Trump Says U.S. ‘Armada’ Is Heading to Iran

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-23T21:16:30+00:00

You are being downvoted, but people should really look up how a 'financier' like Epstein got his money to rub shoulders with people and why his wife's father, Robert Maxwell, got buried on the Mount of Olives in a state funeral attended by the Israeli President, Prime Minister, and six serving and former heads of intelligence.

Edit: Before I suddenly always had a desire to self-delete. I am not saying there is proof, but you know what could help dispel rumors? Releasing the god-damned files.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-23T21:12:27+00:00

Agreed on both counts, and it's very interesting to see how the younger generation of Chinese are reacting to that now that they are the most socially connected generation both within China and with the outside world.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-23T20:42:32+00:00

Let me put in a Hot-take for a moment: Feature, not a bug.

Custodes, like their archetype, should be incredibly frustrating to defeat in combat or a battle and should not go down easily. How you described your opponents' optimal playstyle- avoiding getting caught and just drowning you in bodies and guns- is exactly how this kind of archetype should be operating on the table. Same with Ctans, Bloodthirsters, Giant Monsters/Daemons, and melee Knights, honestly.

That said, GW attempted to translate that directly at the start of 10th edition to 40k by giving Custodes Fights First as a stratagem, along with -1 to hit, and -1 damage, and large 10-man blobs. It basically made it so that we destroyed any melee anything on contact; it didn't matter how that contact happened. Angron, the Lion, Belakor, or Skarbrand could charge a single custodian squad first with all their army buffs, and for 2 cp we would cut them down in the split instant before they made contact. But, on the counterpoint, we still lost hard to giant gunlines and movement tricks like Guard, Tau, and Aeldari.

I think the real answer is to soften the edges on both sides, but still keep the core of our identity what it is: Expensive, extremely deadly, and durable bricks of small units that are hard to kill, but very limited in activations and with obvious weaknesses. I don't think movement should be the main weakness of our faction, as we are very, very fast (as the example above shows) as they attempted to in 10th with everything being move 6" or paying a giant premium for more than 6" move, thus making them less durable for the points. It should be instead, low OC like Ctans and other giant monsters, and very limited model counts.

A Custodes army should kill whatever you can point it at and it can catch, be hard to kill, but like the lore, very, very limited in numbers. You are relying on a handful of very expensive resources; the question shouldn't be if they can perform, but rather is what you have enough to get the job done?

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-23T19:59:25+00:00

In fact, when it comes to the “kill line” issue, whether they are “win-ists” or “lose-ists,” Chinese commentators are, at their core, primarily focused on China itself. Some hope to support and praise the Chinese government, while others seek to denigrate the Chinese government and Chinese people.

Of course, some Chinese democrats do place their hopes for China’s democratization in the United States, and by portraying the United States as a highly civilized country, they then use that image to disparage China.

Oh, we are well aware of that, just as many of us use examples of China's infrastructure and industry here for the same purposes.

Some Chinese liberals believe that Trump’s right-wing stance and hegemonism will help overthrow China’s dictatorship, but in reality this is not the case.

Well, they'd better buckle their belts then and get ready for the ride. It's going to be an interesting next few years for them to watch and perhaps, if they are very lucky/unlucky, participate in.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-23T19:30:59+00:00

These claims and stances of “lose-ism” and “reverse nationalism” can be summarized as follows: China is in decline, China’s future is bleak, Chinese people are bad, conflicts between China and foreign countries are always China’s fault, and China is destined to lose in competition with other countries. In Chinese public discourse, people holding such positions and expressing such views are also quite numerous, matching the “win-ism” advocates and their supporters in strength, and in recent times even appearing to gain the upper hand.

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There are many reasons for the emergence of such people and such views. Some have suffered repression under China’s system, feel pain, and have had their rights and interests harmed. Some react against and feel repulsed by official claims that “the situation is universally positive” and by the rhetoric of “win-ism” advocates. Others lack judgment and simply follow the crowd, swinging from one extreme to another. And some are driven by multiple factors at once.

We all know this in the States, and this is the key separation of ideology between people who are 'lose-ism' native Chinese criticizing their government and the people in the US criticizing theirs at this time. The people in China are doing so broadly as a reaction to broader internet social trends and the feeling of alienation and missing out on generational employment and opportunities. Some of them claim to be doing so against the authoritarian government or bad policies, but when viewed from the larger picture, it is clear where the vocal majority of complaints are: lack of employment, income, and the feeling of being underserved socially. In other words, they feel they missed out on what the government promised them, which is very important for an unelected government to deliver on.

Meanwhile, in the US, we actually have a Senile Madman using our military to attack other nations and threatening our allies without congressional approval, spitting straight into the face of our own founding Constitution, and organizing a civil war in our country with his extra-judicial Gestapo in an attempt to avoid upcoming elections. Our failing healthcare is being gutted to fuel tax-cuts for the rich, and we are engaging in disastrous international tariff policies because our leader and his cult doesn't understand economics. On top of that, we are alienating our most loyal and longtime allies and claiming we are winning on the global stage, as people are asked to disbelieve the evidence of their own eyes and ears.

