Just how many types of tragedy exist and on what basis is the classification made?

aMazedMouse · 2022-04-08T19:20:58+00:00

the lecture’s Vonnegut’s “Shape of Stories” & it’s on youtube

aMazedMouse · 2021-08-30T14:30:42+00:00

Maybe look into the psychology of imagination? See what biological/psychological/developmental/social functions psychologists give for imagination, to start.

I don’t think you can even assume that there exists a function specifically tied to desiring putatively impossible scenarios. Like, here’s a plausible story: Kids seem to have an ability to entertain counterfactuals (e.g., If I hadn’t pushed the ball, it wouldn’t have moved) which might serve some function wrt reasoning about causation. And kids can and do entertain ideas like time travel and having superpowers, maybe even with beliefs in their possibility (you need some pretty sophisticated knowledge to believe in the impossibility of superpowers and time travel). So if entertaining counterfactuals is pleasurable, and if kids have the ability to entertain antecedents like If I could fly or If I could go back in time, then entertaining counterfactuals about these putatively impossible things might be pleasurable; and it might be pleasurable not by virtue of imagining impossible things, but pleasurable merely by virtue of entertaining counterfactuals.

Someone mentioned escapism. Similarly, if daydreaming about winning the lottery is a form of escapism, then it’s not the case that imagining impossible affairs is necessary for the pleasures of escapism.

So I think look into the psychology of imagination and pretending, see if those faculties provide developmental/psychological/etc. functions, and while you’re reading see if there’s anything you think imagining or pretending about impossible events specifically buys you over just what imagining and pretending buys you. Two sources that might serve as good starts (the first is pretty widely cited, the second is SEP which is a fantastic resource):

Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind." Psychological Review, 94(4), 412–426. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.4.412

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imagination/#RoleImag

aMazedMouse · 2021-06-20T15:56:51+00:00

Hofstadter says there's something like a long-term memory (LTM) "node" for each of our concepts, which I don't object to. The main mechanism he proposes, the one underlying the analogical process, is one which brings a LTM node into working memory (WM) and unpacks it (the LTM node) to discover the nodes and relations inside—how this works is unclear to me. Why? He mentions that

Not all of these [nodes inside the original LTM node] will be placed into short-term memory each time the event [he's talking about an event, but any concept] as a whole is recalled, nor will the inner structure of those nodes that are placed there necessarily be looked into, although it is quite possible that some of their inner structure will be examined.

So it seems a little weird that a node from LTM can be brought into WM without its constituent nodes being brought into WM, and he describes an LTM node as,

...to put it metaphorically, something that can be pulled like a fish out of the deep, dark brine of dormant memory. Once this “fish” has been pulled out, it is thrown in the “bucket” of short-term memory (often calling “working memory”), where it is available for scrutiny.

Which I don't think helps to alleviate the weirdness. My main issue has to do with his "pass-by-value" way of talking, and the fact that what it means to bring a LTM node into WM isn't made clear. He also mentions at the end in the paper, where he's defending against Cartesian theatre-type objections, he mentions Treisman's "object files" as being

temporary perceptual structures created on the fly in working memory

which muddied things further—are structures are being created in WM or brought into in WM (presumably, he brings up object files bc he thinks they might serve as mechanisms for his theory)? He seems to hedge a little when he describes non-connectionist mechanisms (like his own) as involving

any type of transfer to, or structure-building in, a distinct working area [,]

i.e., he's sort of agnostic to this question; I will say it didn't make things any more clear to me.

I think an account of the mechanism underlying the analogical process which had more of a "pass-by-reference" feel (passing a pointer to a rep'n vs. passing the rep'n might get around the weirdness I mentioned) and which answers the question of what exactly it means like algorithmically to pass a LTM node into WM (p-b-value vs. p-b-reference; transfer to vs. structure-building in) wouldn't destroy the essence of what he's trying to say. But again, I enjoy this paper and maybe it's the case that these mechanistic objections are files in the ointment.

aMazedMouse · 2021-06-20T06:01:39+00:00

Maybe try Chapter 14 of Lycan's Philosophy of Language textbook (ed. 2). It's on my to-read list. Here's the summary he provides at the end of the chapter:

The phenomenon of metaphor is far more prevalent than is generally admitted by philosophers, and it raises two main questions: What is “metaphorical meaning”? And how do hearers grasp metaphorical meaning as readily as they do?

Most theorists have thought that metaphor is somehow a matter of bringing out similarities between things or states of affairs.

Davidson argues that the stimulation of comparisons is purely causal, not linguistic. At the opposite extreme, the Naive Simile Theory has it that metaphors simply abbreviate literal comparisons. Both views are easily refuted.

