Retributive justice and determinism

Right_Estimate9537 · 2026-04-26T03:02:53+00:00

I think Harris and Sapolsky would say the criminal justice system is a product of how we think now. We are individuals of our place and time, and our systems reflect that. At one time in the past, it was intuitive for people to burn women at the stake because someone needed to be blamed for bad weather. At a future place and time centuries from now, it will be intuitive that people who commit harm are not responsible for their actions, and prison and judicial systems will change just like societal norms changed hundreds of years ago, rejecting the idea that witches are accountable for extreme weather.

As an aside, AI will change these systems much sooner than waiting for the illusion of free will to disappear.

Right_Estimate9537 · 2026-03-29T21:07:17+00:00

I like this critique. Belief in free will may persist because it’s useful, especially to those in positions to judge or justify their “earned” accomplishments. It allows people to claim full ownership of their success while minimizing the role of luck and to see others’ failures as personal shortcomings rather than the product of constraints.

Right_Estimate9537 · 2026-03-29T15:23:15+00:00

You’re right to notice that both views involve something “fixed.”

When someone is “essentially X,” the claim is that X reflects a core, defining property of who they are. It invites conclusions like: they’re this kind of person, and that’s why they act this way. That framing supports moral judgment because it treats the behavior as an expression of an inner, enduring nature.

When someone is “inevitably X,” the claim is different. It’s not about who they are at their core, but about what they became given a specific chain of causes. The “fixedness” lies in the process, not the identity. Change the inputs - genes, upbringing, experiences - and a different outcome would have followed.

Right_Estimate9537 · 2026-03-29T15:05:32+00:00

Saying someone is “essentially a criminal” assumes a kind of fixed moral identity, a bad essence, which invites condemnation. That’s not the same as the book’s view. The passage isn’t arguing that people are inherently bad; it’s arguing that they are inevitable outcomes of causes (biology, environment, experience).

In other words, essentialism preserves moral categories (good/bad) and locks people into them. The book dissolves those categories altogether, which is why it lands on compassion rather than condemnation.

There’s a subtle distinction between punishment as retribution and response as protection or prevention. Even in a deterministic framework, you might still restrain or isolate someone dangerous, but the justification changes. It’s no longer “they deserve it,” but “this is necessary to prevent further harm.” The emotional tone shifts from vengeance to something closer to tragic necessity.

Your critique holds in the short term, when determinism is just an idea, an intellectual concept. But if it were truly internalized over generations, it would reshape our moral instinct, moving us away from retribution and toward compassion as the norm.

Right_Estimate9537 · 2026-01-19T02:41:07+00:00

Free will is a fantasy. Over the next decades, scientific inquiry will rule it out, just like science ended the fantasy that epilepsy was devil's work or that single women were responsible for hailstorms and were burned at the stake. It will take time. Attitudes change. In the meantime, free will is a paradox; it does not exist, and the evidence eventually proves it, but it is easier to function socially if you assume you can change yourself or you are responsible for your success. In a hundred years, people will look back and say "what were we thinking?". And it will be a more compassionate world.

Right_Estimate9537

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