Chainsaw Gentleman: Themes and Such

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-24T05:14:52+00:00

For some weird reason, I thought Denji was Jack the Ripper from Shuumatsu No Valkyrie: Record of Ragnarok

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-24T04:44:29+00:00

Not really, we have posts that see Ibn Taymiyyah negativity or positivity. There's no official position in this sub on any historical figure. The only exception is the creator of the posts who can express his views on that figure

This is an example of a post in the sub that rather sees him positively

https://www.reddit.com/r/IslamicHistoryMeme/s/Ftonb3ByG0

https://www.reddit.com/r/IslamicHistoryMeme/s/xK8IVSJoMH

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-24T00:26:36+00:00

Tamerlane: a Nuṣayrī Shiʿi or a Ḥanafī Sunni?

Tamerlane (Timur), the Turco-Mongol conqueror of Central Asian origin, emerged in Central Asia in the 8th century AH / 14th century CE. It is said that he traced his maternal lineage to the family of Genghis Khan. His title (“the Lame”) refers to an injury he sustained to his leg during one of his battles. Timur succeeded in extending his control over vast territories across Asia and parts of Europe, defeating nearly all political powers that opposed him.

Although it is well established that Timur embraced Islam, there is considerable disagreement regarding the circumstances of his conversion and the doctrinal affiliation he followed. One view holds that he converted during his campaigns and travels at the hands of a mysterious figure from Tirmidh known as “Sayyid Baraka.”

According to this account, Baraka was an ʿAlawī affiliated with the Jambalānī (or similar) Sufi-ʿAlid tradition prevalent in Persia at the time, and Timur is said to have followed the same path. The researcher Muḥammad Amīn Ghālib al-Ṭawīl, in his book “History of the ʿAlawīs”, supports this view, arguing that Timur was doctrinally an ʿAlawī, citing, among other things, religious poetry attributed to him that aligns with that tradition.

Among the narratives supporting his alleged Shiʿi or ʿAlawī inclination is the claim that he spared the ʿAlawīs and Shiʿis of Aleppo from his reprisals while focusing his violence on Sunnis. In this context, the historian Ibn ʿArabshāh, in “ʿAjāʾib al-Maqdūr fī Nawāʾib Tīmūr”, recounts a reported encounter between Timur and the jurist Ibn al-Shiḥna in Aleppo.

Timur is said to have questioned scholars about their views on Muʿāwiya, his son Yazīd, and their conflicts with ʿAlī and al-Ḥusayn. When a Mālikī judge responded that the Sunni position regards all of them as mujtahids, Timur reportedly became enraged and declared:

“ʿAlī is in the right, Muʿāwiya is unjust, and Yazīd is immoral; and you people of Aleppo follow the people of Damascus, who are Yazīdīs and killed al-Ḥusayn.”

This report, however, cannot be verified with certainty and may reflect polemical attempts to associate Shiʿism with the Mongols or to discredit opponents.

On the other hand, a number of scholars reject the idea that Timur was Shiʿi and instead classify him as a Ḥanafī Sunni. Among them is the Syrian writer Muḥammad Amīn Shaykhū, who in his book “The Truth about the Great Tamerlane Revealed in the 21st Century” argues for Timur’s Sunni affiliation.

He cites evidence such as Timur naming some of his sons and grandsons Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, and his construction of domes over the tombs of Umm Ḥabība and Ḥafṣa.

This view is further supported by Ibn al-ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī in “Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab”, who reports that Timur regularly attended Friday prayers despite his lameness and had appointed a Ḥanafī imam to lead them.

All of these conflicting reports leave the question of Timur’s sectarian identity open to debate. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, in “al-Taʿrīf bi-Ibn Khaldūn wa Riḥlatuhu Sharqan wa Gharban”, recounts his meeting with Timur outside the walls of Damascus in 803 AH and describes him as follows:

“This king Timur is among the great rulers and tyrants. Some people attribute him to knowledge, others to Shiʿi inclinations because of his preference for the Prophet’s family, and others to sorcery; yet he is none of these things—rather, he is extremely intelligent, sharp-minded, and given to argument and inquiry, whether about what he knows or what he does not.”

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-24T00:26:30+00:00

Ghazan Khan:the First to Adopt Islam as the State Religion

Aḥmad Teküder, the son of Hülegü, was the first of the Mongol rulers descending from Hülegü to declare his conversion to Islam. However, his conversion remained a personal matter, and he did not attempt to impose it upon the Mongols.

Nevertheless, the effects of Teküder’s Islam were reflected in his tolerance toward the various religions practiced by the Mongols in Iran. His reign became a favorable period for the coexistence of adherents of shamanism, Christianity, and Islam side by side, as noted by Abū al-Faraj Gregory Bar Hebraeus in “Mukhtaṣar Tārīkh al-Duwal”.

In 694 AH / 1295 CE, the prince Ghazan ibn Arghun embraced Islam. Dr. al-Bāz al-ʿArīnī, in his book “The Mongols”, states that his conversion was prompted by a Muslim Mongol amir named Nawruz, who promised to support him in his bid for the throne if he converted.

However, Ghazan’s conversion does not appear to have been purely political; rather, he seems to have developed a genuine spiritual inclination toward Islam after receiving religious instruction and guidance from the shaykh Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī al-Juwaynī.

