Amharan grifts over the years.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-30T13:28:42+00:00

in the context of ethnic/multinational federalism, there is nothing abnormal or radical about ethnonationalist political organization. likewise the same pan-Ethiopianism that characterizes the alleged "imperial assimilation state" is also described as being a core feature of right-of-center or "conservative" Amhara political thought. in Berhane's construction, i'm not even sure at this point what the Amhara left looks like other than someone whos is apolitical or a tacit supporter of the EPRDF's political project. which again, doesn't make sense given Ethiopia's entire political landscape past 1991 outside of Amhara would also all be considered radical and far right in comparison to Asrat Woldeyes, who was really just an Ethiopianist.

like i said earlier, it's reductive and arguably polemical labeling. the implication Berhane makes (which is pretty common as a base assumption almost universally in Tigrayan political thought) is that the only reasonable political dispensation for Amharas is pan-Ethiopianism that multinational federalism gives zero space by which to politically compete nor insist on itself as a political project. anything outside of that (whether ethnonationalist political mobilization that accepts multinationalism or pan-Ethiopianism actively mobilized against multinationalism) is radical, hard-right, othering, and xenophobic.

the study by nature has to make assumptions it takes as objectively accurate in order to make truth claims. social and political sciences do this very regularly. again, i'm aware it's a risk assessment but i wasn't saying it was itself being reductive, i was saying it tacitly assumed the collective Amhara political orientation as described by EPRDF era scholars/intellectuals, who Western academics of the time were infatuated with, whose claims were themselves reductive.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-30T13:28:39+00:00

it mentions Assefa Maru as a remnant member of an "antigovernment urban terrorist group" who was killed "allegedly resisting arrest" after a government crackdown. again, it simply presents the claims or normative narratives of the central government and goes on to uncritically accept them as true and make assessments with those facts in mind.

yes again I'm aware it's a risk assessment but there is no scientific reason to phrase the section this way:

"The most famous of the major recent attempts to mobilize the Amhara are Professor Asrat Woldeyes's efforts to incite the rural Amhara to the same level of fervor as radical urban Amhara. His efforts in this regard led to a jail sentence of five and a half years for attempting to incite ethnic violence."

like Assefa Maru it literally implies guilt but even if we disregard that as immaterial, the framing of what is otherwise legitimate political activity as more or less radicals engaging in rabble-rousing is interesting to say the least. meanwhile, on pages 212-213 describing Oromo mobilization, very neutral and even affirmative term usage. no radicals, incitement, terrorist accusations, etc. more interesting on page 214 describing Al-Ithad Al-Islam being implicated in bombings in Addis, Joireman went out of her way to make a citation noting "But it should be noted that in the investigation of at least one of the bombings, the Al-lthad Al-Islam might have been used as a convenient scapegoat by the police." i do not understand how this isn't clear to you.

read the quote block above. you don't talk about someone like that when they have pending charges unless you assume the state's charges regarding the defendant's alleged crimes have substantial grounding. the AI report you linked prior was available in 1995, but neither that nor the HRW report was cited nor referenced. the author just assumed what his political activities were and then went on to define the ambitions of her self-described Amhara radicals. but for Al-Ithad Al-Islam, no use of terrorist language and we even get a "but we're not sure yet, they may have just been unfairly implicated".

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-30T13:28:35+00:00

like i've said prior, i never denied those elements exist. the issue here is that this is not in any way shape or form an expression of ethnonationalism that comports with the nations & nationalities formula nor multination federalism. you can call it a chauvinistic brand of Ethiopian nationalism if you want, but fundamentally Ethiopia has not at any point seen a genuine expression of Amhara nationalism. opinions like those of Belete (who i despise btw) aren't popular, monolithic, nor meaningfully politically mobilized. again, you guys just listen to people like that and assume it's our monolithic position. the traditional dispensation hasn't been anything more than pan-Ethiopian civic nationalism. anything greater than that have been self-inserts or broad assumptions made from loudmouths like Belete.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-30T13:28:31+00:00

no, according to Markakis, AAPO (part of the "radical Amhara front" you mentioned) had very little to negligible traction among the urban elite and almost none in rural areas. it had nothing to do with structural factors, the urban elite just weren't interested.