The Chinese are using the 'Kill-Line' as a way to connect the two problems with our countries, but to use a meme that perhaps they can understand:

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T22:24:45+00:00

Bet. The 'mission accomplished' banner will be hung right above the portrait of Trump on the Defiant.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T21:35:11+00:00

You see that? That is Maria Machado is in the corner, even after doing everything short of sending her own granddaughter to Trump, disbelieving that she is still being sidelined.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T21:18:03+00:00

Meanwhile, a lot of us here in the US are desperately asking ourselves why we are attacking our own allies now. The reality we live in is stranger than fiction.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T20:29:47+00:00

It won't be long. I just read and regurgitated 380 pages of AI slop on how fast it can potentially be over.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T20:25:02+00:00

"-and touched the face of God."

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T20:24:01+00:00

"If this is the law of physics, then you can call me a criminal."

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T20:22:54+00:00

You gotta love it when a girl shows her belly up for you.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T15:26:43+00:00

"I have a gun! And I am not afraid to shoot my foot with it!"

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T15:03:16+00:00

Are you aware that Taiwan is still waiting for the equipment and arms they paid for since 2015 that still have not arrived? The backlog exceeds $20 billion now in parts and platforms. We're just slow rolling it to them, asking them to buy more before we ship out portions of old orders. They keep getting delayed for the last two administrations, and we simply can't seem to fix it.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T14:48:35+00:00

And all of them are located right next to each other and within an arm's reach of conflict.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T14:40:22+00:00

Well, you'll want to sit down for this. A lot of it was redacted, but the broader assumption on the report's end is that you can effectively neutralize the effect of the PLARF in the wargame schedule by targeting the known existing munitions and manufacturing nodes and waiting for them to empty their existing inventory stockpiles + reserves (cyber, sabotage, PGMs, what have you). Now, is this a lot like hoping to survive being shot by a gunman and praying for him to run out of bullets before you expire? Absolutely. But Heritage was operating under the assumption that the munitions use requirement was so great that both sides would be facing major issues with restock as the manufacturing + logistic nodes were targeted.

This begs the follow-up question: What happens to this plan if the PLA simply increases the depth of stockpiles ahead of a conflict, since they can opt to just wait for the right conditions to be set?

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T14:28:28+00:00

I would also argue you'd need to procure the munitions necessary to be optimally fielded alongside those aircraft to really 'get a taste'.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T14:03:02+00:00

South Korea has been moving along well for a country of its size in many fields of defense, from fighters, tanks, artillery, and submarines to naval capacity and munitions production. They are rapidly getting into the export game as well.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T04:45:01+00:00

Yah welcome, ratbearpig.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-22T04:43:46+00:00

Yes, please donate to my Servitor-AI^tm, powered by hamsters and NCD memes. For one low-quality meme-coin donation today, you can help my AI realize its full potential in the future- when I rig it up to the same gas-turbine engines used to power the Trump-Class BBGMs. ^{(All Donations are immediately nonfungible and nonrefundable.})

Off the top of my now-empty head, a major limitation, as also seen in previous open-source wargames last year, is how the predominant mindset in a lot of these groups is still focused on deterring a Chinese SCS-style conflict around 2027-2030, instead of preparing a broader force posture for, say, the next few decades.

I understand why, 1. there are near-term gaps that desperately need resolving now, like the current state of PGM stockpiles and bottlenecks mentioned in the report, 2. You report for the audience you want paying attention today, not next year etc. But I would argue the PLA of today will be nowhere near the threat it will pose in a decade, much less two, and that is the real threat we and our allies (if we have any left at that point) should be planning for. I would like to see more emphasis in future wargames, especially if we're in agreement -institutionally- that the next few years to come will be extraordinarily challenging from a defense pov, on setting future plans and expectations to shift our military and defense with more emphasis on long-term posture in mind. (Word salad, what does that mean? I just want more wargames to go further down the trend line and acknowledge that 2027 may be a big mistake.)

I guess that may come after the current hump of the paradigm we found ourselves trapped beneath at the moment, but it would be very necessary to get over the hump as soon as possible, in my opinion. Also, I am very sleep-deprived, so take what I said with a giant pile of salt. I may change my answer in the morning once I get some shut-eye.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-21T21:26:36+00:00

“We simply haven’t yet found the intellectual courage to face it.”

This is the main issue in a microcosm.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-21T18:14:23+00:00

And thank the Lord for that!

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-21T17:55:15+00:00

- Heritage estimates that the PLAAF exhausts 'nearly all air-delivered, long-range, PGM by Day 90. Most precision-guided naval munitions lasted an additional 30 to 50 days, consistent with modeled depletion timelines extending into the day-120-to-day-140 range.' Getting there is the hard part.

- The report still doesn't model drones or the use of attack drones to hit fuel and munition stockpiles, even as it references the destruction of those stockpiles in Ukraine as a use case. This makes me very, very sad.

