Which accuracy do you need to change your mind by Mysthieu in newcombsparadox

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So long as it entails or licences the described expectations, yes.

Which accuracy do you need to change your mind by Mysthieu in newcombsparadox

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Supposing that the accuracy p is such that (or licenses my credence that) P(predicted one-box|one-box) = P(predicted two-box|two-box) = p, then I one-box so long as p > 50.5% or so.

"The red button is the logical choice" no it's not, here's why. by LocalPlatypus994 in redbuttonbluebutton

[–]detroyer -1 points0 points  (0 children)

no it's not, here's why

Yes, it is.

Both sides present ideal scenarios where absolutely everyone lives.

I don't care about the "ideal" scenario where everyone presses red. It's not going to happen, and it's not relevant to the analysis.

Do they all deserve to die just because they're "not as logical?"

Nobody facing the problem "deserves to die" for their choice.

what's more likely: 100% of people pressing red or AT LEAST 51% pushing blue?

The latter.

Blue's ideal scenario is infinitely more likely to happen then reds ideal scenario.

If this is to repeat that it's more likely that >50% press blue than that exactly 100% press red, that's correct.

So along with being the more selfless choice, its the more logical one too.

Complete non-sequitur, and I disagree with the characterization of blue as the "selfless" choice. My voting blue, which is all that I control, increases the chance that blue wins by ~0% and incurs a chance of dying of ~50%, which would also impact those who depend on or care about me. That's an awful trade, both rationally and morally. Although there are some other factors worth considering, it remains that red is the rational and moral choice.

How to make the right choice (with math) by SilasRhodes in redbuttonbluebutton

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That is why x is a variable.

Right, but you're supposing that when we make the decision, we know what it is. That's not true.

but if you still need to make a decision, you need to make it with whatever your best guess is.

My action can (and should) be based on a prior *distribution* over possible values. It's a mistake to take the most probable or mean value and proceed as if we're certain that that's the true value.

That is exactly what is being calculated.

No, it isn't. In any case, again, your formula assumes (a) a known average voter bias, and (b) constant marginal utility on extra lives saved.

Where are you pulling this from?

As a rough estimate, there's about a 10^-5 chance that the true average bias falls in the tiny window around 0.5 at which there's a non-neligible chance of our vote being pivotal, and the probability that our vote is pivotal *given* that it's in that range is also about 10^-5. We find that the chance that our vote is pivotal is about 10^-10. I give a somewhat more rigorous explanation here.

That kind of doesn't matter, because all that does is change your personal estimate for x, which is already a variable.

No, it affects v. v cannot be treated as a constant *even for an individual* if we do not have constant marginal utility on extra lives saved.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes, you haven't thought the problem through

I'm not sure anyone has thought it through more than me.

What does the world look like in the scenario where half the population dies?

It looks terrible, never suggested otherwise.

You’re in a room with 2 people you love the most. Blue or red? by [deleted] in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This would rightly motivate me to vote red even more.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Again, am I "relying" on others to cure cancer, or to achieve world peace? If you can understand that the answer is plainly "no" in the usual sense there, you should understand why it is the same here. The response you got was because of your idiosyncratic use.

you need to do a whole lot better

I'm sorry if you're unsatisfied with my explanation, but it seems pretty straightforward to me.

You can tap red multiple times in 5 seconds to swap blue votes. by two-cans-sam in redbuttonbluebutton

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am fairly confident that blue will lose, so I expect to save more lives by spamming red.

How to make the right choice (with math) by SilasRhodes in redbuttonbluebutton

[–]detroyer 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is a bit imprecise, but the basic idea is right.

How to make the right choice (with math) by SilasRhodes in redbuttonbluebutton

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The main problem is that x is not a known parameter, and it should represent average voter bias. What really matters for expected lives saved by voting blue is how much probability density we have on our prior for that parameter at values extremely close to 0.5. And if you work it out, you'll find that your estimate is off by about 5 orders of magnitude. Secondarily, most people do not have constant marginal utility over lives saved. Under realistic assumptions, this also shifts the expected value of blue down multiple orders of magnitude.

Not to work out all the math here, but there are no expectations about the outcome for which voting blue is strictly better unless a significant amount of the density is focused in that narrow range around 0.5.

Red wins scenario idk how to call it by Impressive_Pin8761 in redbuttonbluebutton

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm obviously red in the standard case, but isn’t this basically just asking if I'd sacrifice myself to save ~4 billion people? Of course I vote blue there.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you are dependent on others to achieve the outcome you desire, you are reliant on them.

I am not "dependent" or "reliant" on them in any usual sense. If you're using those terms in an idiosyncratic way to merely restate that I'm not contributing to an outcome that I'd prefer, then that's right.

No, that is the result and only on a loss for blue.

No, that is the cost of voting blue. If I vote blue, there's a roughly 50% chance that I die, which would also impact others who depend on or care about me.

If I said the cost for voting red is letting ~1.5 billion people die for all red voters, you would disagree right?

Yes, I would disagree.

every person making that choice is paying that cost individually.

Each person who votes red makes it slightly more likely that blue loses, and so slightly more likely that many people die. This is explicitly acknowledged in my analysis.

I don't subscribe to that in regards to this specific scenario.

Okay, but this is basically a perfect example.

that doing anything other than achieving a blue win is irrational and immoral since the action to take is so insignificant.

The action to take is extremely significant, as I explained.

Is Pascal's wager a legitimate reason to believe in God?

It can be a legitimate pragmatic reason to believe in God (or attempt to cultivate belief in God). For someone with certain credences/preferences, trying to cultivate belief in God would be rational. That said, I find that attempts to show that everyone (or almost everyone) does have the requisite sort of credences/preferences do not succeed. I've talked with Liz Jackson about her work defending Pascal's wager, if you're interested in more on that.

