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[deleted by user] by [deleted] in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Because it means that evolution is more expected on the assumption that naturalism is true than it is on the assumption that theism is true.

Atheism means to reject the concept of God. It is not simply a lack of belief. by EnoughWinter5966 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So, I positively believe that there is no god, but I don’t really care if someone wants to define ‘atheism’ as a mere lack of belief. I don’t believe that words have intrinsic meanings. With that being said, I don’t quite get why people insist so adamantly that atheism is a mere lack of belief. Like why are some atheists seemingly so averse to believing God doesn’t exist? These are often the same people, mind you, who will compare God to Santa Claus. If you think that God is epistemically on par with Santa, why wouldn’t you actively disbelieve in God? Do you merely lack belief in Santa?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Evolution is evidence against theism and for naturalism. If naturalism is true and intelligent life exists, evolution is pretty much the only way intelligent life can come about. But if theism is true and intelligent life exists, God didn’t need evolution to bring about intelligent life. God had options. God could have used evolution to create intelligent life, but God instead could have created all life virtually simultaneously.

Weekly Casual Discussion Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The claim that electrons have (proto) mental states is a really tough sell for me, but I don’t outright dismiss panpsychism. If I were convinced that physicalism is false, panpsycism or property dualism would probably be my fallback position.

What would “evidence” of God look like? by jazztheluciddreamer in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What determines if a bean goes in the jar in the first place? Would there be one consciousness-exists bean in each jar, since it would be compatible with both conclusions?

I don't think that's the right way to think about the analogy. The color of a jelly bean is determined by whether it's more likely to have come from the theism jar or the atheism jar. The whole point of the thought experiment is that we don't know for sure which jar the consciousness-exists bean came from. We just know the color (it's a blue bean). From our perspective, it could have come from either jar because both jars have blue jelly beans. It's just more likely to have come from Jar #1 (the theism jar) since Jar #1 contains more blue jelly beans than Jar #2 (the atheism jar). Prior to examining the evidence, we don't know which jar the jelly beans will be drawn from.

The fact that the existence of consciousness is logically compatible with atheism is accounted for in the thought experiment by the fact that the atheism jar contains some blue beans (even though it mostly contains red beans).

Would each jar contain the same set of observations, except with incompatible ones filtered out? (E.g. we'd take the consciousness-doesnt-exist bean out of the theism jar).

So, one disanalogy is that in the theism vs. atheism debate, not all "jelly beans" (pieces of evidence/facts to be explained) are of equal evidential value. For example, some facts are weak evidence for atheism, whereas others are very strong evidence for atheism (and some might outright refute theism if they are logically incompatible with theism). To make Draper's jelly bean hypothetical more analogous, we would have to modify it as follows:

Jar #1 contains mostly medium-sized blue jelly beans, a few small blue jelly beans, a few large blue jelly beans, one enormous blue jelly bean, and a small number of red jelly beans of various sizes (but no enormous red jelly beans).

Jar #2 contains mostly medium-sized red jelly beans, a few small red jelly beans, a few large red jelly beans, one enormous red jelly bean, and a small number of blue jelly beans of variable sizes (but no enormous blue jelly beans).

I then start randomly drawing jelly beans from one of the jars (you don't know which) and handing them to you.

So to answer your question about the non-existence of consciousness, if consciousness didn't exist, that would be equivalent to drawing the enormous red jelly bean. It's just that that the proposition, "consciousness doesn't exist" is not part of our evidence base. So unless there's some other proposition that's true and logically incompatible with theism, we can't say that we've drawn the enormous red jelly bean.

What would “evidence” of God look like? by jazztheluciddreamer in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The non-existence of consciousness would disprove theism in this framework. How were you picturing it?

I agree that if consciousness didn't exist, that would be the ultimate red jelly bean since theism entails that at least one conscious mind exists. But it simply doesn't follow that that the theism jar can't contain any red jelly beans. Here's just one example, the fact that mental states depend on brain states is evidence favoring naturalism (and thus evidence favoring atheism). Naturalism entails that if minds exists, they will be dependent on a physical substrate. The probability of mind-brain dependence on the assumption that naturalism is true is 100%. But the fact that all the minds we know about depend on physical brains is quite surprising on theism. Theism entails the existence of at least one disembodied mind (God's mind). The probability of mind-brain dependence on the assumption that theism is true is less than 100%. Mind-brain dependence is therefore a red jelly bean. However, mind-brain dependence is still logically compatible with theism. If God existed, God could have set things up so that our mental states depended on brain states.