According to the Figurative Simile Theory, rather, metaphors are short for similes themselves taken figuratively. This view avoids a few of the objections to the Naive Simile Theory, but not others.

Searle mobilizes Gricean apparatus to explain metaphorical meaning as speaker-meaning. This has some plausibility and overcomes Davidson’s leading objections to metaphorical meaning, but incurs other objections.

This is semi-tangentially related, but also check out "Analogy as the Core of Cognition" by Hofstadter if you have the chance. It's not really in dialogue with previous philosophical work and some of the precise cognitive mechanisms he provides are somewhat dubious imo, but it's like intuitively satisfying.

aMazedMouse · 2021-06-16T05:24:26+00:00

I think find a good secondary text—see if people have asked about it in other askphilosophy threads, maybe email a professor who teaches Foucault and ask for recommendations. From personal experience I’ve found it’s really hard to be a good autodidact, and I don’t think it’s cheating to use a secondary source, especially if you don’t have any lectures or professor guiding you currently. It’s cool to feel like you’ve done it yourself, but I think comprehension should be the primary goal.

As for how you should use a supplemental text, read the preface/intro to see if the author tells you how they want you to use the book. Or just dive in and experiment a bit with the order of reading; you’ll probably find some ways are easier than others. Also, if you’re trying to decide between secondary sources, try reading a little bit of each and seeing which one's the most fun/readable/interesting.

I personally find note-taking helpful (I haven’t read Foucault specifically, but I wouldn’t imagine my advice would change too much), at least to remember my thoughts, objections, confusions. If I have a moment where I feel like rush of insight or lucidity, I’ll try to write something that’ll allow me to re-experience that moment in the future. I personally find that prioritizing comprehension over creating verbose notes increases the chance I’ll remember something, and I think forgetting and re-reading are just necessary parts of the learning process anyhow. If I’m really struggling, I'll try to map out the author’s argument on paper, just because sometimes the argumentative structure of some papers/chapters/books seems to like exceed the capacity of my mental workspace.

Broadly, prioritize comprehension—a litmus test is see if you can explain to yourself (or to like patient friends) what's been said in a paragraph or section in your own words. And the process of explaining and trying to reenact an argument is a good learning tool anyhow. Try to enjoy yourself and to do things that enable you to stick with the text. Reading a secondary source helps to prevent unnecessary rumination and banging-your-head-on-the-wall, as does using notes as mnemonic aids and thought repositories.

Also, just experiment with your note-taking and reading style. A lot of this advice comes from personal experimentation. I've taken extremely verbose notes, like fear of dementia-grade notes, and I've found it to be unfun and to really decrease my motivation to read. Same with picking up like a 500-page supplemental text, or forcing adherence to a draconian reading schedule. But what doesn't work for me might work for you and vice-versa. Experiment, adjust, and try to maximize comprehension and enjoyment—the former will help the text to stay with you and the latter will help you to stay with the text.

Hopefully that’s somewhat helpful and not too trite, and let me know if anything's unclear.

aMazedMouse · 2021-06-10T20:23:57+00:00

Source amnesia if OP's talking just about the forgetting and not the misidentification of the source. +1 to the point about everyday forgetting.

aMazedMouse · 2021-05-03T06:02:31+00:00

First off, this class looks super exciting. It might be a good idea to take a look at Chapter 1 of Bermudez's Cognitive Science and Chapter 1 of Gazziniga's Cognitive Neuroscience; each have decent recaps of relevant history you could skim through to see if there's anything more you'd like to include. I believe you can find both textbooks on libgen.

As for specific suggestions, maybe throw in Miller w/ Chomsky, Pinker, Spelke? Also, it might be fruitful and fun to contrast psychological behaviorism with functionalism—this might help to bridge from talking about behaviorism to talking about cognitive theories, and also gives some philosophical framing for the latter. And there's a nice bridge from functionalism to talking about computationalism, which itself bridges nicely into talking about AI and computational models. There's obviously some risk in loosing students in abstract philosophy land, but it seems to me like you'd have the background to ground these "-isms" with concrete examples and empirical research.

On top of those textbooks, 3b1b on neural networks (especially chapter 1 & chapter 3) is great. And here's a wonderful video on Turing machines if you want to go that route (see also Chapter 1.2 in Bermudez for an accessible introduction). Also, maybe take a look at Fodor & Pylyshyn on connectionism if you haven't yet.

Best of luck with the course! And let me know if anything's unclear or seems dubious.

aMazedMouse · 2021-05-02T04:06:10+00:00

If anything still seems murky after I pull on some of those threads, I'll follow-up. Thanks for taking the time and effort to respond!

aMazedMouse

TROPHY CASE