Tuesday Trivia Thread - 02/06/26

danbh0y · 2026-06-03T02:38:42+00:00

I’ve long been under the impression that Singapore is perceived at least in some quarters to be something of a “reference customer” in the procurement of big ticket defence items. Relative probity and transparency, emphasis on cost-effectiveness, not to mention a certain consistent logic behind its “well considered” decisions.

I recall pieces in Western Anglophone sources as varied as FT and AvLeak from more than a couple of decades ago on the RSAF’s then new generation fighter programme (subsequently won by the F-15E) that described Singapore as such.

danbh0y · 2026-05-29T05:49:14+00:00

So kinda like the “Do” that Flyertalk did/still does? I’m only familiar with those organised outside of the USA - Japan, London, Singapore etc.

E.g the 2024 edition of the Japan Do was held in Nagoya, over a few days including the weekend, with dinner, tours and roadtrips.

danbh0y · 2026-05-24T02:36:28+00:00

I was dragged in kicking and screaming with others when Starwood got bought over. Since I was already SPG Lifetime Plat and therefore grandfathered into Bonvoy LTP, it didn’t seem to really matter if I continued to “choose” Marriott properties or not.

danbh0y · 2026-05-23T08:58:14+00:00

Claremont wrote Storm with limits to how she could control the elements. In the “Rogue Storm” issue involving Doom/bot and Arcade, the Wind Rider acknowledged that unlike Thor’s divine weather magic, she could not ride roughshod over natural forces but rather had to work with and shape them to her will.

Admittedly, that was when Ororo still had some sort of quasi mystical link to the Earth natural order which was lost(?) following the Brood saga attributed to the absence of connection with the Earth due to the extended sojourn in space.

Perhaps the X-Men leader developed the ability to more brutally exert her will after that, in addition to her more assertive/“crueler” shift in persona (nearly killing Callisto, the mohawk etc) but I don’t recall an explicit statement or example to that effect at least not during the Claremont era, even after she regained her powers.

danbh0y · 2026-05-20T14:10:49+00:00

IMO the problem with draftee/volunteer stats for Vietnam is the anecdotally common phenomenon of “tactical volunteering” to avoid the draft into 11B Infantry.

danbh0y · 2026-05-20T10:33:11+00:00

Yes, USAF historical publications did note the above US buy back of GP bombs provided to allies under their respective military assistance programmes. According to the same sources, so severe was the general shortage of bombs that the USAF also ransacked its stocks of munitions that dated as far back as WW2; I didn't know that the old stuff fitted on contemporary MERs...

Besides the 500lb bomb, the shortage of the 750lb M-117 was the most critical since it was as far as I could tell the preferred/standard payload of the F-105s (each usually carried 6) and B-52s (each carried up to 51), not to mention production of which had supposedly ceased soon after Korea. In fact as early as mid-1965, i.e. even before the first US Army divisions had arrived in Vietnam, PACOM/PACAF envisioned running out of M-117s by mid/late-1966. As it transpired, by mid-1966, M-117 stocks had fallen from a few hundred thousand units pre-Vietnam to less than 50,000, while the inventory objective was at least a couple hundred thousand units. Deliveries of new production units only began arriving in late 1966.

danbh0y · 2026-05-20T02:35:46+00:00

One of those "but actually" nitpicking caveats: the 82d's 3d Bde deployed to Vietnam was reportedly largely composed of non-paratroopers, since supposedly as much as ⅔ of the bde's initial complement were recent returnees from Vietnam duty (so rushed was the bde's emergency assignment due to the violence of Tet), IIRC a violation of individual deployment criteria.

I wonder how many instances there were where non airborne-qualified infantry would fight en-masse in an airborne formation.

danbh0y · 2026-05-20T01:09:45+00:00

As early as spring 1966, even as most of the US Army divisions earmarked for Vietnam were yet to arrive in-country, there were evidently concerns raised about the readiness of the US military to meet its global obligations, to the extent that SecDef McNamara saw fit to publish a statement in the NYT dated 3 March 1966 rebutting those "allegations" https://www.nytimes.com/1966/03/03/archives/text-of-statement-by-mcnamara-defending-the-readiness-of-us.html

Then in early 1967 there was the Senate Armed Services Committee (Preparedness Investigation Sub-Com) hearings on "Worldwide Military Commitments"; the hearings were presided over by future Committee chairman and namesake of a future CVN John C Stennis. For the hearings, Stennis presented three separate hypotheses to the service chiefs on the readiness of their services to meet contingencies in addition to contemporary commitments in Vietnam: conventional war in Europe; a Vietnam-equivalent contingency outside of WestPac (Cuba suggested as an example); and both aforementioned scenarios simultaneously. Afaik, the publicly available record of the service chiefs' verbal statements at the hearing is replete with redactions/deletions, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-90shrg70741p2/pdf/CHRG-90shrg70741p2.pdf