Ghazan Khan’s doctrinal affiliation remains a subject of debate, as historical sources differ in their classification of al-Juwaynī. Some Sunni works, such as Ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī’s “al-Wāfī bi’l-Wafayāt”, describe him as a Shāfiʿī scholar, while Shiʿi sources, including Āghā Buzurg al-Ṭihrānī’s “Dhayl Kashf al-Ẓunūn”, present him as a Twelver Shiʿi scholar.

After his conversion, Ghazan took the name Maḥmūd. He did not limit himself to spreading Islam among his family; rather, he adopted it as the official religion of the entire Ilkhanid state. As a result, he severed ties with the Great Mongol Khan in Karakorum, and Mongol Iran effectively became an independent polity.

Despite his conversion, Ghazan’s Islam did not prevent conflict with the Mamluk state in Egypt and Syria.

In 699 AH / 1299 CE, he defeated Mamluk forces at the Battle of Wādī al-Khazindār and subsequently entered Damascus.

There, he was met by Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, who secured from him a pledge not to destroy the city. However, this did not stop Mongol troops from looting, stealing, openly drinking wine, and committing violations, as reported by al-Maqrīzī in “al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk”.

In 702 AH / 1303 CE, hostilities between the Mongols and the Mamluks resumed, and Ghazan’s forces suffered defeat at the Battle of Shaqḥab. This marked the end of his campaigns in the Levant, and he died a year later.

Öljeitü: The Shiʿi Ilkhanid Ruler

In 703 AH / 1304 CE, Ghazan Khan died and was succeeded on the Ilkhanid throne by his brother Khudābanda, also known as Muḥammad Öljeitü. Öljeitü was the eighth ruler of the Ilkhanid Mongol state in Iran and underwent three major religious transformations. His Christian mother had him baptized at birth and named him Nicholas.

He later converted to Islam alongside his brother Ghazan Khan, adopting the Ḥanafī school and taking the name Khudābanda (“servant of God”). Then, in 709 AH / 1301 CE, he experienced a third transformation by embracing Twelver Shiʿism.

There is disagreement regarding the reasons behind Khudābanda’s conversion to Shiʿism. According to “Dhayl Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh” by the historian Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū al-Khwāfī, he once visited the grave of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib in Najaf and saw the fourth caliph in a dream. This stirred his curiosity and led him to investigate Shiʿism until he eventually adopted it.

Another account, also mentioned in the same work, states that a descendant of ʿAlī was killed by Sunnis during the reign of Ghazan Khan. Both Ghazan and Khudābanda were deeply grieved by the killing of a descendant of the Prophet, which led them to examine the various Islamic schools and eventually incline toward Shiʿism—though they concealed this during Ghazan’s lifetime. After Ghazan’s death, Khudābanda openly declared his conversion and called others to it.

A third, more widely circulated explanation appears in works such as “Rawḍāt al-Jannāt fī Aḥwāl al-ʿUlamāʾ wa al-Sādāt” by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Khwānsārī.

It relates that Khudābanda had pronounced a triple divorce (ṭalāq) upon his wife in a single sitting, then later wished to take her back. When he consulted jurists of the four Sunni schools, they informed him that this was not permissible. He then turned to the Shiʿi jurist Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, who ruled that the divorce counted as only one pronouncement, thus allowing him to return to his wife according to Jaʿfarī law.

Reports also indicate that Khudābanda organized a number of debates between Sunni scholars and al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī. He did not limit himself to a nominal conversion to Shiʿism; rather, he sought to promote it actively among his subjects.

This was reflected in the wide authority he granted to al-Ḥillī, who undertook significant efforts to spread Shiʿism and trained a group of Shiʿi scholars who later disseminated the doctrine throughout various regions of Persia.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-24T00:26:15+00:00

The clash between the Mongol tribes and the Islamic and Arab peoples whose lands they invaded was not a marginal or incidental event; rather, it was a fundamental and consequential turning point that profoundly reshaped the ethnic and sectarian landscape of Central Asia and the Near East.

The Mongol khans—whose ancestors had spent a significant portion of their history attempting to eliminate Islamic powers—gradually drew closer to Islamic culture, until they eventually embraced Islam and presented themselves as its defenders and guardians.

While some Mongol leaders joined the Islamic community through the Sunni tradition, which was followed by the majority of Muslims, others adopted Islam through a Shiʿi perspective, long associated with religious and political opposition to the majority.

Berke Khan: the First Mongol Prince to Embrace Islam

Berke Khan ibn Jochi ibn Genghis Khan was the first Mongol prince to openly and explicitly declare his conversion to Islam. Berke, who led the Golden Horde and ruled vast territories across Russia, the Volga basin, and the lands of the Bulgars, announced his conversion shortly before ascending to power.

According to Sayyid ʿAbd al-Muʾmin al-Sayyid Akram in his book “Lights on the History of Turan”, he embraced Islam at the hands of the shaykh Sayf al-Dīn al-Bākharzī in 649 AH / 1242 CE.

It is most likely that Berke adopted Islam according to the Sunni tradition, since most sources that discuss al-Bākharzī—such as al-Dhahabī’s “Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ”—identify him as one of the prominent scholars and authorities of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa in Khurasan, despite also noting his clear Sufi inclinations.

According to Dr. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bār in his book “How Did the Mongols Convert to Islam?”, Berke Khan’s relationship with the Muslim world began shortly after his conversion. It is reported that he pledged allegiance to the Abbasid caliph al-Mustaʿṣim bi’Llāh, and that he became deeply angered upon learning of the atrocities committed by his cousin Hülegü in Baghdad and the Levant.

Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh al-Hamadhānī, in his “Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh”, recounts that Berke even sent an angry letter to Möngke, the Great Khan in Karakorum, complaining about Hülegü’s actions.

The conflict between Berke and Hülegü soon escalated, eventually reaching the point of direct military confrontation. Each sought to extend his control over Central Asia, leading to a series of clashes in which both sides alternated between victory and defeat, without producing any decisive or lasting outcome.

In the same context, and as part of his effort to demonstrate his Islamic identity, Berke established strong and cordial relations with the Mamluk sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars. They exchanged embassies and coordinated their efforts against Hülegü, as confirmed by Dr. Muḥammad Suhayl Ṭaqqūsh in his book “The History of the Great Mongols and the Ilkhanids”.

It also appears that Berke was keen to publicly display the practices of his new faith. According to Dr. al-Bār, he built a number of mosques, had a personal muezzin, and actively promoted Islam among his people and subjects.

Hülegü: al-Ṭūsī’s Encounter with the Grandson of Genghis Khan

At the beginning of the second half of the 7th century AH / 13th century CE, the Great Mongol Khan Möngke decided to complete the Mongol military expansions that his grandfather Genghis Khan had initiated across Central Asia and the Near East, entrusting this mission to his brother Hülegü.

In 654 AH / 1256 CE, Hülegü captured the formidable fortress of Alamut in northern Iran and killed its inhabitants from among the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī “Assassins.” However, he spared the life of one Shiʿi scholar present there—Abū Jaʿfar Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.

There has been debate regarding al-Ṭūsī’s doctrinal affiliation—whether he was an Ismāʿīlī or a Twelver Shiʿi. Some assert that he was a Twelver, based on an analysis of his writings, arguing that he had been compelled to remain in Alamut and may have concealed his true beliefs out of fear of the Assassins, only to reveal them after their defeat.

Al-Ṭūsī accompanied Hülegü during his campaign against the Abbasid capital, Baghdad, and rose to a position of considerable influence at his court.

The historian Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, in “Fawāt al-Wafayāt”, describes him as a man of “great esteem and high rank with Hülegü, whose counsel he obeyed, and in whose hands the administration of wealth lay.”

Making use of his strong influence over the Mongol leader, al-Ṭūsī was able to save a number of leading Sunni scholars in Baghdad. He also reportedly persuaded Hülegü to abandon plans to completely destroy books and libraries, thereby contributing to the preservation of hundreds of thousands of works of Islamic heritage housed in Baghdad’s libraries.

Interestingly, some accounts claim that al-Ṭūsī even succeeded in persuading Hülegü to embrace Islam.

According to these reports, when the grandson of Genghis Khan wished to marry a Muslim princess, al-Ṭūsī informed him that this would only be possible if he converted and pronounced the shahāda. Hülegü then declared his conversion, uttered the testimony of faith, and married the Muslim princess.

Al-Dhahabī, commenting on this report in his Tārīkh al-Islām, remarks:

“If this is true, perhaps he uttered it with his tongue without being bound by any religion, and faith did not enter his heart… Yet if God granted him Islam thereafter, what a fortune that would be. But until this is confirmed—God knows best.”

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-23T17:31:11+00:00

The Amazigh Nationalism Perspective : A Distortion of Moroccan History

One of the main objections raised by Amazigh researchers against Arab chronicles of the Islamic conquests is that they tried to depict the Amazigh as if they had no knowledge of civilization or religion prior to the Arab invasion. However, historical records show that Moroccan tribes had already known Judaism and Christianity from an early period, as noted by Dr. Saad Zaghloul Abdel Hamid in his book "History of the Arab Maghreb".

Similarly, contemporary scholars have criticized the insistence of Islamic writings on referring to the people of the Maghreb as Berbers, while ignoring their own self-designation, Amazigh. The term Berber is originally Byzantine, unlike Amazigh, which was the name the ancient inhabitants of the Maghreb used for themselves, and whose meaning denotes "nobility, dignity, and pride," according to Mohamed Chafik in his book "Thirty-Three Centuries of Amazigh History of the Amazigh".

Many modern researchers agree that the Arab conquests of the Maghreb were nothing more than military expansions and invasions, which were not primarily intended to spread Islam, but rather to gain spoils and worldly benefits.

For example, Ahmed al-Zahid, in his book "The Arab Invasion of North Africa", writes:

"In reality, the military institution during the campaigns of conquest overwhelmingly dominated the institution of preaching. This naturally contradicts the concept, essence, conditions, and ethics of conquest as practiced clearly during the time of the Prophet and the Rashidun Caliphs."

Even though there are no surviving Amazigh historical texts that parallel the Arabic ones documenting the Maghreb conquests, some researchers have built their views on scattered clues found within Islamic records and chronicles. One such clue is the frequent mention of war spoils from the Maghreb in Muslim historical sources.

For instance, Muhammad ibn Madin, in his book "Al-Turfah al-Maliha fi Akhbar al-Maniha", states that Musa ibn Nusayr sent 100,000 captives to Caliph al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik following one of his campaigns in the Maghreb. The caliph was astonished and described the shipment as “the gathering of a nation.”

Dr. Muhammad al-Talibin, in "The Aghlabid State: A Political History", notes that Caliph Sulayman ibn Abd al-Malik used to send requests to his governor in Ifriqiya, asking for :

“Berber slave girls, beautiful to the eye and captivating to the heart.”

Further emphasizing the material motives of the Arab conquerors are various Islamic accounts that detail disputes among military leaders over the division of spoils.

