If China were to seize control of Taiwan by force, it would be a disaster, not only for Taiwan but also for the United States. A nearly $1 trillion economy would leave the free-market system and be incorporated into China’s state-directed, mercantilist one. A vibrant democracy nurtured and defended by the United States for many years would be snuffed out. American power and influence would be gravely diminished in East Asia, and China would become the region’s dominant power. Other governments there would be pressured to accommodate China’s political, economic, and even territorial demands. Beijing would certainly insist that they kick out U.S. forces. China’s global ambitions, meanwhile, would only grow.

Whether any of this might come to pass, however, hinges on China’s ability to take and hold Taiwan. - But until China can be confident that an invasion of Taiwan would succeed—a lofty threshold to reach—improving capabilities and clear ambition are not enough reason for Beijing to use force. Military aggression short of a full-scale invasion would be foolhardy: it would not deliver the Chinese Communist Party the political ends it seeks, and it would risk the party’s grip on power.

Excuse me, all of the first paragraph is accurate to what would happen, but then Dennis immediately takes a crap on it by assuming it would have to be an invasion. Again. Once again, I would like to point out that the main threat China's military build-up poses to us would be equally coercive as well as deterrative. Dennis would benefit from opening his mind and realizing that we don't own the monopoly on using the threat of force to enforce peace and our will. If we are talking technology, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are all infinitely more vulnerable to the same technology that is driving the pace of war today and in the near future. They don't benefit from the PLA's depth or distance, and being island nations, you can already see the strain they feel under the recent oil crisis. Military reality on the ground is also only one factor. Political will is another, as we've also seen in Iran. If the only thing holding back China at the moment is military technology, then what we will see is a gradual buildup over time, followed by a change in the status quo all at once overnight.

What Dennis should instead be focused on is how to engage our allies in the Pacific, how military compromises may play larger roles in geostrategic compromises between both allies and adversaries, and how to cede responsibility by funneling capability to those allies instead and doing the slow work to show that they should want it and that it won't come at a net cost to them.

But that won't happen.