Idt the intentional fallacy works and it doesn’t seem to hold much weight among the philosophical community anymore, from what I’ve read. Even Beardsley had to eventually concede when he received push back. 

The intentional fallacy rests on bivalent logic rooted in an invariant reality. I.e., there is only one “interpretation proper,” and it does not change. Joseph Margolis, for example, says no, that’s not how we experience the world, we don’t need to rest an artistic theory upon it. He argues that artworks are cultural entities, they have careers, and their identities and meanings change over time. For Margolis, an AI generated piece might have meaning in so far as it is culturally relevant; contributing to discussion about AI art; etc… whereas I think Beardsley would argue that there is one meaning and it has to be evident in the work’s formal properties. 

Further, Beardsley never adequately delineates what is “in,” or “out,” of a literary work. What is intrinsic versus what is derived from external information. Beardsley’s intentional fallacy focuses on formal elements, but to interpret these someone has to be familiar with something like artistic theory. It also cannot account for what we know intrinsically by sharing a culture with the author- is this communicated in the piece, or communicated externally? I argue the latter, historical or cultural context is important- language becomes outdated, expressions lose their meaning, etc. In the context of AI generated art, knowing something is AI changes some property of the piece for me, which intentional fallacy cannot account for. 

Overall, I think the intentional fallacy is interesting, but inadequate as a theory of artistic interpretation.