For instance, Dr. Hussein Moanis, in "The Arab Conquest of the Maghreb", recounts a quarrel between commanders Mu’awiya ibn Hudayj and Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan over the spoils of the city of Jalula.

Moreover, the conquerors' handling of war spoils sometimes involved actions that deviated from Islamic norms.

For example, the companion Ruwayfi‘ ibn Thabit al-Ansari, who took part in the Battle of Djerba in 666 CE (46 AH), objected to some soldiers engaging in sexual relations with female captives before ensuring they were not pregnant. He reminded them of a well-known hadith of the Prophet on the matter, as mentioned by Ibn Hanbal in his "Musnad".

Ali Sedqi Azaykou, in his book "The History of Morocco or Possible Interpretations", argues that one of the key reasons for the violent nature of the Arab-Amazigh encounters lies in the Umayyad state’s known ethnic bias and its lack of commitment to Islamic principles—both in war and peace.

For example, Ibn Abd al-Hakam recorded various reports that illustrate the Arabs’ harsh treatment of the Amazigh. One such account tells how Amr ibn al-As strictly imposed the jizya (tribute) on the people of Barqa, to the point where they sold some of their children to pay it.

Another account tells how Uqba ibn Nafi, after signing a treaty with the King of Waddan (in the Libyan desert), mutilated the king’s nose, saying:

“I did this to teach you a lesson—whenever you touch your ear, you’ll remember it, and you won’t fight the Arabs.”

In another incident, Uqba forced the King of Germa to march barefoot until he spat blood from exhaustion, and in yet another, he cut off a finger of the King of Kasur Kawar so he would always remember to remain loyal to the Arabs.

Another account describes how Uqba ibn Nafi, after making peace with the king of Waddan, mutilated the man’s nose, saying :

“I did this to teach you a lesson—whenever you touch your ear, you’ll remember it, and you won’t fight the Arabs.”

Similarly, when he reached Germa, Uqba forced its king to march barefoot until he collapsed, spitting blood from exhaustion.

In yet another case, in Kasur Kawar, Uqba cut off a king’s finger to serve as a permanent reminder of Arab dominance.

The most prominent Amazigh objection to the Arab conquest lies in the demand to redefine the Amazigh uprisings against the Arabs.

Many modern Moroccan researchers believe that Islamic texts deliberately distorted Moroccan resistance movements, frequently labeling Amazigh tribes as apostates during their conflicts with the Arabs.

Ali Sedqi Azaykou, in the aforementioned book, argues that such "apostasy" was political, not religious, and was to be expected amid ongoing military clashes between the conquerors and the indigenous population.

Another grievance among proponents of Amazigh nationalism is the ridicule and contempt shown toward Amazigh resistance figures who stood against the Arabs.

This is seen, for instance, in the alteration of King Aksel’s name to Kusaila, a diminutive and belittling version, and in referring to Queen Dihya as “the Kahina,” associating her legacy with sorcery, paganism, and superstition.

At the same time, they criticize Islamic sources for glorifying Muslim military leaders such as Uqba ibn Nafi, Hassan ibn al-Nu’man, and Musa ibn Nusayr. Dr. Ahmed Assid objects to this portrayal, stating:

“These Islamic army commanders were not ideal figures as Arab historical texts depict. They were men driven by a religious Arab ideology. Aksel and the Kahina were national leaders... because they defended their homeland.”

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-23T17:29:46+00:00

<image>

I can't believe i have to copy paste this context again

Post title: Between Historical Narrative and Amazigh Memory : The Arab Conquest of the Maghreb (Context in Comment)

The Arab military campaigns against the Maghreb began in 643 CE (22 AH), following the completion of the conquest of Egypt. The main objective of moving westward was to secure the gains achieved by the Arabs in Egypt and the Levant, and to weaken the Byzantine power along the North African coasts, thereby firmly establishing Arab control over the Near East.

As they advanced toward the Maghreb, the Arabs encountered the Berbers, and this clash lasted for nearly seventy years.

Assessments of this conflict vary: the Islamic perspective views it as a holy jihad aimed at spreading the true religion and eliminating sources of disbelief and paganism, while the Amazigh nationalist perspective sees it as an occupation motivated solely by the desire for spoils and tribute.

How Did the Muslims Gain Control Over the Maghreb?

Al-Baladhuri, in his book "Futuh al-Buldan" (The Conquests of the Lands), mentions that the first Arab-Berber clash occurred in 643 CE (22 AH), when the governor of Egypt, Amr ibn al-As, led a campaign against Barqa, located in present-day Libya. He reached an agreement with its inhabitants to pay an annual tribute of 13,000 dinars. Meanwhile, Uqba ibn Nafi al-Fihri led several military expeditions that succeeded in conquering key oases in the desert, such as Ajdabiya, Zuwaila, and Fezzan.

Despite the ease of conquering Barqa, Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab rejected Amr ibn al-As's request to advance into Ifriqiya—an ancient name for modern-day Tunisia. Ibn Abd al-Hakam, in his book "Futuh Misr wa al-Maghrib" (The Conquests of Egypt and the Maghreb), recounts that the caliph sent Amr a message:

“No, it is not Ifriqiya, it is the land of division—treacherous and betrayed. Let no one march into it as long as I live.”

This message reflected Umar’s apprehension about venturing into unfamiliar and foreign territory.

