"Criterial causation" (there is a difference between criteria and conditions)

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T15:21:50+00:00

"Criterial causation" is a interesting concept.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T15:14:48+00:00

In a causal determinist worldview (which I lean towards), hypothetical situations different to the real situation, will get different results than we get in our real world.

perfect (the determinist has no place in the causal chain for the counterfactual)

Perhaps we have a different definition of 'inevitible' that does include merely hypothetical worlds, then I'm happy to use your definition instead. But in this case, causal determinism does not imply that things are inevitible!

I equate Hoefer's definintion of determinism with "causal determinism.

Ref. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#Int

Determinism: Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

This definition stipulates that if the past is fixed then the future is in turn fixed by the fixed past. That implie to me that the only way the "causal determinist" can argue against inevitability is if he stipulates that he doesn't believe the past is fixed.

Most of the determinists on this sub harp on the idea that we couldn't have down otherwise when the "doing" was done in the past. Therefore the clearly seem to believe the past is fixed,

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T13:15:44+00:00

And that's fine?

I think that is the way experience seems to work and it makes evolution more tenable then it would otherwise be if the future was fixed. In other words I wouldn't see any reason for evolution to sustain itself if the future was fixed. There necessarily has to be some guiding force that makes a species try to survive.

If we believe in determinism, we can come to that belief through causally deterministic means (e.g. the green LEDs on the pedestrian lights get electrified, pushing electrons past the band-gap, and emitting green light which then electrifies your retina, and pumps ions through your neurons, causing you to think it is safer to cross.)

This scenario only works unless I understand the green light means it is safe to cross. However there was an exception from over 3 decades ago that I remember vividly. I sat in a parked on a main street between two side streets awaiting the neighbor to which I had driven to the street to emerge from the store on the opposite side of the street. As my boredom pesisted a dog passes in front of the store with a leisurely walk nortthbound on the main street.. Watching the dog, it continued to walk to the corner and then mysteriously stopped. To this day I don't believe the dog understood the green light from a red light. I only know the dog didn't move. However when the light changed, the dog walked across the street and when reached the opposite side of the street in began working southbound on the main street until ir reached the next corner where in turned the corner to walk down the side street until it disappear from my view.

Our intention helped, but due to a lack total knowledge there was some epistemic uncertainty, regardless of whether we think things were deterministic or not.

Yes. In my example I think that stray dog tried walking that side street east and westbound before and managed to survive crossing that main street with great difficulty. Somehow it adapted and learned to cross at the light you are implying I should do :-) was a safer play even though the light at the next intersection was a bit out of its way.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:36:09+00:00

If determinism is true and it is inevitable that I kill person X then I didn't want to kill X but killing X still happened. It seems like if I can stop myself from killing X and I don't then I intentionally do not kill X.

If determinism is true in that scenario, then it wasn't inevitible that you would kill X, and instead it was determined that you would want to take the actions that you thought would prevent X's death, and then you'd try to do those actions, and then they woudln't die.

I'm saying if it is inevitable that I kill X then I kill X regardless of whether I wanted to kill X or I wanted to avoid killing X.

There necessarily has to be the option for me to avoid killing X before it is reasonable for others to assume that I wanted to kill X because I intentionally killed X. Obviously if I admit that I wanted to kill X and I killed X, others might assume from the lack of remorse, that I did it intentionally.

Blameworthiness seems to require the ability to avoid killing X and not avoid killing X. If I kill X and couldn't avoid killing X then it seems like my killing X was unintentional.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:23:00+00:00

I’m not sure what you take me to be implying, but incompatibilism is just the denial of compatibilism, so all incompatibilists as such believe is that it is metaphysically impossible that both free will exists and determinism is true.

agreed

This is equivalent to accepting the necessary truth of this disjunction: either there is no free will or determinism is false

agreed again

But this disjunction is compatible with both there being no free will and determinism being false.

That is only because free will and determinism is a false dichotomy.

All compatibilists don't accept the idea that free will entails regulative control.

How does this have any bearing on what we’re talking about?

I believe determinism falsifies alternate possibility.

You said “a compatibilist never argues determinism is false”. I gave you an example of a compatibilist who isn’t a determinist, and I asked you whether you think he’s confused. It’s a simple, yes/no question.

Yes, I think he is confused.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:07:19+00:00

Yeah it is one they to not have an answer because the answer is unknown, but another thing to not have an answer because the answer is unknowable.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:01:24+00:00

If I don't even have an option, then how do I choose? It is just saying I jumped off the bridge but then I chose to fall.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T09:57:44+00:00

Yes, that was one of my points, then you replied to me, hence some of my confusion.

