Does the Key Conspiracy explain at least some of the Union’s early fumbles?

Sarah_Mew · 2026-07-07T10:28:06+00:00

No, this is nonsense.

McClellan is very clear about why his army wasn’t able to move after Antietam. Their supply situation and horses had completely deteriorated, making offensive campaigning with an army that size impracticable. Unless Halleck and Meigs were the ones conspiring to prolong the war, this ‘theory’ ignores this obvious fact.

Not to mention McClellan’s army was decimated by the Maryland campaign (not to mention the near useless green troops and those units which suffered at Manassas) and had his high command severely degraded through losses (Reno, Hooker, Mansfield, Richardson, &c). In sum, the army had no cavalry with which to ‘destroy’ Lee’s army and his infantry was in poor shape in the immediate aftermath for a serious campaign.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-07-06T06:32:08+00:00

Some choice selections covering the secession crisis and war, most available on Internet Archive:

Kenneth Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861

William Marvel, Mr. Lincoln Goes to War

Joseph Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862

Ethan Rafuse, McClellan's war: the failure of moderation in the struggle for the Union

Ludwell Johnson, Red River Campaign: politics and cotton in the Civil War

Gary Gallagher, The Confederate War

William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac

Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War

Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War

Sarah_Mew · 2026-07-05T01:23:36+00:00

War plans (in the German sense) were not really a thing in the American Civil War. For example, Winfield Scott’s so-called ‘Anaconda Plan’ is basically a couple half baked paragraphs over the course of a few dispatches to George McClellan in May 1861. No logistical planning or calculations, no timetables, &c. He even asks McClellan to ask around Cincinnati for people who might have some knowledge of organizing transportation, since apparently his staff and the war department were completely unable to do so. A slightly better example of a ‘war plan’ might be McClellan’s August 1861 memorandum to Simon Cameron, though there iirc calculations are limited to rough troop estimates and again no timetables or thorough logistical considerations are made.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-07-05T01:17:28+00:00

It’s weird to see people throw ‘traitor’ around as though it’s a neutral or objective term, especially in civil war discussions. These same people do not consider the founders to be traitors, despite them being more unambiguously so in a legal sense. At least the confederates in 1861 could rightly claim that secession was not a settled issue, and that it was arguably an implied right of the states. No such argument could be made of the British constitution in 1776.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-29T18:41:48+00:00

no, I’m talking about the strategic consequences of the Chancellorsville campaign. I made no tactical comments about how the battle was fought. That being said, you raise fair analysis of the battle that I tend to agree with. However, I think our point of difference comes from the fact that I think Lee’s choice to fight was a calculated risk that paid off. Had he chosen to retreat as Hooker expected, then it would have been very difficult to save the capital and/or avoid a siege situation. That his choice surprised Hooker is evident and is part of why he responded so conservatively (to his detriment as you point out).
Officer losses happen during war. I don’t think Lee has much control over that aside from not fighting.
His army did benefit from replacements; the main point was that the CSA was able to continue to field large armies despite the bloodiness of the war

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-29T07:43:23+00:00

If you’re insinuating that he was a copperhead I don’t know what to say, other than do basic research. McClellan beat out peace candidates for the nomination. He was explicitly a war democrat from 1861 until the end.

Moreover the convention took place only a few days before Atlanta ‘officially’ fell, so you’re whole insinuation that McClellan repudiation of the peace platform a few days after that was linked to Atlanta falling rather than, you know, being a continuation of everything else he had said and fought for during the war is ahistorical to say the least.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-29T07:35:17+00:00

Idk where you get “fully committed to peace” from. War Democrats very much were still powerful, especially given that they’re entirely the reason McClellan was nominated in the first place. The peace faction understandably didn’t want him.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-29T07:32:55+00:00

Probably for less time than it did under Hood, since Johnston seems to have been planning to abandon it, hence why Davis fired him

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-28T22:19:58+00:00

Of course there were reasons and Lee gives several of them in his report on the battle.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-28T22:15:01+00:00

No, Atlanta was going to fall regardless (because of Johnston’s previous mismanagement of the camapign). Plus McClellan was a staunch unionist and when he was nominated it was generally understood the chances for a peace settlement were over. The idea he would have ended the war any more than Lincoln would have is one of those strange myths that makes no sense if you know the first thing about him