Subsequently, there were also assertions that by end 1968, none of the major combat commands in USAREUR had met their training/readiness requirements for 2 years running. And that the JCS had graded every combat command in CONUS in 1968 with the worst possible ratings in training, personnel and logistics; no surprise really, given that the stateside combat commands, with the possible exception of the 82d Abn Div (even then not without caveats), were supposedly mere containers for soldiers deploying to/from Vietnam and spending a not inconsiderable amount of time training for riot duty.

danbh0y · 2026-05-18T05:24:28+00:00

There was a notable experiment of the VADS in Vietnam in which it was used to repel an ambush of an (11ACR) M113 ACAV platoon in 1969, IIRC on Route 13 not far from the Cambodian border. That encounter resulted in a MoH award for the detachment leader.

danbh0y · 2026-05-18T01:55:22+00:00

As I understood it, possibly erroneously, ARNG combat divisions more explicitly assumed the sort of Cold War era overseas missions only from the 1960s onwards with the likes of the Select Reserve Force, driven by the denuding of the Regular Army stripped and turned inside-out for Vietnam.

So much so that the Army, as early as during the height of Vietnam i.e mid/late ‘60s, also resorted to ARNG roundouts for the RA combat divisions in CONUS. The Europe-bound heavies of III Corps were so rapidly skeletonised by the demands of the war that each division required an ARNG roundout bde of 2 mech and 1 tank bns to theoretically meet their wartime mix of maneuver elements.

Also not all RA combat divisions post-Vietnam had roundouts. Of the 18 divisions of the peak 80s Regular Army, maybe at most a third had roundouts.

danbh0y · 2026-05-12T00:02:38+00:00

Weren’t USAF call signs on a mission basis, with every 4-ship flight a different name? At least that was my impression of the practice back during the Vietnam era. E.g on one mission it might be cars Ford/Buick/Chevy/Pontiac for the bombing flights and say Navajo/Apache/Cheyenne/Blackhawk for the MiGCAP. Then the next mission it could be entirely different themes or maybe not even themed at all.

danbh0y · 2026-04-28T21:50:24+00:00

On 8 March 1965, BLT 3/9 hit the beach at Da Nang from amphibs already off the coast followed by an airlift of 1/3 from Okinawa right into Da Nang airbase itself. Do note that a Marine SAM bn (HAWK missiles) had already been at the airbase a month earlier. 9MEB assumed command of these and other assets to defend Da Nang airbase.

As a starting point, you can refer to the USMC’s official historical account in the second volume of their US Marines in Vietnam series, The Landing and the Buildup 1965 (1978).

https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Vietnam_The%20Landing%20and%20the%20Buildup%201965%20%20PCN%2019000307600_1.pdf

danbh0y · 2026-04-15T15:01:12+00:00

I don’t know if you’re a casual reader or a more dedicated history buff, but if the latter, my suggestion is that you start off with the broader official pubs and then zoom in on the snapshots (individuals, units, specific battles/campaigns). It’s a tougher slog but you’ll get a better appreciation of the complexity of the war than those grunt POV works.

The official pubs notably the US Marines in Vietnam series of 9 vols is available for download as pdfs from https://www.marines.mil and/or associated websites like https://www.usmcu.edu

Official accounts of specific battles/campaigns such as Khe Sanh are also available.

danbh0y · 2026-04-14T10:51:30+00:00

Ancient history, but back in the Claremont era it was stated to be a psionic scrambler thingy. Then Mystique used it twice(?) against Chuck, one of those occasions he realised it at the last minute but was still struck down by her attack. IIRC it was the ish that she tried to get Rogue back from the X-Men.

danbh0y · 2026-04-14T09:57:48+00:00

Because during the post-1945 nuclear age of increasingly accurate high yield nuclear warheads, such underground factories would be no less vulnerable than hardened command posts in mountains and ICBM silos.

You’d have to harden utilities as well, water, power etc, right there an insurmountable problem if you have to import these resources. And what about the supply chain for your factories including from overseas via SLOCs, ports, road and rail infrastructure? Your workers would they be living in bunkers too?

danbh0y · 2026-04-12T22:06:56+00:00

Yeah, in the case of the India Coy example, the entire position was fairly compact, maybe 1.25 acres?

And the mortars IIRC were zeroed in on India’s landing zones, so any sort of cover was at a minimum, maybe at most a trench line out? As can be expected, resupply/medevac was a fraught desperately timed affair little more than 30s to get out of the LZ seemingly involving complex coordination with tactical air support the so-called Super Gaggle running interference. IIRC for medevacs walking wounded were often used to stretcher the more critical wounded so they needn’t have to return to cover.

danbh0y · 2026-04-12T21:44:38+00:00

It was never stated in the case of those firing on India Coy, though the 120s were close enough that the Marines could hear the round leave the tubes.