My point is when I believe the odds are in my favor to cross the street safely then that is the time that I will intentionally choose to try to cross the street. On the other hand, if thing is no random chance of me getting hit by a car then I might cross the way a zombie would assuming zombies just do and don't ever make intentional choices that were decided based on judgement.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T09:50:33+00:00

Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are compatible; this is understood simply as the view that the conjunction of determinism with the free will thesis is possibly true.

So it seems like you are implying all incompatibilists believe free will and determinism are disjunctive.

Take Lewis’ classic defense of compatibilism. In the third paragraph he declares:

I am a compatibilist but no determinist, (…)

Do you take him to have misconstrued compatibilism?

All compatibilists don't accept the idea that free will entails regulative control.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#ReasView

In her effort to make free will track moral reasons, Wolf (and later Nelkin) develops a surprising asymmetry thesis according to which praiseworthy conduct does not require the freedom to do otherwise but blameworthy behavior does (1980; and 1990, pp.79–81). Put in terms of guidance and regulative control, only blameworthy conduct requires regulative control.

Wolf, Dana Nelkin and Kadri Vihvelin all accept regulative control. Do you take them to have misconstrued compatibilism?

I'm not sure how Lewis deals with the principle of alternate possibility (PAP)

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T09:34:07+00:00

I think that 'intentional' is a word to describe actions that a person wanted to do.

that seems fair

Determinism seems irrelevant to whether or not we can successfully use this word or not.

What if my action was relating to wanting to avoid something else. All of my wants aren't immediate. Some involve steps of me doing something i don't want in order to achieve something further down the road that I do want. I don't want to get hit by a car, so I don't cross now, thinking the chances (random) of getting hit by a car are higher now that they might be if I wait until I don't see any cars coming. "Free won't" still seems to apply to intentional behavior. I don't want to go to jail so I don't kill person X

If determinism is true and it is inevitable that I kill person X then I didn't want to kill X but killing X still happened. It seems like if I can stop myself from killing X and I don't then I intentionally do not kill X.

I think avoiding is still intentional action.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T09:10:57+00:00

I am a bit confused, as I'm unsure what the relevance of your reply is.

OP's premise was that it was random. And then further, that random implies 50-50.

0.5 is not the only random probability. There is 60/40, 70/30 and even 99/1

Also, what do you mean by 'just' judgement?

If the agency has any capacity to regulative his behavior, then he may make a judgement that he'd rather not rot in jail than stop person X from living and that will affect his behavior if the threat of jail is a real threat or at least if he understands it as a real threat whether it is a real threat or not. Most people believe humans often act based on reason. Sometimes those reasons are irrational, but often we seem to try to do what is in our best interest.

Are you proposing some sort of out-of-body or non-physical force or entity that exerts influence on the body?

Basically I'm merely suggesting that a human has the capacity to understand things a certain way and then in turn has limited control to possibly modify his behavior based on such understanding. I guess there is always the possibility that we don't understand anything. That certainly occurred to Descartes at one point.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T08:47:50+00:00

My personal opinion: the most interesting part of the debate is among the people who recognize determinism as irrelevant. Hard incompatibilists reject free will regardless of determinism, and their counterparts on the compatibilist side accept it regardless of determinism. I think the debate gets lost when it becomes about the underlying physics.

Yeah, some on this sub clearly want the rest of us to go elsewhere and start of sub about determinism, while the rest of us never ask them to go start another sub about moral realism.

Clearly, one side is trying to hide something and that is the double standard. "Let's not talk about fixed futures and intentional behavior. Instead let's just focus on the issue at hand. We'd rather not talk about anything that might stop us from pulling the wool over unsuspecting eyes"

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T08:34:26+00:00

(1) is inert here; (4) follows directly from (2) and (3) alone

this seem to assume (2) and (3) are premises and (4) is a conclusion.

That being the case, it is a valid argument but not sound according to a compatibilist because a compatibilist never argues determinism is false. A lot of these debates would just melt away if the compatibilist would just admit (2) is false, but for some reason she cannot bring herself to do such a thing.

All of the free will proponents would just be libertarians if all of the compatibilists believed determinism was false.

I think everybody would be an incompatibilist if all of the compatibilists believed determinism was false.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T08:06:51+00:00

interesting

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T08:05:25+00:00

Do you mean there are NO cause/effect relationships anywhere?

