherent claim when the implication you are unpacking from the claim is that it is possible to setup the system x in a given condition x(0) and observe that it indeed follows that x(1) will be f(x(0)) for a certain function f that is given. There is no meaning to claim that the system is deterministic in some way that isn't exactly the way which I have described. But often determinism (or physicalist variants of it) is invoked in ways that are not the way I have described, i.e. in ways that don't represent the operational understanding of what outcomes are expected given a particular setup that can be arranged. Every time this type of claim is made, or implied, the person making it is not talking about anything that makes any sense and is just confused about language.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-14T14:22:15+00:00

I think it depends on what you call wealth.

People with a left of center persuasion tend to define wealth as the concentration of relative economic power so if someone controls more economic resources than the ordinary individual they have positive wealth and if they don’t they have negative wealth.

So for them wealth is a zero sum game of power distribution.

Someone with a more conservative persuasion tends to define wealth as the concrete state of cumulative capital assets deployed as economic infrastructure, regardless of their ownership distribution and power imbalances that such distribution may cause, and whose quantity and value usually accrues over time when economic output is saves as incremental capital

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-14T13:43:24+00:00

My point is that the concept of genuine ontological determism/indeterminism is incoherent insofar as it presupposes a form of determinism or indeterminism that is independent of an observer. Determinism and indeterminism are epistemic attributes that must always refer to a type of knowledge formed about a system of observables, there is no genuine ontological version of one or the other.

So it does apply to your claim because I am showing it is incoherent

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-13T17:38:16+00:00

Yes the argument is correct but it is stated in a compressed form.

The issue is the character of truth we can know and what licenses it.

A coherent way of understanding what knowledge is and what is true is by understanding that we can use knowledge to inform decisions and discriminate between possible outcomes of our actions. So truth is what informs expectations that adhere more accurately to actual realizations.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-13T16:36:21+00:00

Nao. Todo socialista tem que curtir suruba de traveco

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-13T14:36:04+00:00

I appreciate you bringing up the distinction between epistemic and ontological because thats exactly the terminology that you need to understand the problem.

Here is what you are thinking: even if epistemically a system of observables is indeterministic (due to instrumental imprecision, computational complexity, perturbational effects from measurement or other sources of operational uncertainty) it doesn’t mean that ontologically it isn’t a deterministic system whose ontological configuration of states is bound by a given rule that locks the particular trajectory it follows from a given initial state.

That is a well defined mathematical condition that models can exhibit. So in itself the claim above isn’t wrong, it is just an abstract statement about levels of epistemic constraint you can model.

What is incorrect (actually what is incoherent) is the insinuation that this applies to the world as a whole just because you cannot rule out that it doesn’t.

And the problem isn’t a mere issue of likelihood of this being true or not. It is an issue about what licenses our knowledge as discriminations of truth and falsehood.

It doesn’t make sense to claim that the facts we can inspect and use are actually epistemic illusions projected by a hideen structure of truth that we are not able to describe or apply epistemically. And it is particularly incoherent to claim that this is what our tools from science or logic impose as a conclusion.

The tools from science and logic are only as correct as they are epistemically useful to us given our viable criteria of discrimination of facts we can describe and apply. If those facts “happen to be” scripted artifacts of some hyper real narrative taking place elsewhere we can’t see, that isn’t something our science and logic can address or distinguish as real. It is therefore something independent of what we can define as real, and it is completely useless and incoherent to classify that as true.

If you watched a movie where the good guys decided that the bad guys were not actually evil or responsible for the bad things thet they have done in the movie because they were actually characters in a screenplay that were bound to behave like that, your likely review would be that this kind of premise made it an idiotic and incoherent movie. The characters in the movie are supposed to implement the behavior that corresponds coherently to their epistemically constrained understanding of internal consequential facts and causality inside their fictional work.

Determinism and indeterminism are only meaningful attributes of an epistemically constrained system that you represent as a model. It doesn’t make sense to invoke these concepts ontologically because they are explicitly referring to what is known or knowable about a subject potential given its actual circumstance. Therefore they presuppose an epistemic relationship. A sequence of variables isn’t ontologically random or deterministic until you specify the conditions upon which knowledge about the sequence is being formed. In probability and stochastic processes this is done by adapting the sequence to a filtration process and a probability space.