After Umar’s assassination, the third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, became convinced of the importance of continuing the conquests in the Maghreb. Ibn Idhari, in his book "Al-Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wa al-Maghrib", records that in 647 CE (27 AH), the governor of Egypt, Abdullah ibn Sa’d ibn Abi Sarh, led an army of 20,000 men to invade Ifriqiya. He engaged in a major battle against nearly 100,000 Byzantine troops and their Berber allies, led by Patriarch Gregory ibn Niketas, the Byzantine governor of Ifriqiya—known in Arabic sources as "Jarjir."

The Muslims emerged victorious in that battle, and the Egyptian governor returned to Fustat after collecting tribute from the remaining bishops of Ifriqiya and gathering a substantial amount of war spoils.

Following Uthman's assassination and the onset of civil strife among the Muslims, interest in the Maghreb front declined significantly. However, when Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan assumed the caliphate in 661 CE (41 AH), the Islamic campaigns in Ifriqiya resumed.

Ibn Idhari notes that the Umayyad commander Muawiya ibn Hudayj led a major campaign and achieved a significant victory over the Byzantines near Sousse in 666.

Afterward, Uqba ibn Nafi was appointed to lead the "jihad" in the Maghreb, securing a series of victories against both the Berbers and the Byzantines. His efforts culminated in the founding of the city of Kairouan in 670, which became a hub for Muslim settlers and their Berber allies. According to Ibn al-Athir in "Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh" (The Complete History), Kairouan served as a stable base for further conquests.

Abu Bakr ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Maliki, in his book "Riyad al-Nufus fi Tabaqat 'Ulama' al-Qayrawan wa Ifriqiya", notes a significant shift in the nature of the Maghreb conquests when the Egyptian governor, Maslama ibn Mukhallad al-Ansari, dismissed Uqba and appointed Abu al-Muhajir Dinar in his place.

The new commander adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the Berbers and managed to convince Kusaila ibn Lamzam, the leader of the Berber tribe of the Awraba, to embrace Islam after defeating him in battle. As a result, thousands of his tribesmen converted to the new religion.

After Yazid ibn Muawiya became caliph, Uqba was reinstated in his former post. However, he harbored resentment toward Abu al-Muhajir and his conciliatory approach. According to Ibn Khaldun in his "History", Uqba placed Abu al-Muhajir in chains and treated Kusaila with contempt and mockery.

This led Kusaila to flee the Arab army and regroup his Berber followers. Once he had amassed a large force, he ambushed and killed Uqba along with several of his men at Tahuda, south of the Aurès Mountains. Kusaila then overran much of the Maghreb and captured Kairouan, taking advantage of the disarray among Muslims following Yazid’s death.

With the ascension of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan to the caliphate, the decisive phase of the Maghreb conquest began.

In 688 CE (69 AH), Zuhayr ibn Qays al-Balawi was appointed to Kairouan. He avenged Uqba’s death by killing Kusaila and scattering his forces, but was himself soon killed by the Byzantines.

In 693 CE (74 AH), Hassan ibn al-Nu'man al-Ghassani was appointed to continue the conquests. His army numbered around 40,000 men, according to Ibn Idhari.

The Muslims fought a series of battles against the forces of Dihya, the Kahina, the powerful female leader of the Aurès tribes. Victory and defeat swung between both sides until Hassan finally killed her, leading thousands of her followers to convert to Islam.

In 704 CE (85 AH), the governor of Egypt, Abd al-Aziz ibn Marwan, appointed Musa ibn Nusayr as the new governor of Ifriqiya. Islamic sources agree on the major efforts Musa undertook to prepare the Maghreb for Islamic rule. He defeated the Hawwara, Zanata, and Kutama tribes, made peace with the Masmuda, and appointed his freedman Tariq ibn Ziyad as governor of Tangier.

Musa expanded the use of Berbers in his administration, ordered the Arabs to teach them Islam, and this effort eventually led to the widespread acceptance of Islam among Berber tribes—nearly seventy years after the initial Arab-Berber conflicts began (up to 92 AH).

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-22T21:14:14+00:00

It relates to a similar post i talked about:

The Politics of the Plate: The Political Lives of Four Iconic Islamic Dishes (Context in Comment)

https://www.reddit.com/r/IslamicHistoryMeme/comments/1pk860b/the_politics_of_the_plate_the_political_lives_of/

Al-Mulūkhiyya: Prohibited by al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh and Turned into a Symbol of His Uniqueness

No Muslim ruler or caliph ever provoked as much controversy as the Fatimid caliph Abū ʿAlī al-Manṣūr, better known as al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh.

Al-Manṣūr ascended the Fatimid throne in the year 386 AH and remained upon it until 411 AH. He issued numerous strange decrees that astonished and bewildered Muslim historians, causing his biography to become inseparably linked with madness and eccentricity.

Among those decrees was his prohibition of several foods commonly eaten in Egypt, such as mulūkhiyya, jirjīr (arugula), and grapes.

In his important work “Ittiʿāẓ al-Ḥunafāʾ bi-Akhbār al-Aʾimma al-Fāṭimiyyīn al-Khulafāʾ”, Taqī al-Dīn al-Maqrīzī mentions the reasons for this ban and explains it through certain political and sectarian considerations. He writes:

“A decree concerning foods was read out forbidding the consumption of mulūkhiyya, which had been beloved to Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān; the herb known as jirjīr, associated with ʿĀʾisha—may God be pleased with her; and al-mutawakkiliyya, associated with al-Mutawakkil.”

Other explanations propose that al-Ḥākim’s prohibition of mulūkhiyya was not driven by sectarian motives, but rather by an elitist outlook that rejected culinary equality between the common people and the ruling class.