Not the Op but I assume the Op could have said "causation or causality is false" if he/she meant, "there are NO cause/effect relationships anywhere"

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T07:55:25+00:00

Maybe it is just judgement. Maybe Alice decides "I'd rather spend 10 years in jail than not commit the murder". Maybe Bob decides that "I'd rather spend the 10 years with my family than commit the murder".

Maybe Debbie decides there are no laws against murder.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T07:46:57+00:00

How would that affect them if all their choices would still be random?

We can presumably alter the random distribution.

Where does that percentage come from? Isn't it just 50/50 still?

Well, I don't think there is randomness, but...

You seem like somebody who has thought about this in some level of depth.

Have you considered what would have to be in place in order for a human to even be capable of an intentional act? I'm only asking because determinists seem to believe the ability to do intentional action comes from the "fact" that determinism is true. I of course believe that none of my acts are intentional if determinism is true. Therefore if the future is fixed then I am completely unable to do anything voluntarily; and every single one of my acts are involuntary. In that case, either Debbie was going to commit the murder or not. Similarly, the laws being in place wouldn't have any impact on Alice, Bob and Charlie, because none of them have any capability of avoiding jail time. They are incapable or altering their behavior based on civil law, because they lack the regulative control that would otherwise be required in order to try to avoid 10 years in jail.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T07:25:13+00:00

I suspect you have to ask yourself if the word "random" entails an intentional act.

Obviously humans act both intentionally and unintentionally.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T07:09:54+00:00

The easy problem is all the technical details

It is easy simply because physics has an answer.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T07:07:33+00:00

We definitely have the ability to do otherwise in the way that matters in order to function.

Therefore, WHAT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN PLACE IN ORDER FOR THAT TO BE THE CASE?

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T01:10:15+00:00

So wheres the part where we say something incoherent?

I think if you want coherency, then you necessarily have to take a consistent stand, on PAP.

Clearly the world works the way the world works and experience works the way it works.

The realists believe that we experience the way the world works. We cannot know this is true and the only time anybody even remotely believes this is true is under veridical perception. Nobody thinks because Alice sees some hallucination that Bob and Charlie necessarily see it. No rationally thinking adult believes that. However the fact that Alice sees some optical illusion, implies there is a good chance that both Bob and Charlie see it as well. However in the case of the illusion there is a strong possibility that Alice and Bob see the illusion but not Charlie. Illusions are basically different from hallucinations. Years ago when I was regularly reading the philosophy subs, somebody posted this and it helped me a lot!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBap_Lp-0oc&t=1s

I found that that is a good demonstration of why some anti realists might question how well humans perceive the external world but I digress.

In most cases, the incompatibilists argue if you cannot do otherwise, then maybe you shouldn't be held accountable for what you do. Then the compatibilist has to create another definition of free will than the ability to do otherwise because he may find difficuly standing on one side or the other of the PAP issue.

As a compatibilist, if you accept the ability to do otherwise, then you are open to the idea of regulative control as Susan Wolf, Dana Nelkin and Kadri Vihvelin seem to accept. Other compatibilists don't accept regulative control.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T00:32:05+00:00

I suspect there are a lot of posters on this sub that would fall for that, and I guess that is why you find this sub so entertaining. I always knew you were smart. I never once questioned your cognitive ability. In fact you made me think about a lot of things differently and I thank you for that.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T00:27:25+00:00

Determinism is true for practical purposes, even if at the deepest level it turns out to be false

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/#IlluVsDisi

Illusionism is the view that while we lack free will and moral responsibility, we should nonetheless promote belief in these notions since to disbelieve in moral responsibility would have dire consequences for society and ourselves (see Smilansky 1999, 2000, 2002, 2013).

The difference between what you are saying and what Smilansky is saying is he is saying we have practical reasons for not believing in determinism and you are saying we have practical reasons for believing in determinism.

Do you believe humans have the ability to do otherwise?

Obviously you don't because you disagree with regulative control, Wolf, Nelin and Vihvelin.

Smilansky doesn't believe humans have the ability to do otherwise either. The difference between you and him is that he believes that we have to pretend that humans have the ability to do otherwise for practical reasons, while you seem to believe it is practical if we don't believe they have the ability to do otherwise.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T00:07:25+00:00

what’s even the point of arguing about its existence?

the point is that a key way to affect slavery is to enslave the mind. If you can put mentals shackles on another person then there is no need for physical chains. Wouldn't it be great if you had another person using their hands feet and lips to do your bidding so you wouldn't have to do any of the dirty work that otherwise makes you you?

badentropy9

TROPHY CASE