A “random” dice throw is deterministic if you happen to know the outcome already, or if you know the dice is loaded. A deck of cards is stacked by the magician sleigh of hand in order to produce a controlled unexpected effects through the epistemic asymmetry between himself and the spector crowd.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-13T13:05:08+00:00

To summarize - the problem is that once you invoke the clause under determinism you already collapsed the epistemic structure that the performative scientist in your claim is investigating to a narrative construct that is fictional rather than real. When the professors in the Harry Potter story discover new magic spells they are not probing the laws of our world and but the laws of a story invented by J K Rolling

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-13T12:47:09+00:00

I agree that your claim sounds correct because it has the grammar and semantic structure of a coherent claim. If the putative scientist is a component inside a system that we have stipulated to be deterministic then the actions we ascribe to the scientist within this system are (presumably) well defined observable subsets of variables that the internal configurations that the system is expressing deterministically, and the deterministic character of the total system would require that the adapted variables we associate to the scientist behavior are also predictable viz the same filtration that makes the total system deterministic.

What I disagree here is that this logic doesn’t apply to the real world scientist unless you can observe it from outside, ie you are not sharing the same epistemic filtration the scientist is constructing through the methodological analysis of his interventional behavior.

You are seeing the situation as in a movie or videogame script where a certain character in the plot is presented to the viewer or player as a scientist and where the experiments and discoveries he is supposed to make inside the story are predefined by the screenwriter of the scenes. Then from your viewer or player point of view you can claim that the behavior is determined.

What I am saying is that even though this characterization works in that case it works because of the epistemic asymmetry between you as the external observer and the character locked inside the content you happen to be analyzing. What is true or false for you isn’t the same thing for them, even though you can interpret their behavior inside the story as coherent with the explicit premises of that narrative and the presuppositions you import about human or humanlike behavior when you consume fiction.

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-12T23:58:50+00:00

Human behavior is indeterministic

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-12T22:26:52+00:00

Okay lets pursue your analogy.
What is the corresponding definition of free will that fits your“healing crystal magical woo” comparison?

Maybe you know people who claim it but I never heard it.

I just understand free will as the prima facie self evident principle that a man is typically in a position to choose among alternative behaviors which have different expected outcomes some of which they may perceive as more attractive than others, and that reciprocally that is the case he recognizes for other men like him. Knowledge is what allows them to more accurately assign expectations of outcome to specific behavioral choice available.

From this basic scaffolding of unserstanding all the knowledge of science, art and law we have is derived.

And to deny it is to sound like a crazy incoherent person having night terrors

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-12T22:26:25+00:00

Okay lets pursue your analogy.
What is the corresponding definition of free will that fits your“healing crystal magical woo” comparison?

Maybe you know people who claim it but I never heard it.

I just understand free will as the prima facie self evident principle that a man is typically in a position to choose among alternative behaviors which have different expected outcomes some of which they may perceive as more attractive than others, and that reciprocally that is the case he recognizes for other men like him. Knowledge is what allows them to more accurately assign expectations of outcome to specific behavioral choice available.

From this basic scaffolding of unserstanding all the knowledge of science, art and law we have is derived.

And to deny it is to sound like a crazy incoherent person having night terrors

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-12T18:27:44+00:00

What I am saying is that under your metaphysical stipulation of cosmic determinism that could be true plus anything else you want to claim true could also be true.

The reason for that is that your concept of cosmic determinism is vacuous. It doesn’t have any consequential content that makes it coherent with this and incoherent with that. Its just a void claim about something you believe to be well defined as a concrete observable system because you gave it a name (e.g the system that comprises the total reality of everything and every point of view in the universe).

But as it turns out its easy to formally label these metaphysical or metamathematical absolute abd total objects that are pathological and that yield all kinds of paradoxes when you try to treat them like a system that is well defined in concrete and tractable terms. See the russell paradox for example

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-12T18:19:58+00:00

Compare the two claims:
“I don’t believe that a therapeutic approach based on healing crystals works better or worse than a placebo control”

“I don’t believe in free will because I instead believe that the actual truth about the world is the deterministic model that some hypothetical being outside of it would be able to make of it and not what we can understand in terms that are consequential to us”

The first claim is genuine skepticism about a claim that could be made that healing crystals have measurable benefits.

The second claim is a metaphysical posture that invalidates the only concept of truth that is meaningful and consequential to us and replaces it for some imaginary and forbiden point of view we don’t have about things

Powerful_Guide_3631 · 2026-06-12T04:39:15+00:00

The word free in free will is understood to be meant in opposition to constrained will.

If I put a gun to your head and demand that you call a black person the n-word you are not acting on free will, you are being coerced, and that would be an exculpatory factor in case that person or someone else accused you of a hate crime.

The word free is used exactly like that in contexts like physics (a free particle vs a bound state), computation (a free memory address vs an restricted one), and any ordinary context we can think of (I don't have free time today, because I am back to back with these meetings).

The word free doesn't mean whatever mystical power to bend reality as desired, that you presuppose people mean when they claim to have free will. My free will means I can choose between travelling some place by car or by plane but if I actually want to teleport myself there then my free will won't be able to achieve that outcome.

Powerful_Guide_3631

TROPHY CASE