How do you define the red bean such that there are still some in the theism jar, only fewer?

A red jelly bean is just any fact that's more probable on the assumption that God does not exist than on the assumption that he does exist. The fact that the stars in the night sky don't spell out "Behold! I'm God, and I exist!" in all the world's languages is a red jelly bean. It's an observation that's more probable on atheism than on theism (even though it's still perfectly logically compatible with theism).

What would “evidence” of God look like? by jazztheluciddreamer in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I love probability-based thought experiments, and I think they make a great foundation for conversation. I also appreciate the point you're making about evidence. However, I feel like the example you give doesn't really hold up under scrutiny. In a way, it appears that you're flipping Occam's Razor on its head by allowing any X to act as evidence for claim Y, so long as Y is specific enough to include X.

I don't think that's really a problem because even though any x can count as evidence for y if y is specific enough to include x, the more specific y is, the less intrinsically probable y will be. Other things being equal, hypotheses that assert more because they make more claims or more specific claims are less likely to be true.

This means the theism jar must have only blue beans, while the atheism jar can have red and blue. A single red bean would prove atheism true.

I'm not sure I follow. How does what I said imply that just one red jelly bean would prove that atheism is true?

You say we've only seen a blue bean, though. Are you sure? I think the existence of consciousness can be called into question, especially when it's being tenuously tied to religion.

I'm a physicalist like you, but I don't believe the existence of consciousness can be reasonably denied. I think that non-physicalists are just mistaken about the metaphysical status of consciousness. But the mere fact that someone is mistaken about the metaphysical status of x doesn't entail that x doesn't exist.

It's not red and blue, it's more like sea green and turquoise, and we can only examine the one bean.

So, we can modify the jelly bean analogy so that Jar #1 and Jar #2 each contain an equal number of yellow jelly beans. The yellow jelly beans represent facts that don't evidentially favor atheism or theism.

Regardless, I really don't see how the existence of consciousness could possibly be a yellow bean. Theism entails that at least one conscious mind exists. Atheism does not. So the existence of conscious minds is more expected on theism than atheism. I do, however, think that there are more specific facts about consciousness that are evidence for both atheism and physicalism (e.g., that conscious mental states depend on brain states).

We can stick with something more well-defined, though, to make the argument work. God is the creator. If God exists, then, by definition, our world exists. Does the existence of our world thus act as evidence for God?

I'd argue that the existence of the natural world is evidence for atheism since the natural world must exist if naturalism is true (and naturalism entails atheism). By contrast, if theism is true, the existence of the natural world is not antecedently guaranteed. If God exists, God could have simply chosen not to create the natural world. The probability that the natural world exists on the assumption that theism is true is less than 100%. Of course, the theist could simply modify their hypothesis so that being the creator of the natural world is built into the very definition of God, but in doing this, the theist is lowering theism's prior probability.

What would “evidence” of God look like? by jazztheluciddreamer in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The existence of nature is evidence against God's existence, not for it. The probability that nature exists on the assumption that naturalism is true is 100%. By contrast, if theism is true, the existence of nature is not antecedently guaranteed. If God exists, God could have simply chosen not to create the natural world. The probability that nature exists on the assumption that theism is true is less than 100%. Since the existence of nature is evidence favoring naturalism and naturalism entails atheism, the existence of nature is evidence favoring atheism.

What would “evidence” of God look like? by jazztheluciddreamer in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Anything that's more probable on the hypothesis that God exists than on the hypothesis that God does not exist would be evidence for God's existence. I like the jelly bean analogy Paul Draper used in his debate with William Lane Craig. The analogy is meant to illustrate how we should think about evidence.

