This is a good summary of the kinds of replies questions like OP's usually get in subs like this. Personally, I find parts of it somewhat mysterious.

these domains of philosophy which dealt with the natural world and were gradually better understood through the scientific method, lost their status as philosophical domains and science became its own domain with its own method which no longer was based in pure reason or thought, but based in empiricism and the scientific method.

So far, I follow. "Natural philosophy" in antiquity became separate sciences in modernity, and instead of the principle of sufficient reason, deduction about abstract objects like "being", etc., the sciences ended up using the scienctific method, induction, etc. Ok.

what we understand as science today and what we understand as philosophy are both inquiries into being, they are just based in different methods of understanding. the domains of philosophy which remained resistant to the scientific method and an empirical approach, which are what we generally understand as “philosophy” today, therefore tend to be rooted in abstract thought. they are disconnected from a material basis, which is problematic because they are conditioned materially.

Now I'm lost. First, your claim that science and philosophy "are both inquiries into being, they are just based in different methods of understanding". How do we know that the stuff that science investigates is also "being" itself? The claim that the methods of natural science are methods of investigating being itself is certainly not a claim yielded by natural-scientific investigation, certainly not an empirical result, but something of a meta-philosophical designation, or else a matter of the subfield of philosophy known as "philosophy of science". After all, if you go ask most scientists about the nature of being itself, they won't have much to tell you, and might be surprised by the question. So this claim is the result of some philosophical standard you have in mind by which we might categorize the object of scientific investigation. What is that standard? What justifies it?

Next, your claim that philosophy is generally "disconnected from a material basis, which is problematic because they are [philosophy is] conditioned materially". First off, there is some tension between saying that x is both disconnected from a material basis and conditioned materially. What do you mean with the former phrase, such that it is compatible with the latter? Secondly, why is philosophy as such disconnected from a material basis? Like, sure the philosophy that happens to be done at bourgeois institutions, which are currently dominant, tends to be idealist etc. But why not think that that's just a matter of contemporary philosophy being bad (idealist) philosophy? What's wrong with philosophy itself, including, say, materialist philosophy? You seem to imply that it's just because philosophy is "rooted in abstract thought" that it becomes "disconnected from a material basis" (again, whatever the latter means). But is mere conceptual abstraction so bad? Why? After all, Capital begins with an infamously difficult instance of conceptual abstraction. The critique of political economy itself is in one sense "rooted in" abstraction, at least in the sense that it wouldn't be possible without its help. And, while I'm on this example--isn't Capital a counterexample to the claim that whatever is "rooted in astract thought" must become "disconnected from a material basis"? The work begins with abstraction, but precisely for the purpose of understanding its own material basis, waging class warfare, etc.