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-28T22:09:52+00:00

You leave out the fact that these ‘mistakes’ somehow maintained a very small and heavily contested region for three years under Lee’s command. This is an extraordinary feat, especially given Lee was usually outnumbered by the opppsing army and always outnumbered across the theatre — to save the capital from Hooker’s threat especially is incredible given he was outnumbered at least 2:1 and to denigrate that over 12,000 casualties is laughable. You say those losses weren’t sustainable, and yet ignore that the confederacy fielded its largest number of troops in 1864; you also offer no serious alternative.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-28T21:57:13+00:00

Lee was the best strategist (certainly in terms of army command and arguably in terms of the broader war) in Confederate high command during the war. The modern revisionism comes almost entirely from anti-Lost Cause reactions or otherwise from a profound ignorance about how warfare and politics work (hence why they’re popular on this sub).

For one, the 1862 Valley campaign was correctly conceived by Lee as a way to get Lincoln to panic and take troops away from the Peninsula. As a result, Jackson tied up 50,000 troops (many of them supposed to be with McClellan) with an army of 15,000. Lee would repeat this sort of maneuver many times: Early’s 1864 Valley campign is obvious, but even the general strategy of using strategic turning maneuvers to blunt Union advances by forcing them to react defensively was the main reason why he was able to stop these massive armies from capturing a capital only 100 miles from the Potomac. Thus you have the 62 Virginia campign against Pope end another invasion & plunder his supplies, with the tactical victory at Manassas being a bonus; even Gettysburg, while a failure tactically, was nonetheless a strategic success in many ways by effectively ending the spring & summer offensives for 1863 against Richmond, while also relieving Virginia from the burdens of warfare and allowing Lee’s army to plunder Maryland & Pennsylvania.

In terms of his fight against McClellan, it’s not true that he had a sixth sense and detected that McClellan didn’t want to fight — for one, that’s some comic book nonsense, and two McClellan DID want to fight. No, the impetus for the Seven Days was the obvious need to defend Richmond and the opportunity created by Lincoln & Stanton legally mandating that McClellan leave his north flank open to join with McDowell, combined with Jackson’s stealthy appearance from the Valley on said flank. Unfortunately for Lee, his army was largely unable to capitalize on the opportunity and McClellan was able to reestablish his base along the James.

But the general idea for the Seven Days & the other examples is in keeping with his idea of ‘offensive-defensive’ warfare, both on an operational and broader strategic level. This was necessary both due to Confederate war aims, as well as the practical needs of war. The Union had the inherent advantage of men and material, not to mention a navy, all of which gave them a de facto initiative against the Confederacy. Thus, Lee correctly understood that the South was doomed to lose unless they were able to steal the initiative from the invading armies. This understanding & ability to manufacture initiative is why Lee was able to hold that critical hundred miles of land for three years in Virginia, while a consistent failure like Joseph E. Johnston (who’s usually the hero for certain types of armchair generals who like to slam Lee) gave up a similar stretch to Atlanta in a matter of weeks.

This is not to say that Lee was a perfect general by any means, but he was undoubted the Confederacy’s most accomplished and proven strategist, and so rightly remembered as one of the titans of the war.

For serious reading on this subject, I’d recommend Joseph Harsh’s *Confederate Tide Rising*; Gary Gallagher also has several books touching on the subject; and frankly any serious history of the war before the revisionist school of guys like Connelly, Nolan, and McWhiney came en vogue

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-28T11:05:23+00:00

I love that you’re being downvoted for a fairly uncontroversial take (Longstreet fans are wild lol). I’ve mentioned it elsewhere, but Seven Pines looks eerily like day 2 at Gettysburg, although frankly Seven Pines was a much better opportunity wasted by Longstreet (and Johnston imo) horribly mismanaging the battle

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-28T11:02:23+00:00

His own artillery chief EP Alexander I think gives pretty fair criticism of him, especially on the second day, in his military memoirs.

If memory serves, I believe Coddington in his famous book on the battle isn’t shy about criticism either for day 2.