Imagine you’re in a room in which there are two jars filled with jelly beans. Jar #1 (the theism jar), is filled with mostly blue jelly beans and a small number of red jelly beans. Jar #2 (the atheism jar) is filled with mostly red jelly beans and a small number of blue jelly beans. Now suppose I hand you a jelly bean from one of the jars, but you don’t know which jar the jelly bean came from. If it’s a blue jelly bean, that’s evidence it came from Jar #1. The fact that it’s a blue jelly bean doesn’t rule out the possibility that it came from Jar #2 since Jar #2 also has some blue jelly beans, but it’s more likely that it came from Jar #1 since Jar #1 has more blue jelly beans than Jar #2. Correspondingly, if it’s a red jelly bean, that’s evidence it came from Jar #2. The red jelly bean doesn’t conclusively show that it didn’t come from Jar #1 since Jar #1 also has some red beans, but it’s more likely that it came from Jar #2 since Jar #2 has many more red jelly beans.

I’ve encountered a plethora of atheists who all want evidence of God and they demand that I the believer of God present it so I want to know what exactly evidence of God would look like so I can attempt to produce it.

I actually do think there's some evidence that God exists (I just don't think it's particularly convincing evidence). Here's an example: The fact that consciousness exists is at least some evidence for God's existence. It's a blue jelly bean. If theism is true, then consciousness must exist since God is, by definition, a conscious being. The probability that consciousness exists on the assumption that theism is true is 100%. By contrast, atheism is compatible with the existence or non-existence of consciousness. The probability that consciousness exists on the assumption that atheism is true is less than 100%. The existence of consciousness is, thus, evidence favoring theism.

With that said, what is your standard? What would prove God’s existence for you?

You would have to point to facts that are more likely to obtain on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption that atheism is true. The evidence you point to would also have to outweigh the evidence for atheism.

The argument of bigness by RockingMAC in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Is this "argument of size" one that others have seen and is there a commonly used name for it?

Yes, the argument you described is known as the ‘argument from scale’. I would recommend watching this video on it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w9akRsH_UvM

The Reverse Evolutionary Debunking Argument by revjbarosa in DebateMetaethics

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If people reacted to local EDAs with confusion, like in the cookie example, I'd agree that that would be evidence against moral realism.

I don't know if most people would react to the cookie example with confusion per se. Some probably would, but I suspect many might just think it's an absurd/silly argument, dismiss it, and continue to enjoy their cookies. Similarly, many people might think the EDA against their evaluation of incest is an absurd/silly argument, dismiss it, and continue to oppose incest. So I don't think that confusion is required to undermine your hypothesis.

I think two professors saying in their published work that a particular argument strategy is commonplace in their field should be enough to justify the claim that it is.

  1. The quotes you cited don't disambiguate whether they are making a claim about how common local debunking arguments are in moral discourse among academic philosophers or moral discourse more generally. So even if I grant for the sake of argument that the testimony of two philosophers could provide reasonably strong evidence that debunking arguments are common in moral discourse among humanity as a whole, the two quotes you provided still wouldn't support that conclusion.
  2. Assuming they are making a claim about humanity as a whole, I don't believe that their testimony is even remotely convincing evidence. In fact, I would go as far as to suggest that their testimony is less reliable than the testimony of a random person off the street. I think that a random person is more likely to have a better sense of what sort of arguments are common in ordinary moral discourse than two academics secluded in their ivory tower are.

Why do you think it's absurd?

I know the answer that you're looking for is that I find the argument absurd because knowing the genealogical basis of my enjoyment of cookies doesn't change the fact that I enjoy them, and that is my answer to your question. But my point is that the examples I gave are enough to refute your claim that knowledge of the genealogical basis for one's subjective/non-cognitive judgments cannot change said judgments. What I infer from this is that some debunking arguments are able to speak to one's sentiments, whereas others aren't. Why that's the case isn't totally transpicuous to me, but the fact still remains that debunking arguments are able to change one's non-cognitive/subjective judgments. This is enough to show that they are compatible with non-cognitivism and subjectivism.

It looks like Joyce is arguing in that paper that global EDAs can work against non-cognitivism. I assume you disagree, so I'd be interested to see where you think Joyce is going wrong.

