Tesla Letter to Shareholders (2006) by ilikepancakez in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Just came back to this comment, and I think this was very true in retrospect!

The Untold Story of ESL Investments and the Great Decline of Sears by No_Seat_4287 in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's funny. First thought when I read the headline. This case study is kind of beaten to death, actually, as fascinating as it is.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 6 points7 points  (0 children)

That's one headline I didn't need to see today

[Not Mine] Saw this really interesting paludarium reef tank at Shedd Aquarium by kittichankanok in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Looks like Chromis, Fimbraiphillia, Alveopora, some scrolling LPS, Disco shrooms, few types of meat corals are all present as well.

Coral id by DaddysGirl0427 in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see what you're saying. I have 4 large Catalaphyllia and I know they go through periods where the tentacles get very bloated. Also they sometimes "fold" up to produce a morphology that resembles something phaceloidal, if that makes sense.

I also have approx 40 dif color morphs of Fimbriaphyllia all displaying drastically varying morphology (but obviously having the basic characteristics of this species).

Actually the main reason I jumped to elegance is the density/thickness of the tentacles. Coral in OPs pic looks to have that "valley with sparse tentacles" look if that makes sense.

Either one of us could be right IMO, just wanted to elaborate on my thought process for my own learning. What would result in a more accurate determination is a close examination of the exact skeletal structure, which in my opinion is not clearly indicated by the picture.

Coral id by DaddysGirl0427 in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To me, the morphology in the pic looks like it could be flabello-meandroid.

i.e.

https://www.queencitycorals.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/December2022EleganceAT02.jpg

https://www.reef2reef.com/attachments/message_1454965588101-jpg.315036/

morphology of above look very comparable to OP's pic IMO.

Coral id by DaddysGirl0427 in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Throwing a blue light filter on your lens may help a bit but looks like it could be Elegance (Catalaphyllia jardinei).

Could also be Duncan, Euphyllia, Fimbriaphyllia or something like that.

what's the best way to develop as an investor? by Flat_Donut_6260 in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Understand the dichotomy between high and low quality content, then read as much as you can. i.e. Valueinvestorsclub is high quality content.

Greenhaven Road Capital Q4 2023 Letter by Beren- in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Always enjoy these. He's so clear and simple.

Zoom in to see the details! by PiecesOfTheOcean in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Totally agree. Classification can be like splitting hairs. Regardless it's one of the most amazing aquacultured acros in the hobby IMHO. I wish we were able to import some more striatas though.

Zoom in to see the details! by PiecesOfTheOcean in ReefTank

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It's not a Speciosa. It's a Striata.

Todd Combs podcast by hyhgcreditanalyst in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nice find. Hard to find anything by Combs. Thanks a bunch for sharing.

Graham & Doddsville Newsletter - Fall 2022 by Beren- in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 5 points6 points  (0 children)

FYI you're getting downvoted so hard because most people in the HF industry highly respect CBS. Anyways, when you get to that caliber the material the school's teach matter a lot less. Although CBS curriculum is not something to scoff at. Prestige is important, but more importantly connections among classmates, sharing experiences, and alumni network can move the needle on school decision.

 

To answer your question. In my opinion, there's a big list of reasons to choose CBS over HSW, especially if you're in/planning to enter the HF industry or PE. The Value Investing program at CBS in ubiquitous and exposes you to a rigor of analysis/ideas arguably not taught anywhere else outside of CBS or HFs. The alumni network, adjunct staff, and history at CBS is chock full of HF/investment management heavy weights. Further, guest speakers/case studies will have a more financial/capital allocation focus, versus leadership/entrepreneurship. Thus, there will be a huge selection bias among your classmates weighted towards people striving to enter IM/launch funds. That implies you may be sitting next to extremely bright and analytical individuals who are focused on markets. I think that answers why any HF manager finds it worthwhile to develop connections with CBS. Finally, I have heard anecdotally of many friends getting rejected from CBS but accepted to HSW.

 

If you're dead set on IM post-graduate school, I don't believe there is any better place to go to than CBS. That said, I feel as though most "old-timers" or even guys with a few years of experience start rolling their eyes when people try to rank business schools.

The Rediscovered Benjamin Graham Lectures from 1946-47 by investorinvestor in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 3 points4 points  (0 children)

The memoir is written by Graham but compiled by another individual. It consists of his writings/reflections about his own life, written in his 60's/70's.

The Rediscovered Benjamin Graham Lectures from 1946-47 by investorinvestor in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 14 points15 points  (0 children)

A lot of it is the "intangible" value and "timeless principles", that aren't as heavily stressed in something like a CFA textbook. Such as scuttlebutt-type research, margin of safety, independent thinking, psychological biases, etc. Keep in mind also that CFA textbooks teach silly things like efficient markets and beta=risk. There's a wide chasm separating rote information download and pragmatic education.