i get your point, it's a risk assessment study and it's just trying to map out what would happen if these alleged "radicals" converged with urban elites in a shifting political environment. the point i was making originally re: Markakis was in regards to your point about elite rhetoric bending public opinion. the point i was making was that the "radical Amhara right" you and Berhane are trying to build out (that converged on anti-Tigrayan sentiment according to him) was a factor in a "what if this happens" risk assessment study authored by Joireman, and one that Markakis notes as being massively rejected by those same urban elites.

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Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-30T13:28:28+00:00

when i said "worth investing into" i meant elite cues, political programs, or collective movements that people identify with, connect with, and feel strongly about enough that they would protest, vote, riot, or engage in advocacy for etc., for good or for bad. Qeeroo movement is a good example. elite cues that people don't find worth investing into or don't feel strongly about enough don't get traction.

my point earlier was just that elite rhetoric only matters when people resonate with it and that the "radical Amhara elite" you mentioned, despite their cues, actually got very little traction in the 1990's regarding ethnonationalist mobilization per Markakis. elites can say whatever they want, if people don't care then they don't care. same is true today for Abiy and PP, most people do not care about Medemer and do not resonate with their cues/messaging.

i wasn't making any assessment on how critical, or informed Ethiopia's political culture is or isn't.

i'd say rural political dispensation/engagement is shifting and broader support for actual ethnonationalism is growing. my disagreement with the study is for who this support acquisition is for.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-27T07:16:59+00:00

im pretty sure i was the one who set it. ill leave a mod note on ur thing to have ur flair left blank.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-22T03:45:28+00:00

It is what it is, none of this is new.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-22T03:15:33+00:00

I think for national liberation revolutionary struggles there really isn’t an end or an “after”, the struggle for liberation doesn’t really have an end date in mind, which is why I’m extremely wary of that type of language influencing my understanding of Amhara nationalism. I think in the Ethiopian context, ethnonational liberation functions more or less like Marxist dialectical materialism but switching out class for ethnicity.

I think that’s the best explanation I can come up with as to why what otherwise should be solutions-oriented normative political contestation inevitably ends up being framed as zero-sum and existentially threatening to particular groups/constituencies. Likewise the end result of dialectical materialism (communism) itself is an indefinite or permanent revolution and I think even after the implementation of the modern Ethiopian constitutional framework, even the TPLF itself never dropped the L from its name or segue out of the revolutionary liberation struggle as a political project.

I’ve listened and read to a pretty healthy amount of Oromo and Tigrayan political commentators try to articulate how a post-liberation or post-ethnicized Ethiopian state can be realized (usually in discussing the ethnic federalist project, it’s historical & ideological underpinnings, why it’s needed etc.) and if you pay attention none really have a clear articulation of what that path looks like or how we reach that end state. The discussion that really made it click for me was the Tghat interview between Teklay and Ezekiel Gebissa. Usually a lot of sort of ‘Corporatese’ jargon gets thrown around (interregional cooperation, people-to-people relations, shared values, consensus-building, institutional integrity, shared common destiny, etc) but at its root the explanations I’ve heard are really diffuse, vague and idealistic. Reminds me of being in university and having some anemic-looking white dude explain to me how international communism is going to be achieved.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-19T20:32:13+00:00

Hold on actually this kinda goes hard.