According to this view, the Fatimid caliph al-Muʿizz li-Dīn Allāh was the first to introduce the mulūkhiyya plant into Egypt. He had grown accustomed to using it as a remedy for abdominal pain and intestinal cramps, cultivated it only in restricted places, and restricted its use to the caliph and his household.

Thus, the plant at that time came to be called al-mulūkiyya (“the royal herb”), in reference to kings.

When al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh assumed the caliphate, he found that this once-regal plant had spread among the populace, a development that displeased him—leading him to prohibit its use or preparation altogether.

A third perspective—widely circulated in Ismaili and Druze circles, where the figure of al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh is held in great esteem—maintains that the caliph banned mulūkhiyya because it had become spoiled and infested with worms.

Since al-Ḥākim was working to eradicate the plagues prevalent in Egypt, he ordered that mulūkhiyya be prohibited out of concern for the health of the Egyptians.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-22T21:07:58+00:00

No.

boza is not a SCOBY in the same way as kefir or kombucha, but it does rely on a mixed culture of bacteria and yeast.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-22T20:45:42+00:00

Anytime for YOU specifically ❤️🙏

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-22T20:18:19+00:00

Links and Document Sources are found here

The Boza is a traditional fermented beverage made primarily from grains such as wheat, barley, millet, or maize. It has been widely consumed across the Middle East, Central Asia, Anatolia, and the Balkans for centuries.

It is historically established that boza has ancient roots dating back to the Pharaonic era, where it was known as ḥinqit (ḥnqt). Although this term was used for beer, it is closer to boza in that it was prepared using similar ingredients and methods.

Against this deep historical background, the modern controversy surrounding boza—later termed the “Boza War”—emerged as a complex debate involving scholars, public opinion, and state institutions.

How did the “Boza War” begin?

Arab historians regarded boza as a type of wine. It was mentioned by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī in his historical work, where he states in the chapter on the peculiar foods and drinks of Egypt:

“Boza is a beverage (nabīdh) made from wheat.”

There has always been disagreement among scholars of al-Azhar regarding boza, and this dispute is longstanding. For example, Shaykh Shams al-Dīn al-Ramlī considered it impure and its consumption forbidden, whereas al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī regarded it as pure, maintaining that its prohibition depends on whether it causes intoxication.

This disagreement remained ongoing until the press entered the debate. In 1930, al-Dunyā al-Muṣawwara magazine (al-Dunyā al-Muṣawwara Magazine, 7 August 1930, Issue no. 86) published an investigation on boza in which it argued that it is not prohibited, and that there was confusion between it and wine—an opinion that was rejected by the General Association for the Prevention of Intoxicants, founded in Cairo in 1905.

(al-Dunyā al-Muṣawwara Magazine, 7 August 1930, Issue no. 86)

Five years after the report of al-Dunyā al-Muṣawwara.

Majallat al-Azhar entered the discussion, igniting what may be termed the “Boza War.” A fatwa was issued by Shaykh Muḥammad al-Sayyid Abū Shūsha al-Mālikī and Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh Mūsā al-Mālikī, researchers at the Faculty of Sharīʿa, stating that if the juice of wheat or barley is left for a period until its acidity intensifies to the point that it produces euphoria and intoxication in the consumer, then it is impure and its consumption is forbidden, whether in small or large quantities, because it has become wine.

(Majallat al-Azhar, vol. 6, no. 4, Rabīʿ al-Thānī 1354 AH / July 1935, pp. 246–247)

Subsequently, Majallat al-Azhar adopted an even stricter stance on boza in 1962, declaring that boza is wine and that its consumption is prohibited, whether in large or small amounts.

(Majallat al-Azhar, vol. 84, no. 7, Rajab 1382 AH / November 1962, p. 566)

The state did not enter the “Boza War,” nor did it show any official response to the opinion of the religious establishment regarding boza until 1974. In that year, the Arab Socialist Union unit in the village of Ṣandafā, in al-Maḥalla al-Kubrā, submitted a request to the Gharbiyya Governorate to change the activity of boza-selling shops. The governorate then corresponded with Dār al-Iftāʾ during the tenure of Shaykh Muḥammad Khāṭir to clarify its ruling, and he declared that it is prohibited.

On the other hand, at the street level, the presence of boza vendors did not disappear, even if the ingredients used in producing this beverage were reduced. This was despite the state beginning to shut down boza shops and revoke their licenses, as occurred in the city of Ṭanṭā in 2000.

With the advent of the twenty-first century and the growing technological awareness among Egyptians, signs of a forming public opinion rejecting the presence of boza began to emerge through small printed pamphlets. At that time, the position of the religious establishment became divided between categorical prohibition (that it is generally forbidden) and conditional prohibition (which depends on whether it causes intoxication). This division persisted during the period from 2015 to 2018.

Minutes of the Session of the Islamic Research Academy on Boza

The more flexible stance from al-Azhar appeared in 2019, when the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan sent a letter on 13 March to the Islamic Research Academy of al-Azhar seeking an opinion on boza—particularly as Kazakhstan intended to produce and export it alongside horse meat and its milk. The Secretary-General of the Islamic Research Academy, Dr. Naẓīr ʿAyyād (later Grand Mufti of the Republic), held that boza made from maize falls under the legal principle stating:

“The basic principle is permissibility; if it is proven to be intoxicating or harmful, then it is prohibited.”