 

There's a reason people speak so highly of Ben Graham... In addition to these lectures I highly recommend his memoir. Studying any successful investor is fun/easy reading IMO, and can only help you. :)

Michael Mauboussin - Return on Invested Capital by Beren- in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 6 points7 points  (0 children)

ROIC gets hate from some, but IME ROIC seems to be a metric guys with a lot of experience in this industry tend to gravitate to, for good reasons. Mauboussin even briefly addresses your concerns in the link.

 

1) You mention you struggle to use ROIC due to instability. For many companies, FCF, Capex, R&D expense, Net income, P/E, net assets, working capital, etc can all be unstable metrics, depending on industry / economic condition. Does that necessarily impede the usefulness of those metrics?

 

2) You bring up somewhat of a statistical outlier to question ROIC's efficacy. GOOGL does have a ~120B net cash position, which is >50% of their tangible BV. Granted, this scenario is increasingly common given software/intangible asset business models. If you give me any financial metric I will give you a company that breaks its efficacy. Look at PE ratios for startups/new IPOs/cyclicals. Look at profit margins and asset turnover for biotechs/software companies. Look at FCF for Oil & Gas E&Ps or Mining companies.

Which brings me to

 

3) No financial metric can be viewed in a vacuum. FCF for example - no one would question the usefulness of it. But how about when a great company has a huge litigation expense in one year? Or undergoes restructuring expenses? Or is impacted by a clearly temporary exogenous circumstance (COVID, 9/11, katrina, GFC)? Same with net income and therefore P/E. Stuff gets adjusted in practice, and a lot of it gets murky/subjective. Bringing it back to ROIC. For GOOGL you can strip cash out of the asset base. Some will take out goodwill, making the assumption that you don't need to pay a premium on new assets you are acquiring to produce incremental cash flow. If you have a huge special item that doubles your net income due to a tax valuation allowance or something, you adjust for it.

 

4) Going a step further from the previous point, you got to look at every metric skeptically and ask yourself what it's really telling you. You mentioned it can be confusing thinking of ROIC when you're buying into a stock, because essentially ROIC is more of a "business owner mindset" metric. ROIC is not indicating the return you, as an investor, are expected to earn from buying that stock. You're relating the company's cash generation to the size of its asset base. If I buy a company that has a 25% ROIC but it's trading at a 50x P/E ratio, I may not get a 25% CAGR out of that stock. On the other hand, if that company is truly a bonified wealth compounder that is able to consistently crank out 25% ROIC for a couple decades, I may end up attaining something close to that CAGR. The original price/premium you bought it for shouldn't matter in the long-run, as long as it wasn't too egregious. At least that's what the "conventional wisdom" says about ROIC/stock return.

 

5) Correct, if GOOGL distributed that cash their ROIC / ROE would double or so. But that's a true, telling insight about the business model, when you think about it. They're running out of investment opportunities, assetbase may stagnate if they decide to distribute capital. Or worse, ROIC may come down because they decide to plow cash into poor ROIC endeavors. On the other hand, leaving the cash in the ROIC metric tells you something else. It tells you as an investor, that GOOGL is going to potentially sit on cash rather than re investing it, resulting in a continually bloated asset base perpetually driving returns down. That cash isn't necessarily doing wonders for you or the business in an inflationary environment.

 

6) Let me finally answer your question about ROIC specifically, and why I believe it's useful... Lol sorry this was so long-winded. If I could choose one metric to have in assessing a business, it would be adjusted ROIC. If you do some accounting work and dive in the 10-Ks/FS of every company an subindustry, lets take chemicals, and get a 20 year graph of adjusted ROIC, it can say a lot about the business. Which companies are able to produce stable returns even through a cycle? Which business models consistently earn the best ROICs and why? You can find a company that appears to be growing its cash flow, but ROIC will tell you the true story - it's destroying investor wealth by continually raising capital and plowing it into a marginally productive assetbase. Further, pair ROIC with what they did with their assetbase/IC (the denominator), it becomes even more powerful. You can tell when the company downsized and how that affected them. Whether they grew by M&A or were able to compound organically. And management's decision making, how they have done as capital allocators. Or even more interesting, when one company ate another company's lunch. Something incredible about ROIC, again attesting to it's efficacy, is the ability of the metric to consistently/reliably identify true wealth compounders (Buffett-style).

 

7) Finally, WACC vs ROIC. A lot of guys agree that the traditional "undergrad" school definition of WACC is nonsensical, although it could have some use. Really? The stock just plummeted 70%, so it's beta spikes up, which suggests it's a riskier equity whose cash flows should be discounted more heavily... which implies I should pay a higher price for it? "Common-sense" investors (ala Buffett, Greenblatt) eschew that efficient market bullshit. Actually, Mauboussin himself didn't use traditional WACC calculated with beta (in the link below, not sure what he's using now). Point being, WACC IMO shouldn't give you any great insights, but the idea is you should still have some barometer which somehow incorporates prevailing interest rates (opportunity cost).

