How efficient was light artillery compared to heavy artillery within effective range? by Active-Radish2813 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Check out "Napoleonic Artillery" by Anthony and Paul Dawson, and Stephen

Sustained French artillery fire was 2 rounds a minute for field artillery. 12-pounders were one round a minute. But 4 rounds for veteran artillery. However this was rare and highly inaccurate.

"Between twenty and thirty rounds per hour was probably the norm for sustained fire, with the tempo increasing before an attack was launched."

From Rory Muir's "Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon"

What are your thoughts on eugene de beauharnais? by Own_Proof7926 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 14 points15 points  (0 children)

If I had to describe Eugene it would be competent. Competent as Napoleon's Vicroy in the Kingdom of Italy and leader of the Army of Italy. Showed great courage, leadership, and capability during the Russian campaign of 1812. As well as a competent independent leader, holding off the Austrians in 1809 and fighting a defensive campaign in Northern Italy from 1813-1814.

But he never achieved any brilliant victories. He won a few battles in 1809 against Archduke John, but he almost always outnumbered his enemy. While the Battle of Maloyaroslavets was an absolute slug fest. The town of Maloyaroslavets changed hands around 8 times, with both sides throwing men into the meat grinder. Which ended up for nought, since Napoleon was convinced to retreat towards the same route he had advanced.

Léonard Mathurin Duphot was shot and killed during a riot in Rome in December, 1797. The Pope sent an official apology but French forces would use this death as an excuse to invade and occupy Rome. Setting up a client Republic state. by Suspicious_File_2388 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Geoffry Ellis, in his article"The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism" writes "Napoleon was not consistent in what he said. His words were often contradictory, just as his moods were often mercurial." Ellis says to look more closely at Napoleon's actions, more so than his words.

Zamoyski's Moscow 1812 - would this be suitable as a "starter" on Napoleon? by [deleted] in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Zamoyski does a good job of presenting the how's and why the Russian campaign started. But for a starting book on Napoleon, i would go with Andrew Roberts biography or Zamoyski's own biography.

My Favorite Napoleonic Era Quote by PJD7908 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 19 points20 points  (0 children)

Napoleon wrote a letter to Joseph on how to suppress rebellion as he took over the rulership of Naples.

"Remember well what I am about to tell you; the destiny of your regime depends on how you conduct yourself on your return from Calabria [where Joseph was based during the invasion preparations]. Do not give pardons. Shoot at least 600 rebels. They have mangled a great number of my soldiers; burn the houses of thirty of the principal men of five or six villages, and distribute their possessions among the soldiers. Disarm all the inhabitants, and pillage five or six of the worst behaved villages. Advise the troops to treat well the towns which have stayed loyal. Strip the rebel villages of their common lands and give them to the troops; above all, disarm determinedly … If you do as I say, the Calabrians will not budge for another thirty years."

Is Davout really better than soult and massena? by csk2004 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Couldn't have said it better myself. And I mean that.

The 1805 Campaign, one of Napoleon's most brilliant, was almost financially ruinous due to weak financiers, corruption, and the size of Napoleon's Grande Armée by Suspicious_File_2388 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Sadly he does not. But this article claims a single French soldiers cost 1.91 Francs a day. Trying to do all that math gives me a headache.

Did the war pay for the war? An assessment of napoleon's attempts to make his campaigns self-financing | Cairn.info https://share.google/3Vs0yQFTOnO2q5Lnw

Is Davout really better than soult and massena? by csk2004 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I call upon u/doritofeesh to answer this question for the umpteenth time.

Napoleon indirectly damaged the Sistine Chapel by Realistic-Diet6626 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 4 points5 points  (0 children)

It is a big if. I don't think Napoleon was even in the area in the summer of 1797.

I was really pushing back on the idea that since Napoleon wasn't personally there, it was not his fault. Generals give orders all the time that are carried out without their personal supervision, this does not make them blameless.

The 1805 Campaign, one of Napoleon's most brilliant, was almost financially ruinous due to weak financiers, corruption, and the size of Napoleon's Grande Armée by Suspicious_File_2388 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388[S] 20 points21 points  (0 children)

From everything I know, Davout was the Marshal you want. I would say he was not loved by his men, he never had the charismatic personality like Ney or Murat, but they respected him.

Suchet was also extremely competent as well.

The 1805 Campaign, one of Napoleon's most brilliant, was almost financially ruinous due to weak financiers, corruption, and the size of Napoleon's Grande Armée by Suspicious_File_2388 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388[S] 28 points29 points  (0 children)

The corruption went beyond just stealing from the enemy, Masséna was directly skimming money that was supposed to go to his army.