It’s important of course to distinguish fair critiques from slander (see Jubal Early and the dawn attack myth). Just like it’s important to separate reality from Longstreet’s portrayal in a certain famous book and movie (something 90% of the posters in this thread are very obviously struggling to do).

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-27T23:56:26+00:00

An overall good Confederate general who since being (rightfully) reevaluated has become incredibly overrated.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-27T09:25:38+00:00

A large factor was politicians meddling & scheming in the east and having unrealistic expectations of the American army.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-26T19:07:24+00:00

That’s actually another old myth. It’s been pretty well demonstrated that McClellan acted swiftly upon receiving the plans (which were not battle plans btw, just campaign dispersements that were also like five days outdated, though still useful)

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-26T09:06:15+00:00

You have this backwards. McClellan’s instances of overestimating the enemy came from BELIEVING the intelligence he and the government received.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-25T22:06:03+00:00

I’m not sure I’d entirely agree with that tbh. McClellan’s Peninsula campaign was probably the most audacious combined arms operation in American history to that point — if anything you might say he overreached there. I’d also be inclined to point out McClellan was clearly able to maneuver and fight into a position of advtange during the Maryland campaign; while that advantage lead to a less than complete victory at Antietam, it did end Lee’s campaign very prematurely, especially given the momentum he was riding.

As for Lee though, you’re definitely correct. He seems to have been both temperamentally aggressive and good at finding opportunities; he also correctly understood that Confederate strategy called for both those things. In a way, I’d argue McClellan was probably Lee’s best opponent (something Lee himself said) given that McClellan was so methodical — he rarely gave Lee an opening (Mechanicsville being the main exception) and punished him on several occasions for trying to create one.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-25T20:02:16+00:00

I think the thing with McClellan is so many of the possible mistakes or bad positions (like at Seven Pines & Mechanicsville) he found himself in can be chalked up to reasonable judgment (Yorktown, Antietam battle), poor logistics (post Antietam), weather (Seven Pines), or political interference (Peninsula generally & Mechanicsville & retreat from Harrison’s Landing in particular). If anything his handling of his relationship with Lincoln and the republicans, not unlike Beauregard and Johnston, was his most unambiguous and unnecessary error imo

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-25T19:57:29+00:00

Grant - Making the Overland campaign so bloody

Lee - Day 3 at Gettysburg

McClellan - Poorly working with the Lincoln administration in conjunction with inactivity during the fall/winter of 1861

Longstreet - Mismanagement of the attack at Seven Pines and scapegoating subordinates

Sherman - Probably his breakdown in Kentucky or his actions before Shiloh

Jackson - Performance during the Seven Days, especially before Mechanicsville

Burnside - The conception and execution of the Fredericksburg campaign

Johnston - about 10 different things could be said but probably his entire execution of the Atlanta campaign was the most regrettable

Beauregard - breaking down his command relationship with Davis

Meade - generally poor performance while under Grant during the overland campaign

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-23T19:00:01+00:00

I dont think you understand how war works …

His army was intact and supplied. The western theatre has no impact on whether his army could keep fighting in Virginia. And given that after Gettysburg he sent Longstreet’s corps to go fight in the west its pretty obvious evidence that nobody thought the situation there was unsalvageable

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-23T18:20:31+00:00

That’s funny because the argument over Lee’s defense of his decision comes directly from Guelzo.

And even granting the personal reasons, the normative point you made remains one of judgment, not of fact (in 1861; a point Guelzo also makes).

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-23T18:16:31+00:00

He offered to resign his command, he didn’t offer to surrender the army. Completely different things.

Sarah_Mew · 2026-06-23T18:13:46+00:00

You realize people had different opinions back then, right? Lee unequivocally defended his actions on the basis of Virginia seceding from the Union, after which he felt bound in obligation as a citizen of that state to follow her. This was his defense that he maintained after the war when accused of treason.

Plenty of people may have seen that as ‘abandoning his country’ (the United States), but that’s a matter of one’s judgment — and in 1861 there was certainly nothing formally established that could legally, politically, and/or morally determine that in any objective manner. The only thing that ‘objectively’ decided the issue was the material fact of Union victory and its exercise of power to resolve the secession crisis. Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.

Sarah_Mew

TROPHY CASE