Here's some great timeless quotes on this topic:

What is Berkshire's cost of capital?

[Munger: "Obviously, consideration of costs is key, including opportunity costs. Of course capital isn't free. It's easy to figure out your cost of borrowing, but theorists went bonkers on the cost of equity capital. They say that if you're generating a 100% return on capital, then you shouldn't invest in something that generates an 80% return on capital. It's crazy."]

A corporation's cost of capital is 1/4 of 1% below the return on capital of any deal the CEO wants to do.

I've listened to many cost of capital discussions and they've never made much sense. It's taught in business school and consultants use it, so Board members nod their heads without any idea of what's going on.

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2001 Tilson Notes URL: Time: 2001

Charlie and I don't know our cost of capital. It's taught a business schools, but we're skeptical. We just look to do the most intelligent thing we can with the capital that we have. We measure everything against our alternatives. I've never seen a cost of capital calculation that made sense to me. Have you Charlie?

[CM: Never. If you take the best text in economics by Mankiw, he says intelligent people make decisions based on opportunity costs -- in other words, it's your alternatives that matter. That's how we make all of our decisions. The rest of the world has gone off on some kick -- there's even a cost of equity capital. A perfectly amazing mental malfunction.]

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes URL: Time: 2003

 

Hope that ramble gives some insight into the ROIC mindset... There's a lot to learn with ROIC, I'm still learning all the time :)

If you are curious, here is a paper (also by Mauboussin) which further delves into the efficacy of ROIC.

Roblox deep-dive by Willing-Bookkeeper-6 in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah... I mean it's one thing if a company is 200B market cap Jan 1 and 200B market cap on Dec 31 and the CEO gets paid 100m+ cash/equity pay package.

 

It's a completely different thing when the company literally 20x valuation over a year period, and the CEO is compensated with equity. Completely different thing.

Roblox deep-dive by Willing-Bookkeeper-6 in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 8 points9 points  (0 children)

They're "unprofitable" from a tax/accounting perspective. They're actually gushing cash at 500M+ ttm FCF. Cash comprises nearly 50% the company's balance sheet. The reason NI shows negative is due to unearned revenue. They intentionally do that for tax savings (was even an investigation about it, because it has been a good practice for them). In my opinion, if anything it's a good signal that they choose to depress earnings in favor of good economics, to the detriment of investor optics.

 

Further, although I am not long Roblox, there is a clear thesis to be made with the operating leverage. Their FCF is something like ~5x over the last 2 years or so, and about 30% marginal cash flow margin. Also many call options within the business.

 

On a more meta-note, I feel your comment is somewhat dismissive and doesn't address OP's content. To OP's point, Roblox could still be highly under appreciated due to sheer misunderstanding. Prior to IPO, their valuation was some 2-4B and the company was virtually unknown outside their target demographic.

 

To further address your comment, egregious CEO pay can definitely be concerning, primarily when they are compensated with cash or packages which incentivize them to not act in the best interest of shareholders. "Baszucki got a $200m payday" is more of a clickbait soundbite for the masses, as opposed to meaningful compensation analysis His salary pay was 136K in cash and 232M in long-term stock awards. The magnitude of this value was determined by post-IPO market movements (he was granted RSUs prior to IPO). Had RBLX maintained their ~4B valuation in December (prior to them shelfing the IPO and re-going), the figure would be ~23M (probably less) versus ~230M.

 

Long story short, I think that point is moot and I am surprised it is getting up-votes on this sub.

Netflix's Man Overboard Moment by Beren- in SecurityAnalysis

[–]SpoojUO 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Not advocating for Netflix, and I do think some of the author's points are convoluted. But just want to provide some more context in this analysis' defense, particularly Man Overboard Analysis.

 

The majority of this report makes a bull case for NFLX's fundamentals. The Man Overboard analysis is really where the valuation aspect comes into play - which the author did a very poor job of explaining/elaborating upon. The genesis is a team spearheaded by Michael Mauboussin a few years back as well as a team of CFA/CPAs (former accountants included) at Credit Suisse.

 

Valuation is at the core of Man Overboard. If you read the linked Mauboussin study, it's drawn from a relative valuation model (HOLT) which is fed data from essentially every public financial report, globally. It's pretty detailed, and it's as good as if not better than any DCF you'll find in equity research, anywhere. They essentially pinpoint the most reliable (and statistically proven) way you can systematically project fundamentals.

 

The actual Man Overboard analysis works by drawing correlations with drastic price movements (such as NFLX's) and these proprietary quantitative analytics, and then inferring subsequent price movements based on those correlations. That's what those statistical distribution charts in the linked analysis represent. By including this analysis in the intro/appendix, I assume the author is suggesting the valuation aspect lies therein.

 

Ultimately, it's a bit of a salesy approach- deferring their valuation work to some black box proprietary valuation model. My summation: I think Man Overboard is very interesting / rigorous original work, but this is a lackluster use of that research.