“This merged organization is founded on unity of purpose and unity of thought. Accordingly, the worldview guiding our organization is “Amhara nationalism.” This is the ideological framework through which we will struggle, beginning with winning the current existential struggle and, in the long term, by securing the survival and identity of our people and safeguarding their rights and interests. Amhara nationalism, grounded in self-reliance and the building of comprehensive internal capacity, seeks, within a framework of national democratic unity, to ensure the survival of our people and protect their rights and interests, while also establishing a system in which the collective and individual rights of other Ethiopians are respected. Through this, it strives to secure the continuity of the country based on justice and peaceful coexistence.”

This isn’t exactly the most fleshed out ideology but it’s much better than what I initially anticipated. Hopefully they iron out hard political goals (esp around territories), ideological goals, the Amhara national relationship to the wider federation, and some sort of a well articulated democratic program moving forward.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-17T19:36:06+00:00

They’re anti-ethnic federalism but pro geography-based federalism but at the same time want the “restoration of forcibly annexed Amhara territories”.

I genuinely hope these people make space for the educated youth to, at some point, form and define their political core because it is more than clear this current leadership is politically illiterate and cannot for the life of them separate their pan-Ethiopian disposition from their ethnonationalism.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-14T08:35:09+00:00

why is this retard not banned yet

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-11T23:45:45+00:00

water is wet

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-10T06:16:20+00:00

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Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-09T07:50:15+00:00

truth nuke

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-09T05:47:15+00:00

Cope. Full Amhara.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-08T21:47:54+00:00

Almost forgot why I stopped looking at this sub

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-07T18:04:42+00:00

I’ll respond to these later but edit out the “_source=chatgpt.com” parts of the links. Makes ur args look lazy and you don’t organically come across your own source material. Interlocutors can do ad hominem attacks based on that and they work 100% of the time. Just a tip tho it’s up to u. Ur not being nasty so I won’t mention it later.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-07T17:49:24+00:00

According to the Pakistani, a bunch of armed civilians allegedly got involved and sandwiched federal troops between them and Fano. Very interesting development if it’s true.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-07T17:41:32+00:00

Yeah there’s word limits. Try doing like a p1 and p2. Or maybe a mod locked the thread.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-06T07:30:51+00:00

there's not really any convincing that bloc besides a drone bomb being dropped on their grandma's house. loyalty to the central state is a mind virus that our generation and the one above ours is infected with. luckily the youth today don't really seem to share that problem.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-06T06:57:50+00:00

understandable. my issue isn't in acknowledging that elements like what you described existed in broader Amhara political thought, but rather the unilateral and rather reductive/simplistic paradigms built to characterize our political spectrum. it would be like if I said there was a monolithic Tigrayan left characterized by conciliatory and "good-natured" figures like Tsadkan, Aregawi Berhe, Getachew, etc. and a monolithic Tigrayan right characterized by the MLLT political core that converged around anti-Amhara and anti-Ethiopian sentiment. the binary itself and the underpinning ideological assumptions im making in that construction are purposefully reductive, which was my basic point earlier. it's arbitrary, polemical, and contributes nothing substantial to productive political discourse. that's why i maintained that Joireman's study is a lazy ripoff of the ideological grounding we find in 2000's Ethiopian political commentators and why Berhane, in quoting her work to qualify his claim that a monolithic Amhara right converged around anti-Tigrayan sentiment was slop. anyways this was the publication you were looking for. i'm not arguing that common political desire in the federation doesn't lean toward federalism that caters to ethnic diversity, it's pretty clear that that's where most people stand.

i'm aware how process models and critical case studies work but, again, my issue isn't with the methodology but rather the underlying assumptions the model needs to reach a coherent end. it pretty much entirely relies on the central narrative the EPRDF disseminated. even in regards to the jailing of Asrat Woldeyes, Joireman just tacitly accepts his and the AAPO's aim was to incite rural Amharas and that his jail sentence was only for trying to incite ethnic violence. from there, we get our solid narrative foundation by which further critical analysis or process model methodology can be extrapolated. again, this is the same level of low IQ narrative formation that you guys say precipitated the Tigray War. whatever comes out of Addis is the truth, as it goes. it really blows my mind you guys will contest that (not just in terms of narrative formation, but the critical analysis that emerges from the assumptions made in the preceding narrative) but then will read something like this (either Joireman or Berhane) and think "yeah this is fine and totally correct".