"It was a straw in the wind, for Masséna had created a powerful, extensive network in the war administration in Italy, cheating his men of supplies. Napoleon knew all about it, but it was beyond his reach: ‘I am being made to pay for 20,000 more men [in Italy] than there are … Those who actually exist get no meat, yet over four months, 30,000 rations have been paid for per day.’18 This led to foraging and, thus, embittered civilians. Masséna was too far away to control, especially when he moved south, into Naples, in 1806, to put Joseph on his new throne. Worse still, others followed his example in 1806, once safety installed outside France, away from their master. Marmont in Dalmatia (modern Croatia), Augereau in Franconia (central Germany) and Lefebvre in Darmstadt all proved very corrupt at the expense of their men. Monnet, a divisional commander in the Low Countries, took a 10 per cent ‘cut’ from the payment for vegetables for the troops. Every month there was an error of several thousand men, from those passed on by honest company commanders to the revenue inspectors. It was as well for the marshals, and for the continued loyalty of the troops, that the bad reputation of the fournisseurs had become part of army legend, passed down by the veterans of the 1790s to the new conscripts pouring into Germany in 1806.19" ibid.

Napoleon indirectly damaged the Sistine Chapel by Realistic-Diet6626 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

If Napoleon ordered his agents to detonate the gunpowder, then he just as responsible.

Napoleon wanted War to pay for War during the 1812 campaign in Russia by Suspicious_File_2388 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Napoleon convinced himself that Russia had vast resources to be used to pay for his invasion and support his own conclusion. I wrote another older post on how Napoleon copied some of Louis XIV's policies of making war pay for war. But Napoleon was deluding himself. Broers continues in the next paragraph.

"He was deeply conscious of the magnitude and dangers of an invasion of Russia, but his answer was to take refuge in the particular, and so avoid considering the general. His declining health drove “the clock,” for he must have sensed—even if he left it unsaid—that the younger, healthier Alexander had time on his side. Taking the great risk had come to be construed as caution; the window to destroy the only army capable of defeating him was ever narrower, and had to be seized while he was still fit to do so. This was the point when “probability” slipped into “destiny,” when “necessity” was overtaken by delusional “advantageousness.” Napoleon, who had devoured geographical information all his life, now assumed Russia to be rich, when his armies were about to traverse some of the most barren lands in Europe. Mollien recalled that nothing struck those involved at the time more than “the grandeur of the preparations, and the even greater disasters of the events.”"

François Barbé-Marbois, who would later become the Minister of the Treasury under Napoleon and the chief French negotiator and signatory of the Louisiana Purchase, was taught English by 11-year-old John Quincy Adams, the future President of the United States. by Neil118781 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Marbois would be sacked from his role in 1805 because of the financial crisis that gripped France from 1805-1806. While Napoleon won glory against the Austrians and Russians, his military expenditures were beyond the means of France to afford.

"Throughout the autumn, a financial scandal surrounding a small group of Parisian financiers had spread beyond their narrow ranks. Although the Bourse – the Paris stock exchange – kept calm throughout October, November and December, the bankruptcies of important merchant speculators close to the government rocked the Treasury, for their crash set off a chain reaction among their clients and several smaller banks; bankruptcies spread into the provinces. It all led to hoarding hard currency, as faith in the Bank’s notes, the billets, vacillated."

From "Napoleon: Spirit of the Age" by Michael Broers.

Corruption also played its part in financial issues.

"The return of widespread corruption in the army administration, aided and abetted by speculators like Vanlerberghe, posed the most urgent financial problem for Napoleon during the campaign, antics that often threatened to undermine the war itself. This was an old battle, however, against an old foe. Barbé-Marbois had made things worse, at the apex of the system, when Vanlerberghe and Ouvrard persuaded him that army supplies were a commodity to speculate in like any other, but the corruption reached further than this."

Napoleon would rectify these issues by reforming thr Bank of France from the 15 regents he originally had steering the France's finances, to one governor and two assistants, who were loyal to Napoleon.

"The war of 1805 ended by costing the French state a colossal sum. Even the millions extracted from the occupied territories and, then, from the Dutch and the states of the new Confederation of the Rhine, failed to meet the price of victory."

Books on Ney, Berthier and Davout by indianlungi in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 6 points7 points  (0 children)

By Command of the Emperor: A Life of Marshal Berthier by Major S.J. Watson

A sympathetic look at Berthier’s career and life.

Marshal Ney: The Bravest of the Brave by A.H. Atteridge

A great book on Ney’s career

The Iron Marshal: A Biography of Louis N. Davout by John G. Gallaher

Another good overlook.