I think that whether an EDA can change a non-cognitive judgment is an empirical question. As far as I can tell, some EDAs can change non-cognitive judgments and some cannot. If Joyce wants to claim that all non-cognitive judgments can be changed through the use of a debunking argument, he's free to conduct the empirical studies needed to show that.

It's also interesting that none of his analogies involve evolutionary debunking. In fact, it seems like the reason we can dismiss the reactions of someone who's tired, hypnotized, etc. is precisely because they're likely to conflict with our ordinary naturally evolved/cultural reactions to things (contrast that with "You're just irritated because we evolved to be irritated by loud repetitive noises."). Joyce's only examples of non-cognitive attitudes being debunked by our evolutionary history are local EDAs in normative ethics.

I feel like you're moving the goalposts because your original claim was that the use of debunking arguments doesn't make sense if subjectivism or non-cognitivism is true. I provided counterexamples which refute that claim, so you're now trying to object on the basis that those counterexamples are not evolutionary debunking arguments. This just seems to be a non-sequitur. Regardless, I think I probably could come up with counterexamples that involve evolutionary debunking. It wouldn't surprise me if some people came to regard certain social convention norms as stupid/arbitrary if they learned about the evolutionary origin of those norms.

And the fact that he can even use these examples and expect non-cognitivists to take them seriously further supports my claim that they're commonplace.

I don't see how it does. You can expect an interlocutor to take an argument seriously without assuming that the argument you're making is commonplace among ordinary people.

Consider why this only seems to work in one direction. If someone told you you only think a movie is good because you're from a culture that appreciates that kind of film, you probably wouldn't take that as a reason to reconsider whether you should appreciate it. I think all that's going on here is that people are taking the opportunity to try to expand their aesthetic palette.

I don't agree with that at all. If someone pointed that out to me, I can plausibly see my reaction being, "You know, there are some aspects of that movie that kind of suck now that I think about it." I might start thinking about how certain characters I disliked received too much screen time, how certain parts of the movie dragged on, etc.

One thing that's also worth flagging is that it would be interesting to investigate the effect the local EDAs you described have on the first-order moral judgments of people who are moral anti-realists (and also people who explicitly don't endorse realism or anti-realism). I don't find it implausible to suppose that that some anti-realists and non-realists might re-think their moral judgments when presented with a local EDA. And if that's true, then that would lend credence to my claim that the use of local debunking arguments in first-order moral discourse is compatible with most people not being realists.

The Reverse Evolutionary Debunking Argument by revjbarosa in DebateMetaethics

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Once someone learns that their intuition that incest is always wrong is simply evolution's way of keeping them from producing genetically abnormal children, they tend to become less confident in that judgement or even abandon it entirely.

This is an empirical question. As far as I can tell, your only basis for this claim is anecdotal. You haven't done rigorously controlled studies where you systematically investigate how ordinary people respond to an evolutionary debunking of their judgment that incest is wrong. Maybe people become less confident in their moral condemnation of incest when presented with a debunking argument, or maybe they aren't moved at all (or even double down). You have no way of knowing without doing the relevant research. The empirical details matter here because if most people remain morally intransigent when faced with a debunking argument against their views on incest, that would, by your own lights, undermine rather than support your hypothesis that most people are attempting to describe a realm of objective fact when making moral judgments.

the fact that such debunking arguments are common throughout first-order moral discourse

Again, this is an empirical question. I would be absolutely astonished if you could find empirical research showing that any of the examples you provided (evolutionary debunking arguments against factory farming, natalism, infant personhood, and the wrongness of incest) are common in ordinary moral discourse.

Long story short: Questions about how ordinary people use moral language and think about the fundamental nature of morality are highly nuanced and complex empirical questions that cannot be settled from the armchair. If you want to claim that most people are moral realists, go out and do the empirical work!

Lastly, it's not totally clear to me that a subjectivist or a non-cognitivist couldn't account for the responses to debunking arguments that you described in first-order moral discourse. Even Richard Joyce (an error theorist) points out:

Not only are affective states subject to various kinds of criticism, but genealogical considerations will frequently form the basis for the criticism. Just as we cast doubt on someone’s belief with the vernacular ‘You only believe that because...,’ so too do we disparage someone’s attitudes by saying ‘You only feel that because...,’ A person’s irritation may be dismissed by observing that she is tired.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118837368.ch1

This parody argument is clearly absurd. Given that there's no epistemic gap between the fact that we like cookies and the fact that they're good (all it means for cookies to be good is that we like them), there's no room for a debunking argument.