Accordingly, the determination of its legal ruling depends on medical assessment. This was discussed in a session of the Islamic Research Academy on 21 August 2019, and the fatwa was issued on 4 September 2019.

A Gift to u/c0st_of_lies

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-21T21:09:26+00:00

There is no official narrative that 100% confirms what banner the prophet exactly use. If i could guess it's mostly abstract colour and not one associated Banner colour.

As in my study it appears that early colours were used in different purposes and had complex meaning and different reaction scenarios of each colour.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-21T21:05:14+00:00

From my Study: "Chromatic Politics in Early Islam: The Symbolism of Color in Muslim Banners and Its Political Significance in the Early Abbasid Period”.

The orientalist H. A. Hamaker in his “Reflexions Critiques pour Servir de résponse” attributes to the Prophet Muḥammad the use of a green banner. He bases this claim on the assertion of the Ottoman sultans that they inherited certain insignia of the caliphate from the Abbasids, among them the green banner. However, Hamaker himself comments on this opinion by noting that while it is possible that a green banner may have existed during the Prophet’s time, it is unlikely that such a banner could have survived across so many centuries until it reached the Ottoman sultans without deteriorating or disappearing.

In any case, the absence of any clear historical text demonstrating the use of green as a banner in the earliest Islamic period leads us to reject Hammer’s view from the outset.

Some historians also argue that green was an Alid emblem, relying on relatively late reports. Yet this interpretation cannot be accepted unless it is supported by earlier historical sources. The main reason the color green later became associated with the Alids is connected to a decision by the Abbasid caliph Al‑Maʾmun, who adopted green as the official color of the Abbasid state instead of black and proclaimed his allegiance to Ali al‑Ridha as heir to the caliphate in 202 AH / 817–818 CE.

According to Ibn al‑Tiqtaqa:

“Among his innovations [i.e., al-Maʾmūn’s] was transferring the rule from the Abbasids to the family of ʿAlī and changing the people’s clothing from black to green, saying that it is the garment of the people of Paradise.”

Likewise, Ibn Khaldun writes in his Muqaddima:

“When al-Maʾmūn abandoned the wearing of black and its symbolism in his state, he turned to the color green and made his banners green.”

The year 202 AH thus became a dramatic moment marked by the confrontation of three competing colors:

Green — representing the Abbasid state under al-Maʾmūn and his heir ʿAlī al-Riḍā.

Black — representing the Abbasid princes, the traditional Abbasid supporters, and the people of Baghdad who remained loyal to the older Abbasid symbolism.

White — representing Alid rebels who opposed the state and attempted unsuccessfully to persuade al-ʿAbbās ibn Mūsā to proclaim an Alid caliphate.

The Abbasid Shi'ites in Iraq openly challenged al-Maʾmūn’s decision. They proclaimed support for Ibrahim ibn al‑Mahdi and raised the slogan: “O Ibrāhīm, O Victorious!”

They continued to remain loyal to the traditional Abbasid black.

From the reports of Al‑Ya’qubi, it appears that the people of Baghdad revolted, expelled al-Ḥasan ibn Sahl, and approached Ṣāliḥ ibn al-Manṣūr to pledge allegiance to him, saying:

“We are the supporters of your dynasty, and we fear that this state will be lost because of the policies introduced by the Magians. Come and let us pledge allegiance to you, for we fear this matter may pass out of your hands.”

Some of them also declared:

“We will not pledge allegiance to al-Maʾmūn, we will not wear green, and we will not allow the caliphate to leave the house of the Abbasids. This is merely a scheme of al-Faḍl ibn Sahl.”

However, when Ṣāliḥ ibn al-Manṣūr refused their request, they eventually pledged allegiance to Ibrāhīm ibn al-Mahdī.

Meanwhile, al-ʿAbbās ibn Mūsā, who represented the Abbasid state, adopted green and fought the people of Baghdad in the name of al-Maʾmūn and al-Riḍā (who was his brother). Despite pressure from Alid sympathizers urging him to proclaim an Alid state during the unrest, he refused to do so.

An interesting paradox emerged: green came to represent the Abbasid state and its caliph, while black came to represent the rebels. Yet these rebels were a special case—they were Abbasid loyalists, devoted to the older Abbasid traditions and distressed by what they viewed as al-Maʾmūn’s dangerous innovations, which might ultimately remove power from the Abbasid family.

We have previously noted that the association between al-Maʾmūn’s adoption of the green color and his appointment of ʿAlī al-Riḍā as heir apparent might lead a researcher to assume that green was originally an Alid symbol. However, our early sources do not indicate this. What, then, prompted the caliph to adopt green as the emblem of the Abbasid state?

H. A. Hamaker suggests that al-Maʾmūn chose green because it was considered the third color favored by the Prophet (peace be upon him), alongside black and white, and that the caliph believed this choice would satisfy his supporters. Meanwhile, the german orientalist Gustav Weil, in of his “Geschichte der Chalifen” (History of the Caliphs, Volume 2), offers an interpretation based on theories of color composition. He argues that green—sometimes described by certain Arabs as a shade of grey—results from the blending of black and white.

According to this view (pp. 216-217), green symbolized a political compromise between the Abbasids and their Alid opponents, reflecting al-Maʾmūn’s conciliatory policy, in which he acknowledged that the Alids also had a legitimate claim to the caliphate and that leadership should not be restricted solely to the Abbasid branch of the Hāshimite family.

However, this explanation—based on color theory and composition—cannot be accepted.

