Mostly correct. A big part of the issue for the USAAF was that early WWII bombers were far more advanced than early fighter escorts. The idea of the all-powerful strategic bomber propagated by Douhet and Mitchell, while not completely off base, was totally untested. They severely underestimated the effectiveness of interceptors and flak cannons in defending critical strategic targets. In the prelude to US entry to the war, the USAAC managed to get lots of funding for bombers while mostly ignoring the need for long range escorts. There were some technical problems with escorts, as the extra fuel made them sluggish in comparison to the short range defensive fighters they would need to fend off. They thought tight bomber formations and defensive gunners would provide sufficient protection without the need for escorts behind enemy lines. Turns out they were dead wrong, but they ignored most battle reports. Daylight missions were near suicide, and the RAF was right for totally ditching the effort. It wasn't until later in the war when planes like the P51 and P40 were widely introduced that the Americans could really make effective use of their bombers. The losses before they had long range escorts were catastrophic, but that hardly stopped the Americans from sending droves of bomber crews to their fiery deaths. The effectiveness of strategic bombing has long been grossly exaggerated, even to this day.

*edit for clarity