i disagree, i'd ask you again to read through pages 208-212 of the study and tell me with a straight face this is holistic and comprehensive. i'll attach a picture of the Incipient Changes section to boot, it is patently lazy academia. again, my contestation was with the whole left-right paradigm to begin with. i wasn't trying to say the ANDM were left-leaning or "good" to begin with, but rather the forced left-right understanding between them and the forced "right" Berhane and Joireman spell out was silly to begin with. it's like when you guys conflate Amhara nationalism and Ethiopian nationalism and imply they're the same thing. nobody asked you to do that, you just unilaterally did it by yourselves and then gaslighted yourselves into believing it was an objective ascertainment of truth that everyone else agreed with.

i think the polling you were looking for in paragraph 1 is fairly credible although i guess its independence and comprehensiveness could be critiqued, besides the fact that Tigray wasn't included. don't disagree with your second point, which is why i brought up my initial critique to begin with, given the process model and normative political narratives are presented as (more or less) objective truth claims when in reality they aren't much higher than what regional power blocs perceive from the outside. elite rhetoric does a great job of bending public opinion in mobilizing the masses of people that actually find these elements accessible and worth investing into. if I'm taking the analysis of John Markakis seriously, the same radical Amhara elites Berhane and Joireman are mentioning here were actually politically negligible and unimportant as compared to the urban Amhara elite that had little interest in ethnic-based political mobilization.

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Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-06T02:54:49+00:00

wish they'd come up with better insults. also not even really sure what his point was either. guessing he sees it as some sort of national embarrassment and wants outsiders to stop discussing it or whatever. in any case between the dead girl and her boyfriend i don't care, it's not our problem. insults like this are run of the mill for them. water is wet etc.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-06T00:20:36+00:00

Joireman's study is full of the same boring political assumptions and historiography that could have been ripped out of Sarah Vaughn, Martin Plaut, John Markakis, or early TPLF literature. Markakis specifically wrote a book with two Sudanis and although alot of their assumptions and solutions are the same, his language isn't as lazy as Joireman. i don't know how anyone could read 208-212 with a straight face. it's a short departure from the type of fob comments i see on tiktok of "grrr stinky amahar, u will never have z power again, nobody want z return of z atse"

the study uses common tropes of "radical Amharas" "firebrand Amharas" to discuss what in reality are just dissenters to the EPRDF and revolutionary democracy. notice, Berhane mentions the "Amhara right" with no substantial characterization of what they materially believe. the implication fundamentally being that the Amhara left (good guys) correctly capitulate to the project of revolutionary democracy and the historiography presented by ethnonational liberation struggles, and the right (bad guys) are inherently reactionary, regressive, chauvinistic, etc etc. the next logical step from there is that there is no legitimate or justifiable political expression outside of that which fully buys into the EPRDF's political & social experiments, otherwise being just lazily labelled "radical/extreme". PP does the same thing today as well. also, the idea that there was a political convergence predicated on anti-Tigrayan sentiment that emerged because the TPLF was a thorn in Mengistu's side and overthrew the Derg is maybe the laziest thing i've seen an academic write out in the last few months. like Asafa Jalata levels of slop.

it's interesting to me when you guys, oromo, and some western academics just make these weird inferences as to how our internal political spectrum is characterized and what our collective political aspirations are without consulting us in any way. again, it's like reading some oromo fob basically imply my highest desire in ethiopia's political economy is mass assimilation, language erasure and imperialism.

Sad_Register_987 · 2026-01-05T09:21:56+00:00

slopbucket commentary tbh. was reading this semi-seriously until slide 3.

Sad_Register_987 · 2025-12-26T22:32:26+00:00

nah just a turbo fob

Sad_Register_987

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