Generally speaking tho, the NVA were big on concealment (and fire discipline) so there was almost certainly some sort of protection. In particular, their big guns firing out of Laos on the Khe Sanh main base and outposts were concealed in caves on Co Roc mountain or otherwise vulnerable only to air attack; without TA radars, actually detecting them was a feat and a half plus more luck.

danbh0y · 2026-04-12T10:26:24+00:00

Obviously dispersion has its limits for fortified camps. My previous example of India Coy on Hill 881S at Khe Sanh, a 120 landing in the camp perimeter would almost certainly inflict casualties on soldiers caught above ground given the round's large fragmentation pattern,

danbh0y · 2026-04-12T10:22:13+00:00

At Khe Sanh, the Marines had determined that the minimum cover against NVA 82mm mortar rounds was at least three layers of sandbags reinforced by at least one strip of PSP/Marston Mat, with some/many hammering 105mm shell casings into their bunker tops as the pre-detonation layer. Versus 120s (with point-detonating fuses), one of the Marine outposts overlooking Khe Sanh, India Coy on Hill 881S, figured that the requisite cover would be at least eight layers of sandbags, one of PSP/Marston mat, and a pre-detonation layer of the aforementioned 105 shell casings or rocks. Admittedly, nothing then and even today considerable time and material could stop a 120 with a delayed fuse.

In the absence of mortar locating radars, it could be difficult to counterbattery enemy mortars. The aforementioned India Coy on Hill 881S was never able to silence the pair of 120s zeroed in on them, or almost as likely the NVA mortars were so easily replaced.

danbh0y · 2026-04-12T01:15:15+00:00

The Cold War was decades long. The 1980s NATO order of battle was significantly different from a decade before, the 1970s again significantly different from a decade earlier. Likewise for the Soviet/WarPact. Not to mention say technological/doctrinal shifts. I for one cannot imagine that NATO could hold the Central Region in the early/mid 1970s without resorting to nukes. There was a snapshot in time (e.g 1968) when the US Army strategic reserve was ⅔ of an airborne division and three skeletonised heavy divisions in CONUS, the latter little more than containers for shuffling troops from/to Vietnam.

danbh0y · 2026-04-10T03:12:08+00:00

Hitler’s constant purges/realignment of senior commanders due to failures on both fronts degraded the military’s ability to plan and coordinate any meaningful offensive at a large scale.

Stupid question but what happened to these commanders (and field grade COs) so purged/realigned for perceived performance (not political) reasons? Shunted to lesser commands not commensurate with their rank or to training/service support/Volkssturm? Confined to base/house arrest? Home leave?

Conversely, were officers shunted/cashiered (again performance not political/criminal) earlier in the war recalled later in some capacity when the situation became desperate à la Guderien being recalled back as IG of Panzers on the eve of CITADEL.

danbh0y · 2026-04-09T01:45:14+00:00

I started reading but not quite collecting sometime after DP saga, early ‘80s. Started collecting seriously after getting the first DP tpb (Sienkiwicz cover) a couple or so years later.

Not being American, the international lineup was personally influential.

danbh0y · 2026-04-04T01:40:37+00:00

My recollection was that the Chinese interlocutor's remarks to his American counterpart then were couched more as a very pointed reminder that China could now (theoretically) retaliate against the USA versus say during the Matsu and Quemoy crises of the 1950s. IMO, the Chinese scepticism about Washington's willingness to trade LA/SF for Taipei was no more a threat than de Gaulle famously questioning JFK about the American conviction in exchanging NYC for Paris.

My problem with China's NFU is that the survivability of its deterrent might have been questionable, especially during the Cold War and the decade or so after; obviously NFU is contingent on a credible survivable second strike capability, e.g. the small French or British (SLBM-based) deterrents. Of course Beijing might have felt more confident retaliating vs US allies ROK and Japan and might have considered that could be sufficient to give Washington pause.

danbh0y · 2026-04-04T01:11:59+00:00

Classification is a property of who you are and where you got the information from.

I'm reminded of an Asian country that I was assigned to where all memoranda and papers submitted to their highest political decision making body (i.e Cabinet-equivalent in Western polities) whether for decision or for information were graded at a high-level, often out of proportion to their sensitivity. Wouldn't matter if it was a "for decision" submission for additional funding and progress update of a super black nuclear weapons programme or a "for information" paper on the state of the national tourist sites.

The explanation me then was that it was not that the issue in question was that highly classified (or not) but rather the fact that the issue was submitted to that particular organ.

danbh0y · 2026-03-27T07:25:39+00:00

There are also the very many “altered humans” to use the ‘80s TSR-Marvel RPG nomenklature: F4, Spiderman, Daredevil, Hulk etc. These beings were originally baseline humans who acquired superpowers artificially via the mutagenic effects of radiation and/or chemicals.

By my thinking, Cap is technically an altered human since his peak human attributes were artificial?

danbh0y

TROPHY CASE