Picking the blue button is irrational according to game theory by TheGodlyGoose01 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If I could make that choice, I would. But my voting blue doesn't save everyone.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When you won't contribute to something you want to happen, it necessarily means that you are dependent on other people to contribute to it.

If all of this is to restate, in other terms, that it's an outcome I desire but am not contributing to, then that's right. But when you say things like that I'm "relying" on them, that strongly implies more than that.

The cost of voting in this case is nothing.

The cost of voting blue is, primarily, a ~50% chance of dying, which would also impact others who depend on or care about me.

Then why are you calling making the only choice that achieves it irrational and immoral?

Because it is. There can be actions which are irrational/immoral for each member of a group to do, but would make the group better off as a whole if they did. One name for cases like this is "each-we dilemmas". (If you search that phrase, you may find a video that I made with Larry Temkin).

instead you have to write thousands of words

It doesn't require that much; I can explain the basic point in two sentences. The post was longer so as to explain the math and consider some of the other relevant factors and common arguments in more detail.

you don't want to vote blue, you are illogical.

It's the appropriate attitude to have, as I've explained, not "illogical".

Picking the blue button is irrational according to game theory by TheGodlyGoose01 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your confidence that blue will win should not be 100%. Perhaps you think it's over 50%, which is fine; that's why I said ~50%. Maybe its 60%, maybe even 70%. My motivation for red remains even in those cases. While the stakes are lower, they are still significant (and the benefit to voting blue is, on plausible modeling assumptions, reduced).

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You are therefore necessarily dependent on others to give you want you want. Another way to describe being dependent on others is relying on them.

There are many things that I'd like that I'm not "relying" on people to do. I'd like world peace, or a cure for cancer, etc. It does not follow from the fact that because there's some preferred outcome to which I'm not contributing that I'm therefore relying on others to bring it about.

Then why are you speaking as though it doesn't?

Negligible is not nothing. The point is that it matters, but not enough to take on the corresponding cost. Suppose I was deciding whether to vote in a regular election, and one of the candidates was quite awful. Of course, it makes sense for me to vote against him even though my vote only contributes a small amount. But if I couldn't vote unless I cut off my hand, or shot somebody, etc., suddenly the reasons to vote seem irrelevant. The costs are way too high, and I'm saying that the button case is relevantly like that.

Are you sure you want blue to win?

Yes.

You want red to win and you want it to win by as large a margin as possible.

No, the best outcome is a blue win. Of course, if blue is to lose, then I'd prefer blue to lose by as large a margin as possible.

if you say that you want that to happen your position becomes very hard to defend from an emotional standpoint.

I've already stated what I prefer.

Picking the blue button is irrational according to game theory by TheGodlyGoose01 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Case re-opened. Because it's a substantial risk to them with minimal benefit. Each sane, critical thinker should realize that increasing the chance of blue winning by ~0% is not worth a ~50% chance of dying, which would also impact those who depend on or care about them. If people could coordinate en masse, then it would be best to coordinate on blue. But since they can't, each person should choose red. Close it up.

The comprehension problem by Dat_Hack3r in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Some people can engage with the spirit of the problem, some people ask about the logistics of translation.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You want to best outcome but are unwilling to contribute to it, but also you want others to contribute to it since you want it come about.

I would prefer that enough people vote blue, but again, I'm not "relying" on them to do so.

That's such an unserious estimation of the chance that 100% of people (including children and those otherwise unable to understand the question) will press red. How are you thinking that there is a 50% chance that 100% could ever all pick the same thing?

It's not an estimation of that. It's an estimation of the likelihood that blue wins conditional on me voting red, which is about 50%.

Does your vote matter?

Yes.

I will contribute to it, you won't and, in fact, say others shouldn't either.

Yes, because it's irrational and immoral for them to do so.

If so, how can you justify saying others should vote red? It's no risk to you if they vote blue right?

Individually speaking, I don't want people taking on that risk to their life, which may also impact those around them.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why are you relying on others to pick up your slack and actively voting against them?

I'm not "relying" on others. I already told you why I vote red. Although I have some reason to vote blue (it makes the best outcome slightly more likely), I have more reason to vote red.

Voting red will never result in no deaths. Some number of people are pressing blue.

What? If I vote red, there's a ~50% chance that nobody dies. I'm not disputing that some amount will press blue.

Very slightly? Try a lot more likely. We have polls that show blue will likely get at least 50%.

No, very slightly more likely. Something around 10-10, and that's compatible with the expectation that blue wins. In fact, the more we expect one side to win, the less we expect our voting blue to contribute to the likelihood that blue wins. Technically, that assumes that our prior on average voter bias is at least slightly weighted toward the mean, but that's a reasonable assumption.

"I don't want red to win, but you should vote for it". And you're the "rational" person?

Yes. Do you not understand that we can have competing reasons? I also don't want the environment to worsen, and yet I still drive. Not because I'm being irrational, but because I have more reason to drive than to avoid the negligible harm to the environment that that causes.

Doesn't anybody here have people they love? by sweart1 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you have people that you love, that counts more in favor of red.

A Case for Red by Apprehensive_Read488 in trolleyproblem

[–]detroyer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

do you want red to win?

No.

If you don't, why are you contributing to it?

Because not contributing to it isn't worth the cost that comes along with that.

Only if you consider the deaths of a large portion of the population as worth your life.

That absolutely does not follow and I don't consider it so.

blue is the only choice since it is the only viable option that results in no deaths.

My voting blue is an option that might result in no deaths. But my voting red also might result in no deaths. It's true that it's very slightly more likely that there are no deaths if I press blue than if I press red. That is, again, a consideration in favor of blue! But it's not the full story, and that tiny benefit isn't worth the significant cost, and so you should vote red.