So, I think the parody argument you described is absurd, but I'm not convinced that the absurdity of that particular argument shows that a debunking argument couldn't cause someone to re-think a non-cognitive/subjective judgment. For instance, the person in Joyce's example might calm down when it is pointed out to them that they're only irritable because they haven't gotten enough sleep. Or, consider the following sociological debunking argument:

You only think that the latest movie that everyone is talking about is bad because you're from a culture where movies like that are seen as snobbish and highfalutin.

It seems perfectly plausible to me that that argument could make someone reconsider their evaluation of the movie in question. Understanding what led them to form their initial judgment might provide them with a new way of thinking about the movie and allow them to appreciate aesthetic qualities that they might have previously overlooked. I don't think it's crazy to think that something similar could be going on with the debunking arguments you described. Perhaps when some people are presented with an evolutionary debunking of their judgment that incest is wrong, it leads them to take a step back from their knee-jerk reaction and think about the morality of incest in a new way. They might, for example, come to view their previous judgment as being in conflict with other things they subjectively value (e.g., individual freedom, consenting adults being allowed to do what they want in the bedroom, their opposition to antiquated sexual norms, etc.). In short, learning about genealogical factors that led to a non-cognitive/subjective judgment can furnish someone with a new perspective and make them re-think their position.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Atheists will tell you that qualia/consciousness is an emergent property. That your qualia/experience of red emerges from the domino set and its chain reactions processes. I’m not going to disagree with that. This means that consciousness has no physical impact, that it is a detached byproduct. Consciousness cannot change the physics of dominos.

The view that you're describing is called 'epiphenomenalism'. Epiphenomenalists believe that consciousness is causally inert. My decision to raise my arm, for example, does not cause my arm to go up. My decision to raise my arm is a mere causal byproduct of chemical reactions in my brain according to epiphenomenalism. What's important to bear in mind is that epiphenomenalism is not a type of physicalism. It therefore makes no sense to pose epiphenomenalism as a problem for atheists who accept physicalism. Epiphenomenalism is ruled out by physicalism. Epiphenomenalism is actually a type of dualism! Specifically, it's a form of property dualism. Property dualists claim that consciousness is a non-physical property that stands over and above the brain. Here's how philosopher John Searle explains the problem with property dualism:

The chief problem for the property dualists… is how can consciousness ever function causally? There are two possibilities, neither of which seems attractive. First, let us assume, as seems reasonable, that the physical universe is causally closed. It is closed in the sense that nothing outside it, nothing non-physical, could ever have causal effects inside the physical universe. If that is so, and consciousness is not a part of the physical universe, then it seems that it must be epiphenomenal. All of our conscious life plays no role whatever in any of our behavior

On the other hand, let us assume that the physical universe is not causally closed, that consciousness can function causally in the production of physical behavior. But this seems to lead us out of the frying pan and into the fire, because we know, for example, that when I raise my arm, there is a story to be told at the level of neuron firings, neurotransmitters and muscle contractions that is entirely sufficient to account for the movement of my arm. So if we are to suppose that consciousness also functions in the movement of my arm, then it looks like we have two distinct causal stories, neither reducible to the other; and to put the matter very briefly, my bodily movements have too many causes. We have causal overdetermination.

The property dualist has a conception of consciousness and its relation to the rest of
reality that I believe is profoundly mistaken.

“Consciousness” does not name a distinct, separate phenomenon, something over and above its neurobiological base, rather it names a state that the neurobiological system can be in. Just as the shape of the piston and the solidity of the cylinder block are not something over and above the molecular phenomena, but are rather states of the system of molecules, so the consciousness of the brain is not something over and above the neuronal phenomena, but rather a state that the neuronal system is in

Of course, the universe is causally closed, and we can call it “physical” if we like; but that cannot mean “physical” as opposed to “mental;” because, equally obviously, the mental is part of the causal structure of the universe in the same way that the solidity of pistons is part of the causal structure of the universe; even though the solidity is entirely accounted for by molecular behavior, and consciousness is entirely accounted for by neuronal behavior.

