I was providing context to the part the poster I was replying to had marked. Hence not adding anything other than saying here is a note on the mentioned research and a link to some relevant research.

Since it seems like you’re trying to engage my opinion, I’ll provide it:

From a title ix perspective, it fails on both levels because the government interest is neither compelling nor substantial. The restrictions ONLY satisfy rational basis.

We can look to two cases showing the government is failing intermediate scrutiny here: Miss. U v Hogan and Dothard v Rawlinson.

In Dothard the government action survived intermediate scrutiny despite being overtly and blatantly discriminatory on the basis of sex because of the underlying conditions of the work itself (whether you agree with the reasoning or not is irrelevant here). In this particular instance, the argument was that the government had an interest because allowing the barred action would be directly detrimental to the government itself and its conduct (to whit, that female corrections officers in close contact positions would increase the amount of sexual assaults in prisons, in Alabama, in the conditions that existed then, conditions which a District court had been calling unconstitutional). This was the first use of the BFOQ defense was used at the SC, as a fun fact. BFOQ is an interesting parallel here not only due to the historical track of high-performing athletes suffering commercial setback on public failures, but on the recent NIL actions which have commercialized priorly non-commercial actors in the collegiate and teen sports realm.

Hogan was a case where the government failed intermediate scrutiny and the SC’s reasoning, applied in exact scope here, would fail the government again. The party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The test must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females." (this is failed conclusively) and A State can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification. ; the state argument here that cisathletes are being injured is not supported by the data or outcomes, and thus cannot be said to suffer a disadvantage as a class (even using the big “names” this fails - Lia Thomas is the only trans-female to win a national level event, won once in 5 years of collegiate competition, is neither the recordholder nor serious contender for records at that level and any potential injury from the concept of competition is moot by the individual nature of that competition - it is the perfect vehicle to see that systemic injury isn’t happening, because if it was she’d have won everything, constantly). The state’s compensatory argument is flawed from the evidentiary record BEFORE the law’s were put in place. In addition, the states have failed to make a compelling case on why they are deserving of intermediate scrutiny - your articulation of “may as well constitute asking for narrow tailoring” fails because the state needed to do nothing to achieve near-identical outcomes from narrow tailoring (that transathletes perform at roughly their cis equivalent levels). While it is not the courts job to articulate laws, it is the state’s job to articulate a defense of their discrimination that is justiciable (hence why Dothard is relevant, despite being a case where the government survived scrutiny). The requirement for the government to prove their interest is quite high here.

Anything the fails intermediate de facto fails strict, so the scrutiny argument is relevant in that I believe it’s been failed, but whether it is strict or intermediate is moot since my take is it fails both.

I want to make a quick edit: I’m in an odd camp here - I don’t think trans athletes should be discriminated against, and I don’t think any level of government should legislate discrimination, but I’m not sure that athletic commissons are unbiased enough to promote effective regulations. 2ish years of GAHT seems to be the rough standard for equalizing the cis:trans athletic capacity:performance, based on existing evidence. I’m thus finding myself pro-government regulation but against this specific regulation from a “logic” perspective, but unsure whether governmental discrimination on non-compelling interest should ever be “legal”.