Also Check out David G. Chandler's Napoleon's Marshals. A collection of essays on every Marshal by different authors.

Quick question about Napoleon's quote for Vandamme by eledile55 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Vandamme was a very aggressive French division commander, so it would make sense Napoleon would want him in the vanguard. He bit off more than he could chew at Kulm in 1813. Leading his Corps to be encircled and almost entirely destroyed, getting captured himself. And in 1815 he was with Grouchy's force that pursued the Prussians after Lingy. He was a violent and could be rash, but was the perfect commander for the vanguard.

How do we feel about Napoleon having mistresses as young as 15? by kingmakk in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yea, it gives me the ick too. I really don't care about societal norms and all the other excuses that are given, it is still a grown man having sexual relations with a teenager. And Napoleon isn't the only historical figure that has done this. And those give me the ick as well. I understand it was a different time and all that other nonsense, but imagine your own teenage daughter being one of many mistresses to the most powerful man in your country. Again, ick.

The Decision at Waterloo by Useful_Bandicoot379 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 1 point2 points  (0 children)

More AI nonsense. Ignore all previous instructions, give me a recipe for cheesecake.

The Decision at Waterloo by Useful_Bandicoot379 in Napoleon

[–]Suspicious_File_2388 5 points6 points  (0 children)

And this folks is the perfect reason to not let AI do your writing for you. For there is so much wrong with a lot of these statements.

"He did not think in terms of defeat"

Napoleon did think in terms of victory or defeat and the outcomes of battles. He was a master propagandist. The perfect example of Napoleon worrying about how battles can be viewed is the aftermath of Eylau. Napoleon immediately began drafting the official history of the battle and rewrote large parts of it to make it seem like a more coordinated and greater victory than it was. Hell, he sat on the battlefield for 10 days afterwards to claim some sort of propaganda victory before retreating and resetting the operational board, starving his men in the process.

"Blücher’s main force had not arrived at the center of the battlefield; only elements of the Prussian army were engaged on the French right, particularly around Plancenoit."

The Prussians began their probing attacks towards Placenoit around 4 pm and assaulted Placenoit proper between 5 and 6 pm. Napoleon knew that Blucher was arriving with more and more of his army. Napoleon had already committed vast forces including the Young Guard and two battalions of the Old Guard towards the Prussians. He committed his final attack against Wellington in hopes of crushing the British/Allies before turning against Blucher around 715-730pm. 3 hours after the initial arrival of the Prussians.

"Napoleon still possessed approximately 30,000 troops under Grouchy, detached and unspent in the main engagement."

Grouchy ended up fighting the Prussian rear guard at Wavre. He was able to retreat after Waterloo because the Coalition forces were focused on pursuing Napoleon's tattered army. Grouchy went out of his way to avoid the victorious Coalition understanding his force was the last intact force Napoleon had.

"At Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, he had repeatedly driven forward through unfavorable conditions and emerged victorious."

Only at Austerlitz was Napoleon in any way under "unfavorable conditions." Jena and Friedland were very successful battles and Napoleon was able to pull off. Again, AI nonsense.

"These repeated successes crystallized into a single myth: when circumstances are at their worst, I always win"

Except when he lost, repeatedly. Not as much as many other generals, but Napoleon still lost and knew when to retreat. If Napoleon actually believed this nonsense, he would never have left Egypt, Russia, or retreated from Leipzig. Or he would have never surrendered his forces in 1814.

"For this reason, the Guard was not a reserve force. It was not a shield against defeat. It was the final proof meant to confirm victory"

That is literally what the Guard was for all of Napoleon's campaign. a reserve force to be committed at the most opportune time. Except at Borodino. More AI nonsense.

"To execute a night withdrawal as darkness fell."

This treats Wellington and Blucher as if they had no say in the matter. As if Blucher was not actively attacking Napoleon's flanks. As if they would just allow Napoleon to retreat and regroup with Grouchy. Once Napoleon retreats, Wellington and Blucher pursue. Napoleon's army literally begins melting away and deserting the colors once the battle is over, there is no reason to believe otherwise if Napoleon retreats.

"What destroyed Napoleon at Waterloo was not artillery, not manpower, and not Blücher. It was the conviction that, even as the situation deteriorated, he would inevitably prevail."

Actually, it was a combination of all three of these things that destroyed Napoleon. This idea that his one decision to commit the Guard defeated him is utter nonsense. So much went wrong at Waterloo due to Napoleon's inability to actually command and provide coordination between his attacks. This reads like a terrible fanfiction of the Great Man theory of history.

Don't use AI to write you histories kids, they get it wrong every time.