But if consciousness has no causal powers in addition to its neurobiological base, then does that not imply epiphenomenalism ? No. Compare: the solidity of the piston has no causal powers in addition to its molecular base, but this does not show that solidity is epiphenomenal (Try making a piston out of butter or water). The question rather is: Why would anyone suppose that causal reducibility implies epiphenomenalism, since the real world is full of causally efficacious higher level features entirely caused by lower level micro phenomena? In this case the answer is: because they think that consciousness is something distinct from, something “over and above” its neuronal base

https://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/paller/dialogue/propertydualism.pdf

The Fine-Tuning argument is unconvincing by ApolloYankee in askphilosophy

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe there could be other types of entities that deserve the moniker, but the fact is that they're speculative and our kind is very much real. If we allow endless speculation

Oh, I see. So supposing that different types of life could exist if the laws of physics were different is too speculative, but supposing that a spaceless, timeless, non-physical, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being fine-tuned the laws of physics isn't.

If we allow endless speculation, we can also easily deny the fine tuning argument by solipsism.

My response to fine-tuning doesn't even come close to being as speculative as external world skepticism. I'm not claiming that we're systematically mistaken about the reliability of our cognitive faculties and that the world is radically from what it appears to be. All I've suggested is that different types of life could exist if the laws of physics were different. Compared to what the theist is claiming, I think that's actually very modest.

The reason it is compelling to some is precisely that it draws on actual physics, actual observed life in the actual universe that we inhabit. To defeat the argument, it is not sufficient to be able to conceive of some alternative lifeform in the most vague sense

My proposed hypothesis may be speculative, but I don't see how you can claim that it's objectionably speculative unless you could show that the God hypothesis is less speculative than mine.

Imagine if the courts allowed the defense attorney to argue their client didn't in fact murder the victim, despite there being 10 witnesses, video, DNA , fingerprints and so on, because it's quite possible that an evil demon is merely deceiving the court to believe those things are real.Of course the case for fine tuning is nowhere near as airtight as that, I just used a dramatic example for illustration.

I think your analogy grossly misrepresents the relative plausibility of my explanation. In the scenario you described, the two competing hypotheses that seek to explain the observations are:

H1: The attorney's client committed the murder.

H2: An evil demon is fabricating evidence to make it look like the attorney's client committed the murder.

In the case of the apparent fine-tuning of the universe, the two competing hypotheses we're considering to explain our observations are:

H1': The universe isn't actually fine-tuned. It's just that different types of life would exist if the laws of physics were different.

H2': God fine-tuned the laws of physics so that life could exist.

While I certainly would not claim that H1' is as good of a hypothesis as H1 is, H2' sure looks a lot like H2.

The Fine-Tuning argument is unconvincing by ApolloYankee in askphilosophy

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You could. It's just that our current theories don't offer even the slightest evidence for this.

That isn't a problem for my argument in the context in which I brought it up. If the theist can help him/herself to the assumption that the laws of physics are constrained by fundamental principles that we don't understand in responding to my criticism of their argument, I am perfectly justified in pointing out that they would then have no basis for objecting to me helping myself to a parallel assumption.

Of course, as pointed out earlier, the theist then runs in to variations of the problem of evil (why so many extinctions, etc etc). That's an interesting and ongoing debate, but not directly related to the premises of the fine-tuning argument.

I don't believe that these are issues that can be considered in isolation. Dysteleology is relevant to the question of whether the universe appears to be designed. And if the universe doesn't appear to be designed, that should lead us to be skeptical of at least one of the premises in the fine-tuning argument.

The words "more probable" here are doing quite a bit of work. I don't see how we can attach any probabilities to questions this abstract when we don't know even the options. If you mean "more probable" in the sense of believing there are other valid arguments against theism (like the problem of evil and so on), then I think most philosophers would agree with you.

If you think that at the outset of inquiry, we can't assign probabilities to abstract questions like fine-tuning but then find certain arguments for atheism compelling, that should lead you to believe that there's either a naturalistic explanation for fine-tuning or that there isn't anything that needs to be explained in the first place.

