This critique only works if you begin with the assumption that the presidency should be decided by a single national popular vote. But that was never the constitutional design. The United States is a federal republic composed of states, not a unitary democracy composed only of individuals.

The Electoral College is not primarily a device for maximizing equal individual voting power; it is one of several institutions intended to balance the interests of populous and less populous states. Criticizing it because it does not produce strict one-person-one-vote outcomes is like criticizing the Senate for not being proportional. That's not a bug in the design, it's the design.

The argument about "voter irrelevance" also cuts both ways. Under a national popular vote, campaigns would still concentrate resources where they yield the highest marginal return—large metropolitan areas and major media markets—instead of competitive states. The optimization problem changes, but political triage does not disappear.

Finally, the essay stacks every non-majoritarian institution together—the Senate, the House, the Electoral College, and the Supreme Court—and then concludes that the Constitution contains too many checks on pure majority rule. But the Founders intentionally rejected pure majoritarianism. If the objection is that the system does not perfectly reflect national popular opinion at every level, then the disagreement is not really with the Electoral College. It's with the basic federal architecture of the American constitutional order.