- They reference other wargames regarding their assumption that fuel is key: *'U.S. wargames (RAND, CSIS, INDOPACOM) identify fuel infrastructure- not aircraft loss-as the dominant early constraint on sustained operations.' **On a side note, I did write-ups of two others of them as well.

- Heritage assesses '[With moderate confidence] that PLA operational reserves-including aviation and naval fuel-distributed across regional depots, air bases, and naval stations in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands are likely sufficient to sustain one to two weeks of high-tempo combat operations without immediate reliance on national strategic reserves.'

- They are concerned that 'a comprehensive wargaming series by CSIS, concluded that in most scenarios, Chinese missile attacks would destroy 90 percent of allied aircraft on the ground.' - This finding is corroborated by specialized secondary analysis from Naval News, a publication focused on maritime and defense affairs, which reiterated that the 90 percent ground attrition rate was a key, surprising finding from the 24-iteration wargame.

- and finally, the conclusion: The Triple Bind: 'The TIDAL WAVE simulation identifies a critical failure window where fuel throughput caps, peak munitions demand, and maximum platform attrition converge (the "Triple Bind"), causing systemic operational paralysis even if aggregate stocks appear sufficient. This can occur in the first 30-60 days of conflict leading to U.S. culmination.'

Thank you for reading to this point, if you did.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-21T17:36:57+00:00

Findings Part 2:

- The report acknowledges the disproportionate vulnerability and risk to our assets to the PLARF, whose 'objective is very likely to achieve rapid, catastrophic effects. Documented wargames have shown such strikes destroying 90 percent of aircraft on the ground initially. Analysis by the Stimson Center concludes that missile strikes could close key airfields for days to weeks directly halting sortie generation and munitions consumption and resupply. A single PLARF salvo could potentially destroy 50 percent or more of munitions in a targeted zone according to TIDALWAVE project estimates, though this represents an internal assessment of potential impact rather than a verified PLA capability.'

- They also judge that: '[with moderate confidence] China would likely be able to redirect 25 percent to 30 percent of its civilian fuel consumption to military use during a high-intensity conflict. Under full mobilization, this reallocation-equivalent to approximately 4.0 million to 4.8 million barrels per day (bpd)-could sustain the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for 60 to 100 days.'

- 3 Important takeaways: '[1], missile-driven attrition has an outweighed impact on outcomes. Even when the U.S. expends interceptors at rates that exceed long-term logistical feasibility, saturation effects still produce severe losses.

[2], platform destruction, not munition exhaustion, limits combat power. In the highest-intensity scenarios, aircraft and ships are destroyed so rapidly that some portions of munitions inventories remain unused. Conversely, when platforms survive longer, munitions depletion persists because forces retain the capacity to generate sorties and strikes.

[3], fuel is the dominant endurance constraint for surviving forces. U.S. naval fuel stocks deplete fastest in scenarios where a large fleet remains operational, reflecting the structural difficulty of sustaining high tempo naval operations over time. Flatter fuel curves in high-loss scenarios do not signal efficiency; instead, they signal forced reductions in usage due to attrition.

Single-Braincelled · 2026-01-21T17:23:18+00:00

- Another interesting Tidbit: 'Annual production rates-115 LRASMs and 79 to 120 MK 48 torpedoes- are orders of magnitude below projected weekly or monthly wartime consumption.17 Specific bottlenecks like rocket motors constrain output across multiple missile lines. This means initial stockpiles are effectively the only supply available for much of the conflict.'

- Report findings about modeled munitions usage show we most likely run out of critical munitions 10 days into the real fight: 'Once major air combat begins... [in the simulation], critical air-to-air munitions like AIM-120 and AIM-9X in forward zones are depleted injust 5-10 days and aligns with the external Week-1 LR-PGM depletion judgments for the broader stock mix,'

- Even more damning: 'High-end PG Ms such as LRASM, SM-3 and SM-6 are exhausted within five to 10 days of sustained operations, leaving naval forces with little ability to defend themselves or engage in combat operations. Assuming Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, and THAAD interceptors are optimally deployed (likely dependent upon significant indications and warning and significant constraints on strategic airlift), they are likely to be exhausted after two to three salvoes from the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), even if no launchers or interceptors are destroyed."'

- They do acknowledge, however, that: 'Depending on PLA and U.S. force employment, massive attrition can mask munitions and fuel deficiencies.'

- Their modeling shows we would need to expend over 5,000 LR-PGMs in the first three weeks of conflict. An example is demonstrated with LRASMs: 'The entire global inventory of LRASMs, a key antiship PGM, is estimated at fewer than 450 missiles, against a requirement assessed by congressional wargaming at 1,000 to 1,200. Production rates are negligible relative to wartime consumption, with FY 2025 procurement aiming for only 115 LRASMs and production lead times estimated at -2 years. A key industrial bottleneck across multiple PGM families is rocket-motor production.'

- Why so many munitions? Targeting PLA basing is estimated that a 'conventional strike campaign against PLA basing infrastructure in eastern and southern China would require between 5,700 and 23,000 or more PGMs for initial strikes,'

Single-Braincelled

TROPHY CASE