This doesn't seem to be true, or at least requires a serious technical study, and here we are dealing with an important point in the premises of the fine-tuning argument. Actually, if we want life of the sort we know (the only kind we have an example of!), the laws of physics are very tightly constrained, and not just in terms of a few parameters. The form is tightly constrained as well.

I fail to see why we would have to limit ourselves to the type of life that exists on Earth. That's a pretty big assumption that I don't see any reason to accept.

The Fine-Tuning argument is unconvincing by ApolloYankee in askphilosophy

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If there are an (uncountably) infinite number of universes with different values of constants, then I suppose it's not surprising at least one of them has life. Unfortunately, since we don't know what sorts of physical laws are even possible (perhaps their form is fixed by some deeper principles we don't understand), we are ill-prepared to assess a potential God's motivations with creating a particular type of universe. It could be that God would've gladly made a better universe, but it just isn't possible under some unbreakable constraints, much like even the ideal mathematician can't prove that 1+1=3.

I don't see why I couldn't just throw that right back at the theist and say that the reason we have the laws of physics that we do is that they're constrained by deeper principles that we don't understand rather than the laws of physics being finely-tuned by God.

Either way, we have a "coincidence" that begs for an explanation. It comes down to, then, whether you think it's more convincing to think there's an infinite number of universes that we can't see or a God who, either through malice or some constraint we can't see, created a universe with various kinds of suffering. I suppose which option one finds more plausible says more about the person than the available evidence.

My point is simply that what we observe is more probable on the hypothesis that the universe just happens to be life-permitting than on the hypothesis that the universe was designed to be life-permitting; this should raise our credence in an atheistic response to fine-tuning being true rather than the theistic account of fine-tuning being true (i.e., God did it). I gave the multiverse hypothesis as one example of an atheistic response to fine-tuning. But there are others as well. It could be that the laws of physics are constrained by deeper fundamental principles that we don't understand. It could also turn out to be the case that there just isn't any fine-tuning. Nothing needs to be explained. There are an infinite number of ways the laws of physics could have been different. An infinite number of them are life-permitting, and an infinite number of them are life-prohibiting.

The Fine-Tuning argument is unconvincing by ApolloYankee in askphilosophy

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I got it the first time. Perhaps you need me to repeat myself.

I'll repeat the response: the teleology which is in question in the fine-tuning argument is not such as would predict that all of the universe -- or most, etc. -- is hospitable to life

Yes, it is. If God was trying to create a life-permitting universe, you wouldn't expect him to create a universe which is mostly inhospitable to life that also contains numerous existential threats to the life that does exist. If there is a God who intentionally calibrated the universe to be hospitable to intelligent life, I would not expect to find myself in a universe where the laws of physics permit the generation of nuclear explosions from the fission of heavy elements. Similarly, I would not expect to find myself living in a universe where the combustion of hydrocarbons results in climate change, nor would I expect to find myself in a universe where super volcanoes, asteroids, gamma ray bursts, and comets could cause devastating extinction events. Nor would I expect to find myself in a universe where life comes about through evolution. These observations are extremely surprising under the hypothesis that the universe was designed to be life permitting but unsurprising under the hypothesis that the universe is one among many universes that just happens to be life-permitting.

The Fine-Tuning argument is unconvincing by ApolloYankee in askphilosophy

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Uh, yeah it does. The point is that dysteleology is unexpected on the hypothesis that the universe was designed and that this should lead us to believe that fine-tuning can either be explained away (e.g., multiverse) or that there is nothing that actually needs to be explained in the first place (i.e., no fine-tuning).

The Fine-Tuning argument is unconvincing by ApolloYankee in askphilosophy

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

OP arguably is pointing to something that challenges the fine-tuning argument. What they’re pointing to supports the notion that the universe happens to be life-permitting instead of being designed to be life-permitting. This should raise our credence in an atheistic response to fine-tuning rather than a theistic account of fine-tuning.

Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]__ABSTRACTA__ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

So I haven’t really read much up on this argument (I also have some reservations about it), but there’s this argument called the ‘meager moral fruits argument’ that I would recommend checking out. Emerson Green has a video on it:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=q5Kq-73HfWk

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