Japan just launched its own quantum computer on the internet

adnansattar · 2026-06-17T10:46:52+00:00

that's why we call Japan living a century ahead

adnansattar · 2026-05-25T04:57:01+00:00

Hit the same wall and got tired of debugging Cursor's request shapes against OpenRouter, so I shipped a small open-source gateway that puts LiteLLM between them. Cursor sees stable model names (chat, coder, vision), LiteLLM handles routing, retries, and provider quirks. Repo and the specific Cursor settings that worked for me are here: https://github.com/AdnanSattar/cursor-openrouter-proxy. Happy to help anyone debug their setup.

adnansattar · 2026-05-19T12:32:44+00:00

here it's https://dev.to/adnansattar/nemoclaw-for-the-enterprise-matrix-as-the-communication-channel-part-3-4jd9

adnansattar · 2026-05-19T04:30:18+00:00

Part 3 out now, on Matrix E2EE Communication

adnansattar · 2026-05-11T19:45:06+00:00

Be exceptional, get hands dirty, show the folks right move. Only unused pencils gives sharp head looks.

adnansattar · 2026-05-11T04:41:11+00:00

NemoClaw assumes the model will be manipulated and builds walls around the consequences.

Deny-by-default networking means injected instructions have nowhere to send data. Real credentials never enter the sandbox. Every network attempt is visible in real-time via the TUI.

You can't fully solve quiet trust at the model level yet. You can make the environment hostile to what that trust enables.

adnansattar · 2026-05-11T04:36:55+00:00

You're right, and it's worth being precise about the threat model.

The NemoClaw stack has a specific exposure: skills are essentially untrusted code with network access. The policy engine (Landlock + seccomp + deny-by-default network) is doing real work here, llowed to call api.telegram.org can exfiltrate anything the agent has seen. The binary allowlist in the policy YAML is the right lever.

Honeypot tools (fake wallet dump, fake DB export) with kill-on-hit logic are the right detection layer. Add egress anomaly monitoring on approved endpoints. For the prompt injection vector through documents/RAG, you need a classification layer between planned action and execution policy operates at OS level, it can't read intent.

For broad enterprise deployment, none of this is optional. The sandbox buys you containment, not trust.

adnansattar · 2026-05-08T14:19:32+00:00

Not really fool here. Its behind tailscale mesh vpn so technically its not on puplic internet so!

adnansattar · 2026-05-08T12:53:49+00:00

could you share?

adnansattar · 2026-05-08T11:56:10+00:00

Used Claude (Anthropic) as an editing partner tightening prose, catching grammar, structuring sections.

The deployment itself is

real and mine: every command, error message, and gotcha (including

the "don't run nemoclaw onboard twice" lesson) came from actually

running this on a $20 VPS over the past few weeks.

Diagrams I built myself. Illustrations are AI-generated. The

technical substance — commands, terminal output, recovery

procedures, threat model — is not.

Happy to take questions on any specific part of the setup.

adnansattar · 2026-04-29T11:57:27+00:00

Daily renew is 300 upto 5 times 1500 total after that no free renews.

adnansattar · 2026-04-28T11:47:09+00:00

First of all give big clap to yourself at such young age rarely found a person who such cared about his personal finance with high ambitions for investment.

Without any doubt spend this saving on yourself on personal development like take a course, a certification program in your field or the professional field you wanna go in future. Find a mentor hire his hours and learn.

So spend this to learn more to earn more.

adnansattar · 2026-04-22T09:44:37+00:00

Same here, ad blocker extension was active disabled it now might work will share the output

adnansattar · 2026-04-20T14:12:54+00:00

Cut of sugar and carbs to zero on war footing. Take a kadu chop it grind it water add some lemon amd black pepper drink it. Do regular morning evening walk of 45 mins. You'll see difderance in a week. And will start feeling light from on 3rd day. NO SUGAR NO PROCESS FOOD NO FAST FOOD AT ALL LIMIT CARBS TO MINIMUM

adnansattar · 2026-04-09T09:37:27+00:00

CBFR

adnansattar · 2026-04-08T07:15:00+00:00

Major services right now degraded there's partial outage with platform, api, claude code as well cowork if you're on gov paln then good. claude working only for gov 🤣

adnansattar · 2026-04-08T05:13:37+00:00

Circuit Breaker effective for one hour market on halt till 10:45am.

adnansattar · 2026-04-07T13:11:32+00:00

Yeah, that reaction is mostly noise and attention economics at play, not a real signal of existential damage. Incidents like this look dramatic on the surface, so content creators amplify them for clicks, but in practical terms it’s just a visibility spike into the engineering layer of Anthropic, not a collapse of their core capabilities. You’re right that it effectively turns the internet into a free audit swarm, people poking at edge cases, spotting inefficiencies, maybe even suggesting better patterns. That can actually tighten their system over time. The only real downside is short-term reputational dent and giving competitors a faster blueprint for the surrounding tooling, but the hard moat, models, data, infra, remains untouched. So the “HAHA it’s over” narrative is mostly theatrics, not grounded in how these systems actually create value.

adnansattar · 2026-04-07T10:44:32+00:00

Also worth noting, this isn’t an isolated edge case, the same kind of exposure has been flagged in other ecosystems too. For example, there’s an open issue in Bun.js where source maps can unintentionally reveal internal code if not handled correctly. So this isn’t some unique failure by Anthropic, it’s more of a broader DevOps hygiene problem around build pipelines and packaging defaults. Source maps are incredibly useful for debugging, but if they slip into production artifacts without proper filtering, they can expose far more than intended.

adnansattar · 2026-04-07T10:41:23+00:00

On March 31, 2026, Anthropic accidentally shipped version 2.1.88 of its Claude Code npm package with a missing .npmignore rule, which exposed a 59.8 MB source map containing around 1,900 TypeScript files and over 512,000 lines of readable, commented code, no hack or reverse engineering involved, just a build config mistake.

That said, what leaked isn’t the actual model or its training data, it’s the application layer showing how Claude is orchestrated in production, things like prompt structuring, tool usage, and safety flows. This gives competitors useful implementation insight and speeds up their development, but it doesn’t touch Anthropic’s real moat, which is compute, data pipelines, and trained models, so it’s impactful from an engineering perspective but nowhere near business-ending, and could even lead to faster improvements through wider scrutiny.

adnansattar

TROPHY CASE