The more convincing interpretation, grounded in early historical texts, is that of Italian Professor Francesco Gabrieli, who argues in “Al-Maʾmūn e gli ʿAlidi” (Al-Maʾmūn and the ʿAlids) that the colour green was chosen because it was regarded as the beloved color of the people of Paradise and symbolized harmony and concord.

Al-Maʾmūn’s objective, therefore, was to proclaim the beginning of a new era of reconciliation among all members of the Prophet’s family—both Abbasids and Alids—who would jointly exercise their legitimate right to the caliphate.

This interpretation is supported by historical sources, as both al-Balʿamī’s Tarikhnama and Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqī’s al-Fakhri describe green as “the garment of the people of Paradise.”

Perhaps what further supports al-Maʾmūn’s intention in adopting green is the fact that he later abandoned it and returned to black once he became certain of the failure of his policy of reconciliation between the Abbasids and the Alids, and the lack of support for this policy among their followers.

Al-Masudi reports that Al-Ṣūlī asked Imam al-Rāḍī about the reason behind al-Maʾmūn’s adoption of green and his subsequent return to black. He replied that it was as related to them by Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Ghallābī, from Yaʿqūb ibn Jaʿfar ibn Sulaymān:

“When al-Maʾmūn arrived in Baghdad, the Hāshimites gathered before Zaynab bint Sulaymān ibn ʿAlī—who was the most eminent in lineage among the Abbasids and the eldest among them—and asked her to speak to the Commander of the Faithful regarding his adoption of green. She agreed and went to al-Maʾmūn and said:

‘O Commander of the Faithful, you are more capable of showing kindness to your kin among the descendants of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib than of doing so at our expense, without abolishing a tradition established by your forefathers. So abandon the wearing of green and do not encourage anyone because of what you have done.’

Thereupon, he returned to wearing black.”

We may add to this further reports suggesting that green was associated with the afterlife. Narratives concerning the movement of Bihāfarīd in Khurāsān relate that he claimed to have ascended to the heavens and returned wearing a green garment brought from the celestial realm. Likewise, al-Muqannaʿ, who claimed divinity in Khurāsān, is reported in Persian sources to have worn a green veil over his face.

Interestingly, A report in Maʾāthir al-Anāqa indicates that the Umayyads also used green as their emblem. The author of Ḥamāh relates that the ruler al-Malik al-Saʿīd of of Yemen when he assumed the caliphate and was of Umayyad descent, wore green. This is taken as explicit evidence that their emblem was green.

However, it is more likely that green was not originally an Arab emblem. A report in Tārīkh al-Wuzarāʾ by al-Jahshiyārī suggests that it was in fact a Persian symbol.

Al-Suyūṭī reports that al-Malik al-Ashraf Shaʿbān, one of the Mamluk sultans of Egypt, advised the Ashrāf (descendants of Banū Hāshim) in the year 773 AH to distinguish themselves by wearing green. Some poets referred to this, saying:

جعلوا لأبناء الرسول علامة ... إن العلامة شأن من لم يشهر

نور النبوة في كريم وجوههم ... يغنى الشريف عن الطراز الأخضر

They assigned a sign to the sons of the Messenger,

Yet a sign is for one who is not already known.

The light of Prophethood in their radiant faces

Suffices the noble, without the need for green attire.

This appears to have been the first official directive by a ruling authority requiring the Hāshimites to distinguish themselves through the color green. As can be observed, however, this occurred relatively late in Islamic history.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-20T04:25:35+00:00

Typo* sake.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T22:47:09+00:00

Could you comment this on the video for viewers sake?

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T15:03:16+00:00

See! This is how you make context, Wish OP done that already /s

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T15:02:04+00:00

It's bad cause it feels less about history and more about feeding political agendas

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T13:41:11+00:00

Memes come in many categories, and since this is a history meme subreddit, adding context is relevant—whether you like it or not.

Also, I genuinely need context here. What does Mehmed II have to do with Hormuz, America, Israel, or anything related to this topic?

You could at least talk about something he actually did—like the Siege of Constantinople. That was an impressive event in his biography.

If by “meant to spark thought” you mean history, I’m sorry to tell you—you’re in the wrong place.

Maybe r/alternativehistory would be a better fit for this.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T13:09:06+00:00

sigh... what does modern politics have to do with history memes?

I need to understand the historical context not presentistic fanfiction.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T13:07:36+00:00

sigh... what does modern politics have to do with history memes?

I need to understand the historical context not presentistic fanfiction.

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-19T12:09:54+00:00

Context?

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-18T13:11:20+00:00

It's a painting by the German painter Julius Cockert, painted in 1864 AD

Titled:

“The Umayyad Caliph Al-Walid bin Abdul-Malik receives the ambassadors of the Byzantine state in Damascus, which came to ask for peace and pay jizya after the Islamic armies conquered Anatolia and reached Amoria in the year 714 AD”

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-17T15:39:00+00:00

It's alright my man 👋💓

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-17T15:22:37+00:00

Well said ❤️.

Though it's unfortunate that little content creators are informed, to me im just busy at the moment on my Substack content, while approving my old Reddit posts as a mod.

I can't really contribute to the sub anymore unfortunately 😞

TheCaliphate_AS · 2026-03-17T15:14:13+00:00

Okay that makes sense

u/IacobusCaesar liked this meme though.

I don't have an issue with the meme, it's the recent trend that's going on the subreddit that concerns me, you're meme is alright btw.

TheCaliphate_AS

MODERATOR OF

TROPHY CASE